‘Nationalist Opposition’?
In the light of these events Hitler began to weigh up his options for getting into power. First of all, he continued to pursue his policy of rapprochement with right-wing conservative groups for which a new plebiscite organized by the veterans’ organization Stahlhelm provided an opportunity. In April 1931 it gained the signatures of 10 per cent of the eligible voters required for a plebiscite calling for the dissolution of the Prussian parliament with the aim of destabilizing Brüning’s government. For the Reich government led by the Centre Party politician, Brüning, was dependent on toleration by the SPD, while the SPD prime minister of Prussia, Otto Braun, relied on the Centre as his most important coalition partner. The advocates of the plebiscite calculated that bringing forward the elections in Prussia would produce a fundamental change in the position of the majority parties, thereby undermining the coalition between the Centre and the SPD. After the Prussian parliament rejected the referendum, the vote on the plebiscite was set for 9 August 1931; in addition to the NSDAP,2 the DVP, DNVP, and the KPD all supported the plan.3 The project came to grief over the turnout. Barely 40 per cent of the electorate, although overwhelmingly supporters of the measure, went to the polls, rather than the 50 per cent required.
Hitler now turned his attention elsewhere. When he met Goebbels on 23 August in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin he announced he was in the capital ‘to undermine Brüning’s position through a hundred meetings’.4 On the evening of the following day he made a start. At a soirée at Göring’s house he met Schacht and leading representatives of arch-conservative political opinion in Germany. Leopold von Kleist, the Prussian royal house’s plenipotentiary, was there; also Rüdiger von der Goltz, the chairman of the United Fatherland Associations, and Magnus von Levetzow, another trusted agent of the ex-Kaiser. The discussion of what common policies they might adopt lasted until 4 a.m. in the morning.5 A week later, on 30 August, in Kreuth in Upper Bavaria, Hitler met the DNVP leader, Hugenberg, to consider how to approach the imminent elections for Reich President.6 They decided to mount a major demonstration of the ‘nationalist opposition’ (which essentially consisted of the DNVP, Stahlhelm, and NSDAP) in October and in subsequent meetings between Frick and Strasser acting on behalf of the NSDAP and representatives of the Stahlhelm and the DNVP it was agreed to put up Otto von Below, a former First World War general, a leading member of the United Fatherland Associations and a member of the Reich Committee which had organized the Young Plan plebiscite, as their joint candidate for the office of Reich President.7 Following the plan that Hitler had pursued with conservative circles the previous year to support Cuno for the highest office of state, this was now his second attempt to strengthen the alliance with this political camp by supporting the candidacy of a conservative politician.
Yet only a few days later Hitler made it clear to his most important political ally, Hugenberg, that he was by no means set on forming an alliance with the DNVP. On 7 September 1931 in a letter to Hugenberg he complained bitterly about the Stahlhelm and the DNVP. When working with the NSDAP in the governments of Thuringia and Brunswick both, he claimed, had proved disloyal; any alliance between the NSDAP and ‘bourgeois organizations’, Hitler suspected, seemed designed to end ‘in our being squeezed into submission in a malicious and deceitful manner’. As far as the situation in Brunswick was concerned (the DNVP prime minister, in view of the disastrous financial position, wished to make savings by cutting the post of a Nazi minister who had resigned), Hitler gave Hugenberg an ultimatum: If by 15 September another Nazi minister had not been appointed, on 16 September he would regard ‘the National Socialist Party as having quit the nationalist opposition’ and would make this public.8 Hugenberg gave way and on 15 September Dietrich Klagges, a Nazi, became a new minister in the Brunswick state government.9
In the meantime Brüning’s government was in crisis. In the autumn of 1931 the Reich Foreign Minister Julius Curtius (DVP) resigned after a plan he had supported for a customs union with Austria failed, and Brüning found himself facing a demand from Hindenburg to give his cabinet a decisively right-wing reshuffle. Hitler came to Berlin in order to engage in talks with various people about the possibility of joining the government. This was only a few days before the planned demonstration of the ‘nationalist opposition’ to be held in Bad Harzburg that was to focus on the demand for the Reich and Prussian governments to resign. On 3 October he first met Major General Kurt von Schleicher, in charge of the ministerial office in the Defence Ministry, who, as an important figure working behind the scenes in 1929/30, had helped to organize the transition to a presidential style of government and was now sounding out the possibilities of extending the base of the Brüning government in a right-wing direction. Afterwards Hitler reported on the meeting to Goebbels, saying he had responded negatively to Schleicher’s pointed questions about whether the NSDAP would tolerate Brüning’s government in parliament, but had on the other hand declared himself prepared either to enter the government – on condition there were fresh elections – or to take over government with the NSDAP acting on its own.10 Goebbels’s notes continue: ‘We shall give up Prussia for now, if we can secure a decisive position of power in the Reich . . . Marxism in Prussia can be put down by a state commissar.’ The so-called nationalist opposition would be left empty-handed, for Hugenberg would not get anywhere with Hindenburg. Instead, as Goebbels’s notes tell us, a political deal was taking shape: the NSDAP would take over the government in the Reich, while accepting in return a Reich Commissar in Prussia appointed by the Reich President.
A different solution was, however, found to the government crisis. On 7 October Brüning resigned so that Hindenburg could give him the task of forming a new cabinet. This was done by 9 October. The DVP was no longer part of the government, Brüning took over the Foreign Ministry, and Reich Defence Minister, General Wilhelm Groener, became acting Interior Minister in place of the Centre Party politician, Joseph Wirth. Three further ministries were reshuffled. Over all, the result was that Brüning’s government had acquired a more conservative profile, although with the departure of the DVP and that party’s links to big business it had lost some of its support from industry.11
On 10 October, only hours before Hitler set off for Bad Harzburg, Brüning requested a meeting with him. The Reich Chancellor noted that, although at the meeting Hitler’s ‘increased self-confidence’ had been noticeable, what he said about foreign policy had been confused and on economic and finance policy he had been totally vague. As the precondition for continuing to move the government’s course more ‘towards the right’ Brüning demanded that Hitler should declare his position with regard to the re-election of the Reich President, which Hitler refused to do.12 The same day Hitler, accompanied this time by Göring, was received by President Hindenburg, a meeting that was brought about by the head of Deutsche Bank, Emil von Stauss,13 although it suited Brüning too, for the latter was hoping to weaken Hitler’s position in the run-up to the imminent demonstration by the Right. For Hitler, however, Hindenburg’s invitation was also very convenient precisely because of the Harzburg event.14 He had delivered ‘an hour-long lecture’, he reported afterwards to Levetzow, seeking to use ‘military analogies’ so as to avoid overtaxing the Reich President; he had, he said, evaded Hindenburg’s question about which parties he might possibly form a cabinet with. Although Hindenburg put out some positive signals after the meeting, in private he expressed reservations about Hitler as an individual.15 The reception, which was reported by the press,16 nevertheless signified a certain rise in status for the NSDAP. Before then the Reich President had always refused to have any direct talks with its leader.17
Meanwhile, delegations from the NSDAP, the Stahlhelm, the DNVP, the Pan-German League, and the Reichslandbund, numerous representatives of the old Prussian conservative ruling classes, and also leading figures from German business had all gathered in Bad Harzburg. This small town in the state of Brunswick had been chosen because the
NSDAP was part of the government there and thus there was no ban on uniforms, as in Prussia.18 Hitler’s right-wing conservative colleagues were keen to make a powerful show of combined strength with the aim of putting the government under pressure, indeed to topple it and replace it with a Conservative–National Socialist government. Hitler was once again determined to present himself in Harzburg first and foremost as the confident leader of the ‘nationalist opposition’, whose freedom of action could not be restricted by anyone and who could treat even his political allies more or less as he liked, and this was indeed how he behaved.
Hitler and his companions, Goebbels and Göring, did not arrive in Bad Harzburg until 2 a.m. in the morning – too late to confer with his ‘partners’ about the following day, as he had originally agreed to do. This was part of Hitler’s strategy not to be drawn into binding commitments in Harzburg, an approach that led to his behaving in a curt and abrasive manner throughout the event. What is more, he grew more and more convinced that the others were wanting to get the better of him. He told Goebbels he was ‘furious that people want to elbow us aside’. The following morning he did not attend the joint meeting of NSDAP and DNVP parliamentary deputies, but instead used a meeting of the National Socialist parliamentary party to read out a declaration he had worked out with Goebbels that was considerably more sharply worded than the agreed joint communiqué of the ‘nationalist opposition’.19 He stayed away from the joint lunch and afterwards at the parade of the various organizations he left the site after the SA had marched past him. He did not bother with the Stahlhelm’s march-past. During an hour-long discussion Hugenberg was only just able to prevent Hitler from leaving early.
During the addresses to the assembled company Hitler, in Goebbels’s view, was ‘not on good form’ because he was so furious. Hugenberg had spoken before him and after him came the head of the Stahlhelm, Franz Seldte, and his deputy, Theodor Duesterberg, Eberhard Count von Kalckreuth, Hjalmar Schacht, the former president of the Reichsbank, a surprise guest who sharply attacked the government’s financial policy, and after him Count von der Goltz.20 Then finally the limited common ground was covered in the aforementioned communiqué, which called for the Brüning and Braun governments to resign and for fresh elections in the Reich and in Prussia. After the event the Nazis claimed that in Harzburg the leadership of the ‘nationalist’ camp had passed to them. The Völkischer Beobachter of 14 October reported that the ‘rally of intellectual forces in Harzburg was concentrated round Hitler as its epicentre’.21The announcement of the candidacy of General von Below for Reich President, which had been planned to follow Harzburg, was quietly dropped.22
On 13 October 1931, a few days after the Harzburg rally, the Reichstag reconvened after a recess of more than six months to debate a government statement by the old/new chancellor, Brüning. In an extraordinarily long letter, published on 16 October in the Völkischer Beobachter, Hitler took issue with his speech. Amongst other things, he took up Brüning’s comment that during the previous weeks he had tried without success to draw the parties into government; Hitler retorted that as far as the NSDAP was concerned he had been unaware of such a step.23 The same day Brüning’s government survived by a slim margin a motion of no confidence from the DNVP and NSDAP. This had been the first objective of the Harzburg Front and Hitler had invested great hopes in it. The tiny group of Business Party members decided at the last moment to support Brüning, having previously been in contact with Hugenberg and Hitler. The Reichstag adjourned again, this time until February of the following year.24 Hitler’s two-pronged strategy had turned out to be a total failure, for the ‘nationalist opposition’ not only appeared disunited, but had not achieved its central objective, the overthrow of the government. At the same time, Hitler’s alternative approach, seeking a rapprochement with Brüning and Hindenburg, had not led to any tangible results either.25
The next day Hitler, accompanied by Goebbels and his girlfriend Magda Quandt, went to the city of Brunswick, where on 18 October a parade of 100,000 members of the SA, SS, and Hitler Youth lasting six hours was held. It was the largest Nazi demonstration before they came to power. At the rally afterwards Hitler almost implored the SA men present: ‘Hold your nerve! Hold together! Don’t waver one metre from the goal!’ This demonstration of strength was designed to blot out the recent parliamentary defeat and the tactical flirtation with the parties of the right that had preceded it.26
Hitler was, nevertheless, dependent on their cooperation. In November he succeeded in penetrating the highest conservative circles. At a small gathering in the Berlin salon of Baroness Marie Tiele-Winckler, he met ‘Empress’ Hermine, the second wife of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Others there included Leopold von Kleist, the Prussian royal house’s plenipotentiary, Göring, and Levetzow. Yet again Hitler delivered a long and almost uninterrupted monologue with the intention of leaving a lasting impression on the distinguished guests. With regard to being a possible candidate for the office of Reich President he said, according to Levetzow’s account, that he ‘would consider it beneath his dignity to accept a position and a title that had been created by a criminal revolution. In his eyes there was only one “Imperial Regent”.’ On the other hand, he became enraged when he was reminded of 9 November: He intended to ‘outlaw all November criminals when the Nazis come to power’. He wanted them to be ‘publicly garrotted . . .’27
At the end of November 1931 both the NSDAP and Brüning found themselves in an extremely embarrassing position. The so-called Boxheim documents, plans prepared by leading members of the Hesse NSDAP for a violent take-over of power, fell into the hands of the police. Just at this point, however, the Reich Chancellor was promoting negotiations between the Centre Party and the NSDAP for a coalition in Hesse, which, following the results of the state elections of 15 November, would have enjoyed a majority in parliament. This would be a way, so Brüning thought, of creating the basis for close cooperation with the NSDAP at Reich level. He was gambling above all on securing the support of the NSDAP for an extension of the term of office or the re-election of Hindenburg as Reich President, when the latter’s period of office came to an end in the spring of 1932.28 This was a position he could hardly maintain after the discovery of the Boxheim documents.
For his part, Hitler brusquely dismissed all speculation, particularly by the German Nationalist press, about his alleged involvement in negotiations with the Centre Party to enter the cabinet. In the 1 December issue of the Völkischer Beobachter, he asserted that such reports were ‘pure invention’. At the same time he used the denial to take a sideswipe at the German Nationalists, who intended through their allegedly misleading reports to ‘discredit . . . the National Socialist movement above all in the eyes of German Nationalist voters’. He said nothing in public about the Boxheim documents. (Behind the scenes the Party leadership distanced themselves from them.)29 Instead he changed tactics and once again aimed his attacks at his potential political allies, whose ‘intrigues’ were ‘no more suited to reinforcing the “Harzburg Front” than to challenging the existing system’. That could in any case be achieved not by ‘the German Nationalist Party or its press . . . but only by National Socialism’.30 He renewed the claim to leadership vis-à-vis the Stahlhelm that he had asserted at Bad Harzburg. In December 1931 he used a letter published in the press to explain once again in detail his autocratic bearing in Harzburg, peppering it with polemics directed at the veterans’ organization; a correspondence ensued that reached a crescendo of mutual reproaches.31
The dynamics of the crisis
In fact Hitler escaped lightly from what was at the time a political fiasco but proved to be only the provisional end of the ‘nationalist opposition’. The deepening economic and political crisis of the Weimar Republic set developments in train that opened up other opportunities to seize power.
In the winter of 1931/32 the economic crisis in Germany was reaching its climax. In 1932 industrial production dropped to 60 per cent of what it h
ad been in 1928. In January 1932 the number of registered unemployed rose to over six million (almost 1.2 million more than in January 1931) but in reality at least 1.5 million more people were out of work. Only a minority of those registered as unemployed could claim unemployment benefit, which was constantly being cut as a result of the financial burden. Most of the unemployed had to live on meagre local authority welfare benefits. Those in work were faced with higher contributions to social security funds, wage cuts, and frequent short-time working, critical losses that were not compensated for by falling prices. Millions of people sank into poverty. The consequences were malnourishment, indeed starvation, and the associated illnesses. Homelessness became a mass phenomenon, while criminality arising from the immediate pressures of poverty increased, as did the suicide rate.
Hitler Page 31