For the Tarentines, the alliance between the Romans and Thurians was an insult, calling on aid from a non-Greek, as well as a threat with the increased involvement of Rome in the affairs of the south. The Tarentines had long coveted leadership of the Italian Greeks through the often ineffective Italiote League.30 Syracusan involvement in Bruttium had been a limiting factor for the Tarentines, but the death of Agathocles had created a regional vacuum of power that they looked to fill. But Roman encroachment was ever threatening. Only a few years prior, they had established the colony of Venusia in Apulia about 80 miles northwest of Taras.31 A Roman garrison in Thurii put an immediate roadblock in the way of any plans towards the east, and threatened further Roman interference. The successful defense of Thurii ensured a continuing Roman presence in the region, much to Tarentine dismay.
It was in 282, shortly after the Lucanian siege of Thurii had been broken by Fabricius, that the Tarentines attacked the Roman fleet. The story of the attack and its consequences, as relayed by Roman sources, are truly spectacular. Three major episodes dominate: the successful Tarentine attack on the Roman fleet, the Roman embassy that resulted in war, and the subsequent debate among the Tarentines about what to do.32 The Tarentines as a whole are depicted as drunk at nearly every point and given to rash decisions without forethought, a stark contrast to the calm response of the Roman ambassadors to even the gravest insults. Tarentine arrogance is poignantly described when they are said to mock the Roman diplomat Postumius’ accent while speaking Greek. Dio goes further still, asserting that the Tarentines had been plotting with Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls even before the attack on the fleet in a similar conspiracy theory as presented by Orosius with regards to the Samnites.33 Blame for the war is squarely placed on the shoulders of the foolish Tarentines. Roman aggression is relegated to mere background.
However, Appian’s narrative of these events offers a slight variation. As he had done with Britomaris during the affair with the Gauls, Appian offers a somewhat more nuanced portrayal. He has the Tarentine politician named Philocharis remind his fellow Tarentines of an ancient treaty that forbad the Romans from sailing beyond the Lacinian Promontory near Croton, south of Thurii. Unfortunately, this treaty is only mentioned by Appian, who is far from a reliable source, and he places it in the voice of Philocharis rather than himself.
In terms of Appian’s reliability here, it would be odd for later Romans to invent a treaty that undercuts their own justification for war. The unique reference to this treaty would suggest that it fell out of the main historical tradition rather than it being invented by Appian. A similar debate existed among ancient writers with regards to the so-called Philinus treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians that designated relative spheres of influence, which was seen as proof of Roman blame for the Punic Wars. But Appian is here relying on a variant historical tradition, much as he would when discussing the first round of negotiations with Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea. In Appian’s narrative of the attack on the fleet, the Romans are still right, but, as with the Gauls before, they are not completely innocent. Appian is referring to a real treaty between Rome and Taras, which the Romans violated in 282. This treaty was likely made between 332 and 330, probably in conjunction with the agreement the Romans made with Alexander the Molossian who had been campaigning on behalf of the Tarentines at that time.34 Limitations on Roman fleet movements were perhaps restricted by this treaty in Tarentine territorial waters, which the Tarentines defined as extending to the Lacinian Promontory.
While the Romans likely violated an agreement with the Tarentines, at the very least in Tarentine eyes, their actions were not aimed directly at the city. The Romans had commissioned a modest fleet in 311 as part of their expanding interests in more distant regions.35 The central place the attack on the fleet has been assigned in the Roman narrative means that the details of what actually happened are all but lost. Certainly the role of Tarentine drunken impulse should be rejected as later invention. The fleet must have been present in conjunction with the Roman defense of Thurii.36 The city lay on the far side of the mountains of Lucania, making logistical support by land difficult; the fleet would greatly ease these concerns. Having accomplished his goal of relieving the city, Fabricius would have withdrawn his men northwards back across Lucania.
With the Roman consul gone, the Tarentines acted, not in a drunken haze but in a coordinated effort to remove the Romans from Magna Graecia. They attacked the Roman fleet, probably near Thurii rather than within sight of Taras itself. Several ships were sunk and a number of them captured with their crews. The Tarentines then moved against Thurii, sacking it and expelling its Roman garrison. Pro-Roman leaders were sent into exile, replaced, no doubt, by those in favor of a Tarentine alliance.37 The apparent speed with which Thurii fell, especially when they were able to fend off multiple Lucanian attacks until help arrived, suggests that the Tarentines relied on local sympathizers to open the gates.
Despite the characterization of Tarentine motivations as particularly irrational by the pro-Roman narrative, their attack was aimed at a real threat to the goal of regional hegemony. Blame, such as it is, was on both sides. It was the Romans who were expanding their alliances into Magna Graecia and had violated their treaty with Taras. By belittling Tarentine actions as decided in a fit of drunken impulsiveness, pro-Roman sources constructed a narrative that simultaneously denigrated the Tarentines, emphasized Roman morality, and justified their military response. The Tarentines, on the other hand, coveted the leadership of the Italiote Greeks, which they did not actually have, and acted to prevent Roman usurpation of their perceived right to hegemony. Instead of the complex geopolitical conflict between two ambitious cities, this episode becomes a farce that ultimately resulted in the Tarentines’ deceptive invitation for Pyrrhus to come to Italy, an action the Romans claim he would come to regret. The story is simplified and gripping, eliminating the nuance of what was happening in Italy at the time. The political and military interactions of the peoples of Italy were interwoven in a convoluted web into which Pyrrhus would step.
Roman diplomatic and political warfare
The Tarentine attack on the Roman fleet and Thurii must have been late in the year, precluding any Roman military response in 282. Instead, they dispatched envoys led by L. Postumius Megellus to the south, nominally seeking a diplomatic solution to their row with Taras in early 281. The Roman demands were straightforward: the return of Roman prisoners, those individuals exiled from Thurii be allowed to return, the return of any property that had been seized from Thurii, and the surrender of those who had orchestrated these ‘crimes’.38 The return of Roman prisoners was a relatively small matter, but restitution in Thurii and the surrender of Tarentine citizens were very unrealistic. These demands were part of fetial procedures to declare war (rerum repetitio), which were often extreme with little expectation of acceptance.39 Refusal on the part of the Tarentines created a religious justification on the part of the Romans, which would have been confirmed by the fetiales.
The Tarentines are depicted as drunkenly insulting the Roman ambassadors, mocking their dress and accents, and brashly welcoming war. While this description makes for good theater, the Tarentines hardly needed to be inebriated to refuse the Roman demands as unreasonable. The Romans wanted the capitulation of a city that saw itself as the rightful hegemon of the Italiote Greeks. Further, their concerns about Roman expansion southward were still relevant. In addition, they could reasonably expect aid from the Samnites and nearby peoples in some form. No doubt some sort of debate took place, which may very well have led to mutual insults and hurt pride. But this fantastic scene is a later Roman construction with seemingly little basis in reality; it is justification for war that highlights Tarentine debauchery in comparison to Roman civility.40 Whatever the specific details, the Tarentines refused the Roman demands, resulting in war.
The Roman response aimed at an end to the war through a combination of military power and political pressure. With the
diplomatic mission still underway, the senate in early 281 had decided to assign the consuls to pursue the ongoing wars against the Etruscans and Samnites respectively. Upon Postumius’ return though, the Roman people, we are told, were incensed and demanded immediate action against the Tarentines. There was supposedly some attempt to dissuade the impulse of the masses until after the current spate of wars was concluded, but the anger of the people was too much.41 The Senate here acts as a force of considered moderation in contrast to the people, whose counterparts dominated Taras. Throughout the war, the Senate is depicted as always acting in the best interest of the Republic through wise leadership. The nuance of internal Roman politics is almost completely lost in the surviving narrative. The consul L. Aemilius Barbula was ordered to suspend his campaign in Samnium and move south against Taras. Some sources claim Aemilius avenged the insult given to the ambassadors by ravaging Tarentine territory. As Aemilius’ army entered the territory of Taras, there would no doubt have been some depredations to demonstrate the seriousness of Rome’s intentions. However, he also quickly made the exact same demands as Postumius without any additions. It is the Tarentine response to Aemilius’ demands that provides a somewhat better view into the political struggles within the city and the diplomatic efforts of the Romans.
With a Roman army on their doorstep, the people of Taras are said to have realized their own danger. They debated whether to accept the proposal of Aemilius or to seek a foreign general to wage the war as they had done in the past. The obvious choice was Pyrrhus of Epirus. Should they pursue war, the Tarentines could count on some assistance from the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians due to their own current wars with the Romans, as well as the Messapians.42 However, this support was deemed insufficient, either due to Roman successes in 281 or the lack of unified leadership. Among the calls for war, Plutarch says that some of the wiser older citizens opposed inviting Pyrrhus.43 Among these was Meton, who failed to carry his point and slipped out of the meeting. When the day of the assembly came to decide the matter formally, he entered while singing and accompanied by flute girls, apparently drunk.44 The Tarentines called for him to dance and enjoyed the spectacle. But once he had their attention, Meton dropped his act and warned his fellow citizens that should they decide on war by inviting Pyrrhus to lead, they would soon find it impossible to enjoy such frivolity with a garrison of foreign soldiers amongst them. The character of Meton foreshadows the inadvisability of war. His speech garnered some support, but not enough. The pro-war party bundled him out of the assembly.
The debate whether or not to invite Pyrrhus suggests that there was some internal disagreement in Taras about the matter, even though it is shaped to fit into the larger negative characterization of the Tarentines. The Romans had a dim view of democratic unruliness. This negative characterization of the Tarentine democracy fits the general Roman model. Unlike the leadership of the Senate in Rome, in Taras the hot-headed elements overwhelmed those like Meton that held wiser opinions. Similar character flaws would later lead the Tarentines to likewise join Hannibal, another ‘foreign’ invader of Italy. While exaggerated by the Roman annalists, the political divisions are consistent with other communities at the time. Factional strife had been an important factor in the debates in Thurii when they had reached out to the Romans rather than their fellow Greeks. There were pro-Roman individuals in Taras, as seen in subsequent events. Faced with direct Roman action, the Tarentines could hardly stand alone against a direct Roman attack. Appian summarizes the pro-war position by equating submission to Roman demands as surrender, but also pointing out that outside help was needed as it had been by other western Greeks before.45
Meton and those that thought like him urged a reasonable cautiousness with regards to the aggressive and powerful Romans, standing in for the reader who knows the end of the story. Direct war was a departure for the Tarentines in their opposition to Rome, which had instead focused on indirectly acting through others. Rome was a dangerous opponent. In the end, the faction that urged war won out. The Tarentines were unwilling to back down, which would have only invited future Roman demands making the city a de facto subordinate to barbarians and ending any dreams of hegemony. Thus the pro-Roman faction’s protestations are preserved in the narrative as tragic figures. Meton becomes Cassandra, able to see the reality of the situation but unable to convince anyone to listen. As such, an invitation was extended to Pyrrhus to come to the aid of Taras. The full military support of the city was promised, as well as 370,000 Italian infantry and cavalry as a further lure.46
It was not long before the Romans knew of the Tarentine decision. What impact news of Pyrrhus had is unknown, but the Romans continued to pursue a campaign of pressure on Taras through a combination of political, diplomatic, and military action. Aemilius immediately ramped up his campaign, devastating the countryside and seizing local strongholds. But this was not a simple campaign of destruction. Aemilius freed the most influential Tarentines that he captured in his attacks, who, we are told, returned to Taras impressed with his kindness and promoted a peaceful resolution.47 This strategy was aimed at strengthening the faction that urged reconciliation and bringing about a ceasefire. At the very least it would sow political discord in the city. The Romans had pursued a similar strategy at Neapolis, expanding their local contacts in an attempt to promote friendly factions.
At the same time Aemilius began to peel away Taras’ Greek allies, isolating the city. It was around this time that Locri, Croton, and Rhegium joined the Romans. The Romans had already proven capable of asserting their military power in the region, coming to the aid of Thurii and now attacking Taras. Rome was a powerful ally in the face of renewed Tarentine aggression. Locri and Croton, like Thurii, had resisted Tarentine hegemony for decades. All three cities had been within the Syracusan sphere of influence and they now feared Tarentine interference. A Roman alliance offered protection. The Romans, on the other hand, took advantage of the regional vacuum of power left by Agathocles to extend their alliance network and further inhibit the growth of the rival power of Taras. The Roman alliance with Thurii had inserted the Romans in Italiote Greek affairs and added fuel to the existing conflict with the Tarentines, which in turn created further opportunities for expansion that the Romans were quick to seize.
This multipronged attack caused the Tarentines to second-guess their decision to reject Roman demands for restitution over events at Thurii. The captured men that Aemilius had released agitated for peace, no doubt alongside men like Meton, and secured the selection of a pro-Roman leader named Agis as head of state (strategos autokrater).48 Agis was a friend of the Romans already, although the exact nature of this relationship is not detailed. The expectation was clearly that Agis would pursue peace talks with Aemilius and secure an end to the fighting before more serious damage was done. Of course, the invitation to Pyrrhus had already been sent. It would be a mistake to label this a simple fluctuation as a result of the changing whims of a democracy as the Romans would. These events were a reaction to the effort by Aemilius to put maximum pressure on Taras through a variety of means in the hopes of forcing an end to the conflict in their own favor.
The campaign by Aemilius demonstrates a great deal of sophistication. The Romans did not rely on pure aggression, but mixed military and diplomatic efforts. While Postumius’ mission had little chance at success, it justified further Roman action. Aemilius acted in a way that would both strengthen Rome’s regional influence and put diplomatic pressure on Taras. His military operations were a supplement to these efforts. The Romans were not simple conquerors who defaulted automatically to all-out war. They had constructed an expansive alliance system through a clever combination of warfare and diplomacy, which was on display here. Aemilius could hope to return to Rome having secured Roman domination of Magna Graecia and perhaps even peace with Taras.
However, Aemilius’ plans collapsed late in 281. The potential for peace under the leadership of Agis ended with the arrival of Pyrrhus’ men in Taras.
Late in 281 Pyrrhus’ lieutenants Cineas and Milo arrived with several thousand troops.49 The pro-war faction now seized the leadership of the city, with the support of Pyrrhus’ men, and removed Agis. Pyrrhus’ troops then occupied the citadel. Aemilius decided to withdraw from southern Italy as the campaigning season was coming to a close. The Tarentines, emboldened by their ally, laid an ambush for the Romans in a narrow pass, but ceased their attacks when the Romans used their remaining Tarentine captives as human shields.50 Unwilling to see his gains reversed, Aemilius wintered in the colony of Venusia, only a few days’ march from Taras.51 Early the next year, Pyrrhus himself arrived and the war would take on a much larger dimension. The Romans now faced an unknown entity in the form of the Epirote king, while still facing enemies across the length of Italy.
King Pyrrhus of Epirus
The Greek world had been greatly expanded by the campaign of Alexander the Great (r. 336–323), and the aftermath of his death saw rampant war and political chaos throughout the eastern Mediterranean and Near East. In an environment of powerful Hellenistic kingdoms, the region of Epirus was largely inconsequential. Epirus was a small area of northwest Greece that played only a peripheral role in the events of the Classical Age, and was only marginally more relevant in the Hellenistic. One of the more significant parts was when the royal family of Macedonia had intermarried with that of Epirus. Olympias, wife of Philip II and mother of Alexander the Great, was from Epirus. The region was organized as a confederation of tribes including the Molossians, Chaonians, and Thesprotians. This political arrangement was perhaps encouraged by Antipater in order to act as a limiter on the potential growth of power of the Molossians in the aftermath of Alexander’s death, but the system was not so well organized as to be called a league or kingdom.52 The king of the Molossians, who made up the most powerful tribe, served as the military leader of the combined forces of the confederation and as such was able to exercise significant, but not limitless, power. Alexander the Molossian (r. 350–331) was able to use these combined resources to campaign in Italy on behalf of the Tarentines. But after his death, Epirus suffered decades of instability and weakness.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 6