Pyrrhus’ life before his western campaign was intimately involved in the wider conflicts of the kings of the Hellenistic world.53 The Greek east remained his focus, even as he was campaigning in the west. He was a second cousin to Alexander the Great through Olympias. Pyrrhus’ youth was largely spent outside Epirus and at the mercy of foreign rulers. As an infant Pyrrhus had to be smuggled out of Epirus to be raised in the court of the Illyrian king Glaucias when his father was assassinated. In 306 he returned as a young man, only to be driven out after four years by Cassander, ruler of Macedonia. Pyrrhus then took refuge with Demetrius Poliorcetes before being sent to the Ptolemies in Egypt as a hostage. In 297, Ptolemy II Philadelphus returned Pyrrhus to his throne in Epirus, along with money and troops, as a means of weakening Cassander in Macedonia. Although he had gained a significant military reputation, Ptolemy was simply using him as an (expendable) pawn in the larger game of Hellenistic politics. Even after establishing himself in his homeland, Pyrrhus still could not escape the machinations of his more powerful neighbors.
Epirus did not have the resources to allow Pyrrhus to assert himself on the political stage of the Hellenistic world. As such, he began to seek opportunities to expand the resources at his disposal. He concluded a series of dynastic marriages, which included Lanassa, daughter of Agathocles of Syracuse. Lanassa gave birth to two sons (Alexander and Helenus), but she eventually left Pyrrhus and married Demetrius. Pyrrhus incorporated Ambracia into the Epirote alliance and established a treaty with the Acarnanian League to the south.54 He had his eyes on bigger prizes than these remote regions of Greece, but had to compete with other generals that could match him in martial skills and were not eager to see him expanding into more strategically valuable areas. In 292 he attempted to seize Thessaly from Demetrius but was driven back. Six years later he successfully invaded Macedonia but was again driven out of his gains, this time by Lysimachus. By 286, the achievements of Pyrrhus were limited, especially when he tried to contend directly with great powers. Other opportunities had to be sought in order to realize his goals in Greece and Macedonia.
The call for help from the Tarentines in 281 had significant potential for Pyrrhus’ ambitions. Greek cities spanned southern Italy and eastern Sicily, and were closely tied together through trade and political connections. Agathocles, to whom Pyrrhus was related by marriage, had united many of the Western Greeks only a decade prior. Pyrrhus’ uncle, Alexander the Molossian, had already campaigned in Italy, albeit with limited success. Beyond the Greeks, the promise of hundreds of thousands of Italians that could be tapped for his own military purposes must have seemed a godsend. Italy and Sicily were rich lands that he could use to pursue his eastern ambitions.
What then of the totality of Pyrrhus’ ambitions in the west? Plutarch tells us that Pyrrhus’ goal was to conquer Italy, including Rome, Sicily, and then Carthaginian Africa.55 Such a plan is spectacularly unlikely, and the result of later exaggeration in an attempt to make Pyrrhus’ campaign into an attempt to replicate in the west Alexander’s conquest of the east. For later Romans, it was inconceivable that Pyrrhus could have planned anything less than the conquest of Rome. Why else come to Italy? But this is a Roman construction derived from their own perceived historical importance. Pyrrhus’ invasion is framed as an impediment to Rome’s inevitable rise to world dominion, making it difficult to credit such a clearly exaggerated standpoint.
The king’s actions during the war speak to a more realistic and limited set of goals: to conquer the Greek areas of Italy and Sicily. At no point did Pyrrhus make a serious attempt to attack the city of Rome, and only once did he actively campaign beyond southern Italy despite repeated victories on the battlefield. Likewise he showed no inclination to cross over to Africa and attack the city of Carthage itself, as Agathocles had done. In the negotiations with the Romans that are described in the sources, Pyrrhus is consistent through them all: hegemony in southern Italy. (No doubt this would come to include Sicily as well, but any such diplomatic efforts do not survive.) War with Rome and Carthage was incidental, not the end goal. His intention was not an easy task, but certainly a reasonable one. His resources were too limited to aim at much more. How well-informed Pyrrhus was about the geopolitical realities of Italy and Sicily is unknown.
Pyrrhus followed his lieutenants Cineas and Milo with a substantial military force: 20,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 2,000 archers, and 20 elephants.56 Along with the 3,000-man garrison already dispatched to Taras the previous year, Pyrrhus commanded a force of around 28,000 men, modeled on the army of Alexander. The elephants had become a staple in Hellenistic warfare and had never been seen in Italy before. Against inexperienced men and horses, these beasts could prove useful, but in general were ineffectual against experienced heavy infantry.57 Most of Pyrrhus’ men were drawn from Epirus, but were supplemented with significant numbers of mercenaries supplied by other Hellenistic kings. His primary patron in this instance was Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt, who sought to check the expansion of Ptolemy Ceraunus and Antigonus Gonatas in Greece and Macedonia by supporting Pyrrhus.58 Antigonus and Ptolemy Ceraunus themselves also provided some aid in order to get Pyrrhus out of their hair for a time. These forces would be supplemented by men raised in Italy.
Pyrrhus’ crossing into Italy is made to foreshadow the hopelessness of his expedition. During the crossing, we are told that Pyrrhus and his men ran into a storm that scattered his ships.59 Local Messapians are said to have come to his aid. However, this event seems to have had no significant impact, and may be a later addition meant to presage the difficulties of the war for Pyrrhus. Similarly, Pausanias claims that Pyrrhus had to sneak past the Romans to get to Italy, but this seems very unlikely.60 The story reinforces the Roman nature of Italy and effectively makes Pyrrhus into a thief stealing in at night. Dio offers up an ambiguous prophecy about whether he would conquer the Romans or the Romans him akin to the prophecy given to Croesus.61 Upon arrival in Taras, the king of Epirus was named as strategos autokrater in place of the deposed Agis and he began to put the city on a war footing.
The outbreak of the Pyrrhic War was shaped into a narrative of Roman honor confronting Greek licentiousness. Our sources emphasize the attack on the Roman fleet and the spectacular affronts to Postumius’ diplomatic mission, which make for a compelling tale. But a careful analysis of the larger geopolitical contexts of these years reveals a far more nuanced picture of Roman expansion and the attempts to stop it that relied on a combination of diplomacy, force, and internal intervention. War had already broken out in Italy years before the Tarentines got involved, let alone Pyrrhus.
Notes
1 Meister (CAH) vii.1.384–411; Green (1993) 220–224; Consolo Langher (2000); Berve (1953). For a brief overview of the ancient sources, which are fragmentary and often reliant on the hostile account of Timaeus, see Meister (CAH) vii.1.384. Diodorus (19.1–21.17) and Justin (22.1–23.2) provide the most detailed surviving accounts.
2 DS 19.8.1; cf. DS 19.5.4–6; Justin 22.2.11–12.
3 DS 20.71.
4 Will (1979–1982) 1.118–20; Berve (1953) 62–68, but see Meister (CAH) vii.1.409–411 who disagrees with Berve’s arguments in support of the legality of Agathocles’ tyranny and the extent of Agathocles’ power.
5 Hoyos (2010) 149–176; Huss (1985) 176–203.
6 Pap. Oxy. 24.2399; DS 20.15–16; Berger (1988).
7 DS 16.67.1–2; 19.5.4; 24.46.1; Plut. Dion 25.11–14; Tim. 2.31; Berger (1988) 96.
8 Meister (CAH) vii.1:408; Consolo Langher (2000) 283–319; De Sensi Sestitto in La Magna Grecia da Pirro ad Annibale (2015) 50–58; Seltman (1912).
9 DS 14.100–112; DH 20.7; Lomas (1993) 36.
10 De Sensi Sestitto (2011) and (2015).
11 Tagliamonte (1994); Griffith (1935) 194–212.
12 The Romans issued four series of silver didrachms (called Romano-Campanian as they were produced in Campania), on which were imprinted respectively the head of Mars, the laurelled head of Apollo, the head o
f Hercules, and the helmeted head of Roma, all of which were stamped ROMANO (of the Romans). Pliny (NH 33.44) and Livy (Per. 15) claim that the Romans did not mint in silver until 269, but probably they are referring to distribution of war loot, DH 20.17; Burnett (1977). The first series with the head of Mars is variously dated to the late fourth century by Mitchell (1969), ca. 300 by Burnett (1998) 21–48; Crawford (1985) 25–34, and to the time of the Pyrrhic War by Stazio (1971); Thomsen (1957–1961) 1:210–47. Crawford dates the laurelled Apollo to the time of Pyrrhus and Mitchell only the helmeted Roma. Burnett argues for a 40 or so-year gap in coinage by the Romans between ca. 300 and 260 based on the hoard from S Martino. Holloway in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) places the Romano-Campanian coins in the First Punic War required by major ship-building efforts that spanned Italy. However, this requires a radical revision of the dates of Tarentine coinage.
13 The Samnites, Etruscans, Gauls, and Umbrians joined forces to oppose the Romans at Sentinum in 295, Livy 10.24–31; Plb. 2.19.5–6; Zon. 8.1; Front. Strat. 2.5.9; Oakley (1997–2005) 4:268–339; Degrassi (1954) 97.
14 Orosius (Hist. 3.22.12) does assert an overt alliance between the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites with the Etruscans and Gauls, but nothing in the scant evidence that survives of the war suggests any explicit cooperation. Orosius may be drawing from Livy’s lost book 12, which covered these events, but the Periochae do not mention any alliance nor do any other sources. See Salmon (1967) 255–279.
15 As Polybius (2.19) succinctly summarizes. Walbank (1957–1971) 1:184–214.
16 Plb. 2.19–20; Oros. Hist. 3.22.13–14; Aug. Civ. Dei. 3.17; Harris (1971) 78–82.
17 App. Samn. 6, Celt. 11.
18 Plb. 2.20.1–3; Flor. 1.8.21; Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; App. Samn. 6, Celt. 11; Dio fr. 38; MRR 1:188. The scale of this Roman victory is likely exaggerated, Harris (1971) 80–81.
19 The triumph of 281 was over Volsinii and Vulci, which suggests these two cities were the center of fighting, Degrassi (1954) 98.
20 Pliny NH 34.32; Livy Per. 11.
21 Bispham in Bradley, et al. (2007) 191–214; Salmon (1967) 50–186; Isayev (2007) 55–140; Guzzo (1989) 21–105; Herring in Bradley, et al. (2007) 281–290.
22 Fronda (2006) 409 n. 52; Herring in Bradley, et al. (2007) 281–291.
23 Burnett in La Magna Grecia da Pirro ad Annibale (2015) 811.
24 DH 19.13; Val. Max. 1.8.6; Plin. NH 9.118; 324.32; Degrassi (1954) 97.
25 In 326 the Lucanians established relations with the Romans, which were immediately abandoned thanks to Tarentine manipulation, Livy 8.25.3, 27; Oakley (1997–2005) 2:685–686. In that same year at Neapolis, the Tarentines promised naval support if the city resisted the Romans, DH 15.5–10; Livy 8.22–23; Kent (2013); Oakley (1997–2005) 2:640–645.
26 App. Samn. 7.1.
27 Kent (2013); Lomas (1993) 44–46. The Neapolis affair also suggests that the Romans and Tarentines could have been directly involved in the decision-making process.
28 DH 19.13, 20.4; App. Samn. 7.1–2; Plin. NH 34.32; Livy Per. 11.
29 Intrieri (1987–1988) 27–28.
30 Lomas (1993) 35–36; Intrieri (1987–1988) 25–27. For an archaeological survey of third-century Taras, see Dell’Aglio in La Magna Grecia da Pirro ad Annibale (2015) 431–461.
31 Vel. Pat. 1.14.6; DH 17/18.5; Hor. Sat. 2.1.35–37. For an overview of Roman activities in Apulia in the late fourth century, see Fronda (2006). For a discussion of Roman colonization in the fourth and third centuries, see Bispham (2006).
32 DH 19.5–6; App. Samn. 7; Livy Per. 12; Val. Max. 2.2.5; Florus 1.13; Eutrop. 2.11; Oros. Hist. 4.1.1–3; Zon. 8.2. Polybius (1.6.5; 8.24) does not mention the attack on the fleet, but does place the blame for the war on Tarentine arrogance. Plutarch likewise does not mention the attack on the fleet, which Barnes (2005) 60–61, argues was due to a recognition of Dionysius’ unreliability. However, the attack is common to nearly every other source and fits within the geopolitical context of events. Modern discussion of this episode is immense, see in particular Barnes (2005); Wuilleumier (1939) 102–105; Urso (1998) 113–128.
33 Dio fr. 39; Oros. Hist. 3.22.12.
34 Livy 8.17.10; Oakley (1997–2005) 2.681 n. 1; Forsythe (2005) 350; Cary (1920) 165–173; contra Barnes (2005) 140–141.
35 Thiel (1954) 19–27. For an overview of the early Roman fleet, see Steinby (2007).
36 Barnes (2005) 144; Thiel (1954) 24–25.
37 App. Samn. 7.1.
38 App. Samn. 7.2.
39 Harris (1979) 167–168.
40 Barnes (2005) 14–19.
41 DH 19.6; App. Samn. 7.3; Zon. 8.2; Oros. Hist. 4.1.4.
42 The Samnites, Lucanians, and Messapians offered their support to Pyrrhus when the invitation was eventually made by the Tarentines, Plut. Pyrr. 13.6. The Bruttians were already allied with the Samnites and likewise joined Pyrrhus when he arrived.
43 Plut. Pyrr. 13.2; App. Samn. 7.3. Walbank (1957–1971) 2:101, suggests that the internal political turmoil may go back to a local source, which is rejected by Hoffman (1936) 14–22.
44 Plut. Pyrr. 13.3–5; DH 19.8; Dio 39.10; App. Samn. 7.3. See Barnes (2015) 48–53.
45 App. Samn. 7.3.
46 Plut. Pyrr. 13.6.
47 Zon. 8.2. A similar strategy was pursued by Pyrrhus during his negotiations with Rome and even later by Hannibal.
48 Zon. 8.2.
49 The precise order of which came first and what forces each brought is unclear due to contradictory evidence in the sources. Both likely arrived around the same time (or perhaps together) in the fall, Wuilleumier (1939) 108; Lévêque (1957) 282.
50 Zon. 8.2; Front. Strat. 1.4.1.
51 Wuilleumier (1939) 109.
52 Hammond (1967) 557–563; Soueref in La Magna Grecia da Pirro ad Annibale (2015) 20–22; Lévêque (1957) 240–244.
53 Plut. Pyrr. 1–12; Justin 17.3.17–22; Lévêque (1957) 83–239; Hammond, et al. (1972–1988) 3:219–238.
54 Hammond (1967) 568–569.
55 Plut. Pyrr. 14.
56 Plut. Pyrr. 15.
57 Scullard (1974).
58 Justin 17.2; Hammond (1988).
59 Plut. Pyrr. 15; Zon. 8.2.
60 Paus. 1.12.2; Lévêque (1957) 69–70.
61 Dio fr. 40.6.
3 The military campaigns of 280 and 279 BCE
Over the winter of 281/280 Pyrrhus made his personal preparations and crossed into Italy from Epirus, to which the Romans responded with another campaign in southern Italy. The battles which took place acquired fantastic elements that highlighted the grand nature of this war, including brave individual heroics, elephant combat, literal self-sacrifice, and the ultimate resolve of the Roman people. Nevertheless, the Romans suffered a string of humiliating defeats. Pyrrhus outmaneuvered and defeated Roman armies at Heraclea, successfully invaded Latium, and won another victory at Ausculum the following year. Roman generals were not able to match Pyrrhus on the battlefield. Of course these events were quite embarrassing for the Romans, who were particularly proud of their martial skills. As such, the surviving Roman narratives emphasize the tenacity of their ancestors in the face of defeat. They show a consistent desire to minimize the scope of Roman losses or they simply assert that the Romans were in fact victorious. According to the Romans, even Pyrrhus was forced to recognize their virtues and forlornly admit that the war was a mistake. Nevertheless, by the end of 279 Pyrrhus was firmly in control of southern Italy. Throughout Pyrrhus’ campaigns in these years, he consistently pursued the more limited goal of controlling southern Italy rather than the outright conquest of Rome.
Preparations for war (spring 280 BCE)
In the Romans’ preparations to fight, fanciful elements of the conflict are once again emphasized. We are told that there were certain religious rites that had to be dealt with first, namely the ritual declaration of war by the fetiales. The issue was that the ritual required throwing a spear into the lands of Rome’s enemy. Epirus was quite inconveniently distant to m
ake this practical. As such, the Romans are said to have captured an Epirote, bought him some land near Rome, and then performed the fetial ritual there as it was now enemy territory.1 The story is clearly a later invention meant to emphasize the ‘foreign’ (that is extra-Italian) nature of Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus is depicted as the aggressor invading Roman space. Roman piety is also showcased in opposition to Pyrrhus’ own impiety later in the war. No doubt, the gods were implored by the Romans in their war, but the details of such activities with regards to the declaration of war are subsumed in later myth-making.
Due to preexisting conflicts, the Romans faced a two-front war with Pyrrhus in the south and the Etruscans in the north, which was not much of a deviation from prior years. The two consuls, P. Valerius Laevinius and Ti. Coruncanius, were deployed accordingly.2 Laevinius was sent south, which would result in the battle of Heraclea. Coruncanius was sent north to deal with the Etruscans. The consul of the previous year, L. Aemilius Barbula, was prorogated and given Samnium as his provincia. He had wintered in Venusia after Pyrrhus’ arrival. The Romans were no stranger to waging wars simultaneously on multiple fronts as their previous conflicts in Italy had often involved several opponents at once. The Romans recognized the threat the king posed as a rallying point, and acted swiftly in an attempt to prevent the wars they were already waging in Italy from coalescing into a coordinated effort as had happened in the Third Samnite War. As such, their generals were deployed to fight aggressively in enemy territory rather than defending Roman lands. The campaign of Coruncanius was a continuation of conflicts that predated Pyrrhus’ arrival. Aemilius’ efforts needed to inhibit Samnite support for Pyrrhus. The campaigns of both Coruncanius and Aemilius are poorly attested, but both earned triumphs. Neither the Etruscans nor the Samnites were able to oppose the armies of Rome alone and both consuls likely faced little difficulty. Aemilius was able to prevent the Samnites from sending men to aid Pyrrhus at Heraclea.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 7