A History of the Pyrrhic War

by Patrick Alan Kent

  41 MRR 1:195.

  42 Val. Max 6.3.4; Livy Per. 14.

  43 Livy Per. 13, 14; Forsythe (2005) 357. Dio (fr. 40.39–40) meanwhile insists that the Romans were eager to enlist to defend their homeland, and that a speech changed their fear of Pyrrhus to courage and hatred.

  44 Plut. Pyrr. 24.4; de Sanctis (1956–1964) 2:413. Griffith (1935) 62–63 also suggests he had a significant number of mercenaries from Sicily.

  45 Oros. Hist. 4.2.6; DH 20.10.1.

  46 Lévêque (1957) 520–521; Wuilleumier (1939) 136.

  47 Dio fr. 40.45.

  48 Plut. Pyrr. 25; DH 20.11–12; Zon. 8.6; Front. Strat. 2.2.1; Livy Per. 14; Florus 1.13.11; Oros. Hist. 4.2.3; Eutr. 2.14.3; Lévêque (1957) 521–524; Wuilleumier (1939) 134–136.

  49 Plutarch (Pyrr. 25.2) places the battle in the vicinity of Beneventum. Orosius (Hist. 4.2.3) and Florus (1.13.11) place it in the Arusinian plains in Lucania (near Paestum). Frontinus (Str. 4.1.14) says the Arusinian plains near Beneventum. Beloch (1922–1927) 4.1:557 has suggested that both consuls fought a single battle against Pyrrhus in Lucania. Lévêque (1957) 518–519 based on Beloch, Frontinus, and Livy (25.16–17), argues that the confusion of location is an error based on the fact that the Calor River flows from Lucania, near the Arusinian plains, to Beneventum. Wuilleumier (1939) 134–135 suggests that the confusion was caused by two nearly simultaneous battles in Samnium and Lucania.

  50 Plut. Pyrr. 25; DH 20.11; cf. Enn. Ann. fr. 205–206. Plutarch says that Pyrrhus himself commanded this force, while Dionysius has him remain in his camp to experience a prophetic dream while it was happening. It seems unlikely Pyrrhus would have risked himself in such an action, and his presence was certainly not as important as it would be with the main body of men where he is to be found during the subsequent battle.

  51 Plut. Pyrr. 25.5; cf. DH 20.12.

  52 Eutr. 2.14.5; Oros. Hist. 4.2.6.

  53 Beloch (1922–1927) 4.1:557 argues based on Polybius (18.28.11) and Justin (25.5.5) that the battle was a draw; cf. Lévêque (1957) 525–526. Zonaras’ claim (8.6) that Pyrrhus was forced to flee with only a few horsemen is clear exaggeration meant to highlight the scale of the Romans’ victory.

  54 Wuilleumier (1939) 134–135.

  55 Degrassi (1954) 98.

  56 DS 27.4.3.

  57 Marchetti in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) 61–72.

  58 Brauer (1986) 160–161.

  59 Burnett in La Magna Grecia da Pirro ad Annibale (2015) 819–882; Brauer (1986) 141–162; Stazio (1971) 171–174.

  60 Just. 25.3.4; Polyaenus, Strat. 6.6.1.

  61 Plut. Pyrr. 26.2; Zon. 8.6; Just. 25.3.4.

  62 Plb. 1.8–9; cf. Zon. 8.6; Justin 23.4.

  63 M. Curius Dentatus and Ser. Cornelius Merenda, MRR 1:196.

  64 Degrassi (1954) 98 suggests ‘Bruttieisque’ in the lost potion of the entry for this year, but it is not certain.

  65 MRR 1: 197; Degrassi (1954) 98–99.

  66 DH 20.17.1–2; Dio fr. 42; Zon. 8.7; Salmon (1967) 288. Beloch (1926) 474, argues that this was a minor affair as no triumphs were awarded, but Salmon (loc. cit.) points out that both consuls were dispatched suggesting that it was seen as a significant threat and that the lack of triumphs was due to the fact that they were reclaiming lost territory rather than conquering new.

  67 Degrassi (1954) 99; Zon. 8.6; DH 20.15.

  68 Zon. 8.6. Zonaras is sloppy in his epitomizing here, suggesting that the Tarentine rebels then contacted the Romans for an alliance. However, Dio fr. 33 shows that it was the Caerites who contacted the Romans and that Zonaras has combined the two events.

  69 Zon. 8.6. Orosius (Hist. 4.3.1–2; 4.5.2; Livy Per. 14) gives a far more hostile account of Carthaginian involvement, suggesting that they came to help the Tarentines fight the Romans.

  70 Zon. 8.6; Front. Strat. 3.3.1.

  71 Head (1911) 103–104; Walbank (1957–1971) 2:332.

  Epilogue

  Up to this day, you would have seen nothing beyond the cattle of the Volscians, the flocks of the Sabines, the carriages of the Gauls, and the broken arms of the Samnites. Now if you looked at the captives, you saw Molossians, Thessalians, Macedonians, Bruttians, Apulians, and Lucanians. If you looked at the parade, you marked out the gold, the purple things, the Tarentine paintings and luxuries.1

  When describing the triumphal processions that paraded through Rome with the end of the Pyrrhic War, Florus emphasizes it as a moment of accomplishment in the conquest of Italy and the beginning of the period of trans-Mediterranean conquests. This was a transitory moment in Roman history. The ancient enemies of the Roman people had been defeated. Gone were the glorified cattle raids of neighbors only a few miles away. Now even the furthest reaches of Italy had been conquered. More importantly, the people of the city now witnessed their defeat of peoples from beyond the peninsula. Dentatus is said to have even marched elephants through the streets of Rome. This was only the first triumph of many that would see the conquest of a vast empire.

  The Pyrrhic War is the culmination of Rome’s heroic age in the history of Dionysius when great deeds, personal combats, and divine intervention were still commonplace. Here it is useful to return to the battle of Beneventum. According to Dionysius, the night before the fighting Pyrrhus had a horrific dream in which his teeth fell out and blood ceaselessly poured from his mouth. He had just ordered a group of his men to seize a strategic point behind the Romans in the middle of the night and now, due to the dream, feared that this dangerous action was a mistake. His advisors, however, convinced him not to let this opportunity pass. This episode serves as a counterpoint to the destruction of the statue of Jupiter described in the epitome of Livy. The gods sent portents of doom to both sides, leaving the outcome of the fight unknown. The Romans defeated their fear, religiously and militarily, and overcame their obstacles. But Pyrrhus, on the other hand, Dionysius says, “was not strong enough to conquer Fate.”2

  In this fashion, the battle of Beneventum is the climax of the Roman narrative of the war. It was a microcosm of the entire struggle. The Romans validated their greatness through victory against both the divine and the mundane, while Pyrrhus would always be one step short. Fate constrained Pyrrhus, but was unable to hold back the Romans. Indeed, Fate herself seemingly walks the battlefield. Gone are the tactical maneuvers of the fight, replaced by the seemingly random event of a baby elephant calling for its mother and throwing everything into confusion. The elephants become Pyrrhus’ hubris made manifest. This same pattern can be seen in Pyrrhus’ later assault on Argos where he pulled his helmet off so that everyone could see him as he marched through the city in triumph. Then an old woman threw a roof tile that hit him in the head, resulting in his death.3 He could never conquer Fate like his enemies the Romans or his cousin Alexander.

  Despite Roman exaggeration, Pyrrhus was not Alexander. He came to Italy and then Sicily not in hopes of conquering the west in imitation of his cousin, but with the intention of bringing the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily under his control. He always had his eyes on the wars of the Hellenistic east, but lacked the resources to compete with his more powerful rivals. Political unification of the Italiote and Sicilian Greeks had been a limited reality only a decade prior under Agathocles, king of Syracuse and Pyrrhus’ sometime father-in-law. War with the Romans and Carthaginians were tangents, not objectives. Pyrrhus pursued peace with the Romans and attempted to drive the Carthaginians from Sicily. But he failed to understand the geopolitical roots of the problems he faced. Factions divided Syracuse, Taras, and other cities, which he tried to rise above but in reality failed to find strong connections with local leadership. His attempts to quickly end foreign wars failed to take into account the drawn-out and tenacious nature of Italian warfare in which the Romans thrived, and the Carthaginian skillfulness at exploiting the internal dissension of their enemies while exercising strategic patience. Even those smaller communities that often fall out of the narrative pursued their own interests first in a fluid military and polit
ical environment. Pyrrhus’ success on the battlefield was insufficient to realize his goals. But victory in the Pyrrhic War served as proof of Roman greatness for later generations. They had defeated a man who they insisted was nearly comparable to Alexander the Great.

  Rome’s new status as a major power is confirmed in an alliance with Ptolemy II Philadelphus, the king of Egypt and successor to Alexander. Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, N. Fabius Pictor, and Q. Ogulnius Gallus were sent to Egypt in 273 as ambassadors where they were treated well, given gifts, and concluded a treaty.4 Rome was welcomed into the circle of great powers in recognition for defeating Pyrrhus. In this moment of triumph, the virtue of early Rome is reinforced in two events that contrast with the negative impact of empire upon later generations.

  During the censorship of C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus in 275 the issue of foreign luxuries was addressed.5 This was the same Fabricius who had twice been consul during the war and had famously embraced his humble fortune in the face of Pyrrhus’ promises. Now in the position of censor and moral enforcer, Fabricius expelled P. Cornelius Rufinus from the Senate for the extravagance of owning silver drinking cups that weighed ten pounds. Rufinus had twice been consul and once dictator, but his display of luxury is shown in opposition to the humility of Fabricius, who is the epitome of early Roman virtue. Dionysius proceeds to then praise the office of the censor, which he says had the responsibility of reviewing all of the actions of citizens in public and within the household even to the way a father raised his children and a husband treated his wife. The censor made sure that everything was done in the best way and for the good of the community.

  Much better were the actions of the ambassadors to Ptolemy. When given magnificent gifts, they tried to deposit them in the public treasury rather than keep such ostentation for their own benefit. In recognition for their achievements, the Senate allowed them to retain the gifts. Here the individual is subordinated to the community. Luxury was not in and of itself a bad thing; it was the motives of the person that made it so. The community, represented by the Senate, gives permission to keep items that no doubt surpassed those Rufinus had owned because of their honorable attempts to deposit them. Rufinus becomes an exemplum of the negative impact of empire on Rome, foreshadowing the moral decline in the second century that resulted from the influx of wealth from their conquest of the Mediterranean. For the moment, at the end of the Pyrrhic War when the Romans stood triumphant, they retained the moral superiority that had seen them through the conquest of Italy.

  For Dionysius, Roman achievement was linked to the Greek roots he imagined for them. Many of the virtues of the Roman people, he insists, were linked to a memory of their Greek origins. As they defeated the peoples of Italy, the Romans continued to embody those ancient ideals even as the Greeks themselves became barbarized in the wake of Alexander the Great. With the defeat of Pyrrhus, the Romans demonstrated themselves not only as the successors of Alexander as well as the Greeks in general. Pyrrhus remarks that the Romans are to be admired. He is portrayed as a petitionary after the battle of Heraclea rather than a victor, coming to the Senate in hopes they will grant him peace. But even in their moment of triumph, Dionysius notes that the same corruption would eventually infect the Roman people as individuals sought greater personal glory for themselves.6 It was the loss of the values embodied by Fabricius to which later Roman historians, politicians, and philosophers pointed as the reason for the civil wars that ended the Republic. The community, the res publica, that had once been preeminent was replaced by men like Rufinus who put their own desires before their fellow citizens. The story of the Pyrrhic War is shaped into both a laudatory and a cautionary tale.

  The narrative of the war is not only a commentary on the far future of the Republic, but also a preamble to the challenges of the Punic Wars. As Polybius had said, the war is portrayed as the moment when Italy became Roman in fact as well as by right. While Pyrrhus is labeled as a foreign invader of Roman space, he is only a momentary foe for the Romans. The most impactful violation of Italy is due to the Punic faith of the Carthaginians. They had already shown their untrustworthiness. The Roman Senate is said to have rejected an offer of support by the Carthaginian admiral Mago. The brief descriptions of the exchange make it clear that the Romans needed no outside help and certainly did not want foreigners in Italy (Pyrrhus or Carthaginians). Mago supposedly then reached out to Pyrrhus in an attempt to play both sides, displaying his Punic faith. So too, we are told that when the Carthaginians had suffered severe losses to Pyrrhus in Sicily they attempted to pay him to go away, implicitly suggesting a return to Italy and war with Rome with which they were supposedly cooperating. But it is during the siege of Tarentum that they prove themselves as enemies of the Roman people.

  In Zonaras’ somewhat confused version, the Carthaginians aided the Roman siege of the city with a naval blockade after being called by the faction hostile to the garrison commander Milo. Orosius’ account, on the other hand, taken from Livy’s lost book 14, is far more coherent and deeply hostile.7 As with Zonaras, he says that the Tarentines asked for Carthaginian help upon hearing of Pyrrhus’ death. But gone are the internal political divisions. A united Taras has called for Carthaginian help against the attacking Romans. The Carthaginians then arrive and lose a fight with the Romans. They had arrogantly expected to easily sweep aside the Romans, but now are shocked that they could possibly lose. Most importantly, the Carthaginians have trespassed in Roman space. The Philinus treaty had supposedly defined Italy and Sicily as Roman and Carthaginian space respectively. Part of Polybius’ rejection of the treaty was exonerating Roman guilt in getting involved in Sicilian affairs, which directly led to the First Punic War. The Livian tradition, from which Orosius derives, takes a different tack, asserting that the Carthaginians were to blame for future conflicts because they had already broken the agreement by coming to the aid of Taras, which is also reflected in Dio.8 The version found in Zonaras, suggesting Roman and Carthaginian cooperation to some degree, seems the more likely. The two peoples had a long relationship that stretched back to the founding of the Republic. Mago’s mission was one of support against a common foe, and there is no reason to think that the Carthaginians would take such a bold step as to aid the Tarentines against Rome. It makes no sense in the context of the time. The continuous denigration of the Carthaginians throughout the narrative of the Punic War is setting the stage for the next phase of Roman expansion in the Punic Wars.

  Many of the events of the Pyrrhic War parallel those of the Second Punic War some 50 years later. In particular, the deeds of Pyrrhus and Hannibal are very similar. In both wars, the Romans faced a skilled general, each of whom invaded Italy. Both employed sophisticated tactics on the battlefield that Roman generals had serious difficulty countering (although some writers would insist the Romans won their battles against Pyrrhus). Both brought elephants with them to Italy, which the Roman legionaries feared at first but ultimately overcame. Both were joined by rebellious Italian peoples such as the Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tarentines. (Unlike Pyrrhus, Hannibal was also able to persuade the Campanians to join him.) And in terms of martial skill, the two are described as among the best generals of all time. During his apocryphal meeting with Scipio Africanus, Hannibal ranks himself as the third greatest general in history just after Pyrrhus. “Then Scipio broke out into laughter and inquired, ‘What then would you have said if you had beaten me [at Zama]?’ ‘Then doubtless,’ [Hannibal] said, ‘I would be before Alexander and before Pyrrhus and before all the other generals.’”9

  Pyrrhus and Hannibal, despite their prowess, were unable to take advantage of their victories or overcome Roman tenacity. After the battles of Heraclea and Cannae respectively, each general is said to have been presented with the opportunity to attack Rome itself. Both were urged to attack the city by their lieutenants Milo and Maharbal respectively, but chose not to do so. Each may have defeated Roman armies, but they could not defeat the Roman spirit. After these
two losses on the battlefield some Romans did in fact despair. After Heraclea, the Senate, we are told, was on the verge of accepting a peace dictated by Pyrrhus. Meanwhile, some survivors of Cannae thought all was lost and considered abandoning Rome. But each group was rallied by a patriotic call to fight on against the odds. Defeat was only momentary; victory in the long term was assured due to the superiority of the Roman people. In the end even the greatest generals fell before the collective might of the Romans, just as Alexander himself would have done, had he come to Italy, Livy says.

  While many of the deeds of Pyrrhus and Hannibal are similar, there is a significant difference in intention as with Rufinus and the ambassadors to Ptolemy. A clear distinction is made in the character of each. Maharbal mocks Hannibal, saying that he is capable of winning battles but that he does not know how to use the victory.10 Pyrrhus, on the other hand, decides to follow the advice of Cineas and try to negotiate in recognition of Roman virtue. Hannibal proves a fool, while Pyrrhus makes the better choice. At the battle of Heraclea Pyrrhus nearly lost his life due to an attack by Oblacus Volsinius, prompting the king to switch armor with one of his companions, Megacles, in order to protect his life from any further attempts. Similarly, Hannibal feared assassination and, it is said, wore various disguises from day to day in order to hide his identity.11 But the circumstances of these actions and their motivations are radically different. Pyrrhus was in the midst of battle, personally reinforcing his men where the fighting was heaviest. And when Megacles fell, Pyrrhus threw off his helmet to assure his men that he lived. Hannibal, on the other hand, hid in his daily life, not from any real threat but from only the fear of one. Pyrrhus’ action may have not been the most admirable, but it is understandable and ultimately one he redeemed by again exposing himself to danger. Hannibal was acting merely as a coward jumping at shadows. So too, in the ranking of generals Hannibal places himself highly, asserting that only one victory more would have made him the greatest of all time. Pyrrhus appears on the same list, here and elsewhere, but he never is the one placing himself so high. It is always others that remark on his skill. Pyrrhus is said to have dreamt of emulating Alexander and laid out plans to conquer the west to Cineas, which speaks to his (misguided) ambition more than his arrogance.