What then of the betrayal of the city by the garrison? Dionysius, Appian, and Dio specify that Decius fabricated evidence of pro-Pyrrhus sympathizers to justify their treachery, while others simply point to the general greed of the Campanians. Dionysius also mentions that a second version of the story had Fabricius himself order the garrison to take control of the city on the basis of rumors of support for Pyrrhus among the populace. Although he states that “either report is possible,”6 he clearly gives more weight to the story placing the full blame on Decius and the Campanians by constantly reinforcing their abhorrent nature in his narrative. This brief aside implicating Fabricius is found in no other surviving sources, which is hardly surprising given his historic reputation. Indeed, several versions of the story have Fabricius as the one who punishes the garrison. His involvement in ordering Decius’ actions do not fit the moral component of the events at Rhegium and it undermines the entire depiction of Roman virtue that pervades the entire narrative of the war.
It is in fact very likely that pro-Pyrrhic sympathizers were to be found in Rhegium similar to the factionalism displayed in many other cities. Pyrrhus himself would have been eager to encourage any local support he had in the city. Rhegium would serve as a vital link between Magna Graecia and Sicily, it could regulate trade moving through the straits as a counterpoint to the Carthaginian-allied Mamertines, a garrison there would protect his Bruttian allies, and it would eliminate a major Roman base in the south. Fabricius, on the other hand, as consul in 282 had already been forced to retake Thurii when that city renounced its Roman alliance, which gave him firsthand experience with the internal political machinations that could undercut Roman hegemony. The presence of a Roman garrison in Thurii had not been sufficient to hold the city against internal and external pressure. It is certainly possible that Fabricius himself, perhaps with some evidence of pro-Pyrrhic factions, ordered the garrison in Rhegium to ensure the city remained friendly to Rome by any means necessary.
Roman complicity in these events is further reinforced by the apparent delay in their response. To be sure, Dionysius and Appian insist that Fabricius immediately acted to punish the garrison, but their timelines are unclear. Livy’s epitome refers to the action against the garrison at Rhegium taking place after the siege of Taras in 272, which is supported by other authors referring to a delay in Rome’s response due to the pressures of the war with Pyrrhus.7 Dionysius says that a second uprising by another garrison in Rhegium was not put down until 270.8 But this duplication is rooted in the insistence that the Romans would not have allowed such an act to go unpunished for so long. A delayed response was due to the immediate concerns of the war with Pyrrhus. The actions of the Campanian garrison to keep Rhegium friendly to Rome must have been, at least unofficially, condoned.
Indeed, the punishment of the garrison seems to not be the result of the massacre at all. It was only when they threatened the peace imposed on southern Italy by the Romans years after Pyrrhus’ departure that the city was restored to its former inhabitants. After Pyrrhus had withdrawn from Italy, the Campanian garrison attacked the nearby cities of Croton and Caulonia.9 Feelings of pity or responsibility were secondary to pragmatic concerns about this aggression. It may very well be that the Campanians were particularly brutal in their methods in Rhegium, eliciting local resentment, but the Romans did nothing about it for years in order to ensure control of this strategically important city. Pro-Roman writers shifted the blame to the Campanians alone, absolving the Romans generally and Fabricius specifically. The tale of Rhegium became a tale of morality that buttresses the overall image of Roman virtue during the war.
Italy during Pyrrhus’ absence (278–276 BCE)
The war in Italy did not stop while Pyrrhus shifted his campaign to Sicily. Unfortunately, those sources that would have given the most detailed (if biased) account of these events, such as Dio Cassius, Dionysius, and Livy, are lost. Zonaras’ epitome is the only extant source. While the narrative of this period is confused, significant military and political efforts were made on all sides. Although Pyrrhus had become a central focus, the underlying factors of the war before his arrival remained. The same fluidity of alliances and hard-fought gains typical of Italian warfare are well evident. Although the sources are problematic in detail, they nevertheless present a consistent picture of aggressive Roman involvement in southern Italy. Pyrrhus’ allies were pressed hard in his absence. By 276, the Romans controlled the Italian coast from Rhegium to Heraclea, were able to march at will across Samnium, and had bottled up Pyrrhus’ garrison in Taras.
At the end of 279, Pyrrhus had shifted his focus to the Sicilian Greeks and soon departed for the island. He left behind garrisons in several cities with the largest in Taras, perhaps numbering 8,000 men, and promised to return.10 Milo commanded at Taras, while Pyrrhus’ son Alexander remained at Locri, whose mint Pyrrhus was using to produce coins. Pyrrhus’ strategy was to have the forces he left behind secure his gains among the Italiote Greek cities while his Samnite, Lucanian, and Bruttian allies acted as buffers against Roman aggression. Plutarch says that the Tarentines were upset over the king’s decision to leave.11 They demanded that he stay to fight the Romans or leave their city as he had found it. Pyrrhus’ response was to order them to remain quiet; he would deal with things on his own schedule. The supposed hostility on the part of the Tarentines to the king’s departure is used by Plutarch to demonstrate the sense of entitlement of the people of Taras, linking back to the foolish acts that had gotten them into this situation and their balking at Pyrrhus’ insistence on discipline. In addition, this is an early indication of a decline in the king’s moral character. Pyrrhus would begin to exhibit more despotic tendencies.
On the other side, Roman commanders continued to focus their entire attention on operations in southern Italy. No triumphs or campaigns are mentioned against northern Italian peoples after 280. The peace that had been made with the Etruscans held. In 278, the consuls were C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus, who had been consular colleagues in 282.12 Aemilius seems to have campaigned somewhere in southern Italy but failed to achieve anything of note.13 For Fabricius, 279 and 278 were an eventful couple of years. In 279 he had famously declined Pyrrhus’ overtures of wealth and power in favor of his honorable poverty while serving as an envoy, and early the next year had allegedly been approached by Pyrrhus’ doctor with an offer to poison the king, which he revealed to Pyrrhus, deeming such an act despicable. Once the king had left Italy in early 278, Fabricius was able to launch a significant military campaign. For this year, he celebrated a triumph over the Lucanians, Bruttians, Tarentines, and Samnites.14 Given that a battle against a combined force of these people akin to Sentinum seems unlikely, Fabricius apparently covered a great deal of ground. The triumph over the Tarentines may suggest that Milo opposed Fabricius in some fashion but failed to stop his depredations. The Senate may also have felt that whatever the scale of Fabricius’ successes, a triumph would boost the spirits of the Romans after their defeats at Heraclea and Ausculum. Fabricius certainly had experience in the political and military arena of southern Italy, which gave him an edge in navigating the shifting situation in the region.
The Romans established an alliance with the city of Heraclea in 278. Cicero says that Heraclea had a particularly favorable treaty with Rome and that it was formed in the consulship of Fabricius (implying it was he who negotiated it) during the war with Pyrrhus, which would place it in 278.15 A treaty between Rome and Heraclea in 278 is consistent with events of that year. Roman diplomatic efforts would have been strengthened by Fabricius’ military success, the consuls’ prior contacts in the area, and Pyrrhus’ recent departure. At the same time, a particularly favorable treaty, as Heraclea’s was, is to be expected as the Romans were trying to reestablish a foothold in the region at this time. Heraclea was a strategically located city along the southern coast not too far west of Tarentum, as well as being symbolically important as the former head of the Italiote League. It was
also near the site of the Romans’ first defeat at the hands of Pyrrhus. The consuls would have been motivated to make concessions to secure an alliance with the city when Roman influence in the region was at a minimum. Pyrrhus’ departure in 278 offered a significant opportunity for the Romans. His victories may have dampened Roman plans, but in his absence they could continue their aggressive campaigns. As Pyrrhus became bogged down in the political quagmire of Sicily, his Italian allies were on their heels.
In 277, the consuls were P. Cornelius Rufinus and C. Junius Bubulcus Brutus.16 As with the year before, both campaigned in southern Italy. Zonaras provides the only information for this year, which is light on particulars and heavy on romantic improbabilities. While Zonaras’ fanciful description of events is problematic in detail, it nonetheless coheres with the larger project of Roman diplomatic and military efforts during this period and can be accepted with some reservation.17
The consuls at first operated jointly in Samnium. Zonaras says that the Romans recovered their courage, desired to punish those that had summoned Pyrrhus, and managed to quickly seize several fortified places in Samnium. However, the places the Romans took were deserted as the Samnites had withdrawn to hilltop forts.18 The consuls found the Samnites in the Cranite Mountains, the location of which is unknown. The Romans attempted to force their way up the difficult terrain, but suffered heavy casualties for which Rufinus and Brutus blamed one another. Under the right circumstances, the Samnites were still capable of inflicting losses on invading Roman armies, but they were also completely unable to stop the Romans from marching across Samnium at will.19 The consuls of 277 decided to simply ignore the people in the Cranite Mountains and focus their attention elsewhere with no significant negative consequences. The Samnites were, at this point, incapable of fielding an army sufficient to face the Romans in battle, requiring outside assistance to mount any significant resistance.
As a result of their difficulties, the two consuls ceased their combined efforts for the rest of the year. Brutus remained in the southern Apennines, celebrating a triumph over the Lucanians and Bruttians.20 Zonaras says that Brutus remained in Samnium, but he may be poorly epitomizing his source. Rufinus turned towards the Greek city of Croton, resulting in a rather spectacular tale. The city was apparently divided between pro-Roman and pro-Pyrrhic factions. While it remained in alliance with Pyrrhus, some local friends of Rufinus attempted to rebel and invited the consul to take control of the city. However, the other faction prevented this betrayal by requesting an Epirote garrison from Milo. Rufinus, after failing to assault Croton’s walls, feigned an attack on Locri in order to get the garrison to move there. He then turned back and, aided by fog, took Croton. Nicomachus, the garrison commander, attempted to return to Taras but was ambushed by Rufinus and defeated. As such, Locri too joined the Romans. Pyrrhus’ son Alexander, who had been in command in the city, must have withdrawn at some point although the circumstances are unknown.
It seems that Rufinus did manage to take Croton and Locri.21 While the specifics given by Zonaras are fantastic, they do reflect the complex geopolitical realities of the region. Frontinus indicates that the men sent to reinforce Croton were Lucanians, and that Rufinus simply pretended to withdraw so that they left.22 He does not mention any move towards Locri. A temporary increase of defenders in the face of a Roman consular army is logical enough. The factionalism within the city is certainly consistent with other nearby cities, as is the willingness to change sides when circumstances seemed to favor it. A pro-Roman faction may have played a role in convincing the garrison reinforcements that they were no longer needed. If they were Lucanians as Frontinus says, historic hostilities would have only added to the tension of the situation. Rome’s recent successes in the area and Pyrrhus’ continued absence were also factors in people’s minds. Regardless of the confused details, by the end of 277 the Romans had gained control of three major cities along the southern Italian coast, effectively bisecting Pyrrhus’ western domains.
Despite some setbacks, Roman efforts in 277 were largely successful in southern Italy. Brutus earned a triumph for his efforts. Rufinus, however, did not, perhaps due to disputes with Fabricius, who would expel him from the Senate as censor in 275.23
In 276, the Romans faced greater difficulties. The consuls, Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges and C. Genucius Clepsina, fought the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians, for which Fabius earned a triumph.24 However, two events blunted Roman efforts. The first problem was the return of Pyrrhus to Italy, which is no doubt why no military or diplomatic operations are mentioned in Magna Graecia. The second problem was an outbreak of plague in the city of Rome, which supposedly resulted in widespread miscarriages and deaths among people and animals.25 Whatever the scale of the plague, it would have undercut Roman war-making to some degree and may have affected recruitment. Nevertheless, the Romans had made significant gains in southern Italy during Pyrrhus’ absence through a combination of military and diplomatic efforts. But his return from Sicily endangered those advances.
Pyrrhus’ return to Italy
Matters had gone quite well for Pyrrhus when he first crossed to Sicily, but by early 276 everything was falling apart as he tried to tighten his grip. Italy too was in danger. Envoys from Pyrrhus’ Italian allies traveled to see him in Syracuse, saying that they were no longer able to resist the Romans and would surrender if he did not come to help them.26 The Samnites had proven largely ineffective in acting as to shield the Italiote Greeks as Roman armies marched through southern Italy with few difficulties. To make matters worse, Roman alliances with Heraclea, Croton, and Locri in addition to Rhegium threatened to strand Pyrrhus in Sicily if he remained. Sicily itself, especially Syracuse, was increasingly hostile. Pyrrhus had little choice but to leave the island, but crossing back to Italy was precarious. Increased Carthaginian aggressiveness following the failure of Pyrrhus’ siege of Lilybaeum did not help.
Pyrrhus’ immediate problem was in actually crossing the straits again. His fleet was strong, perhaps 110 ships, but was no larger than that of the Carthaginians.27 The crossing was made more difficult than the first had been due to a Roman garrison in Locri in particular. In addition, the straits were being patrolled by Carthaginian vessels once more. Transporting his army, including elephants, all the way back to Taras by sea was not feasible as it risked storms, enemy attacks, and any other number of hazards that had destroyed many an ancient navy. Crossing at the shortest point was difficult as well since both Messana and Rhegium remained hostile. There was little other choice and Pyrrhus set out. But his fleet did not go unnoticed, losing several ships in a brief fight against the Carthaginians before he managed to escape.28 Despite some losses, Pyrrhus made it.
Zonaras’ account of Pyrrhus’ arrival back in Italy is preferable to Plutarch’s.29 Plutarch describes these events but simplifies the narrative, implying Pyrrhus landed near Rhegium and then was harassed as he marched towards Taras, leaving out his looting of the temple of Locri. He is telescoping what he considers superfluous happenings. While Zonaras’ version is also condensed, it provides a more detailed description of Pyrrhus’ attempts to secure the toe of Italy for himself.
According to Zonaras, Pyrrhus first sailed to Locri where the locals quickly reconsidered their Roman alliance and killed the garrison in the city.30 Whether he landed at or near the city is unclear. Pyrrhus then attempted to secure his lines of communication with Sicily. Although the Syracusans and other Sicilian Greeks had become resistant to Pyrrhus’ attempts to increase his power there, they remained allies up to this point. The king no doubt had given up his dreams of being a true king of Sicily, but securing the resources of the Greeks on the island to some degree was still imperative. As such, he attacked Rhegium in order to gain control of the Italian side of the straits. But he failed to take the city, which was still defended by its Campanian garrison.
As Pyrrhus withdrew from Rhegium, he faced a much more significant problem. He had extended himself by marching across the mountain
s of Bruttium and a significant force of Mamertines from Messana now harassed his retreat. The Mamertines must have also played a role in Rhegium’s successful defense. These events may be the source of allegations by Roman sources that the Campanian garrison of Rhegium had made an alliance with the Mamertines. The mountains of Bruttium did not give Pyrrhus an easy path, but the Bruttians themselves were friendly with the king. Pyrrhus was pursued, according to Plutarch, by 10,000 Mamertines. Whatever the actual number, the Mamertines refused to engage in fixed battle. Instead, they used the terrain to harass Pyrrhus’ men and even killed two elephants. Pyrrhus was forced to rush back and forth along his line of march to deal personally with these constant attacks.
During the retreat from Rhegium, Plutarch describes another instance of Pyrrhus’ personal prowess in line with his fight with Oblacus Volsinius and his scaling the walls of Eryx. Pyrrhus suffered a wound to his head, which covered his face in blood in a rather gory display. At this moment a huge Mamertine challenged the king to single combat, if he still lived. Furious and drenched in blood, Pyrrhus responded. Before his opponent could act Pyrrhus brought his own sword down on the Mamertine’s head, cutting the man completely in two. Having terrified his enemies, the king faced no further raids on his march back to Locri. While the details of this episode can be dismissed as unhistorical, Pyrrhus is portrayed as still formidable and the episode heightens the tension leading into the battle of Beneventum. Even when things were going poorly, either on a personal level from a sword wound to the head or on a strategic level with the loss of allies, Pyrrhus could not be counted out. Regardless, the focus on Pyrrhus as an individual combatant overshadows the great amount of skill he displayed in extricating his army from Rhegium with minimal losses.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 18