by Polybius
Dorimachus and Scopas waited until Timoxenus had a very short time of office left, and when Aratus, though elected by the Achaeans for the coming year, would not yet be in office; and then collecting a general levy of Aetolians at Rhium, and preparing means of transport, with some Cephallenian ships ready to convoy them, they got their men across to the Peloponnese, and led them against Messenia. While marching through the territories of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea they pretended that they did not wish to do any injury to the Achaeans; but their forces, from their inveterate passion for plunder, could not be restrained from robbing the country; and consequently they committed outrages and acts of violence all along their line of march, till they arrived at Phigalea. Thence, by a bold and sudden movement, they entered Messenia; and without any regard for their ancient friendship and alliance with the Messenians, or for the principles of international justice common to all mankind, subordinating every consideration to their selfish greed, they set about plundering the country without resistance, the Messenians being absolutely afraid to come out to attack them.
[1] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀχαιοί, καθηκούσης αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν νόμων συνόδου κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, ἧκον εἰς Αἴγιον. συνελθόντες δ᾽ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, [2] καὶ τῶν τε Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιέων ἀπολογιζομένων τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἀδικήματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δίοδον, τῶν τε Μεσσηνίων παρόντων κατὰ πρεσβείαν καὶ δεομένων σφίσι βοηθεῖν ἀδικουμένοις καὶ παρασπονδουμένοις, [3] διακούσαντες τῶν λεγομένων, καὶ συναγανακτοῦντες μὲν τοῖς Πατρεῦσι καὶ Φαραιεῦσι, συμπάσχοντες δὲ ταῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίαις, [4] μάλιστα δὲ νομίζοντες εἶναι δεινὸν εἰ μήτε συγχωρήσαντος τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς μηδενὸς τὴν δίοδον μήτε καθάπαξ ἐπιβαλόμενοι παραιτεῖσθαι κατετόλμησαν ἐπιβῆναι στρατοπέδῳ τῆς Ἀχαΐας παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας, [5] ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις παροξυνθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις καὶ συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις: ὃ δ᾽ ἂν τοῖς συνελθοῦσι βουλευομένοις δόξῃ, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι κύριον. [6] ὁ μὲν οὖν Τιμόξενος ὁ τότ᾽ ἔθ᾽ ὑπάρχων στρατηγός, ὅσον οὔπω ληγούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ῥᾳθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαν, ἀνεδύετο τὴν ἔξοδον καὶ καθόλου τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν ὄχλων. [7] μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Κλεομένους τοῦ Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως ἔκπτωσιν, κάμνοντες μὲν τοῖς προγεγονόσι πολέμοις, πιστεύοντες δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει, πάντες ὠλιγώρησαν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ παρασκευῆς. [8] ὁ δ᾽ Ἄρατος, σχετλιάζων καὶ παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, θυμικώτερον ἐχρῆτο τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἅτε καὶ προϋπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς ἀλλοτριότητος ἐκ τῶν ἐπάνω χρόνων. [9] διὸ καὶ συνάγειν ἔσπευδε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ συμβαλεῖν πρόθυμος ἦν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. [10] τέλος δὲ πένθ᾽ ἡμέραις πρότερον τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτῷ χρόνου παραλαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ Τιμοξένου τὴν δημοσίαν σφραγῖδα, πρός τε τὰς πόλεις ἔγραφε καὶ συνῆγε τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν. [11] ὑπὲρ οὗ δοκεῖ μοι πρέπον εἶναι βραχέα προειπεῖν διὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς φύσεως.
7. This being the time, according to their laws, for the meeting of the Achaean federal assembly, the members arrived at Aegium. When the assembly met, the deputies from Patrae and Pharae made a formal statement of the injuries inflicted upon their territories during the passage of the Aetolians: an embassy from Messenia also appeared, begging for their assistance on the ground that the treatment from which they were suffering was unjust and in defiance of treaty. When these statements were heard, great indignation was felt at the wrongs of Patrae and Pharae, and great sympathy for the misfortunes of the Messenians. But it was regarded as especially outrageous that the Aetolians should have ventured to enter Achaia with an army, contrary to treaty, without obtaining or even asking for permission from any one to pass through the country. Roused to indignation by all these considerations, the assembly voted to give assistance to the Messenians: that the Strategus should summon a general levy of the Achaean arms: and that whatever was decided by this levy, when it met, should be done. Now Timoxenus, the existing Strategus, was just on the point of quitting office, and felt besides small confidence in the Achaeans, because martial exercise had been allowed to fall into neglect among them; he therefore shrank from undertaking the expedition, or from even summoning the popular levy. The fact was that, after the expulsion of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, the Peloponnesians, weary of the wars that had taken place, and trusting to the peaceful arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations. Aratus, however, indignant and incensed at the audacity of the Aetolians, was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had in fact a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he was for instantly summoning the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was all eagerness to attack the Aetolians. Eventually he took over from Timoxenus the seal of the league, five days before the proper time, and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis. But the peculiar character of this man, I think, makes it proper for me to give a brief preliminary sketch of him.
[1] Ἄρατος γὰρ ἦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τέλειος ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον: [2] καὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν καὶ διανοηθῆναι καὶ στέξαι τὸ κριθὲν δυνατός, καὶ μὴν ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς πρᾴως καὶ φίλους ἐνδήσασθαι καὶ συμμάχους προσλαβεῖν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, [3] ἔτι δὲ πράξεις, ἀπάτας, ἐπιβουλὰς συστήσασθαι κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ ταύτας ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν διὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ κακοπαθείας καὶ τόλμης, δεινότατος. [4] ἐναργῆ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων μαρτύρια καὶ πλείω μέν, ἐκφανέστατα δὲ τοῖς ἱστορηκόσι κατὰ μέρος περί τε τῆς Σικυῶνος καὶ Μαντινείας καταλήψεως καὶ περὶ τῆς Αἰτωλῶν ἐκ τῆς Πελληνέων πόλεως ἐκβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον πράξεως. [5] ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὗτος, ὅτε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουληθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις, ἄτολμος δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὄψει δ᾽ οὐ μένων τὸ δεινόν. [6] διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν βλεπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῇδέ πῃ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεί ποτ᾽ ἦν εὐχείρωτος. [7] οὕτως αἱ τῶν ἀνθρ
ώπων φύσεις οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἔχουσί τι πολυειδές, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐνεργημάτων πρὸς ἃ μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχειν, πρὸς ἃ δ᾽ ἐναντίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ περί τινα τῶν ὁμοειδῶν πολλάκις τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ συνετώτατον εἶναι καὶ βραδύτατον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τολμηρότατον καὶ δειλότατον. [8] οὐ παράδοξα ταῦτά γε, συνήθη δὲ καὶ γνώριμα τοῖς βουλομένοις συνεφιστάνειν. [9] τινὲς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς κυνηγίαις εἰσὶ τολμηροὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν θηρίων συγκαταστάσεις, οἱ δ᾽ αὐτοὶ πρὸς ὅπλα καὶ πολεμίους ἀγεννεῖς, καὶ τῆς γε πολεμικῆς χρείας τῆς κατ᾽ ἄνδρα μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν εὐχερεῖς καὶ πρακτικοί, κοινῇ δὲ καὶ μετὰ πολεμικῆς ἐπ᾽ ἴσον συντάξεως ἄπρακτοι. [10] Θετταλῶν γοῦν ἱππεῖς κατ᾽ ἴλην μὲν καὶ φαλαγγηδὸν ἀνυπόστατοι, χωρὶς δὲ παρατάξεως πρὸς καιρὸν καὶ τόπον κατ᾽ ἄνδρα κινδυνεῦσαι δύσχρηστοι καὶ βραδεῖς: Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τούτων τἀναντία. [11] Κρῆτες δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ λῃστείας καὶ κλοπὰς πολεμίων καὶ νυκτερινὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγγηδὸν ἔφοδον ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς: Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνες τἀναντία τούτων. [12] ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ διαπιστεῖν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐάν που περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐναντίας ἀποφάσεις ποιώμεθα περὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.
8. Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose: no one surpassed him in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his power of attaching friends and gaining allies: in intrigue, stratagem, and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful termination by personal endurance and courage, he was pre-eminent. Many clear instances of these qualities may be found; but none more convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea, of the expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and especially of the surprise of the Acrocorinthus. On the other hand whenever he attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger. The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked reverses sustained by him; and that in this particular department he was always easily defeated. So true is it that men’s minds, no less than their bodies, have many aspects. Not only is it the case that the same man has an aptitude for one class of activities and not for another; it often happens that in things closely analogous, the same man will be exceedingly acute and exceedingly dull, exceedingly courageous and exceedingly timid. Nor is this a paradox: it is a very ordinary fact, well known to all attentive observers. For instance you may find men who in hunting show the greatest daring in grappling with wild beasts, and yet are utter cowards in the presence of an armed enemy. Or again, in actual war some are active and skilful in single combats, who are yet quite ineffective in the ranks. For example, the Thessalian cavalry in squadron and column are irresistible, but when their order is once broken up, they have not the skill in skirmishing by which each man does whatever the time and place suggests: while, on the other hand, exactly the reverse of this is the case with the Aetolians. The Cretans, again, either by land or sea, in ambushes and piratical excursions, in deceiving the enemy, in making night attacks, and in fact in every service which involves craft and separate action, are irresistible; but for a regular front to front charge in line they have neither the courage nor firmness; and the reverse again is the case with the Achaeans and Macedonians.
I have said thus much, that my readers may not refuse me credit if I have at times to make contradictory statements about the same men and in regard to analogous employments. To return to my narrative.
[1] ἁθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν κατὰ δόγμα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν — [2] ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων παρεξέβημεν — καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων αὖθις ἐπιπορευθέντων ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ δεομένων μὴ περιιδεῖν σφᾶς οὕτω προφανῶς παρασπονδουμένους, βουλομένων δὲ καὶ τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας μετασχεῖν καὶ σπευδόντων ὁμοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιγραφῆναι, [3] περὶ μὲν τῆς συμμαχίας οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπέλεγον, οὐ φάσκοντες δυνατὸν εἶναι χωρὶς Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν συμμάχων οὐδένα προσλαβεῖν: [4] ἔτι γὰρ ἔνορκος ἔμενε πᾶσιν ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία δι᾽ Ἀντιγόνου κατὰ τοὺς Κλεομενικοὺς καιροὺς Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἠπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι, Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, Ἀκαρνᾶσι, Θετταλοῖς. [5] ἐξελεύσεσθαι δὲ καὶ βοηθήσειν αὐτοῖς ἔφασαν, ἐὰν ὅμηρα δῶσιν οἱ παραγεγονότες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν υἱεῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλιν χάριν τοῦ μὴ διαλυθήσεσθαι πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς χωρὶς τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν βουλήσεως. [6] ἐστρατοπέδευον δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐξεληλυθότες, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ὅροις, ἐφέδρων καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ συμμάχων ἔχοντες τάξιν. [7] Ἄρατος δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τὰ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους διαπράξας, ἔπεμπε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, διασαφῶν τὰ δεδογμένα καὶ παρακελευόμενος ἐπανάγειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας καὶ τῆς Ἀχαΐας μὴ ψαύειν: εἰ δὲ μή, διότι χρήσεται τοῖς ἐπιβαίνουσιν ὡς πολεμίοις. [8] Σκόπας δὲ καὶ Δωρίμαχος ἀκούσαντες τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ γνόντες ἡθροισμένους τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, ἡγοῦντο συμφέρειν σφίσι τότε τίθεσθαι τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις. [9] παραυτίκα μὲν οὖν ἐξαπέστελλον γραμματοφόρους εἴς τε Κυλλήνην καὶ πρὸς Ἀρίστωνα τὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγόν, ἀξιοῦντες κατὰ σπουδὴν αὑτοῖς ἀποστέλλειν τὰ πορθμεῖα τῆς Ἠλείας εἰς τὴν Φειάδα καλουμένην νῆσον. [10] αὐτοὶ δὲ μετὰ δύ᾽ ἡμέρας ἀνέζευξαν γέμοντες τῆς λείας, καὶ προῆγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἠλείαν. ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τῆς τῶν Ἠλείων ἀντείχοντο φιλίας Αἰτωλοὶ χάριν τοῦ διὰ τούτων ἐπιπλοκὰς λαμβάνειν πρὸς τὰς ἁρπαγὰς τὰς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ λῃστείας.
9. The men of military age having assembled in arms at Megalopolis,
in accordance with the decree of the federal assembly, the Messenian envoys once more came forward, and entreated the people not to disregard the flagrant breach of treaty from which they were suffering; and expressed their willingness to become allies of the league, and their anxiety to be enrolled among its members. The Achaean magistrates declined the offered alliance, on the ground that it was impossible to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other allies, — for the sworn alliance negotiated by Antigonus during the Cleomenic war was still in force, and included Achaia, Epirus, Phocis, Macedonia, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly; — but they said that they would march out to their relief, if the envoys there present would place their sons in Sparta, as hostages for their promise not to make terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. The Spartans among the rest were encamped on the frontier of Megalopolis, having marched out in accordance with the terms of their alliance; but they were acting rather as reserves and spectators than as active allies. Having thus settled the terms of the arrangement with the Messenians, Aratus sent a messenger to the Aetolians to inform them of the decree of the Achaean federation, and to order them to quit the territory of Messenia without entering that of Achaia, on pain of being treated as enemies if they set foot in it. When they heard the message and knew that the Achaeans were mustered in force, Scopas and Dorimachus thought it best for the present to obey. They therefore at once sent despatches to Cyllene and to the Aetolian Strategus, Ariston, begging that the transports should be sent to a place on the coast of Elis called the island of Pheia; and they themselves two days later struck camp, and laden with booty marched towards Elis. For the Aetolians always maintained a friendship with the Eleans that they might have through them an entrance for their plundering and piratical expeditions into the Peloponnese.