5 Justin 18.1.6.
6 Dio fr. 40.31–2; Zon. 8.4; Lévêque (1957) 343.
7 DH 19.13.3.
8 Plut. Pyrr. 20.5; App. Samn. 10.5; cf. DH 20.6. Wuilleumier (1939) 128 rejects this episode as a later invention based on the connection with the Saturnalia being too precise.
9 Dio. fr. 40.23–25.
10 cf. Cic. De Off. 1.12.38; Lévêque (1957) 344.
11 Plut. Pyrr. 20; DH 19.14–18; Dio fr. 40.33–38; Zon. 8.4; Ennius Ann. fr. 186–193; App. Samn. 10.4.
12 Plut. Pyrr. 18.2; Zon. 8.4.
13 DH 15.5–10; Livy 8.22–23; Kent (2013).
14 Plut. Pyrr. 18; Zon. 8.4. Plutarch’s narrative places Fabricius’ mission after Cineas’ visit to Rome, while Zonaras has Cineas use the already released prisoners as leverage. Zonaras does not explicitly mention immunity for the Tarentines, but implies it by having Pyrrhus assert that he came to Italy to settle their dispute with Rome.
15 App. Samn. 10.1; FGrH 839.
16 Polyae. 6.6.3.
17 Intrieri (1987–1988) 32–33.
18 Plut. Pyrr. 18.4; Zon. 8.4; App. Samn. 10.2.
19 Plut. Pyrr. 19; Zon. 8.4; App. Samn. 10.2; Eutrop. 2.13; FGrH 839.2. Cicero (De Sen. 6.16; cf. Sen. Ep. 19.5.13) claims that the speech was preserved intact to his own day, but it was likely a more recent composition, Lévêque (1957) 352; Skutsch (1985) 360–364.
20 Plut. Pyrr. 19.5; Justin 18.2.10–11; App. Samn. 10.3; Eutrop. 2.12.
21 As suggested by Wuilleumier (1939) 128. Popular background of the Claudii, Cornell (1995) 373–377; Staveley (1959); and of Fabricius, Lévêque (1957) 341.
22 Hoyos (2010) 43; Cornell (1995) 212.
23 Tagliamonte (1994). Etruscans aided the Athenian Sicilian Expedition, Thuc. 7.57.11. They also served in the armies of Agathocles against Carthage, DS 20.61.6; Justin 22.8.4–6.
24 The major source for these treaties is Polybius (3.22–25), but they are also referenced by Livy (7.27.2; 9.43.26; Per. 13) and Diodorus (16.69.1; 22.7.5). The chronology of the treaties is made difficult by contradictory and incomplete information, which has resulted in a great deal of debate, see Scardigli (1991); Oakley (1997–2005) 2:252–262; Scullard (CAH) vii.2:517–537; Walbank (1957–1971) 1:337–356.
25 Livy 7.38.2; Oakley (1997–2005) 2:359–360.
26 Some of the more recent arguments in support of the Philinus treaty are Serrati (2006); Scullard (CAH) vii.2:530–536; Huss (1985) 204–206; and Mitchell (1971), and those doubting its authenticity include Oakley (1997–2005) 2:258–262; and Hoyos (1985).
27 Livy Per. 14; 21.10.8; Zon. 8.8.3; Dio fr. 43.1; Oros. Hist. 4.5.2.
28 Scullard (CAH) vii.2:533.
29 Livy 9.43.26.
30 The renewal should be dated to late 279 or perhaps early 278, Hoyos (1984) 403–417; Mitchell (1971) 646–648; Lefkowitz (1959) 156–157; Lévêque (1957) 414; contra Nenci (1958) 275–285. Polybius (3.25.1–5) gives the terms of the renewal, which Livy (Per. 13; cf. DS 22.7.5) says occurred after Ausculum. Justin (18.2.1–3) and Valerius Maximus (3.7.10) describe the arrival of Mago’s fleet in Rome, which Justin places after Ausculum in his somewhat confusing timeline.
31 “ἐὰν συμμαχίαν ποιῶνται πρὸς Πύρρον, ἒγγραπτον ποιείσθωσαν ἀμφότεροι, ἳνα ἐζῆ βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων χώρᾳ; ὁπότεροι δ’ἂν χρείαν ἔχωσι τῆς βοηθείς, τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔφοδον, τὰ δέ ὀψώνια τοῖς αὑτῶν ἑκάτεροι. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ‘Ρωμαίοις βοηθείτωσαν, ἂν χρεία ῇ. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα μηδεὶς ἀναγκαζέτω ἐκβαίνειν ἀκουσίως.” Plb. 3.25.3–5; trans. Hoyos (1984) 431.
32 It has been argued that πρὸς can also be taken as ‘against’, indicating a pact against Pyrrhus by Meister (1970) 415–416; Mitchell (1971) 650–651. However, nowhere in Greek does συμμαχία πρὸς mean ‘an alliance against’, and this translation creates problems with the subsequent portions of the agreement, Hoyos (1984) 420–432.
33 Hoyos (1984) 437–438.
34 Justin 18.2.1–3; Val. Max. 3.7.10.
35 Livy 36.4. Livy (36.44.5–7) describes Carthaginian ships taking part in a naval battle during the war. On the treaty, Plb. 15.18; Livy 30.37.1–6; Walbank (1957–1971), 2:466; Lazenby (1998), 228–232. Appian (Pun. 54) does say that the Carthaginians were to be Roman allies by land and sea, but does not indicate a specified obligation to provide ships on demand or some sort of schedule.
36 Passerini (1943) 100–101; Lévêque (1957) 412–414.
37 Scullard (CAH) vii.2:537.
38 Wuilleumier (1939) 125–131 rejects the idea of a second diplomatic mission, which Lefkowitz (1959) 160–161 follows with some reservation. Similarly, Passerini (1943) argues for a single diplomatic mission but instead places it in 278 during Fabricius’ consulship. These arguments rely heavily on Justin’s abbreviated and confused chronology. Lévêque (1957) 406–409 and Judeich (1926) 11–18 argue that there were two separate missions of some sort.
39 Plut. Pyrr. 21.1–4; Zon. 8.5; Gell. NA 3.8; Front. Strat. 4.4.2; Val. Max. 6.5.1; Florus 1.13.21; Livy Per. 14; Cic. De Off. 1.40, 3.86. Lévêque (1957) 406, and Wuilleumier (1939) 129, reject this story outright. The tale is very similar to that of Camillus and the teacher, Livy 5.27; Plut. Cam. 10; Mossman (2005) 506.
40 MRR 1:194.
41 App. Samn. 11.1.
42 Plut. Pyrr. 22.1; Justin 24.4–5. For events in Macedonia, see Hammond, et al. (1972–1988) 3:251–257.
43 App. Samn. 10.5.
44 Plut. Pyrr. 22.1–2.
45 Dio fr. 51.22; Brauer (1986) 144; Lévêque (1957) 332–333.
46 Brauer (1986) 144–145.
47 Justin 18.1.8–9; Zon. 8.6.
48 Plut. Pyrr. 16; App. Samn. 8; Zon. 8.2; Livy 23.7.5; see Lévêque (1957) 302.
49 Wuilleumier (1939) 112–113.
50 contra Lévêque (1957) 337.
51 Zon. 8.5; App. Samn. 11.1–2; Gell. NA 3.8.5.
52 MRR 1:189–194.
53 Cic. Pro Cael. 39; Horace Od. 1.12.40; Val. Max. 4.3.6. Regardless of later elaboration, Fabricius was celebrated immediately after his death, Stouder (2009) 191–194.
54 Plut. Pyrr. 20.1; DH 19.14.1; App. Samn. 10.4.
55 DH 19.15–16; cf. App. Samn. 10.4.
56 Dio fr. 40.35; Zon. 8.4.
57 Plut. Pyrr. 20.2.
58 Plut. Alex. 65; Mossman (2005) 505.
59 “Ὦ Ἠεράκλεις,” εἶπε, “Πύρρῳ τὰ δόγματα μέλοι ταῦτα καὶ Σαυνίταις, ἔως πολεμοῦσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς.” Plut. Pyrr. 20.4; cf. Eutrop. 2.12.
60 Plut. Pyrr. 20.4; App. Samn. 10.4.
61 Eutrop. 2.14.
62 Livy 42.47.
63 Lazenby (1996) 122.
64 Peirano (2010) 46–47.
65 Mossman (2005) 504.
66 Dio fr. 40.33; DH 19.14.4.
67 Ennius fr. 183–190; Barnes (2005) 24.
68 Corbier (2009) 230–231.
5 In Sicily
In 278, Pyrrhus’ attention shifted to the island of Sicily and the long-running war between the Greeks and Carthaginians there. For ancient writers, this was simply an extension of his hubris, as he sought to conquer Sicily and Punic Africa since he was unable to overcome Roman fortitude. In reality, Pyrrhus had already obtained most of what he wanted in Italy. He was in firm control of the Italiote Greeks, which was bolstered by alliances with the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. An end to the war with Rome would have been desirable, but not immediately necessary. And so Pyrrhus now looked to bring the Sicilian Greeks under his control. War with the Carthaginians, like the Romans, was not the primary goal. The king was invited to Syracuse in order to deal with problems of political divisio
n and to provide assistance in case of a Carthaginian attack on the city. After establishing himself in Syracuse through deft political moves, Pyrrhus launched a methodical campaign against the Carthaginians that nearly drove them from the island. But he failed to understand the political complexities of Sicily and his attempts to expand his power over his allies resulted in widespread disaffection. The Sicilian Greeks were not interested in having a king, and the Carthaginians built on decades of experience, and took advantage of the cracks that began to form.
To Sicily (278 BCE)
The death of Agathocles in 289 once again saw the renewal of political turmoil in Syracuse and general division among the Sicilian Greeks. In several cities tyrants seized power. Like Agathocles before them, these tyrants attempted to establish their own hegemonies over other Greek cities, but they succeeded only in exacerbating the divisions between the poleis. Internal matters were little better. Men like Phintias, tyrant of Acragas, had greatly angered the people of his own city through brutal practices.1 The Syracusans had seen some foreign success under their leader Hicetas but failed to accomplish anything lasting in the face of internal divisions. In addition, the Mamertines, Italian mercenaries formerly employed by Agathocles, seized strategically important Messana and began to raid those around them, becoming a continual source of conflict in eastern Sicily.2 The Carthaginians welcomed the chaos, which allowed them to greatly expand their own influence, deftly taking advantage of the factionalism within and between cities. In the face of Hicetas’ limited successes, Carthaginian armies were dispatched to aid those he fought, resulting in two major defeats for the tyrant.3 Prominent cities such as Enna and Heraclea accepted Carthaginian garrisons, which served to increase their presence in the Greek areas of Sicily while also isolating powerful cities such as Acragas.4
Syracuse itself fell into stasis, with various oligarchic and democratic factions fighting for power.5 Prior to Pyrrhus’ arrival, two men had risen to prominence. The first, Theonon, had managed to overthrow Hicetas and seize control of the fortified off-shore citadel called the Island. The other, Sosistratos, whipped up popular anger at the memory of Agathocles’ tyranny, exiling many prominent men who he claimed were aiming at tyranny.6 By 279, Sosistratos controlled the city of Syracuse as well as Acragas, while Theonon held the Island. But neither was able to overpower the other, creating a political stalemate.7 The assistance of Pyrrhus was sought to settle these issues, as the Syracusans had earlier approached Timoleon.
Direct help for Syracuse from the other Sicilian Greeks was unlikely. They were weakened by internecine war, already under Carthaginian control, and/or fearful of a return of Syracusan domination. Like the Tarentines, the Syracusans had a long history of requesting foreign aid. A joint diplomatic mission was sent to Pyrrhus in Italy by both Sosistratos and Theonon.8 Plutarch says that in addition to Syracuse the envoys promised to bring Acragas and Leontini to the king as well. No doubt the envoys intended to impress Pyrrhus with the support he would immediately gain on the island, but it was also a carefully constructed façade. According to Diodorus, it was Sosistratos who controlled Acragas as well as some 30 other cities. Meanwhile the city of Leontini, ruled by the tyrant Heracleides, had been a subject ally of Syracuse since Agathocles’ time.9 The request for Pyrrhus’ aid represented only those cities within the Syracusan orbit, not the Sicilian Greeks as a whole. Syracusan promises of widespread support, as with the Tarentines before them, were less than they seemed.
As the Syracusan envoys asked Pyrrhus for help, the king struggled with what he should do. First was the possibility of taking control of Sicily and leading a successful war against Carthage, which promised significant increases in the king’s wealth, military resources, and prestige. But shifting his theater of operations also threatened to expose his Italiote Greek allies to Roman attacks. The Romans had rejected Pyrrhus’ attempts to make peace, and were campaigning in southern Italy against his Samnite and Lucanian allies. Second, the throne of Macedonia was empty after the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus there.
The king, Plutarch says, railed against Fortune for presenting him with two opportunities at the same time (Sicily and Macedonia), forcing him to choose between the two.10 This indecision is built upon the anachronistic idea that Pyrrhus wanted to conquer all of the Italy, Sicily, and Libya, on top of Macedonia and Greece. A major theme of Plutarch’s Life is the king’s inability to pursue a single goal, instead changing directions as each new opportunity arises without finishing anything. The king’s grandiose fantasies of glory to match Alexander continuously undercut everything he attempts. The chance of conquering either the west or the east is seemingly within reach, but not both. In classic Greek fashion Pyrrhus’ greatest enemy is his own hubris, which is neatly paired with the humility of the Romans he faces. The Romans desired only to defend what was seen as theirs, Italy. But this image is of the constructed character of Pyrrhus whose motivations should not be assigned to the historical figure.
Pyrrhus’ ultimate decision to go to Sicily was one based on practical strategic considerations. Operations in Sicily were probably already on his mind, albeit not as part of some grandiose scheme of conquest. Unification of the Italiote and Sicilian Greeks was a previously demonstrated reality to which Syracuse was a key component, even if the city’s influence had waned since Agathocles’ time. The king was in no better position to take Macedonia in 278 than he had been in 286; he needed to expand his resources to see his plans in mainland Greece come to fruition. Indeed, there is little reason to think that Pyrrhus had any widespread support in Macedonia; he was not invited to take the throne after Ptolemy Ceraunus’ death, only informed by messengers that it was vacant.11 Pyrrhus took a logical course of action considering both the immediate realities of his situation and with future plans in mind. This was not some half-cocked scheme to emulate Alexander. While peace with Rome would have been helpful, and no doubt what he desired before shifting operations to Sicily, Pyrrhus seized a significant opportunity to establish himself in Syracuse while the war in Italy was relatively quiet. As such, he dispatched his trusted advisor Cineas to begin diplomatic efforts among the Sicilian Greek cities.12 Shortly thereafter, Pyrrhus left a garrison under his lieutenant Milo in Taras as well as other cities and moved towards Sicily.13
With the Syracusans now politically divided and with the threat of Pyrrhus’ intervention, the Carthaginians followed up their earlier offensives with an attack on the city in 278. The potential interest of Pyrrhus in Sicily had already spurred the Carthaginians to renegotiate their treaty with the Romans involvement. The territory of the Syracusans was devastated while a large army besieged the city and 100 ships blockaded the Great Harbor.14 They were able to count on aid from pro-Carthaginian elements in the city, but the walls of Syracuse were imposing and not easily assaulted. The Carthaginians settled in for a siege. There was small danger of the city falling quickly but the Syracusans were in a precarious position, making Pyrrhus’ arrival that much more pressing.
For Pyrrhus, actually getting from Taras to Syracuse was not so simple, and Pyrrhus’ enemies had little reason to make the passage easy. The mountains of Bruttium posed formidable obstacles, followed by the narrow straits between Rhegium and Messana. The Carthaginians were no doubt troubled by Pyrrhus’ decision to shift operations, which threatened to disrupt their siege of Syracuse. As such, they made a concerted effort to prevent the king’s crossing. The Bruttians were friendly to Pyrrhus, but the Romans had already installed a garrison in Rhegium on the Italian side of the straits. On the Sicilian side of the straits, the Carthaginians and Mamertines concluded an alliance between themselves.15 In addition, a fleet of some 30 Carthaginian ships patrolled the straits.16 Pyrrhus faced a difficult situation. He had around 60 warships, as well as transport vessels for his army.17 But unable to cross freely at the straits, Pyrrhus’ fleet would be forced either to fight, risking defeat and significant losses to the military forces it was transporting, or to take a longer route further out to sea, ris
king attack in open water or natural disasters.
The king first moved his forces as close as he could, to Locri, a city on the eastern side of the toe of Italy that was the last friendly port he could expect on the peninsula. The problem of a friendly port in Sicily was solved when Tyndarion, tyrant of Tauromenium, offered to receive the king in his city some 25 miles south of Messana.18 Pyrrhus chose to risk the open water and crossed from Locri to Tauromenium, a distance of some 22 miles. The Carthaginians made no apparent effort to hamper him. Perhaps Pyrrhus snuck by at an opportune moment, as Timoleon had done before and Appius Claudius Caudex would later. Or, if the number of warships on both sides is accurate, the Carthaginians may have not wanted to risk a fight with Pyrrhus’ larger fleet. Either way, Pyrrhus managed the crossing with no major difficulties despite the precautions of his enemies. Putting in first at Tauromenium, he then moved southwards towards Syracuse. Unwilling to get caught between the Syracusans inside the city and Pyrrhus’ approaching army, the Carthaginians lifted their siege and blockade of Syracuse. They would focus on a defensive strategy to oppose the king. Pyrrhus entered the city triumphantly without fight. Many cities proceeded to send embassies, offering support apparently beyond the initial Syracusan promises. The campaign was off to a good start, as had been the case in Italy.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 14