A History of the Pyrrhic War

by Patrick Alan Kent

  The dominion of Pyrrhus

  Pyrrhus entered Syracuse without a fight in late 278. The city was deeply divided in factional strife with which the king had to contend. He proceeded to reconcile the two men who had been vying for control of the city and had invited him to Sicily. Pyrrhus managed to settle the matter between Sosistratos and Theonon, which helped his political position in the city. He was able to present himself as a mediator and assert his superiority above the various factions of the city without being beholden to any one in particular.19 Once on the island, other cities, including Leontini, sent ambassadors.20 Sosistratos also brought Acragas and other nearby small cities to the king, as promised. Pyrrhus then set about preparing for a campaign against the Carthaginians, but his legal position was poorly defined and his control nominal as he relied on voluntary support of his Sicilian allies just as he had in Italy.

  Pyrrhus’ familial relationships to Agathocles helped among some groups of Syracusan society but were problematic among others. Agathocles had given his daughter Lanassa to Pyrrhus (along with the island of Corcyra as dowry) to help secure his possessions in Magna Graecia long before Pyrrhus’ own western campaign. She had provided Pyrrhus two sons, Alexander and Helenus, but was unable to accept the royal practice of polygamy used for political alliances and left him for Demetrius Poliorcetes. Diodorus mentions Lanassa as a motivating factor for the Syracusans.21 Agathocles had been popular among some of them. But the tyrant was not well liked by everyone as he represented a severe departure from the established political system and had employed brutal tactics against his enemies. After Agathocles’ death Sosistratos had persecuted those who he claimed had supported the tyrant, seizing property and driving many into exile. Pyrrhus was forced to tread carefully if he was to avoid alienating powerful local leaders on every side as he had no deep-rooted support in the city. Pyrrhus likely emphasized his familial relations to those who were receptive and downplayed them to those who were hostile. As such, he decided that it would be best if his eldest son Alexander stayed in Italy to avoid unnecessary conflicts.

  Syracuse was under Pyrrhus’ control and by extension subordinate cities such as Acragas and Leontini, but it was reliant on their voluntary support. Polybius, through a speech of Hieronymus during the Second Punic War, says that the Sicilians hailed Pyrrhus as hegemon and king (ἡγεμών καὶ βασιλεύς), and Justin says he was called king of Sicily (rex Siciliae).22 Such language calls to mind Agathocles and later Hiero II, but these literary descriptions give a false impression of Pyrrhus’ actual power.

  In Italy Pyrrhus had not issued any coins in his own name, relying instead on local issues, some of which bore some of his iconography. During his time in Sicily, though, he issued a wide array of coins on a significant scale. Pyrrhus produced coinage that bore a variety of iconography that provide a window into his power on the island.23 He used images typical of the kings of the Hellenistic east and associated with Alexander, such as the head of Zeus and his thunderbolt, which indicated the power of the monarch. Heracles was a particularly potent symbol for Pyrrhus. The demigod’s exploits across the world were a parallel to the conquests of Alexander, and symbolized Greek superiority to the barbarian. Pyrrhus also claimed descent from Heracles, giving his leadership a divine power. Gold coins bore the image of Nike in an abstract form pioneered under Alexander, which symbolized a calling to conquer. Gold, silver, and bronze coins were issued in a variety of weights. On all of these issues, Pyrrhic/Epirote, Hellenistic, and Sicilian iconography was mixed.

  Some of Pyrrhus’ coins bear the inscription ‘King Pyrrhus’ (ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΠΥΡΡΟΥ), but this does not necessarily indicate a claim of kingship over the Sicilian Greeks or Sicily as a whole. King Pyrrhus in this case does not equate to King of Sicily.24 Indeed, his leadership differed greatly from those other kings as Pyrrhus relied on voluntary submission instead of military domination as they mostly had. Even as Pyrrhus issued coins in Syracuse, the city itself continued to produce coinage under its own authority. King (basileus) and hegemon in this instance most likely refer to the authority granted to him by the Sicilian Greeks in prosecuting a war with Carthage. His position was one that was built upon his individual leadership, which is emphasized in the iconography of his coins. Pyrrhus lacked any well-established connections in Syracuse that could have given him any ability to enforce a strong rule. Pyrrhus’ familial ties to Agathocles were a double-edged sword at best and likely provided little basis for his rule. The factions of Syracuse supported Pyrrhus through necessity rather than any real connection.

  The weight systems Pyrrhus employed were as varied as his iconography. Gold and silver coins conformed to the Attic standard, which was the basis for issues under Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic kingdoms. Bronze coins were minted on the local Sicilian Greek weight standard (litra). Pyrrhus also issued silver octobols, an unusual denomination in the Hellenistic period, which were similar in weight to Tarentine coins and reduced weight Corinthian pegasi that were common on the island. The primary purpose of Pyrrhus’ coins was to pay for his campaign. Whatever money he had brought from Epirus and made use of in Italy must have been running thin. The octobols served as a means of paying his men, who were drawn now from a wide geographic area that stretched from mainland Greece to Sicily, in a way that was somewhat compatible with a variety of weight standards.25

  Not only did Pyrrhus’ coins serve a financial (paying for the campaign) and political (visually reinforcing his leadership) role, they also created the potential for a more unified monetary system. Coin weights in Italy, Sicily, and the western Mediterranean in general had lacked a universal standard, which made interchange an issue to some degree. As with Alexander the Molossian before him, Pyrrhus promoted the Attic standard while also integrating local weights within a more comprehensive system.26 Whether this was a planned strategy or merely convenience, it facilitated interchangeability across the western Greek world that would foster a more unified economic area. This could, in time, strengthen Pyrrhus’ own control of the region while stimulating trade. As with the Hellenistic kingdoms of the east, diverse populations required a flexible approach in order to create a more cohesive polity.

  Pyrrhus’ coins in Sicily were a marked departure from his time in Italy. Pyrrhus had not produced coins in Taras, Locri, or any other Italian city in his own name. A majority of the coins that were produced during his time in the west were minted in Sicily, with the mints of Italy producing far fewer.27 To some degree, this increase is to be expected given the fact that his campaign was not stretching into a third year. But Syracuse itself was of monumental importance to any lasting hegemony in the west. The Tarentines proudly claimed leadership of the Italiote Greeks, but rarely managed to make that a reality, let alone have any influence in Sicily. The Syracusans, on the other hand, had at times managed to establish control over Sicily as well as southern Italy. Similarly, the Carthaginians were a far more established enemy of the Greeks than the Romans. Control of Taras was key to Pyrrhus’ hegemony in southern Italy, but control of Syracuse created the potential for a Hellenistic-style kingdom. Pyrrhus’ coins clearly indicate the king’s intentions in the long run, but also the limitations of his authority upon his arrival.

  Pyrrhus’ authority and military power was dependent on his local allies who made up most of his soldiers, since only a core of some 8,000 men had come with him from Italy. The support of men like Sosistratos and Theonon was far more relevant than his own family connections. So too Pyrrhus relied on other poleis voluntarily allying with him. His coins indicate a limitation of his actual power and retention of local autonomy. His position relied on his ability to unite aided by his reputation as a victor, an image he promoted through the iconography of his coins. The subsequent campaign against the Carthaginians in 277 would have greatly strengthened Pyrrhus’ hand, but there was still a fundamental flaw in his exercise of power. Pyrrhus lacked effective agency among his allies. He was forced to rely on others, which meant th
at if their support was withdrawn he had few options to assert himself. The king may have had dreams of greater influence, but he had to tread very carefully to avoid alienating his support.

  The military forces of the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus

  The Carthaginians maintained significant military and naval forces in Sicily. Carthaginian armies were large, well organized, and served a key function in their wars against the Greeks on Sicily, but our knowledge of these conflicts is limited to Greek sources that portray Carthaginian armies as large, poorly organized, poorly led, and prone to dissolving at the first setback. Nevertheless, Carthaginian forces had managed to deal serious defeats to their Greek opponents at times and were certainly capable enough to pursue offensive campaigns or defend against Greek attacks as circumstances dictated. Very little is preserved concerning the specific makeup or activities of Carthaginian armies in the Pyrrhic War, but a general outline can be established.

  Carthage’s land forces were drawn from three pools of manpower: the citizens of Carthage itself, who sometimes formed Sacred Battalions, the Libyphoenician population surrounding the city, and mercenaries drawn from around the western Mediterranean.28 It is the use of mercenaries drawn from Gaul, Spain, Numidia, Italy, and other places that are negatively emphasized by Greco-Roman sources. Nevertheless, mercenaries were often professionals (as opposed to Greek or Roman militia) who rarely betrayed their employers save only when pay was not forthcoming.29 Mercenaries were skilled and effective, and no problems with them are mentioned in the Pyrrhic War.

  Carthaginian armies were diverse in their makeup, which allowed for a great deal of flexibility through an assorted mixture of different infantry, cavalry, and light infantry. (Elephants were not yet used by the Carthaginians.) How these armies were organized is not known in any detail, although no doubt a system of units and officers was in place to coordinate the men in battle. A large Carthaginian army could number between 20,000 to perhaps 60,000. Unfortunately, reliable numbers are hard to come by as Greek and Roman sources enjoyed exaggerating their enemies’ numbers to glorify their own victories. At times they describe ridiculous-sized armies of 120,000 to 300,000 men and casualties of 150,000 in a single battle.30 But the lack of unbiased data makes it difficult to offer little more than conjecture with regards to numbers for most campaigns and battles before the Punic Wars.

  The Carthaginians were the preeminent naval power of the western Mediterranean. By the time of the Pyrrhic War, the quinquereme had become the foremost warship although triremes were still commonly used as well. The quinquereme was a long, slender ship with a crew of around 300 (mostly working the oars) designed for ramming enemy vessels.31 The Carthaginian ships were well designed and the crews skilled, often proving more than a match for Greek navies in battle. Although the total number of ships in service during the Pyrrhic War is not mentioned, Carthaginian fleets in total seem to have numbered between 200 and 300 ships, which would have required tens of thousands of men. Most of the crews were drawn from Carthaginian citizens. Carthage’s navy was formidable and played a key role in supporting military efforts in Sicily, raiding, protecting supply lines, and moving soldiers.

  The Carthaginians were capable of fielding large and capable military and naval forces when Pyrrhus began his campaign. We are told that an army of 50,000 men and 100 ships was besieging Syracuse in 278.32 Whatever the precise number, a substantial amount would have been needed to lay siege to the city. Once the king arrived, these forces withdrew and disappear from the surviving narrative. During Pyrrhus’ march across the island in 277, no Carthaginian army would oppose him on the battlefield and no naval operations are recorded by either side. The pro-Greek sources create an image of weakness and cowardice in the face of an awe-inspiring Pyrrhus.

  However, instead of challenging Pyrrhus in the field where they faced a skilled general, Carthaginian commanders chose a defensive strategy relying on a series of fortified cities and bastions scattered throughout the western areas of the island. The most important city was Lilybaeum located at the western tip of Sicily, which served as the basis of Carthaginian power. Each of these sites was well fortified against attack, which the Carthaginians expected to bring any efforts by Pyrrhus to a grinding halt. Likewise, control of the sea by their navy would force Pyrrhus to make a series of bloody assaults as he would be unable to starve out the garrisons in coastal sites. The Carthaginians would later pursue similar tactics during the First Punic War in the face of Roman invasion. Such a defensive strategy would be supplemented with a series of targeted diplomatic strikes meant to sow division between Pyrrhus and his allies. However, the Carthaginians failed to anticipate Pyrrhus’ ability as he pushed their strategy to its limits.

  The precise number of soldiers Pyrrhus transported from Italy to Sicily is difficult to determine due to incomplete information in the sources. Appian says he crossed with his elephants and 8,000 men, probably a mixture of cavalry and infantry, a number reinforced by Pyrrhus’ coin production.33 (The king left a similar-sized force sans elephants in Italy under his lieutenant Milo to protect his possessions there during his time away.) These 8,000 men formed the core of his army in Sicily, which would have been mostly those who had come with him from Epirus to Italy including his phalanx of Epirotes. Pyrrhus had been unable to draw any more men from Epirus as reinforcements.34 No Italian allies are mentioned as crossing with him or in the subsequent campaigns, which may be the result of fragmentary sources or the fact that the Samnites, Lucanians, and Italiote Greeks were defending against Roman incursions into southern Italy.

  Pyrrhus was forced to rely on his Sicilian Greek allies to provide him the manpower needed to face the Carthaginians. The king was supported by men sent by the leaders of Syracuse (10,000 men), Leontini (4,000 infantry, 500 cavalry), and Acragas (8,000 infantry, 800 cavalry).35 No doubt other Greeks and perhaps some Sicels sent men as well, but they were either not seen as relevant or were too few to warrant mention in the surviving sources. In total, Pyrrhus entered the Carthaginian epikrateia with around 30,000 infantry, between 1,500 and 2,500 cavalry, and his elephants.36 A majority of his soldiers were Sicilian Greeks, making him especially dependent on their continued goodwill. In the various sieges of the campaign the army proved very effective in difficult assaults against the walls of Eryx and Panormus, suggesting Pyrrhus led a capable military force.

  Once he took control of Syracuse, Pyrrhus also controlled a rather large fleet of over 200 warships, made up mostly of quinqueremes.37 These were, like his army, mostly provided by his allies. The largest of these ships was a royal ‘niner’ (ἐννήρες). However, Pyrrhus’ navy never saw any action. This absence, combined with his efforts to build more ships in 276, suggest that the Greek navy was inferior to that of Carthage making the king wary of losing his own ships. As such, Pyrrhus’ naval forces would not play a significant role in the war beyond ferrying him to and from Sicily.

  The campaign in Sicily (277 BCE)

  Pyrrhus had crossed into Sicily in the late summer of 278, moving down the eastern coast of the island until he reached Syracuse. From there, he began preparations for a campaign against the Carthaginians, including the minting of coins to pay for it. This operation would be drastically different from what had occurred in Italy. There would be no major battles. Instead, it was a methodical series of bloody sieges of fortified cities and locations. Pyrrhus set out from Syracuse at the head of an army of around 32,000 men in the spring of 277. His campaign was carefully planned and informed by his experienced Sicilian Greek allies. The linchpin to Carthage’s position was Lilybaeum far to the west. But Pyrrhus had to isolate the city before he could launch a major attack on it. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, countered Pyrrhus’ efforts through a combination of a defensive military strategy and an offensive diplomatic effort.

  As in Italy, there was no way for Pyrrhus to root out every garrison or conquer every town in alliance with his enemies, which would be a slow effort exposed to counterattacks. As such, he
pursued a similar strategy of gathering local alliances as he had in Italy, but with greater success in Sicily than he had seen there. The tyrants of Tauromenium and Leontni had already provided soldiers. Soon after the campaign began the centrally located city of Enna sought an alliance, followed by several western cities as Pyrrhus moved into Carthaginian territory.38 Where many central Italian communities chose to remain allies of the Romans, Sicilian communities were proving more amenable. This process is not unexpected, as influence in various cities and regions of the island had changed repeatedly between the Carthaginians and Greeks over the previous decades as the power of each side had waxed and waned. For many communities, an alliance with Pyrrhus was simply the most pragmatic choice in a mercurial political and military environment. Of course, this also meant that their loyalty to Pyrrhus was equally dubious. Unlike in Italy, in Sicily Pyrrhus was able to take control of city after city, peacefully and by siege, resulting in a real perception of momentum in driving the Carthaginians from the island. Where the Romans had lost little territory to the king, the Carthaginians were being steadily pushed back.

  Pyrrhus marched west from Syracuse towards the large city of Acragas halfway along the southern coast of Sicily, probably along the road from Catana. Acragas had been under the control of Sosistratos. Once Pyrrhus arrived he took control of its military forces and dependent communities.39 From here, he could march deep into the heart of Carthaginian territory to the west with a secure base of operations and supply lines. Pyrrhus then moved west along the coastal road, taking control of Heracleia, a city about 15 miles west of Acragas, and Azones.40 Whether these cities required a siege or were taken by some other means is not mentioned, although Heracleia did have a Carthaginian garrison. As he continued west, the peoples of Selinus, Halicyae, Segesta and others joined voluntarily.41 These cities were situated in the foothills overlooking the plain in which Lilybaeum was located, and were well placed to cut the city off from the interior while simultaneously supplying Pyrrhus’ army during a siege.