by Polybius
13. When the people of Megalopolis learnt that the Aetolians were at Methydrium, they came to the rescue en masse, at the summons of a trumpet, on the very day after the battle of Caphyae; and were compelled to bury the very men with whose assistance they had expected to fight the Aetolians. Having therefore dug a trench in the territory of Caphyae, and collected the corpses, they performed the funeral rites of these unhappy men with all imaginable honour. But the Aetolians, after this unlooked-for success gained by the cavalry and light-armed troops, traversed the Peloponnese from that time in complete security. In the course of their march they made an attack upon the town of Pellene, and, after ravaging the territory of Sicyon, finally quitted the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus.
This then, was the cause and occasion of the Social war: its formal beginning was the decree passed by all the allies after these events, which was confirmed by a general meeting held at Corinth, on the proposal of King Philip, who presided at the assembly.
[1] λίππου τοῦ βασιλέως. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πλῆθος μετά τινας ἡμέρας ἁθροισθὲν εἰς τὴν καθήκουσαν σύνοδον, πικρῶς διέκειτο καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν Ἄρατον, ὡς τοῦτον ὁμολογουμένως αἴτιον γεγονότα τοῦ προειρημένου συμπτώματος. [2] διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων κατηγορούντων αὐτοῦ καὶ φερόντων ἀπολογισμοὺς ἐναργεῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠγανάκτει καὶ παρωξύνετο τὸ πλῆθος. [3] ἐδόκει γὰρ πρῶτον ἁμάρτημα προφανὲς εἶναι τὸ μηδέπω τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ καθηκούσης προλαβόντα τὸν ἀλλότριον καιρὸν ἀναδέχεσθαι τοιαύτας πράξεις ἐν αἷς συνῄδει πολλάκις αὑτῷ διεσφαλμένῳ: [4] δεύτερον δὲ καὶ μεῖζον τούτου τὸ διαφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀκμὴν ἐν μέσῳ Πελοποννήσου τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἄλλως τε καὶ προδιειληφότα διότι σπεύδουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Σκόπαν καὶ Δωρίμαχον κινεῖν τὰ καθεστῶτα καὶ συνταράξαι τὸν πόλεμον: [5] τρίτον δὲ τὸ συμβαλεῖν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις οὕτω μετ᾽ ὀλίγων μηδεμιᾶς κατεπειγούσης ἀνάγκης, δυνάμενον ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις ἀποχωρῆσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τότε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εἰ τοῦτο πάντως ἡγεῖτο συμφέρειν: [6] τελευταῖον καὶ μέγιστον τὸ προθέμενον καὶ συμβαλεῖν οὕτως εἰκῇ καὶ ἀσκόπως χρήσασθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὥστε παρέντα τὰ πεδία καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁπλιτῶν χρείαν δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν εὐζώνων ταῖς παρωρείαις πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, οἷς οὐδὲν ἦν τούτου προυργιαίτερον οὐδ᾽ οἰκειότερον. [7] οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ προελθόντα τὸν Ἄρατον ἀναμνῆσαι μὲν τῶν προπεπολιτευμένων καὶ πεπραγμένων πρότερον αὑτῷ, φέρειν δ᾽ ἀπολογισμοὺς περὶ τῶν ἐγκαλουμένων ὡς οὐ γέγονεν αἴτιος τῶν συμβεβηκότων, αἰτεῖσθαι δὲ συγγνώμην, εἰ καί τι παρεώρακε κατὰ τὸν γενόμενον κίνδυνον, οἴεσθαι δὲ δεῖν καὶ καθόλου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ πράγματα μὴ πικρῶς, [8] ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνως, οὕτως ταχέως καὶ μεγαλοψύχως μετεμελήθη τὸ πλῆθος ὥστε καὶ τοῖς συνεπιτιθεμένοις αὐτῷ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων ἐπὶ πολὺ δυσαρεστῆσαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς πάντα βουλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἀράτου γνώμην. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν προτέραν ἔπεσεν ὀλυμπιάδα, [9] τὰ δ᾽ ἑξῆς εἰς τὴν τετταρακοστὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑκατόν.
14. A few days after the events just narrated the ordinary meeting of the Achaean federal assembly took place, and Aratus was bitterly denounced, publicly as well as privately, as indisputably responsible for this disaster; and the anger of the general public was still further roused and embittered by the invectives of his political opponents. It was shown to every one’s satisfaction that Aratus had been guilty of four flagrant errors. His first was that, having taken office before his predecessor’s time was legally at an end, he had availed himself of a time properly belonging to another to engage in the sort of enterprise in which he was conscious of having often failed. His second and graver error was the disbanding the Achaeans, while the Aetolians were still in the middle of the Peloponnese; especially as he had been well aware beforehand that Scopas and Dorimachus were anxious to disturb the existing settlement, and to stir up war. His third error was to engage the enemy, as he did, with such a small force, without any strong necessity; when he might have retired to the neighbouring towns and have summoned a levy of the Achaeans, and then have engaged, if he had thought that measure absolutely necessary. But his last and gravest error was that, having determined to fight, he did so in such an ill-considered manner, and managed the business with so little circumspection, as to deprive himself of the advantages of the plain and the support of his heavy-armed troops, and allow the battle to be settled by light-armed troops, and to take place on the slopes, than which nothing could have been more advantageous or convenient to the Aetolians. Such were the allegations against Aratus. He, however, came forward and reminded the assembly of his former political services and achievements; and urged in his defence that, in the matters alleged, his was not the blame for what had occurred. He begged their indulgence if he had been guilty of any oversight in the battle, and claimed that they should at any rate look at the facts without prejudice or passion. These words created such a rapid and generous change in the popular feeling, that great indignation was roused against the political opponents who attacked him; and the resolutions as to the measures to be taken in the future were passed wholly in accordance with the views of Aratus.
[1] ἦν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ταῦτα: πρεσβεύειν πρὸς Ἠπειρώτας, Βοιωτούς, Φωκέας, Ἀκαρνᾶνας, [2] Φίλιππον, καὶ διασαφεῖν τίνα τρόπον Αἰτωλοὶ παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἤδη δὶς εἰσβεβληκότες εἴησαν εἰς τὴν Ἀχαΐαν, καὶ παρακαλεῖν αὐτοὺς βοηθεῖν κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας, προσδέξασθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν, [3] τὸν δὲ στρατηγὸν ἐπιλέξαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πεζοὺς μὲν πεντακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακοσίους, καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἐὰν ἐπιβαίνωσιν Αἰτωλοὶ τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν: [4] συντάξασθαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους ὅσους δεήσοι παρ᾽ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς χρείας. δοξάντων δὲ τούτων, [5] οἱ μὲν Ἀχαιοὶ φέροντες γενναίως τὸ γεγονὸς οὔτε τοὺς Μεσσηνίους ἐγκατέλιπον οὔτε τὴν αὑτῶν πρόθεσιν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους καθεσταμένοι τὰς πρεσβείας ἐπετέλουν, [6] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς �
��χαΐας ἄνδρας ἐπέλεγε κατὰ τὸ δόγμα, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Μεσσηνίους συνετάττετο πεζοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἑκατέρων ὑπάρχειν δισχιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους, [7] ὥστ᾽ εἶναι τὸ πᾶν σύστημα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιγινομένας χρείας πεζοὺς μὲν μυρίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ χιλίους. οἱ δ᾽ Αἰτωλοί, [8] παραγενομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς καθηκούσης ἐκκλησίας, συνελθόντες ἐβουλεύσαντο πρός τε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας εἰρήνην ἄγειν, κακοπραγμονοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι φθείρειν καὶ λυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συμμάχους: [9] πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, ἐὰν μὲν ἀφιστῶνται τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων συμμαχίας, ἄγειν ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην, εἰ δὲ μή, πολεμεῖν, πρᾶγμα πάντων ἀλογώτατον. [10] ὄντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων, εἰ μὲν οὗτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν ἄγοιεν καὶ συμμαχίαν, τὸν πόλεμον τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπήγγελλον: εἰ δ᾽ ἔχθραν ἕλοιντο πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς ἐποίουν κατὰ μόνας, [11] ὥστε μηδ᾽ ὑπὸ λόγον πίπτειν τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον αὐτῶν τῶν ἐγχειρημάτων.
15. These events occurred in the previous Olympiad, what I am now going to relate belong to the 140th. The resolutions passed by the Achaean federal assembly were these. That embassies should be sent to Epirus, Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip, to declare how the Aetolians, in defiance of treaty, had twice entered Achaia with arms, and to call upon them for assistance in virtue of their agreement, and for their consent to the admission of the Messenians into the alliance. Next, that the Strategus of the Achaeans should enrol five thousand foot and five hundred horse, and support the Messenians in case the Aetolians were to invade their territory; and to arrange with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians how many horse and foot were to be supplied by them severally for the service of the league. These decrees showed a noble spirit on the part of the Achaeans in the presence of defeat, which prevented them from abandoning either the cause of the Messenians or their own purpose. Those who were appointed to serve on these embassies to the allies proceeded to carry them out; while the Strategus at once, in accordance with the decree, set about enrolling the troops from Achaia, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians to supply each two thousand five hundred infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry, so that the whole army for the coming campaign should amount to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.
On the day of their regular assembly the Aetolians also met and decided to maintain peace with the Spartans and Messenians; hoping by that crafty measure to tamper with the loyalty of the Achaean allies and sow disunion among them. With the Achaeans themselves they voted to maintain peace, on condition that they withdrew from alliance with Messenia, and to proclaim war if they refused, — than which nothing could have been more unreasonable. For being themselves in alliance, both with Achaeans and Messenians, they proclaimed war against the former, unless the two ceased to be in alliance and friendly relationship with each other; while if the Achaeans chose to be at enmity with the Messenians, they offered them a separate peace. Their proposition was too iniquitous and unreasonable to admit of being even considered.
[1] οἱ δ᾽ Ἠπειρῶται καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίους εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν προσέλαβον, [2] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένοις παραυτίκα μὲν ἠγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐθαύμασαν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον, τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλούς. [3] διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς αὐτούς: οὕτως ἡ συνεχὴς ἀδικία συγγνώμης τυγχάνει μᾶλλον τῆς σπανίου καὶ παραδόξου πονηρίας. [4] Αἰτωλοὶ γοῦν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ χρώμενοι, καὶ λῃστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολέμους ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεχλεύαζον, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν μελλόντων. [5] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, προσφάτως μὲν ἠλευθερωμένοι δι᾽ Ἀντιγόνου καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτιμίας, ὀφείλοντες δὲ Μακεδόσι καὶ Φιλίππῳ μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον πράττειν, διαπεμψάμενοι λάθρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς φιλίαν δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων ἔθεντο καὶ συμμαχίαν. [6] ἤδη δ᾽ ἐπιλελεγμένων τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν νεανίσκων καὶ συντεταγμένων ὑπὲρ τῆς βοηθείας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Μεσσηνίων, Σκερδιλαΐδας ὁμοῦ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος ἔπλευσαν ἐκ τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος ἐν ἐνενήκοντα λέμβοις ἔξω τοῦ Λίσσου παρὰ τὰς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους συνθήκας. [7] οἳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῇ Πύλῳ προσμίξαντες καὶ ποιησάμενοι προσβολὰς ἀπέπεσον: [8] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Δημήτριος μὲν ἔχων τοὺς πεντήκοντα τῶν λέμβων ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ νήσων, καὶ περιπλέων τινὰς μὲν ἠργυρολόγει, τινὰς δ᾽ ἐπόρθει τῶν Κυκλάδων: [9] Σκερδιλαΐδας δὲ ποιούμενος τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπ᾽ οἴκου προσεῖχε πρὸς Ναύπακτον μετὰ τετταράκοντα λέμβων, πεισθεὶς Ἀμυνᾷ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ἀθαμάνων, ὃς ἐτύγχανε κηδεστὴς ὑπάρχων αὐτοῦ. [10] ποιησάμενος δὲ συνθήκας πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς δι᾽ Ἀγελάου περὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ τῶν λαφύρων, ὑπέσχετο συνεμβαλεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς εἰς τὴν Ἀχαΐαν. [11] συνθέμενοι δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Σκερδιλαΐδαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγέλαον καὶ Δωρίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, πραττομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλεως, συναθροίσαντες πανδημεὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐνέβαλον εἰς
16. The Epirotes and King Philip on hearing the ambassadors consented to admit the Messenians to alliance; but though the conduct of the Aetolians caused them momentary indignation, they were not excessively moved by it, because it was no more than what the Aetolians habitually did. Their anger, therefore, was short-lived, and they presently voted against going to war with them. So true is it that an habitual course of wrong-doing finds readier pardon than when it is spasmodic or isolated. The former, at any rate, was the case with the Aetolians: they perpetually plundered Greece, and levied unprovoked war upon many of its people: they did not deign either to make any defence to those who complained, but answered only by additional insults if any one challenged them to arbitration for injuries which
they had inflicted, or indeed which they meditated inflicting. And yet the Lacedaemonians, who had but recently been liberated by means of Antigonus and the generous zeal of the Achaeans, and though they were bound not to commit any act of hostility towards the Macedonians and Philip, sent clandestine messages to the Aetolians, and arranged a secret treaty of alliance and friendship with them.
The army had already been enrolled from the Achaeans of military age, and had been assigned to the duty of assisting the Lacedaemonians and Messenians, when Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos sailed with ninety galleys beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of their treaty with Rome. These men first touched at Pylos, and failing in an attack upon it, they separated: Demetrius making for the Cyclades, from some of which he exacted money and plundered others; while Scerdilaidas, directing his course homewards, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys at the instigation of Amynas, king of the Athamanes, who happened to be his brother-in-law; and after making an agreement with the Aetolians, by the agency of Agelaus, for a division of spoils, he promised to join them in their invasion of Achaia. With this agreement made with Scerdilaidas, and with the co-operation of the city of Cynaetha, Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, collected a general levy of the Aetolians, and invaded Achaia in conjunction with the Illyrians.
[1] τὴν Ἀχαΐαν μετὰ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν. ἀρίστων δ᾽ ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγός, οὐ προσποιούμενος οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων, ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας, φάσκων οὐ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἀλλὰ διατηρεῖν τὴν εἰρήνην, εὔηθες καὶ παιδικὸν πρᾶγμα ποιῶν: [2] δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εὐήθη καὶ μάταιον εἰκὸς φαίνεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅταν ὑπολαμβάνῃ τοῖς λόγοις ἐπικρύψασθαι τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναργείας. [3] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον διὰ τῆς Ἀχαιάτιδος ποιησάμενοι τὴν πορείαν, ἧκον ἄφνω πρὸς τὴν Κύναιθαν. [4] συνέβαινε δὲ τοὺς Κυναιθεῖς, ὄντας Ἀρκάδας, ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ἐν ἀκαταπαύστοις καὶ μεγάλαις συνεσχῆσθαι στάσεσι, καὶ πολλὰς μὲν κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων πεποιῆσθαι σφαγὰς καὶ φυγάς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἁρπαγὰς ὑπαρχόντων, [5] ἔτι δὲ γῆς ἀναδασμούς, τέλος δ᾽ ἐπικρατῆσαι τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἱρουμένους καὶ κατασχεῖν τὴν πόλιν, φυλακὴν ἔχοντας τῶν τειχῶν καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ Ἀχαΐας. [6] τούτων δ᾽ οὕτως ἐχόντων, ὀλίγοις ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν παρουσίας διαπεμπομένων τῶν φυγάδων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ δεομένων διαλυθῆναι πρὸς αὑτοὺς καὶ κατάγειν σφᾶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, [7] πεισθέντες οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν πόλιν ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος, βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις. [8] [τῶν Ἀχαιῶν] ἐπιχωρησάντων δ᾽ ἑτοίμως διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι σφίσιν ἀμφοτέρους εὐνοήσειν, ἅτε τῶν μὲν κατεχόντων τὴν πόλιν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐχόντων πάσας τὰς ἐλπίδας, τῶν δὲ καταπορευομένων μελλόντων τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συγκατάθεσιν, [9] οὕτως ἀποστείλαντες τὴν παραφυλακὴν καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως οἱ Κυναιθεῖς διελύσαντο καὶ κατήγαγον τοὺς φυγάδας, ὄντας σχεδὸν εἰς τριακοσίους, λαβόντες πίστεις τῶν παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις νομιζομένων τὰς ἰσχυροτάτας. [10] οἱ δὲ κατανοστήσαντες οὐχ ὡς αἰτίας ἢ προφάσεως ἐπιγενομένης τοῦ δοκεῖν ἄλλης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς τινα γεγενῆσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον παραχρῆμα κατελθόντες εὐθέως ἐπεβούλευον τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς σώσασι. [11] καί μοι δοκοῦσι, καθ᾽ ὃν καιρὸν ἐπὶ τῶν σφαγίων τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐδίδοσαν ἀλλήλοις, τότε μάλιστα διανοεῖσθαι περί τε τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσεβείας. [12] ἅμα γὰρ τῷ μετασχεῖν τῆς πολιτείας εὐθέως ἐπεσπῶντο τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τούτοις ἔπραττον τὴν πόλιν, σπεύδοντες τοὺς σώσαντας ἅμα καὶ τὴν θρέ