Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  5. VB, 28 April 1933.

  6. Peter Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter. Führung der Partei und Kontrolle des Staatsapparates durch den Stab Hess und die Partei-Kanzlei Bormann (Munich, 1992), 8.

  7. RGBl. 1933 I, 1016; Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung (Munich, 1969), 263f.

  8. Alfred Rosenberg made himself the spokesman for this view in an article in the VB on 9 January 1934 (‘Totaler Staat?’). According to this, the new state was the ‘tool’ of the NS movement.

  9. Goebbels TB, 1 and 2 December 1933.

  10. VB (N), 3 December 1933, ‘Stabschef Röhm über seine Aufgaben als Reichsminister’.

  11. On his contacts among Berlin diplomats and the foreign press see Eleanor Hancock, Ernst Röhm. Hitler’s Chief of Staff (New York, 2008), 142ff. and 148. On Röhm’s largely abortive attempts to establish contact with François-Poncet see ADAP Series C, No. 129.

  12. Wolfgang Sauer, Die Mobilmachung der Gewalt (Frankfurt a. M., Berlin, and Vienna, 1974), 318ff.

  13. Longerich, Geschichte, 201f. For example, in October 1933 the Reich Interior Minister wrote to the Reich governors and state governments that there were ‘repeated reports of assaults by low-ranking leaders and members of the SA. These assaults must now finally cease’. See BAB R 43 II/1202).

  14. See Röhm’s article ‘Die S.A. im neuen Staat’, in Der SA-Mann, 16 December 1933; see also the publication of a keynote speech by Röhm in ibid., 20 January 1934.

  15. Texts in VB (N), 1/2 and 3 January 1934.

  16. Ibid., 24 January 1934: ‘Adolf Hitler bei seinen S.A. Führern’; Schulthess’, 1934, 21/22 January 1934.

  17. Rudolf Hess, ‘Partei und Staat’, in Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, January 1934, Reprinted in VB (N), 23 January 1934.

  18. On the appointment see Piper, Rosenberg, 323ff. In making this appointment Hitler had specifically not responded to Rosenberg’s demand to make the state a ‘tool’ of the NSDAP (VB, 9 January 1934, ‘Totaler Staat’), as he limited Rosenberg’s authority to the ‘movement’.

  19. Church law regarding the legal position of the clergy and Church officials, 6 September 1933, published as an extract in Joachim Beckmann (ed.), Kirchliches Jahrbuch für die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 1933–1938 (Gütersloh, 1948), 24f. See also Scholder, Kirchen, 667ff.; Kurt Meier, Der evangelische Kirchenkampf, 1 (Göttingen, 1976), 116ff.

  20. Klaus Scholder, Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich, 2 (Berlin, 1985), 37.

  21. Meier, Kirchenkampf, 1, 116ff.; Scholder, Kirchen, 1, 644ff. and 681ff.

  22. VB (N), 15 November 1933, Resolution of the ‘German Christians’.

  23. Scholder, Kirchen, 1, 783f.; Meier, Kirchenkampf, 1, 122ff.; Goebbels TB, 29 November 1933.

  24. Scholder, Kirchen, 1, 792ff.; Meier, Kirchenkampf, 1, 136f.

  25. VB (N), 2 December 1934, ‘Kein staatliches Eingreifen in den Meinungskampf in der Evangelischen Kirche’.

  26. Goebbels TB, 8 December 1933.

  27. On the meeting of 25 January 1934 see Meier, Kirchenkampf, 1, 146ff.; Scholder, Kirchen, 1, 814ff.; Scholder, Kirchen, 2, 59ff. More than eight years later Hitler referred to the bugged telephone call recalling that the Protestant dignatories had ‘collapsed with shock’. See Picker, Tischgespräche, 7 April 1942.

  28. Scholder, Kirchen, 2, 51.

  29. VB (M), 29 January 1934, ‘Die Kirchenführer hinter dem Reichsbischof’ (statement of 27 January 1934); Scholder, Kirchen, 2, 57ff.; Meier, Kirchenkampf, 1, 161ff.; Jørgen Glenthøj, ‘Hindenburg, Göring und die evangelischen Kirchenführer. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung des staatspolitischen Hintergrundes der Kanzleraudienz am 25. Januar 1934’, in Heinz Brunotte and Ernst Wolff (eds), Zur Geschichte des Kirchenkampfs. Gesammelte Aufsätze, 1 (Göttingen, 1965), 45–91. See also Hitler’s account to Goebbels in TB, 28 January 1934.

  30. On the speech see Domarus, 1, 352ff.

  31. VB (N), 3 February 1934.

  32. Krohn et al., Handbuch, including among others: Wolfgang Benz: ‘Die jüdische Emigration’, sections 5–16; Werner Röder, ‘Die politische Emigration’, sections 16–30; Hartmut Mehringer, ‘Sozialdemokraten’, sections 475–93; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, ‘Kommunisten’, sections 493–506; Jan Foitzik, ‘Linke Kleingruppen’, sections 506–18; Michael Schneider, ‘Gewerkschaftler’, sections 543–51.

  33. Domarus, 1, 349ff.

  34. RGBl. 1934 I, 75.

  35. Broszat, Staat, 263ff.

  36. VB (N), 25/26 February 1934 on the oath taking by Hess and 27 February 1934 on Hitler’s Hofbräuhaus speech.

  37. Ibid., 24 March 1934, ‘Konferenz der Reichsstatthalter beim Führer’.

  38. BAB, R 43 II/495, Frick to Lammers, 4 June 1934, and reply from Lammers, 27 June 1934; Broszat, Staat, 151ff.

  39. The only Prussian ministry left was the Finance Ministry. On the details see Alfred Kube, Pour le mérite, 65ff.

  40. If Z, ED 1, Liebmann Notes, note about meetings on 2 and 3 February 1934; see Müller, Heer, 95f. Hitler had already put forward the idea of a 300,000–man army to the British ambassador on 24 October. See ADAP C 2, No. 23.

  41. Müller, Heer, 94; see also If Z, ED 1, Liebmann Notes, notes about a meeting of commanders on 15 and 18 January 1934, at which a number of such cases were discussed. These tensions were also noticed outside the SA and the Reichswehr. See Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Sopade 1934–1940 (reprinted Salzhausen et al., 1980) (Sopade) 1934, 14ff.

  42. UF 10, No. 2366.

  43. Müller, Heer, Appendix, Doc. 7; on the 28th February see ibid., 98ff. If Z, ED 1, Liebmann Notes: Meeting of the Army commander-in-chief (Fritsch) and Hitler speech of 27 February 1934. It is unclear whether Liebmann gave the wrong date for the meeting or whether it refers to a preliminary meeting. Further statements by the witness, Stölzle, in the investigations into the case against Dietrich/Lippert (If Z, Gm 07.06, vol. 4, 24 Jun 1949) concerning a subsequent ‘fraternization breakfast’ involving SA leaders and Reichswehr officers in the staff mess. After the officers’ departure Röhm demanded absolute obedience of the order by the SA.

  44. Ernst Röhm, Die nationalsozialistische Revolution und die SA. Rede vor dem Diplomatischen Korps und der Auslandspresse in Berlin am 18. April 1934 (Berlin, 1934). See also a similar speech to Bavarian SA formations, which he had published in the SA-Mann of 19 May 1934.

  45. Hancock, Röhm, 148f.; see also Engelbrechten, Armee, 288ff., about the ‘Spring Inspections’, for which the Berlin-Brandenburg SA paraded on 15 Sundays.

  46. IMT 36, 951-D, S. 72f.

  47. VB, 21 April 1934.

  48. Photo report on this trip in Reichsmarine 6/1934, 57–9.

  49. Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler. Biographie (Munich, 2008), 177.

  50. Sauer, Mobilmachung, 343ff.; Heinz Höhne, Mordsache Röhm. Hitlers Durchbruch zur Alleinherrschaft 1933–1934 (Reinbek b. Hamburg, 1984), 226ff.; Göring statement in IMT 9, 302: He collected information and passed it on to Hitler; If Z, Gm 07.06, Dietrich/Lippert Trial, vol. 6, Witness interrogation Rudolf Diels, 22 October 1953; If Z, ED 1, Liebmann Notes: Meeting of the Army commander-in-chief (Fritsch) with commanders on 7 May 1934 in Nauheim.

  51. Tooze, Ökonomie, 93ff.

  52. Silverman, Economy, 253. In March 1934 the ‘quasi-unemployed’ – emergency relief workers, public relief workers, school leavers who were initially employed in agricultural work, and those in the volunteer labour service programme – amounted to a total of 1,075,000 workers, which was the maximum reached. In the period summer 1933 to summer 1934 the number of those employed through these state support measures represented between 20 and 40 per cent of those entering the work force. On these groups of employed see also Claudia Brunner, Arbeitslosigkeit im NS-Staat. Das Beispiel München (Pfaffenweiler, 1997).

  53. Those removed from the unemployment insurance programme included, for example, housemaids and those employed in agriculture, forestry, and the coastal fishing industry
. See Volker Herrmann, Vom Arbeitsmarkt zum Arbeitseinsatz. Zur Geschichte der Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1929–1939 (Frankfurt a. M., 1993), 59. The statistics show clearly that during summer 1933 hundreds of thousands were coming onto the labour market who were not from the reserve army of the unemployed. When the numbers of employed once again declined by almost 800,000 at the end of the year, only around 300,000 of those affected were registered in the unemployed statistics. See Silverman, Economy, 251. Also, only a minority of those workers newly recruited from spring 1934 onwards had been formerly unemployed.

  54. VB (N), 22 March 1934, ‘Deutsche Arbeiter fanget an.’ On the return to the ‘battle of labour’ motif in propaganda see also the various headlines in the VB: 23 March 1934, ‘Der Bau von 1500 Kilometern Reichsautobahn freigegeben’; 5 April 1934, ‘Die Leistungen der Gemeinden in der zweiten Arbeitsschlacht’; 6 April 1934, ‘Über 250 000 Bauarbeiter neu eingestellt’; 10 April 1934, ‘In einem Monat 570 000 Arbeitslose weniger’; 11 April 1934, ‘Einzigartiger Aufmarsch am Tag der Nationalen Arbeit’; 22/23 April 1934, ‘Musterschau deutschen Schaffens eröffnet’.

  55. Morsch, Arbeit, 131.

  56. Tooze, Ökonomie, 98ff.

  57. Michael Ebi, Export um jeden Preis. Die deutsche Exportförderung von 1932–1938 (Stuttgart, 2004), 97ff.; Tooze, Ökonomie, 103.

  58. Schulthess’ 1934, 108; Decree Against Price Increases of 16 May 1934 (RGBl. 1934 I, 389f.); see also Tooze, Ökonomie, 125.

  59. Morsch, Arbeit, 146f.

  60. For examples see Kershaw, Opinion, 120ff.

  61. Tooze, Ökonomie, 125; Morsch, Arbeit, 214f.

  62. Ibid., 178; Sopade 1934, 9, 13, 74f., and 99; on the deterioration in the mood in the first half of 1934 see Ian Kershaw, Der Hitler-Mythos. Führerkultur und Volksmeinung (Stuttgart, 1999), 86ff.; Kershaw, Opinion, 75ff. On the Councils of Trust see Sopade 1934, 36ff. and 136ff.

  63. Domarus, 1, 382.

  64. Morsch, Arbeit, 178; Sopade 1934, 105ff. and 187.

  65. After a ministerial meeting concerning transfer issues on 7 June 1934, at which Hitler approved Schacht’s approach. See Regierung Hitler 1, No. 359.

  66. Tooze, Ökonomie, 96f.

  67. Hans-Erich Volkmann, ‘NS-Wirtschaft’, 298f.

  68. Rolf Barthel, ‘Rüstungswirtschaftliche Forderungen der Reichswehrführung in Juni 1934’, in Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte 9 (1970), published a memorandum of the Army Weapons Office, dated 20 June 1934, demanding ‘economic leadership by the Reich Chancellor’, which meant de facto the appointment by Hitler of a strong economic representative.

  69. Domarus, 1, 418f.

  70. Dated 7 June 1934 (ibid., 385); see also the similarly very self-confident order by Röhm of 8 June to the SA (ibid.).

  71. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 231ff.; Karl Martin Grass, ‘Edgar Jung. Papenkreis und Röhmkrise 1933/34’, Dissertation, Heidelberg, 1966.

  72. Goebbels TB, 15 May 1934.

  73. Pyta, Hindenburg, 859ff. Papen, Wahrheit, 369ff., maintains that, after having gained Hitler’s agreement, he prepared on Hindenburg’s behalf the draft for such a testament, but Hindenburg decided not to include the recommendation in the testament but instead simply in a letter to Hitler.

  74. Goebbels TB, 21 May 1934.

  75. Ibid., 25 August 1933.

  76. Text in UF 10, No. 2375.

  77. Hitler’s directive is revealed in Goebbels TB, 18 June 1934; PA 1934, 243.

  78. Pyta, Hindenburg, 844f.; Joachim Petzold, Franz von Papen. Ein deutsches Verhängnis (Munich and Berlin, 1995), 209ff.; Papen, Wahrheit, 345f.

  79. On Hitler’s appearance in Gera see VB (N), 19 June 1934, ‘Die Welt muss wissen: Die Zeit der Diktate ist vorbei’, and ‘Dr. Goebbels gegen die Nörgler’; VB, 23 June 1934, Report on the summer solstice celebration.

  80. UF 10, No. 2376.

  81. VB (N), 27 June 1934, ‘Nirgend kann die Glaubenskraft des Menschen besser verwurzelt sein als im Nationalsozialismus’.

  82. Ibid., 29 June 1934, ‘Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich’, ‘Deutschland lebt, wenn Adolf Hitler es führt!’ (Göring) and ‘Goebbels in Kiel’.

  83. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Reichswehr und “Röhm-Affäre”. Aus den Akten des Wehrkreiskommandos (Bayer.) VII. Dokumentation’, in MGM 1 (1968), 107–44.

  84. Rosenberg, Tagebuch, 43.

  85. Domarus, 1, 394; Aufzeichnungen (‘Tagebuch’) Viktor Lutze, published in part in Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 May 1957; If Z, Gm 07.06, vol. 10, Dietrich/Lippert Indictment, 4 July 1956, 56, concerning the telephone call to Wiessee, and vol. 1, 98ff., letter from Robert Bergmann, Röhm’s former chief adjutant, 14 May 1949.

  86. Goebbels TB, 1 July 1934.

  87. Domarus, 1, 420f.

  88. Grass, Jung, 242.

  89. Fritz Günther von Tschirschky reports in his memoirs (Erinnerungen eines Hochverräters (Stuttgart, 1972), 176ff.) that, together with Bose and Jung, he haddeveloped the following plan: By referring to the Nazis’ misuse of power Papen would persuade Hindenburg to declare a state of emergency, take over power, and establish a directory in which Hitler would be dominated by conservatives. It was thus a revival of the ‘taming concept’. Papen had put this proposal to Hindenburg’s son at the end of June during the latter’s visit to the Vice-Chancellery. However, he had passed it on to Blomberg, thereby neutralizing the plot. There is no other evidence for the plan. Bose and Jung were murdered and Papen does not mention it in his memoirs.

  90. Domarus, 1, 395; Goebbels TB, 1 July 1934.

  91. Domarus, 1, 395; If Z, Gm 07.06, vol. 10, Dietrich/Lippert Indictment.

  92. Domarus, 1, 396; If Z, Gm 07.06, Bd. 10, Dietrich/Lippert Indictment.

  93. Domarus, 1, 397; VB (N), 10 July 1934, ‘Die große Friedensrede des Stellvertreters des Führers’.

  94. The available evidence for alleged meetings is based purely on second-hand reports and cannot be verified. See Sauer, Mobilmachung, 308f.

  95. Domarus, 1, 398f.; Hitler’s authorship is clear from the Hess speech of 8 July.

  96. Ibid., 399f.

  97. Ibid., 401f.

  98. Ibid., 402f.; If Z, Gm 07.06, vol. 10, Dietrich/Lippert Indictment, 64ff. The Berlin Gruppenführer, Karl Ernst, was reported as having been shot, although at this point he was on his way to Berlin. See also Goebbels TB, 4 July 1934, on the situation on 30 June.

  99. Ibid.

  100. Wolfram Selig, ‘Die Opfer des Röhm-Putsches in München’, in Winfried Becker and Werner Chrobak (eds), Staat, Kultur, Politik. Beiträge zur Geschichte Bayerns und des Katholizismus. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Dieter Albrecht (Lassleben, 1992), 351–6.

  101. Hitler, Monologe, 30 January 1942. On Ballerstedt see above p. 91f.

  102. Günther Kimmel, ‘Das Konzentrationslager Dachau. Eine Studie zu den nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen’, in Martin Broszat and Elke Fröhlich (eds), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, 2, Part A (Munich, 1979), 365.

  103. Der Gerade Weg, 17 June 1932 (up to January 1932 the paper was called Illustrierter Sonntag). See Rudolf Morsey (ed.), Fritz Gerlich – ein Publizist gegen Hitler. Briefe und Akten 1930–1934 (Paderborn, 2010); Hans-Günter Richardi and Klaus Schumann, Geheimakte Gerlich/Bell. Röhms Pläne für ein Reich ohne Hitler (Munich, 1993).

  104. That alone was enough reason why he ceased to be the editor of Mein Kampf, as Othmar Plöckinger has convincingly shown in his Geschichte, 133ff. His personal relationship with Hitler was by no means sufficiently close for the reason for his murder to have been his knowledge of intimate details of Hitler’s life.

  105. Veronika Diem, ‘Friedrich Beck (1889–1934) und die Gründungsgeschichte des Münchner Studentenwerks’, in Elisabeth Kraus (ed.), Die Universität München im Dritten Reich. Aufsätze, Part 1 (Munich, 2006), 43–71.

  106. Selig, ‘Opfer’, 349ff. They were Walter Häbich, Adam Hereth, Erich Gans, Julius Adler, and Ernestine Zoref.

  107. They were Eugen von Kessel, who was believed to have carried out intelligence wo
rk for the former Gestapo chief, Rudolf Diels, Othmar Toifl, who had acted as an informant and in other ways for the SS and the Gestapo, and the SA doctor, Erwin Villain, who had been condemned for a violent attack on state secretary Leonardo Conti of the Interior Ministry, despite the opposition of the Berlin SA. See Frank Flechtmann, ‘Casanova, Vidoq, Toifl, Mauss. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte des Spitzels’, in Geschichte, Politik, und ihre Didaktik 26 (1998), 281–6; Judith Hahn, ‘Erwin Villain und Leonardo Conti: Scharmützel unter NS-Kameraden’, in Deutsches Ärzteblatt 104/42 (2007) A 2862–A 2864.

  108. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 285. Among the victims was the police president of Gleiwitz. See Daniel Schmidt, ‘Der SA Führer Hans Ramshorn. Ein Leben zwischen Gewalt und Gemeinschaft (1892–1934)’, in VfZ 60 (2012), 201–35. Apart from the SA leaders, the following were murdered: Kuno Kamphausen, head of the council building works department of Waldenburg (evidently because of a quarrel with an SS leader over a building matter), Emil Sembach, dismissed from the SS in spring 1934 because of alleged embezzlement, and Erich Lindemann, physician and one of the leaders of the Jewish Veterans Association in Silesia. On Lindemann’s murder see If Z, Gm 08.06, vol. 9, Osnabrück court indictment, 21 April 1956.

  109. Ernst Ewald Martin, former head of Gauleiter Mutschmann’s intelligence service, Lamberdus Ostendorp, member of the SA’s internal police, and the leader of the Dresden SA Brigade, Joachim Schroedter. A further name on the list of deaths, Otto Pietrzok, is evidently an error. See Rainer Orth, Der SD-Mann Johannes Schmidt. Der Mörder des Reichskanzlers Kurt von Schleicher? (Marburg, 2012), 193ff.

  110. Jürgen Schuhladen-Krämer, ‘Die Exekutoren des Terrors: Hermann Mattheiss, Walter Stahlecker, Friedrich Mussgay, Leiter der Geheimen Staatspolizeileitstelle Stuttgart’, in Michael Kissener and Joachim Scholtyseck (eds), Die Führer der Provinz. NS-Biographien aus Baden und Württemberg (Constance, 1999), 407ff.

  111. Barbara Schellenberger, ‘Adalbert Probst (1900–1934), Katholischer Jugendführer – Opfer des Nationalsozialismus’, in Düsseldorfer Jahrbuch. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Niederrheins 69, 279–86; on Probst see also Dietmar Schulze, ‘Der “Röhm-Putsch” in der Provinz Sachsen’, in Hallische Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte 15 (2005), 26f.