Goebbels, who had just about stood loyally by Hitler, took the opportunity to make another attempt to influence policy. Following a leaders’ conference in Munich at the end of April, at which propaganda and organizational issues were discussed, he pressed Hitler in private to make the Party ‘more Prussian, more active and more socialist’. According to Goebbels’s account Hitler had ‘tactical misgivings’ but agreed with his propaganda chief that he should devote ‘more attention to the matter of socialism’. Goebbels was not satisfied, however,134 and during the following weeks made critical comments on the Party leader in his diaries.135 Meanwhile in May another conflict was brewing, for a public statement Goebbels had issued some years previously was threatening to land Hitler in considerable difficulties.136
In the so-called Stennes trial in Berlin members of the notorious SA-Sturm 33 were accused of attempted murder. The joint plaintiff (the lawyer Hans Litten was representing four workers injured by the SA in the attack) was now claiming that the SA’s assaults were part of a strategy and that those responsible were the leaders of the SA and the Party. Stennes had been head of the SA in East Germany at the time of the incidents, although he had since been removed from his post. He and Hitler were summoned as witnesses.
Stennes adopted a surprisingly loyal stance towards the leaders of his former party and testified that in his day the NSDAP had stuck strictly to legality. Then Hitler was forced to undergo a cross-examination lasting several hours by Litten, who was very well briefed. Litten was not satisfied with the diffuse explanations Hitler used to reaffirm his ‘lawful’ course of action but rather presented him with a passage from Goebbels’s pamphlet Der Nazi-Sozi that stated that the Nazis wanted ‘revolution’: ‘Then we shall boot out parliament and establish the state on the strength of German fists and German grit!’137 Litten’s cross-examination visibly unsettled Hitler. He could not remember, he said, whether he had been aware of Goebbels’s publication when he was appointed as Reich head of propaganda. Furthermore, it had not been ‘officially sanctioned’. Goebbels was in any case obliged to ‘stick to the guidelines I give him as Party leader’ and it was well known that he insisted on the Party taking a lawful path. Litten finally asked Hitler the provocative question whether he had ‘promised Reich Chancellor Brüning to dissolve the SA if the Party should join the government’. Hitler challenged this accusation and became very worked up. The suggestion that he would ‘dissolve the SA in order to join a government would be tantamount to offering to commit suicide himself or for the Party to commit suicide’.138 That evening, when they were sitting together in the Kaiserhof, Goebbels remembered that he had cut the dubious passage out of the second, updated edition,139 thus removing any risk that he could be called as a prosecution witness against Hitler’s claims to be pursuing a lawful course.
This episode demonstrates how very precarious this course was and how little Hitler told those closest to him about his ‘true’ intentions.
In the spotlight
It was evident that there was extreme and irreconcilable tension between Hitler’s ostensible pursuit of ‘lawful’ tactics in his policy of rapprochement with the moderate Right and the SA’s activism and demands for a more ‘socialist’ Party profile. Hitler coped with this internal Party conflict by not permitting any more opposition in the NSDAP to him as ‘Führer’ and by instead ensuring that potential opponents wore each other out. Thus Goebbels, who had strong reservations about Hitler’s path, the Strasser brothers, and also the ‘revolutionary’ elements within the SA could not, as we have seen, come together to create a united front, but rather spent most of their time fighting each other. A central component of this style of leadership was a policy of extreme personalization, through which Hitler could nip in the bud any internal Party structures that might limit his power to define what was good for the Party. To avoid the emergence of leadership by committee, he adopted a system in which he allocated tasks in the Party leadership to particular trusted people, both individually and in specific combinations, while simultaneously ensuring that an atmosphere of rivalry, indeed of suspicion, was dominant among them. Six men in particular were significant in this regard: Gregor Strasser as head of the Reich Party organization; Wilhelm Frick as leader of the Party in the Reichstag and figurehead in the NSDAP’s first coalition government in Thuringia; Ernst Röhm as SA chief of staff; Hermann Göring as the go-between with German nationalist, arch-conservative, and business circles in Berlin; Alfred Rosenberg as the Party’s chief ideologue and editor-in-chief of the Party organ, the Völkischer Beobachter, and Joseph Goebbels as Gauleiter in the capital and Reich propaganda chief. As Hitler continued to make all essential decisions himself, while communicating them only hesitantly and in careful stages, those around him were, as described, kept in a state of permanent anxiety and bewilderment about what aims and strategies the Party leader was actually pursuing. The situation was only made more difficult by the fact that these ‘solo decisions’ could turn out to be bafflingly flexible, while Hitler was being simultaneously inflexible in other matters.
Yet Hitler’s unique position in the Party, his stance as one who tried to keep out of internal Party wranglings and arguments about policy, reserving for himself the function of ultimate arbiter, his remoteness, his unpredictability, and his air of being a ‘visionary’, in short his position as ‘charismatic leader’, were first and foremost important to the NSDAP’s active members, the diehard Nazis. Now that the Party was turning into a mass movement, however, the majority of its supporters consisted of protest voters who were not already under Hitler’s ‘spell’. The NSDAP’s election propaganda was aimed primarily at this audience and supported above all by unrestrained agitation against the Weimar ‘system’ and by wide-ranging promises directed at the various different groups of voters rather than by propaganda focusing on Hitler personally as a ‘saviour’ figure. In other words, Hitler had to perform a balancing act between the role of the charismatic Party leader who stood above the action and the demands being placed on him as a politician who had to gain power by one means or another on behalf of a rapidly growing movement, before it was destroyed by its own inner contradictions.
These demands placed on Hitler’s so carefully created public persona also had an impact on his life as a private individual, in so far as one can speak of such a thing. For from his standpoint, as we have seen, no area of his life was truly ‘private’. Now that he considered himself to be on the way to becoming a ‘statesman’, he modified his circumstances to correspond to how he imagined his new role. He adopted a grander lifestyle, habitually staying in first-class hotels, and made his home in the luxurious nine-room Munich flat he had moved into in 1929 and which he shared with Geli Raubal. As early as 1923 his connection with the Bechsteins had brought him into the exclusive Wagner circle in Bayreuth, where he was a guest at the Wagners’ home and had a particularly close relationship with Winifred Wagner, who was widowed in 1930 and as head of the Wagner Festival continued to maintain his idol’s musical legacy.140 He now no longer found himself periodically short of money. As he became better known, sales of Mein Kampf increased, and the income he declared to the tax office increased threefold from 1929 to 1930 to 48,000 RM, rising further in the following years.141 Hitler was now in a position to give himself bohemian airs, but also live in comfort. The same was true of his relationships with women.
As already described, in the 1920s Hitler cultivated acquaintanceships with young, still rather childlike, girls who looked up to him and admired him. Since 1927 his niece Geli Raubal had been his constant companion. Although at first the rumour that his niece was also his lover boosted his self-presentation as a genius who came from nowhere, it was likely to be a positive hindrance to his planned elevation to the highest offices of state. Marriage, however, or even a deep and lasting relationship that could offer him some respite from politics was something he could not imagine. Then, in the summer of 1931, a new situation arose.
On one of his visits to
Berlin Goebbels introduced Hitler to Magda Quandt, a confident, educated, and cultivated woman of 29, who had been living an independent life since her divorce from the industrialist Herbert Quandt. To Goebbels Hitler expressed the view that Magda was ‘fabulous’, as Goebbels noted, and he enjoyed the hospitality she offered him and his entourage. They had been invited to lunch but Hitler stayed on into the evening at her comfortable home on Reichkanzlerplatz in Berlin-Charlottenburg and the next day he was there again with his whole entourage. Goebbels, who had evidently not told Hitler that he and Magda had been having a relationship for several months,142 became jealous when he heard about these meetings and Hitler’s attentions: ‘Magda has been behaving in a rather unladylike way with the boss. I’m very upset about it. She’s not quite a lady.’ Goebbels clearly blamed Magda for the situation: ‘I don’t mind the boss enjoying a bit of affection and charm, though. He gets so little of it.’ The ensuing quarrel with Magda was so violent that for a while at the end of August the relationship was in the balance.143
At the beginning of September, while Goebbels was away on a trip, Hitler again visited Magda. Goebbels’s impression was that he had simply ‘invited himself for a meal’. ‘Agonizing jealousy’ kept Goebbels awake that night and he decided that Magda had to tell Hitler ‘how things stand between us’.144 Even so, the same situation occurred a few days later, when Goebbels was again away. A phone call to Magda late one evening interrupted a conversation she was having with Hitler. Back in Berlin, he learnt more details about that evening’s conversation. After it Magda declared to Hitler that she wanted to marry Goebbels, at which Hitler was ‘devastated’. ‘But he’s standing by me, and Magda is too.’ Goebbels’s conclusion was: ‘Hitler is resigned. He’s so lonely. He has no luck with women. He’s too soft. Women don’t like that. They have to feel a man is a master over them.’145 When he discussed the matter with Hitler on a visit to Munich two days later, Hitler was ‘very sweet to me. A friend and a brother. I’m the lucky winner, he says. He loves Magda, but he’s happy to see me happy. “An intelligent and beautiful woman. She will not get in your way but will further your career.” He clasped both my hands with tears in his eyes. All the best! . . . We’re to marry right away.’ They pledged for the future: ‘All three of us will be good to each other. He intends to be our most loyal friend.’146
These speedy wedding plans may well have taken Goebbels somewhat by surprise, for up to this point he and Magda had agreed not to marry until after the ‘seizure of power’. During his absence, Magda and Hitler seem to have come to an arrangement. The engagement took place at the end of October and it was Hitler who enabled Goebbels to give Magda an expensive engagement present, an exquisite sports car financed by the manufacturer being given free advertising in the Völkischer Beobachter on Hitler’s instructions.147 The wedding took place less than two months later. Hitler was of course the best man.
The suggestion that Hitler’s interest in Magda Quandt caused him to push for the marriage to Goebbels is supported not only by Goebbels’s own diaries but also by a second account, which, although there are one or two discrepancies in the time sequence, nevertheless concurs fully with what Goebbels reports. It comes from Otto Wagener, at that time Hitler’s close confidant, who writes that Hitler became aware of Magda but was disappointed to discover she was in a relationship with Goebbels. In discussion with Wagener Hitler then developed the idea of creating a close and confidential friendship with Magda because in his work she could ‘act as the female opposite pole to my one-sided male instincts’. Hitler hinted that he considered it an advantage for Magda to be married. Wagener soon had an opportunity of presenting this idea to Magda. Hitler, he told her, simply needed someone who could bring him back to earth from his grandiose schemes and ‘show him everyday life’, someone who would go with him to the theatre, the opera or to concerts and spend some time talking to him afterwards. In short, he needed a woman who would ‘make him human’. According to Wagener, Magda had understood this line of argument at once and had declared for her part that in such a situation she would have to be married. The next step was for Wagener to suggest that she and Goebbels marry soon. After reflecting on this for a time both said they were happy to do so.148
The arrangement agreed by Hitler, Magda Quandt, and Goebbels can certainly be described as a triangular relationship. For Hitler it had great advantages, as it fitted in with his self-perception as a public figure without a significant ‘private’ life. He could enjoy a close relationship with a woman he admired without entering into an actual commitment. In addition, he had found a woman with whom he could engage in conversation, one whose social skills and good taste would be useful to him, and who could fit into the role of First Lady of the National Socialist movement. Magda was to become accustomed to visiting Hitler without her husband, receiving him at home on her own, travelling with him or, in later years, spending a few days, occasionally with her children, on the Obersalzberg. As Magda was married, the relationship acquired a veneer of respectability and boundaries were established that Hitler was only too ready to accept, having excluded the possibility of marriage for himself and having, as we may safely assume, no interest in a sexual relationship. Hitler became not only a close friend of the Goebbelses but was treated as a member of the family, which grew quickly during the following years. For his part, he regarded the Goebbels children, who were all given names beginning with the letter H, as his special favourites. Thus Hitler was able to experience some kind of family life without any ties or obligations, and that was exactly how he wanted it. For Goebbels and Magda too this extensive opening up of their married life to Hitler brought rewards: Goebbels could hope through Magda to exercise undreamt of influence on Hitler, whom he idolized, and the ambitious Magda had the opportunity to take pride of place close to the man she admired hugely and whom she regarded as Germany’s rising star.
This arrangement, made in mid-September 1931 with Magda Quandt, necessarily had an effect on Hitler’s relationship with Geli. We know too little about the emotional aspect of this relationship even to speculate. It seems evident, however, that after forming a relationship after his own fashion with Magda he reconsidered the role Geli had played in his life thus far. It is possible that Hitler’s changed attitude to Geli expressed itself through increased strictness and a desire to control her life more completely. This change may account for a quarrel he had with her at this time, after he forbade her, although she was now 23 years old, to go to Vienna for an extended period without her mother to continue her training as a singer. Geli refused to comply.149 The argument was not resolved by the time Hitler left the apartment on Prinzregentenplatz on the morning of 18 September. The following morning Geli Raubal was found shot dead in the apartment. The shot had been fired from his pistol a few hours after his departure. It was generally assumed she had committed suicide. ‘I daren’t search for motives’, was Goebbels’s comment in his diary.150 Three days after her burial Hitler visited her grave in the Central Cemetery in Vienna.151 Early in 1932 he had the sculptor Ferdinand Liebermann make a bust of Geli and when it was delivered in February he was, according to Goebbels, ‘very upset’.152
10
Strategies
Chancellor Brüning’s main political objective was to end reparations. A satisfactory outcome to the Geneva disarmament conference planned for 1932 would, he hoped, help him achieve this. Settling the disarmament issue would, he calculated, prompt the United States to cancel repayment of the outstanding debts owed by its allies, which in turn would incline the latter to mitigate the demands they were making on Germany. To emphasize the urgency of the situation, even before the start of negotiations, Brüning sought to demonstrate the absolute insolvency of the Reich, even if this meant exacerbating the financial and economic crisis. The increase in support for the Nazis as a result of the deteriorating situation did not conflict with this plan but rather was to serve as proof of Germany’s desperate state and prompt the western powers to come
round.
In the summer of 1931 the crisis in the Reich reached a temporary peak. The Second Emergency Decree for the Protection of the Economy and Finances of 5 June 1931 brought in massive welfare cuts, reductions in wages and salaries for public sector employees, and a crisis tax, all of which caused a serious deterioration in the relationship between Brüning and the DVP (which was represented in the government) as well as with the SPD (which continued not to oppose him in parliament). Along with the Emergency Decree the government published an appeal regarding reparations designed to demonstrate the desperate situation in the Reich. It appeared on the day Brüning arrived at Chequers, the British prime minister’s country residence, for several days of talks with the British government. The unintended consequence was a massive collapse in the creditworthiness of the Reich. Brüning’s tactics seemed to be working, however, when on 30 June the American President Herbert Hoover proposed a temporary international moratorium on debt repayments, limited to one year. This covered not only German war reparations but also war debts among the allies themselves. After international negotiations, the moratorium came into force at the beginning of July. In spite of this, the crisis in Germany deepened. The collapse of the textile firm, Nordwolle, put pressure on its bank, the Darmstädter und Nationalbank. The bank’s closure on 13 July 1931 started a run on other banks. The government declared two bank holidays and intervened massively in the money markets but failed to stabilize the situation as it had hoped. Foreign banks called in their debts and more German banks, businesses, states, and local authorities got into financial difficulties. Although the seasonally-adjusted number of unemployed dropped from 4.9 million in January to 4 million in July 1931, more than 1.2 million people more were unemployed than in the July of the previous year. Social provision was overstretched and could not prevent mass unemployment turning into mass poverty. In addition, the Bank of England’s abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931 caused a massive devaluation of the pound and a dramatic reduction in German foreign trade.1
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