by Polybius
[1] ὁ δ᾽ Ἄρατος ἐπιμείνας δύ᾽ ἡμέρας, καὶ πιστεύσας εὐήθως ὅτι ποιήσονται τὴν ἐπάνοδον, καθάπερ ὑπεδείκνυσαν, τοὺς μὲν λοιποὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους διαφῆκε πάντας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, [2] τρισχιλίους δ᾽ ἔχων πεζοὺς καὶ τριακοσίους ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἅμα τῷ Ταυρίωνι στρατιώτας, προῆγε τὴν ἐπὶ Πάτρας, ἀντιπαράγειν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς προαιρούμενος. [3] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον, πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον ἀντιπαράγειν αὐτοῖς καὶ συμμένειν, τὰ μὲν διαγωνιάσαντες μὴ κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἔμβασιν ἐπίθωνται σφίσι περισπωμένοις, τὰ δὲ σπουδάζοντες συγχέαι τὸν πόλεμον, [4] τὴν μὲν λείαν ἀπέστειλαν ἐπὶ τὰ πλοῖα, συστήσαντες τοὺς ἱκανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὴν διακομιδήν, προσεντειλάμενοι τοῖς ἐκπεμπομένοις ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ Ῥίον ἀπαντᾶν, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν ποιησόμενοι τὴν ἔμβασιν, [5] αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐφήδρευον τῇ τῆς λείας ἐξαποστολῇ περιέποντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προῆγον ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ὀλυμπίας. [6] ἀκούοντες δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ταυρίωνα μετὰ τοῦ προειρημένου πλήθους περὶ τὴν Κλειτορίαν εἶναι, καὶ νομίζοντες οὐδ᾽ ὣς δυνήσεσθαι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ῥίου διάβασιν ἄνευ κινδύνου ποιήσασθαι καὶ συμπλοκῆς, [7] ἔκριναν συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν ὡς τάχιστα συμμῖξαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, ἀκμὴν ὀλίγοις οὖσι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀνυπονοήτοις, [8] ὑπολαβόντες, ἂν μὲν τρέψωνται τούτους, προκατασύραντες τὴν χώραν ἀσφαλῆ ποιήσεσθαι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ῥίου διάβασιν, ἐν ᾧ μέλλει καὶ βουλεύεται συναθροίζεσθαι πάλιν τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πλῆθος, [9] ἂν δὲ καταπλαγέντες φυγομαχῶσι καὶ μὴ βούλωνται συμβάλλειν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, ἄνευ κινδύνου ποιήσεσθαι τὴν ἀπόλυσιν, ὁπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ συμφέρειν. [10] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τοιούτοις χρησάμενοι λογισμοῖς προῆγον, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν περὶ
10. Aratus waited two days: and then, foolishly believing that the Aetolians would return by the route they had indicated, he dismissed all the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to their homes, except three thousand foot and three hundred horse and the division under Taurion, which he led to Patrae, with the view of keeping on the flank of the Aetolians. But when Dorimachus learnt that Aratus was thus watching his march, and was still under arms; partly from fear of being attacked when his forces were engaged on the embarkation, and partly with a view to confuse the enemy, he sent his booty on to the transports with a sufficient number of men to secure their passage, under orders to meet him at Rhium where he intended to embark; while he himself, after remaining for a time to superintend and protect the shipment of the booty, changed the direction of his march and advanced towards Olympia. But hearing that Taurion, with the rest of the army, was near Cleitoria; and feeling sure that in these circumstances he would not be able to effect the crossing from Rhium without danger and a struggle with the enemy; he made up his mind that it would be best for his interests to bring on an engagement with the army of Aratus as soon as possible, since it was weak in numbers and wholly unprepared for the attack. He calculated that if he could defeat this force, he could then plunder the country, and effect his crossing from Rhium in safety, while Aratus was waiting and deliberating about again convoking the Achaean levy; but if on the other hand Aratus were terrified and declined the engagement, he would then effect his departure unmolested, whenever he thought it advisable. With these views, therefore, he advanced, and pitched his camp at Methydrium in the territory of Megalopolis.
[1] Μεθύδριον τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος: οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡγεμόνες, συνέντες τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, οὕτως κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἀνοίας μὴ καταλιπεῖν. [2] ἀναστρέψαντες γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Κλειτορίας κατεστρατοπέδευσαν περὶ Καφύας. [3] τῶν δ᾽ Αἰτωλῶν ποιουμένων τὴν πορείαν ἀπὸ Μεθυδρίου παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ὀρχομενίων πόλιν, ἐξάγοντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τῷ τῶν Καφυέων πεδίῳ παρενέβαλον, πρόβλημα ποιούμενοι τὸν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ῥέοντα ποταμόν. [4] οἱ δ᾽ Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ διὰ τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας — ἦσαν γὰρ ἔτι πρὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τάφροι καὶ πλείους δύσβατοι — καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπίφασιν τῆς ἑτοιμότητος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ μὲν ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπεδειλίασαν, [5] μετὰ δὲ πολλῆς εὐταξίας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐπὶ τὸν Ὀλύγυρτον, ἀσμενίζοντες, εἰ μή τις αὐτοῖς ἐγχειροίη καὶ βιάζοιτο κινδυνεύειν. [6] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, τῆς μὲν πρωτοπορείας τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἤδη προσβαινούσης πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολάς, τῶν δ᾽ ἱππέων οὐραγούντων διὰ τοῦ πεδίου καὶ συνεγγιζόντων τῷ προσαγορευομένῳ Πρόποδι τῆς παρωρείας, ἐξαποστέλλουσι τοὺς ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, Ἐπίστρατον ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν Ἀκαρνᾶνα, καὶ συντάξαντες ἐξάπτεσθαι τῆς οὐραγίας καὶ καταπειράζειν τῶν πολεμίων. [7] καίτοι γ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἦν κινδυνευτέον, οὐ πρὸς τὴν οὐραγίαν ἐχρῆν συμπλέκεσθαι, διηνυκότων ἤδη τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς ὁμαλοὺς τόπους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν πρωτοπορείαν, εὐθέως ἐμβαλόντων εἰς τὸ πεδίον. [8] οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἀγῶνα συνέβη γενέσθαι τὸν ὅλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις καὶ πεδινοῖς τόποις, οὗ τοὺς μὲν Αἰτωλοὺς δυσχρηστοτάτους εἶναι συνέβαινε διά τε τὸν καθοπλισμὸν καὶ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν, τοὺς δ᾽ Ἀχαιοὺς εὐχρηστοτάτους καὶ δυναμικωτάτους διὰ τἀναντία τῶν προειρημένων. [9] νῦν δ᾽ ἀφέμενοι τῶν οἰκείων τόπων καὶ καιρῶν εἰς τὰ τῶν πολεμίων προτερήματα συγκατέβησαν. τοιγαροῦν ἀκόλουθον
11. But the leaders of the Achaeans, on learning the arrival of the Aetolians, adopted a course of proceeding quite unsurpassable for folly. They left the territory of Cleitor and encamped at Caphyae; but the Aetolians marching from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus, they led the Achaean troops into the plain of Caphyae, and there drew them up for battle, with the river which flows through that plain protecting their front. The difficulty
of the ground between them and their enemy, for there were besides the river a number of ditches not easily crossed, and the show of readiness on the part of the Achaeans for the engagement, caused the Aetolians to shrink from attacking according to their original purpose; but they retreated in good order to the high ground of Oligyrtus, content if only they were not attacked and forced to give battle. But Aratus, when the van of the Aetolians was already making the ascent, while the cavalry were bringing up the rear along the plain, and were approaching a place called Propus at the foot of the hills, sent out his cavalry and light-armed troops, under the command of Epistratus of Acarnania, with orders to attack and harass the enemy’s rear. Now if an engagement was necessary at all, they ought not to have attempted it with the enemy’s rear, when they had already accomplished the march through the plain, but with his van directly it had debouched upon the plain: for in this way the battle would have been wholly confined to the plain and level ground, where the peculiar nature of the Aetolian arms and general tactics would have been least effective; while the Achaeans, from precisely opposite reasons, would have been most effective and able to act. As it was, they surrendered the advantages of time and place which were in their favour, and deliberately accepted the conditions which were in favour of the enemy.
[1] τὸ τέλος ἐξέβη τοῦ κινδύνου ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς. ἐξαπτομένων γὰρ τῶν εὐζώνων τηροῦντες οἱ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἱππεῖς τὴν τάξιν ἀπεχώρουν εἰς τὴν παρώρειαν, σπεύδοντες συνάψαι τοῖς παρ᾽ αὑτῶν πεζοῖς. [2] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, οὔτε κατιδόντες καλῶς τὸ γινόμενον οὔτ᾽ ἐκλογισάμενοι δεόντως τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβησόμενον, ἅμα τῷ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἰδεῖν ὑποχωροῦντας ἐλπίσαντες αὐτοὺς φεύγειν, [3] τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν κεράτων θωρακίτας ἐξαπέστειλαν, παραγγείλαντες βοηθεῖν καὶ συνάπτειν τοῖς παρ᾽ αὑτῶν εὐζώνοις, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἐπὶ κέρας κλίναντες τὴν δύναμιν ἦγον μετὰ δρόμου καὶ σπουδῆς. [4] οἱ δὲ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἱππεῖς, διανύσαντες τὸ πεδίον, ἅμα τῷ συνάψαι τοῖς πεζοῖς αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ τὴν παρώρειαν ὑποστείλαντες ἔμενον, [5] τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς ἥθροιζον πρὸς τὰ πλάγια καὶ παρεκάλουν, ἑτοίμως πρὸς τὴν κραυγὴν ἀνατρεχόντων καὶ παραβοηθούντων ἀεὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πορείας. [6] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀξιομάχους ὑπέλαβον εἶναι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος, συστραφέντες ἐνέβαλον τοῖς προμαχομένοις τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν ἱππέων καὶ ψιλῶν. ὄντες δὲ πλείους, καὶ ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου, πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἐκινδύνευσαν, τέλος δ᾽ ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς συγκαθεστῶτας. [7] ἐν δὲ τῷ τούτους ἐγκλίναντας φεύγειν οἱ προσβοηθοῦντες θωρακῖται κατὰ πορείαν ἀτάκτως ἐπιπαραγενόμενοι καὶ σποράδην, οἱ μὲν ἀποροῦντες ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις, οἱ δὲ συμπίπτοντες ἀντίοις τοῖς φεύγουσι κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, ἀναστρέφειν ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν. [8] ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς συγκαταστάσεως ἡττηθέντας μὴ πλείους εἶναι πεντακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ φεύγοντας πλείους δισχιλίων. [9] τοῦ δὲ πράγματος αὐτοῦ διδάσκοντος τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἵποντο κατόπιν, ἐπιπολαστικῶς καὶ κατακόρως χρώμενοι τῇ κραυγῇ. [10] ποιουμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν τὴν ἀποχώρησιν πρὸς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων, ὡς μενόντων ὑπὸ ταῖς ἀσφαλείαις ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τάξεως, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐσχήμων ἐγένεθ᾽ ἡ φυγὴ καὶ σωτήριος: [11] συνθεασάμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτους λελοιπότας τὰς τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείας καὶ μακροὺς ὄντας ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ διαλελυμένους, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν εὐθέως διαρρέοντες ἀτάκτως ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐπὶ τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις, [12] οἱ δὲ συμπίπτοντες ἀντίοις τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις φαλαγγίταις οὐ προσεδέοντο τῶν πολεμίων, αὐτοὶ δὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήττοντες ἠνάγκαζον φεύγειν προτροπάδην. ἐχρῶντο δὲ τῇ φυγῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, [13] ὡς προείπομεν, ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις: ὅ τε γὰρ Ὀρχομενὸς αἵ τε Καφύαι σύνεγγυς οὖσαι πολλοὺς ὤνησαν. μὴ γὰρ τούτου συμβάντος ἅπαντες ἂν ἐκινδύνευσαν διαφθαρῆναι παραλόγως. [14] ὁ μὲν οὖν περὶ Καφύας γενόμενος κίνδυνος τοῦ
12. Naturally the result of the engagement was in harmony with such a beginning. For when the light-armed troops approached, the Aetolian cavalry retired in good order up the hill, being anxious to effect a junction with their own infantry. But Aratus, having an imperfect view of what was going on, and making a bad conjecture of what would happen next, no sooner saw the cavalry retiring, than, hoping that they were in absolute flight, he sent forward the heavy-armed troops of his two wings, with orders to join and support the advanced guard of their light-armed troops; while he himself, with his remaining forces, executed a flank movement, and led his men on at the double. But the Aetolian cavalry had now cleared the plain, and, having effected the junction with their infantry, drew up under cover of the hill; massed the infantry on their flanks; and called to them to stand by them: the infantry themselves showing great promptness in answering to their shouts, and in coming to their relief, as the several companies arrived. Thinking themselves now sufficiently strong in numbers, they closed their ranks, and charged the advanced guard of Achaean cavalry and light armed troops; and being superior in number, and having the advantage of charging from higher ground, after a long struggle, they finally turned their opponents to flight: whose flight involved that of the heavy-armed troops also which were coming to their relief. For the latter were advancing in separate detachments in loose order, and, either in dismay at what was happening, or upon meeting their flying comrades on their retreat, were compelled to follow their example: the result being that, whereas the number of those actually defeated on the field was less than five hundred, the number that fled was more than two thousand. Taught by experience what to do, the Aetolians followed behind them with round after round of loud and boisterous shouts. The Achaeans at first retreated in good order and without danger, because they were retiring upon their heavy-armed troops, whom they imagined to be in a place of safety on their original ground; but when they saw that these too had abandoned their position of safety, and were marching in a long straggling line, some of them immediately broke off from the main body and sought refuge in various towns in the neighbourhood; while others, meeting the phalanx as it was coming up to their relief, proved to be quite sufficient, without the presence of an enemy, to strike fear into it and force it into headlong flight. They directed their flight, as I said, to the towns of the neighbourhood. Orchomenus and Caphyae, which were close by, saved large numbers of them: and if this had not been the case, they would in all probability have been annihilated by this
unlooked-for catastrophe. Such was the result of the engagement at Caphyae.
[1] τον ἀπέβη τὸν τρόπον. οἱ δὲ Μεγαλοπολῖται, συνέντες τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς περὶ τὸ Μεθύδριον ἐστρατοπεδευκότας, ἧκον ἀπὸ σάλπιγγος πανδημεὶ βοηθοῦντες τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ τῆς μάχης, [2] καὶ μεθ᾽ ὧν ζώντων ἤλπισαν κινδυνεύσειν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, τούτους ἠναγκάζοντο θάπτειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τετελευτηκότας. [3] ὀρύξαντες δὲ τάφρον ἐν τῷ τῶν Καφυέων πεδίῳ, καὶ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς νεκρούς, ἐκήδευσαν μετὰ πάσης φιλοτιμίας τοὺς ἠτυχηκότας. [4] οἱ δ᾽ Αἰτωλοὶ παραδόξως δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν ποιήσαντες τὸ προτέρημα, λοιπὸν ἤδη μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας διὰ μέσης Πελοποννήσου διῄεσαν. [5] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ καταπειράσαντες μὲν τῆς Πελληνέων πόλεως, κατασύραντες δὲ τὴν Σικυωνίαν χώραν, τέλος κατὰ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν. [6] τὴν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀφορμὴν ὁ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος ἔσχεν ἐκ τούτων, τὴν δ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένου δόγματος ἁπάντων τῶν συμμάχων: [7] οἳ συνελθόντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων πόλιν ἐπεκύρωσαν τὸ διαβούλιον διαπροστατεύσαντος Φι