Laevinius faced a more difficult situation than his colleagues. He needed to quickly shore up Roman influence in southern Italy in the face of significant diplomatic and military pressure from the Tarentines and Pyrrhus. Operations in Magna Graecia required long supply lines that could be threatened by hostile Lucanians, Samnites, and Greeks. A base in the south was vital, which meant the return of the pro-Roman leaders of Thurii that had been ousted by the Tarentines. Thurii offered a fortified site that was well situated south of Lucania, near Taras, and on the coast. As he marched south, Laevinius garrisoned sites in Lucania to protect his supply lines and prevent local support from reaching Pyrrhus.3
The Romans also took measures to secure their own allies. They targeted hostile leaders among allied cities, fearing what they termed rebellion. Even the nearby Latin city of Praeneste may not have been free of anti-Roman sentiment, and saw some of its leaders seized and held in the treasury house in Rome.4 This sort of interventionism was not unusual. Amongst existing allies it was a way to empower those who favored the Romans, securing vital military support. Alliances between Italian communities were quite unstable and the Romans felt the need to make sure that the growing scale of this war did not endanger their own dominance.
The Romans expanded their efforts further by deploying garrisons in many areas of the peninsula. The most significant of these was deployed to Rhegium, a city which sat on the straits between Italy and Sicily. Here the Romans sent several thousand men led by their own commander, Decius Vibellius.5 The city controlled an important navigational point along the coast that could facilitate contact with a Roman-controlled Thurii and inhibit enemy naval activities along the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy. At the same time, the vulnerable supply lines through Lucania could be supplemented by seaborne efforts. Rhegium would remain under Roman control for the entirety of the war, although the actions the garrison took to maintain that control were extreme. If Laevinius could secure Thurii quickly, the Romans would be in a strong position to prosecute the war.
Roman efforts in early 280 were substantial, organized, and aggressive, which may have caught Pyrrhus off guard. The Romans had seized the initiative and as such it would be Pyrrhus who was forced to react. He had been promised significant Italian support by the Tarentines, but found little. Samnites and Lucanians were not forthcoming due to Roman efforts in their homelands (and perhaps Tarentine exaggeration). The king also needed to make significant efforts to quell hostile factions in Taras that could undermine his control in the future. Not everyone in the city was to be trusted. A Tarentine noble named Aristarchus sought to appear friendly to the king and was eventually sent by him on a mission to Epirus.6 Instead, Aristarchus went to Rome. Whether Pyrrhus suspected disloyalty is unfortunately left unclear, but nevertheless indicates the continued presence of pro-Roman factions in Taras akin to those that were evident in the previous year. Pyrrhus implemented measures in Taras to train its citizens and organize its political system towards the war effort. Whether Pyrrhus felt prepared or not, he had little choice but to gather his own forces, supported only by the Tarentines and march to battle when he heard of Laevinius’ approach, but his position was far from secure.
The battle of Heraclea (summer 280 BCE)
In the summer of 280, the armies of Laevinius and Pyrrhus met in battle near the Greek city of Heraclea. The sources for the battle are fragmentary and contradictory, focusing heavily on fantastic elements to compensate for a clear Roman loss. Here, both sides sought a quick end to the war. While the two armies were roughly equal in numbers, Pyrrhus’ forces proved themselves far more capable than their Roman counterparts. The king was able to marshal his diverse forces effectively on the battlefield, outmaneuvering the Romans and winning the day. Laevinius found himself unable to match the generalship of Pyrrhus, and the Romans suffered their first defeat of the war.
The two armies were roughly equal in size. The ancient sources do not give precise numbers for the Romans, but Plutarch refers to the ‘great size’ of the Roman force and Justin says they were more numerous than Pyrrhus’ army.7 However, these assertions put forward the idea that Pyrrhus’ genius allowed him to defeat a numerically superior force, mirroring the achievements of his cousin Alexander the Great against the Persians. For later pro-Roman writers spectacular achievements by Pyrrhus early in the war made the glory of his eventual defeat that much greater, similar to the later victory over Hannibal after his early battlefield successes against the numerically superior Romans. Of course, it was important in the Roman narrative to point out that the Romans were, in fact, not barbarians like the Persians, as Plutarch has Pyrrhus say.8 A tradition of numerical superiority of the Romans existed in ancient times, but it served an ideological purpose that undercuts its reliability.
Modern estimates of the number of Roman legions present a range from two to four, with corresponding total numbers (Romans and allies) ranging from 20,000 to 50,000.9 There is no reason to think that Laevinius would bring a larger than normal force, despite Pyrrhus’ supposed reputation. A standard consular army would have been seen as sufficient. Laevinius likely commanded two legions accompanied by allies, totaling somewhere around 20,000. It is impossible to give a more specific size as early Roman armies varied to some degree in the size of legions and the ratio of allies to citizens. Having left a garrison in Lucania, the Roman army may have been somewhat diminished from its original size.
Pyrrhus had with him an initial force of about 28,500 men, supported by the Tarentines. Pyrrhus’ shipwreck on his way to Italy seems to be more of a literary hindrance rather than a historical one and so likely had little impact on the size of his forces. He did disperse some of his men in garrisons to secure his allies’ loyalty and defend them from the Roman army led by the proconsul Aemilius. As for the number of Tarentines Pyrrhus could draw from, Diodorus says that they had supported Cleonymus with 22,000 in 302.10 However, such figures should be approached with skepticism since the Tarentines also promised Pyrrhus hundreds of thousands of Italians when he arrived. As such, an estimate of between 20,000 and 25,000 men under Pyrrhus’ command at Heraclea is reasonable.11 It is difficult to see Laevinius engaging an army that greatly outnumbered his own, even keeping the Roman tendency towards brashness in mind. In the end, it seems that the forces of Laevinius and Pyrrhus at Heraclea were probably of roughly equivalent size.
As the two armies approached one another, their respective commanders supposedly exchanged letters. Pyrrhus is said to have arrogantly offered to serve as mediator between the Romans and the peoples of southern Italy, to which the Romans replied that they did not ask him to mediate nor did they fear him as an enemy. The Romans established their camp on the right bank of the Siris River south of Heraclea, while Pyrrhus set himself up on the left.
Before the battle began, we are told that Pyrrhus attempted to get a sense of the enemy he faced. In one story, he dispatched spies who were immediately captured by the Romans. Instead of executing them, Laevinius showed them around the camp. He then released them, demanding they tell Pyrrhus not to send spies again but to come discover the strength of the Romans for himself. This story is drawn from a well-established tradition of self-confident commanders that included Xerxes, Scipio Africanus, and others.12 According to Plutarch, Pyrrhus personally observed the Romans from the far side of the Siris and was greatly impressed with their discipline.13 Awed at the supposed size of the Roman army, he is said to have wanted to delay the engagement until his Samnites and Lucanian allies arrived but was forced to fight by Laevinius. Roman merits are here built up while simultaneously emphasizing Pyrrhus’ strengths.
Laevinius sought a quick engagement, as was typical of Roman generals in the wars of this period, while Pyrrhus saw an opportunity to take advantage of his superior position. With the river between them, one side would have to take the risk of fording it. It was the Romans who acted first and began to cross. The Romans were in hostile territory, which meant that any delay would disproportionately affect their
ability to resupply, and they needed to defeat Pyrrhus before his army was bolstered by allied forces. This aggression allowed Pyrrhus to use the river to his advantage by stationing men along it in order to hamper the Romans. As such, they could have inflicted casualties while minimizing their own losses before the battle proper.14 Zonaras says that the initial attempt by the Romans to get over the river failed, and as a result Laevinius dispatched his cavalry to cross out of sight, presumably further up river.15 The Roman infantry advanced again directly against Pyrrhus’ men, but this time succeeded with the support of their cavalry who attacked from the rear. Pyrrhus himself led 3,000 cavalrymen to cover the retreat of his river guards and give his phalanx time to form up. The Romans no doubt had taken losses and were tired after fighting their way across the Siris, while Pyrrhus’ main force was still fresh. It was then that the main infantry lines engaged.
The exact course of the battle is impossible to determine as the ancient sources do not provide a coherent picture. One spectacular event in the fighting is well attested, however: the attempt to kill Pyrrhus by a Ferentani ally in the Roman army named Oblacus (or Oplax) Volsinius.16 During the course of the fighting, Pyrrhus was moving around the battlefield directing his men and giving aid where needed. Oblacus was the leader of a Roman allied cavalry contingent and is said to have followed the king’s movements with the intention of engaging him in single combat. Pyrrhus’ companions noticed Oblacus and warned the king, but they were ignored. Seizing an opening, Oblacus charged at Pyrrhus. Despite his heroics, Oblacus was intercepted by the king’s bodyguards and killed.
Whether or not this story is in any way based on reality, it speaks to a profound difference between the Greeks and Italians that was promoted by the surviving sources. Pyrrhus was noted for his personal bravery in battle, but when faced by a powerful young warrior like Oblacus he relied on his bodyguards for protection. Italian vitality is juxtaposed with a Greek desire to avoid fighting when the situation was not in their favor. The fact that this story is attached to a non-Roman is not especially surprising. The heroics of Italian allies are highlighted in other instances such as the later battle of Pydna, where the Roman victory was ascribed to a group of Paeligni.17 By assigning this deed to an Italian, it reinforces the interconnectedness of the Romans and Italians after the Social War, when the story was written, and the assertion of Italy as Roman space. Oblacus’ actions thus become Roman by transference.
According to Dionysius and Plutarch, as Oblacus was falling from his own speared horse, he managed to kill Pyrrhus’ own steed. The king was pulled to safety by some of his friends while others finished off the attacker. The situation so badly shook Pyrrhus that he switched armor with one of his Companions, Megacles, in order to avoid another such incident. When Megacles was killed in the royal raiment, the Epirote army supposedly began to lose morale. Only Pyrrhus showing himself unharmed saved the day. The king displayed a moment of weakness (corrected once he again exposed himself), and it supposedly nearly cost him the battle as the Romans surged forward. Pyrrhus was a dangerous foe, but he was not invulnerable. Florus goes so far as to say that Oblacus put Pyrrhus and his men to flight, giving the Romans the battle.18 The episode with Oblacus is gripping but can hardly be taken as anything based in historical reality, at least in the way that it has survived.
Setting aside Florus’ fanciful assertions, we are told that the battle was hard fought with changing fortunes on both sides, which is a common theme in early Roman battles about which little historical information survived for later writers to use. In the end, Pyrrhus outmaneuvered his Roman opponents and won the day. Exactly how he did so is unclear. Laevinius may have attempted to outflank Pyrrhus with hidden cavalry, only to see this force thwarted by Pyrrhus’ elephants which caused the Roman horses to flee due to their frightening smell.19 The elephants may then have charged into the Roman infantry in pursuit of the cavalry, followed up by a charge of Pyrrhus’ Thessalian cavalry.20 Whatever the precise details, the Epirote phalanx seems to have held the Roman infantry in place while the more mobile cavalry and elephants outflanked them. The Roman cavalry was scattered and Pyrrhus’ cavalry and elephants wreaked havoc amongst the legionaries. The Romans broke and fled the battlefield.
Plutarch gives different casualty figures for the two sides: 7,000–15,000 for the Romans and 4,000–13,000 for Pyrrhus.21 Whatever the exact numbers, the sources generally insist that the Romans took heavier overall losses while Pyrrhus lost his best troops. Zonaras describes a massacre of the fleeing Romans that was only stopped thanks to a wounded elephant throwing Pyrrhus’ army into confusion.22 However, the pursuit was probably minimal. In an anecdote, Frontinus recounts that Pyrrhus advised never pressing a retreating army too hard in order to encourage them to retreat next time.23 In subsequent negotiations Pyrrhus seems to have desired a quick end to the war, which would have been hampered by inflicting undue losses. A little mercy could go a long way. Similarly, the king would release his Roman prisoners in an attempt to foster a positive relationship. The Roman army initially regrouped in the Latin colony of Venusia in Apulia about 75 miles to the north where the now proconsul Aemilius had spent the previous winter.24
In their first engagement, Pyrrhus had defeated the Romans. Even without the presence of his Italian allies, the king utilized the Siris River, his superior cavalry, and his elephants to win an impressive victory. His position in southern Italy was much more secure, buffered by his alliances with the Samnites and Lucanians. Any pro-Roman factions in cities such as Thurii had little hope of immediate support. Soon after the battle, the Samnite and Lucanian armies arrived to join the king. We are told that Pyrrhus scolded them for being late, but was so pleased with his victory that he shared some of the spoils with them anyway, hoping to secure their continued friendship.25 Of course, the disparaging assertion by later Roman writers that the Samnites were waiting to see who won the battle ignores the fact that a Roman army was campaigning in Samnium. The Romans made similar claims about the purposeful delays of the Samnites with regards to the battle of Veseris in 340 when they were ostensibly allied with the Romans.26 In celebration of his victory, Pyrrhus sent a bronze tablet to the shrine of Zeus at Dodona on behalf of himself and the Tarentines, which undercuts the claims by some later Romans that Heraclea was not a defeat.27 Now bolstered by a substantial force of Italians, Pyrrhus marched north into central Italy.
The Latium campaign (late summer 280 BCE)
With Pyrrhus having won the battle of Heraclea, the question becomes what he intended from there. He seized the initiative, marching north into Latium within a short distance of the city of Rome. However, Pyrrhus did not have the time, resources, or desire to lay siege to the city. This was not a campaign of outright conquest, but one intended to force the Romans to the negotiating table and accept a peace favorable to the king. While the campaign ultimately did not achieve Pyrrhus’ strategic goals, it demonstrated the danger that he represented to the Romans as the war continued.
The Tarentines had been the ones to invite Pyrrhus to Italy, but he found his strongest military allies to be the Samnites. They supplied capable warriors for his army and would serve as a significant buffer against future Roman incursions southward. The Samnites had been fighting the Romans for much of the previous 60 years, inflicting severe defeats on them at times. But they had suffered massive losses in return. The Samnites were forced repeatedly to accept peace dictated by Rome. Too weak to stand alone anymore, they were subordinate allies for Pyrrhus. To secure their loyalty he offered the Samnites a chance to return to their past glories when they rivalled Roman power, a promise that Hannibal would also offer at the end of the century. They were also a potential source of mercenaries for any future military campaigns in Italy or elsewhere.
With Pyrrhus’ backing, the Samnites could potentially resist Roman aggression in the future. Samnite leaders no doubt played a key role in the planning of Pyrrhus’ campaign northwards. They knew the terrain well from personal experience.
For Pyrrhus there was a possibility of gaining new allies in the north, aided by preexisting Samnite connections. During the many wars that were fought across the Italian peninsula in the century before Pyrrhus’ arrival, various coalitions had existed. As the Roman alliance system expanded, their enemies had also banded together. Most spectacularly, in 295 the Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls joined forces under the Samnite Gellius Egnatius.28 The subsequent battle of Sentinum had been close fought, but it was ultimately a Roman victory that resulted in the strengthening of Roman power across the center of the peninsula. With Pyrrhus’ arrival, there was a possibility of recreating that coalition. Bringing in Etruscan support would have served Pyrrhus’ purpose well in forcing the Romans to make peace so that he could turn his attention elsewhere.
Immediately after the battle of Heraclea, Laevinius regrouped his forces at Venusia, but then quickly withdrew across the Apennines to Capua. Zonaras says that Laevinius followed Pyrrhus’ army and harassed it while it marched to Campania before taking up position in Capua, but such a move would have risked a second defeat against a now stronger opponent and so seems unlikely.29 The move from Venusia to Capua required a march through the mountains of Samnium, a maneuver made necessary by the threat of being cut off from any reinforcement or support by Pyrrhus. Laevinius needed to move quickly before the march became impossible. Pyrrhus himself set off north from Magna Graecia, securing alliances with nearby peoples and removing Roman garrisons where possible in Lucania and Apulia. The king did not need to root out each and every Roman soldier. He needed to create a stable situation and an image of strength. Future negotiation would, theoretically, see the withdrawal of any Roman garrisons that were too troublesome to remove at present. Speed was the key to success. He would pursue a similarly aggressive strategy in Sicily.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 8