The exact nature of Pyrrhus’ delegation is opaque due to duplication and confusion of details from his diplomatic efforts the previous year. The position of each side had changed little; the Romans were still on their heels while Pyrrhus was still in a strong position. The exchange of prisoners is revisited and Appian says that Cineas again approached the Roman nobility with bribes.41 Renewed efforts to work in both official and unofficial channels are probable enough. Whatever connections Cineas had forged in his prior visit to Rome could prove useful to once again pressure the Senate to make peace. And the exchange of prisoners would certainly have been important after a second battle.
Beyond his negotiations with Rome, by the fall of 279 Pyrrhus’ situation was becoming quite complicated as various delegations arrived to ask for his assistance from elsewhere. Political and military conflict was rife around the Mediterranean, and Pyrrhus’ reputation had received a significant boost thanks to his success in Italy. Two years prior, Celtic groups had begun to invade Greece and in 279 had killed Ptolemy Ceraunus, the king of Macedonia.42 The general political confusion of the eastern Mediterranean meant that there was no clear successor to Ptolemy, leaving the throne open. Other Hellenistic kings and generals were too preoccupied in their own squabbles to give much thought to defending Macedonia and Greece from barbarians at the moment. In the west, the Sicilian Greeks were falling prey to renewed Carthaginian aggression and the most powerful Greek city, Syracuse, had been engulfed in civil strife since the death of Agathocles ten years prior. To make matters worse, after a two-year absence a minor rebellion had broken out in Epirus threatening Pyrrhus’ control of his own kingdom.43
Pyrrhus needed to choose where to focus his attention. His Italian possessions were seemingly safe for the time being, which would be further strengthened if peace with the Romans could be established. Macedonia and Syracuse beckoned to him, supposedly rousing Pyrrhus to berate Fortune for giving him two chances at glory when he could only pursue one.44 However, even with his recent success Pyrrhus was no match for the powerful Hellenistic monarchs of the east. The situation in the eastern Mediterranean was in flux with the recent deaths of Lysimachus and Seleucus in addition to Ptolemy Ceraunus, but Pyrrhus’ resources were still comparatively modest. He had already been dependent on outside assistance to provide soldiers and money for his campaign in Italy. He needed control of his own assets to assert himself in Hellenistic circles. At the same time, bringing the Sicilian Greeks under his control was surely already part of his campaign plans. Perhaps Pyrrhus anticipated a quick victory on the island. Certainly the situation in Macedonia did not seem in immediate danger of being settled. By establishing hegemony in Sicily and southern Italy alongside Epirus, Pyrrhus would have been in a strong position to not only make a bid for the Macedonian throne, but hold it.
The Tarentines had long seen themselves as the rightful leaders of the Italiote Greeks, and were now able to assert themselves to a greater degree with Pyrrhus’ backing. They served as Pyrrhus’ base of operations and acted as his primary agents in Italy, which they celebrated. A statue of Victory bearing a military trophy and standing atop a globe was commissioned from a student of the famed sculptor Lysippus.45 A new series of silver didrachms was struck with traditional images of Taras combined with Pyrrhic elephants.46 Notably, Pyrrhus’ elephant is much smaller and almost an afterthought on the coins. Italiote Greek cities that had long resisted Tarentine leadership, especially Croton and Locri, now submitted to Pyrrhus and tacitly Taras.47 Thanks to Pyrrhus, the Tarentines enjoyed the effective control over their fellow Italiote Greeks that they had always wanted.
But not everything was going as the Tarentines desired. Pyrrhus’ presence was both good and bad. Although the Tarentines were greatly strengthened by the king, he also instituted reforms in the city when he supposedly witnessed how lax the population was. Pyrrhus put the city on a war footing, introduced military exercises, closed the gymnasia, ended the drunken festivals of the populace, and otherwise disrupted life of Taras.48 Some Tarentines were so unhappy with these changes that they fled the city. While no doubt exaggerated as an attack on Greek decadence, there would have still been many in the city that resented his presence. Pyrrhus’ control of the city was for the purposes of the war, instituting little change of Taras’ political institutions.49 There certainly had been a pro-Roman faction in the city prior to the king’s arrival who may have agitated against Pyrrhus’ control. For Taras as a whole, the prospect of Pyrrhus’ departure for Sicily would have allowed greater freedom to run their own affairs with less interference, regardless of whether they supported him or not.
We are, unfortunately, very poorly informed about the activities of the other Italian peoples. They appear largely as passive actors who only react to the actions of the primary antagonists of the war. The loss of Livy is felt particularly with regards to the other peoples of Italy. The Samnites would have continued to act in their own interest against the Romans as they had for decades. Perhaps they sought to undermine Roman alliances in Campania and the Liris River Valley akin to similar efforts in years past. Rome’s own Italian allies would have likewise been active in challenging local Samnite aggression. However, these dynamics do not fit into the general depiction of the war. Other peoples were merely supporting cast with varying degrees of relevance. Nevertheless, warfare in Italy was endemic and undoubtedly continued below the battles and negotiations taking place between the major powers, but it has fallen out of the surviving sources.
The sudden diplomatic involvement of the Carthaginians added further wrinkles. After Agathocles’ death, the Carthaginians had managed to expand their control in Sicily against the Greeks there. Syracuse, always Carthage’s staunchest opponent, was in political chaos and could not mount an effective defense against a Carthaginian attack on the city. The resulting Syracusan diplomatic mission to Pyrrhus no doubt played a role in Carthage’s own decision to send Mago and a fleet to Italy. Mago’s mission in Rome had been a success with a new agreement, and he is said to have then traveled to speak with Pyrrhus. The Roman tradition depicts this as fides Punica, implying a desire to make a preemptive peace with the king and backstab the Romans. But there is no reason to think, if it occurred at all, that this mission was aimed against Rome or that the Romans were necessarily unaware of it. The Carthaginians did not want Pyrrhus in Sicily and as such Mago could have acted as a counterweight to the Syracusan delegation to the king. Indeed, the Carthaginians may have even purposely negotiated with the Romans first in order to give Pyrrhus further enticement to stay out of their business.
Unlike the year before, in 279 the Romans had the implicit backing of Carthage to bolster their resolve to continue the fighting. The Romans were no strangers to long, bloody conflicts, which were the norm in Italy. But Carthaginian support, even if only ideological, was nonetheless significant. The Romans still boasted impressive manpower reserves of their own population as well as that of their allies in central Italy. Pyrrhus had done little damage to the Roman alliance system, which never appears to have been a goal on his part.50 Losses in Apulia were significant, but Lucania, which was now under Pyrrhus’ control, had only been tenuously tied to Rome. Meanwhile, the Campanians and peoples of the central Apennines remained staunchly pro-Roman. The losses suffered at Heraclea and Ausculum were substantial, but not debilitating. Similar defeats had been suffered against Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls in the past. Pyrrhus’ invasion north, which had failed in its intended purpose to intimidate, was not repeated. The Romans had suffered setbacks, but remained in control of central Italy.
Cineas, or whoever led Pyrrhus’ second delegation, no doubt found some Romans open to the idea of peace, but once again could not obtain an end to the war. However, a prisoner exchange seems to have been again agreed upon by the two sides.51 Fabricius may have been involved in this arrangement, but it is unclear. For the Romans, the inevitable military involvement of the Carthaginians would divide Pyrrhus’ attention and create opportunities
for Roman gains. Meanwhile, the pact that had been negotiated reduced, if not precluded, the possibility that the Carthaginians would make peace with the king without them. For the Romans, the war was far larger than merely their fight with Pyrrhus. Peace with the king may have been a theoretical possibility, but the Samnites were another matter. These preexisting conflicts required continued Roman attention and necessitated that the war continued.
By 279, the Pyrrhic War had become a convoluted mess. Pyrrhus, Romans, Carthaginians, Tarentines, Syracusans, Samnites, and more all competed in the pursuit of their own goals. Diplomatic missions crisscrossed the Italian peninsula and the wider Mediterranean alongside the armies that marched to battle. Pyrrhus had through his intervention placed himself at the center of all of this, juggling a dozen different competing interests in the midst of a complex web of prior conflicts while attempting to further his own agendas. In the end, the king chose to continue with his plans in the west and accepted the Syracusan requests for help. The Macedonian throne would have to wait. Peace with Rome would have been desirable, but the situation seemed sufficiently under control for him to turn his attention elsewhere for a time. At the very least, Pyrrhus could count on the Tarentines and Samnites to continue to act as his agents on the peninsula in his absence.
Fabricius and the king, virtue at odds
The theme of virtue underpins all of the negotiations in 280 and 279. In particular, the character of Fabricius is presented as the embodiment of Roman values in his dealings with Pyrrhus. Fabricius was a major figure in the war, serving as an envoy to the king in 280 and perhaps 279, and as consul in 282 and 278.52 Fabricius’ interaction with Pyrrhus took on a legendary nature, emphasizing his personification of the Roman values of humility and honesty in the face of temptation and difficulty. He was the pinnacle of Roman virtue, a theme that permeates all of the sources and is commonly referenced as an example to be emulated.53 Pyrrhus himself serves as the foil to Fabricius’ outstanding character.
Fabricius, we are told, was a poor man despite his great reputation and noble family, conjuring comparisons with that other epitome of Roman values Cincinnatus, who worked in the fields alongside his slaves.54 Pyrrhus wanted Fabricius to advocate for peace and promised him rich rewards to make up for his poverty. Dionysius has Fabricius pontificate on the values of Roman society, which have afforded him honor and respect despite his lack of luxury.55 The plunder that Fabricius gained in war as consul he used to enrich his soldiers and his community over himself, citing the early Republican hero Valerius Publicola as his model. Fabricius argues in favor of the communal good over the individual, whose greatest duty was to the res publica. Furthermore, Fabricius argued that Pyrrhus’ offers of wealth came with a cost; they were essentially loans with the expectation of obedience that spoke of tyranny, not liberty. In a similar vein, Dio/Zonaras say that Fabricius told Pyrrhus that in fact it was he, as king, who was in extreme poverty despite all of his royal wealth.56 Fabricius may not have had much, but as such he did not have a desire to grasp for more. Pyrrhus, on the other hand, was always striving for greater things, imperiling what he already had, an idea that echoes the earlier warnings of Cineas to the king while still in Epirus as they discussed the impending western campaign. When Fabricius ultimately refuses the ‘gifts’ of the king, it is a testament to the values that had made Rome great.
Thoroughly impressed, Pyrrhus tries other means of getting Fabricius on his side. Plutarch says that the king first tried to intimidate Fabricius.57 He hid an elephant behind a curtain and when Fabricius was near the beast was suddenly revealed; it trumpeted and created a frightful image. The Roman was quite unimpressed and gave no outward reaction in the face of this unanticipated shock. This event mirrors one that Plutarch mentions also in his Life of Alexander, when the philosophers of India were quite unimpressed with the achievements of the conqueror so far from home.58 Pyrrhus then invites him to dinner where Cineas proceeded to speak at length about the Epicurean preference for ease and comfort over politics. Fabricius replied, “O Heracles, let Pyrrhus and the Samnites hold to these beliefs while they are at war with us.”59 Fabricius demonstrates resolve in the face of the unexpected, finds strength in his own values, and looks upon Greek philosophy with disdain. Pyrrhus was impressed and asked Fabricius to join him as his companion after the war had been settled. The king was offering Fabricius a place of honor and wealth, as well as the opportunity for adventure. Fabricius replied that the king should be careful, lest the Epirotes preferred himself to Pyrrhus.60 According to Eutropius, Pyrrhus said that it would be easier to shift the path of the sun than divert Fabricius from the path of honor.61
The next year, in 279, when Fabricius is erroneously said to be consul, we are told that Pyrrhus’ personal doctor approached Fabricius offering to poison the king before the battle of Ausculum. A Roman reader is left in a precarious position. Pyrrhus has already beaten the Romans at Heraclea and invaded Latium. The situation was grim and this was an opportunity to put an end to a significant threat. But Fabricius did not take the easy choice. Instead he rejected this shameful offer and chose to continue the fight in an honorable fashion, just as Laevinius had proposed in his exchanges with Pyrrhus before Heraclea. A contrast is constructed between the right but difficult thing to do and the wrong but easy thing. But for the reader, the choice was supposed to be clear. The Roman success of the early Republic was rooted in a strict adherence to principle. Fabricius’ actions stand in contrast to the ‘new wisdom’ of intrigues and diplomatic maneuverings characteristic of Carthaginians and Greeks, which were increasingly common in the second century.62 Of course the Roman exploitation of local factionalism during and before the Pyrrhic War is ignored. Indeed, Fabricius’ speech is the ultimate statement of the ideals of the early Republic and the climactic point in Dionysius’ narrative. The Romans were facing their final challenge before their final conquests of Italy (which was already theirs by right if not in reality), and they succeeded thanks to their virtues. The reader’s faith in Roman moral superiority is rewarded as the war began to turn against Pyrrhus.
But Fabricius was merely the individual who stood in for the Roman community as a whole. After he had failed to seduce Fabricius to his side, according to some sources Pyrrhus released his captured Roman prisoners to return home for the Saturnalia on the condition that they return to him if peace were not settled. The Roman soldiers returned home to their families, but the Senate, urged by Appius Claudius Caecus, rejected peace. Roman superiority was a major component of the speech of Appius. The Senate also decreed that any soldiers who refused to return were to be punished with death. The story itself closely resembles that of M. Atilius Regulus who was captured by the Carthaginians during the First Punic War and was supposedly sent by them as part of a diplomatic effort in the hopes that he would urge peace to save his own life.63 Regulus instead urged a continuation of war, like Appius, and then chose to return with the Carthaginians since peace had not been made, and was brutally killed. Beyond the prisoners, Fabricius was virtuous in every way, but the same values that he epitomized were for the most part shared by the Roman people as a whole. It is Cineas, an opponent, who gave voice to this characterization, describing the Senate as a council of kings.
Roman moral superiority is reinforced by Pyrrhus himself, who can be found constantly praising his enemies. Fabricius symbolizes the barbarization of the Greeks through his comments on tyranny which is a corruption of honorable monarchy according to Dionysius.64 The Romans are taking up the mantle of Hellenism, which is their birthright in Dionysius’ history. At the same time, there is a political maturity to the Romans that Pyrrhus cannot match.65 We are told that Pyrrhus had come to recognize the strength of the Romans and as such to have regretted becoming involved in fighting them, blaming the duplicitous Tarentines for the war.66 Pyrrhus becomes a figure that is not inherently bad; he is merely misguided. He was ignorant of the Romans prior to coming to Italy, but once he gained firsthand knowledge he came to respect
them. Pyrrhus is made into another mouthpiece for Roman virtue, even in the midst of fighting them. But this is Roman fantasy meant to glorify the Roman past. When Pyrrhus decided to leave Italy after the battle of Ausculum, we are told that it was because he did not want to contend with what he now recognized as insurmountable Roman resolve and virtue. Pyrrhus himself embodies some of that Roman spirit, spurning gold in favor of arms when discussing the ransom of Roman prisoners.67 The Romans had not yet been able to conquer Pyrrhus on the battlefield, but the values of their community are said to have overcome the king’s desire to fight. The portrayal of Fabricius is meant to minimize Roman defeats and avoid dealing with reality.68 Historically the events of 280 and 279 had not been kind to the Romans, but the subsequent Roman literary tradition found the roots of eventual victory in these exaggerated episodes of extraordinary deeds. The qualities of men like Fabricius are made to foretell Roman victory.
Notes
1 Plut. Pyrr. 16.3–4. Zonaras (8.3) offers little more, but gives a very pro-Roman slant to the exchange.
2 DH 19.9–10.
3 Bickerman (1947); contra Lévêque (1957) 319–321.
4 DH 19.13; Zon. 8.4; Justin 18.2.6–7; Stouder (2009); Lévêque (1957) 341–345. This mission is placed after Cineas’ visit to Rome by Plutarch (Pyrr. 20) and Appian (Samn. 10.4); both imply further negotiations afterwards. Stouder (2009) 188–190 questions the idea of a ransom which she sees as abnormal and thus later invention. Ransoming of prisoners is not mentioned at all in the context of the wars of Italy before the third century, either by the Romans or those they fought. At the Caudine Forks (Livy 9.1–16; Oakley [1997–2005] 3:3–96), the Samnites released their Roman prisoners after humiliating them and seized their weapons and armor. These events resulted in the establishment of a peace of some sort (whether a foedus or sponsio). While far from the refined narrative of negotiation found in the Pyrrhic War, the Caudine Forks disaster does suggest releasing prisoners after battle in combination with peace negotiations was a possibility in Italian warfare.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 13