Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  67. Goebbels TB, 12 March 1938; Schausberger, Griff, 556ff.; Below, Adjutant, 90.

  68. ADAP D 1, No. 352.

  69. IMT 31, 2949-PS, 369. For the role of Prince Philip in German–Italian relations see Jonathan Petropoulos, Royals and the Reich. The Princes von Hessen in Nazi Germany (Oxford and New York, 2006), 177ff.

  70. Andreas Nierhaus, ‘Der “Anschluss” und seine Bilder – Inszenierung, Ästhetisierung, Historisierung’, in Werner Welzig (ed.), ‘Anschluss’. März/April 1938 in Österreich (Vienna, 2010); Gerhard Jagschitz, ‘Photographie und “Anschluss” im März 1938’, in Oliver Rathkolb et al. (eds), Die veruntreute Wahrheit. Hitlers Propagandisten in Österreichs Medien (Salzburg, 1988).

  71. Goebbels TB, 13 March 1938; on the text see Domarus, 1, 815ff. On the propaganda treatment see PA 1938, Nos 728f. and 733.

  72. Domarus, 1, 817ff.; Below, Adjutant, 91ff.; Keitel, Leben, 219f.

  73. Domarus, 1, 817f. On his stay in Linz see also Dietrich, Jahre, 52f.

  74. RGBl. 1938 I, 237f. The law was drafted by the head of the department for constitutional and administrative matters in the Reich Interior Ministry, Wilhelm Stuckart, who had been summoned to Linz by Hitler. See Botz, Eingliederung, 62.

  75. Domarus, 1, 821.

  76. According to Goebbels this plan emerged on 11 March. See TB, 12 March 1938.

  77. RGBl. 1938 I, 237f. To reconstruct the decision-making process see Below, Adjutant, 92. The improvisation is also clear from an official ‘personal report’ by the head of the department in the Propaganda ministry. See Alfred Ingemar Berndt, Meilensteine des Dritten Reiches. Erlebnisschilderungen großer Tage (Munich, 1938), 214. For the importance of the stopover in Linz for the decision-making process see Botz, ‘Hitlers Aufenthalt in Linz im März 1938 und der Anschluss’, in Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Linz 1970, 185–214.

  78. Domarus, 1, 821.

  79. Dokumentationsarchiv (ed.), ‘Anschluß’, Doc. 104f.

  80. Goebbels TB, 14, 15, and 16 March (there still with the title Reichspropagandahauptamt) and 17, 19, and 20 March 1938.

  81. Botz, Nationalsozialismus, 74f.

  82. Ibid., 137ff.; Jonny Moser, ‘Die Apokalypse der Wiener Juden’, in Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien (ed.), Wien 1938. 110 Sonderausstellung, 11. März bis 30. Juni 1988 (Vienna, 1988), 286–97; Herbert Rosenkranz, Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung. Die Juden in Österreich 1938–1945 (Wien, 1978).

  83. Botz, Nationalsozialismus, 99ff.

  84. Domarus, 1, 824f.

  85. Ibid., 825; see also Gerhard Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel, ed. Hildegard von Kotze (Stuttgart, 1974), 15f., whose entry concerning the constitutional position of the Catholic Church is understandable in the context of Hitler’s next encounter on 9 April. See above p. 557. Maximilian Liebmann, Theodor Innitzer und der Anschluss. Österreichs Kirche 1938 (Graz, 1988), 73.

  86. Botz, Nationalsozialismus, 157ff.; Liebmann, Innitzer, 85ff. On the generally positive attitude to Innitzer of the Nazi leadership see Goebbels TB, 2, 3, and 7 April 1938.

  87. VB (B), 16 March 1938, ‘Heute Freudentag in Berlin’ (headline) and Goebbels’s appeal.

  88. Goebbels TB, 17 March 1938; Domarus, 1, 825f.; VB (B), 17 March 1938, ‘Triumphaler Einzug des Führers in die Hauptstadt des Großdeutschen Reiches’.

  89. Kershaw, Hitler-Mythos, 160ff., quote 161; Hellmuth Auerbach, ‘Volksstimmung und veröffentlichte Meinung in Deutschland zwischen März und November 1938’, in Franz Knipping and Klaus-Jürgen Müller (eds), Machtbewusstsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Paderborn, 1984), 273–95.

  90. BAF, RW 19/86, Current Economic situation, 1 April 1939; Volkmann, ‘NS-Wirtschaft’, 381ff.; Sarholz, Auswirkungen, 283ff.

  The Sudeten Crisis

  1. On 11 March, the evening preceding the Anschluss, Jodl noted a remark by Hitler to the effect that after the incorporation of Austria there was no need to hurry to ‘deal with the Czech question’, but preparations for Case Green should be pushed forward energetically and geared to the new strategic situation. See IMT 28, 1780-PS, 372.

  2. E.g. Goebbels TB, 7 March 1938: ‘And one day Czechoslovakia will collapse under our blows . . . the Führer is glad that Prague is so intransigent because it makes it all the more certain that one day it will be ripped apart’.

  3. Goebbels TB, 20 March 1938.

  4. ADAP D 2, No. 107; see Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 193f.; Helmuth K. G. Rönnefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik, 2 parts (Wiesbaden, 1961) 1, 218f. See also the similar watchword ‘always demand more than can be granted’ in Goebbels TB, 15 April 1938.

  5. ADAP D 2, No. 109.

  6. Ibid., No. 135; see Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise 1, 231ff.; Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 198.

  7. ADAP D 2, No. 133.

  8. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938 (Boppard am Rhein, 1980), No. 45; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck. Eine Biographie (Paderborn, 2007), 313ff.

  9. Domarus 1, 826ff.

  10. Heiber (ed.), Goebbels Reden 1, No. 33; VB (N), 9 and 10 April 1938.

  11. Goebbels TB, 10 April, and 3 April 1938: Innitzer had been ‘very shocked and depressed by the Vatican declaration’.

  12. Ibid., 10 April 1938; see also Engel, Heeresadjutant, 15f., on Hitler’s first meeting with Innitzer on 15 March, according to which Hitler had subsequently said that the Catholic church in Austria was a state church and had a very different attitude to the state from the one in Germany, which, as a result of the need for confessional parity, had always been political. Goebbels’s diary entry enables the meeting to appear in a completely different light. According to Liebmann, Innitzer, 142f. (which appeared before the publication of the Goebbels diaries) the only thing known about the meeting was that Hitler had told Innitzer coldly that he had been prepared to give a binding declaration concerning the status of the Catholic church in Austria, but now, after Innitzer’s recent statements, he was no longer in a position to do so.

  13. Domarus 1, 848ff., quote 849.

  14. Sopade 1938, 419ff., detail on numerous cases in which ballot secrecy had not been preserved and the results had been manipulated. Goebbels admitted there had been irregularities in Munich where Gauleiter Wagner had ‘cheated a bit’, unfortunately ‘very stupidly’. See Goebbels TB, 26 April 1938; for the description of a concrete case of ballot manipulation see also Auerbach, ‘Volksstimmung’, 279. Jung, Plebiszit, 109ff.

  15. Führer edict., 23 April 1938 (RGBl. 1938 I, 407f.).

  16. Botz, Eingliederung, 86ff.

  17. Longerich, Stellvertreter, 132ff.; Botz, Eingliederung, 108ff.; on the pre-history of this constitutional model see Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 231ff. On Hitler’s role in the drafting of the Eastern Marches Law see BAB, R 43 II/1353b, Hess to Lammers, 19 February 1939; ibid., R 43 II/1366, Lammers to the Reich ministers, 14 April1939. Eastern Marches Law (RGBl. 1939 I, 777); Sudetengau Law (ibid., 780).

  18. On the programme of visits see Domarus, 1, 856ff. On Hitler’s stay in Florence see Schwarz, Geniewahn, 15ff. On the trip see Wiedemann, Mann, 133ff.

  19. Ciano, Diary, 5 May 1938.

  20. ADAP D 1, No. 759.

  21. Domarus, 1, 861.

  22. ADAP D 1, No. 761.

  23. Ibid., No. 762. See also Goebbels TB, 7 May 1938.

  24. Ibid., 20 May 1938; PA 1938, Nos. 1437 and 1448; on the implementation of these directives see, for example, the FZ and DAZ, which switched their coverage to a more aggressive tone on the 19th; see Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 293ff.

  25. ADAP D 2, No. 175. Repeated in Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 149, but with the sense distorted.

  26. On the weekend crisis see Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 1, 277ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 563ff. See, in particular, the documents in ADAP D 2, No. 169ff. France und Czechoslovakia had signed a treaty of alliance and fr
iendship in January 1924.

  27. Goebbels TB, 22 May 1938; see DAZ, FZ, and VB from 21 May 1938.

  28. For the start of the campaign see DAZ, 22–25 May 1938; FZ, 22–27 May 1938; VB, 22–26 May 1938. For the instructions see PA 1938, Nos 1467 and 1504.

  29. IMT 28, 1780-PS, 372, here also the explicit context for the directive for Case Green.

  30. Müller, Beck/Studien, No. 45; also Wiedemann, Mann, 127f., and If Z, 3037-PS (affidavit) on the meeting. See Kershaw, Hitler, 1, 152.

  31. Domarus, 1, 897ff., quote 903.

  32. Ibid., 974ff., quote 975.

  33. Domarus, 2, 1048f.

  34. Ibid., 1153.

  35. ADAP D 2, No. 221; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 1, 310; Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 201.

  36. In the old version of the directive for Case Green of December 1937 the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht had made a war against Czechoslovakia before Germany was fully ready for war dependent on the unlikelihood of intervention by the western powers; a two-front war had to be avoided (ADAP D 7, Appendix III K, 547ff.).

  37. Beck/Studien, No. 46f.; Müller, Beck, 180 and 324ff. On the conflict between Hitler and Beck see also Kershaw, Hitler 2, 153ff.

  38. Müller, Heer, Doc. 115; Below, Adjutant, 103f.; If Z, ED 1, Liebmann, Personal experiences at the meeting; Müller, Heer, 314.

  39. Müller, Beck/Studien, 298ff.

  40. Dieter Bettinger and Martin Büren, Der Westwall. Die Geschichte der deutschen Westbefestigung im Dritten Reich, 2 vols (Osnabrück, 1990); Seidler, Todt, 163ff.

  41. Memorandum on the question of our fortifications in Otto-Wilhelm Förster, Das Befestigungswesen. Rückblick und Ausschau (Neckargemünd, 1960), 123–48, quote 123.

  42. For Hitler’s criticism of the West Wall works see Engel, Heeresadjutant, 27f. and 32. Hitler regularly inspected the work on the fortifications (see below p. 670) and emphasized their strategic importance in major speeches. See 12 September 1938 (Final speech at the Party Rally in Domarus, 1, 897ff., 903f.: ‘the most gigantic fortification project of all time’) and 9 October (ibid., 954ff., quote 955).

  43. Michael Geyer, ‘Rüstungsbeschleunigung und Inflation. Zur Inflationsdenkschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht vom November 1938’, in MGM 30 (1981), 135; Tooze, Ökonomie, 273ff.

  44. Geyer, ‘Rüstungsbeschleunigung’, Doc. 3 and p. 129.

  45. BAF, RH 15/150, Army General Staff (Hellmann) Note, 2 June 1938: Meeting of Göring with the commander-in-chief of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff, and the inspector of the pioneers and fortfications.

  46. Sarholz, Auswirkungen, 308f.; BAF, RH 15/150, 14 June 1938, Transcript by an officer from the General Army Office.

  47. BAF, RH 15/150, Wa.A. to Wa J Rü, 30 May 1938.

  48. The Provisional Aircraft Procurement Programme No. 8 (3rd draft) of 3 June 1938 already envisaged the construction of more than 24,000 aircraft. See BAF, RL 3/55: 23,783 up to 1 April 1942, 3. Draft; Geyer, ‘Rüstungsbeschleunigung’, 134 and 176; Sarholz, Auswirkungen, 334. See also Budrass, Flugzeugindustrie, 536ff.; Deist, ‘Aufrüstung’, 586ff.

  49. Ibid, 587f.

  50. IMT 38, 140-R, 375ff.

  51. Dülffer, Weimar, 471ff.

  52. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 96ff.; Volkmann, ‘NS-Wirtschaft’, 358ff.; BAF, R 2501/6581, Reichsbank memorandum: The supply situation in the German economy, 27 June 1938. According to it, domestic supplies, particularly of textile fibres, oil, rubber, iron, non-ferrous metals, and fats were critical.

  53. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 116ff.

  54. Tooze, Ökonomie, 297ff.; Gottfried Plumpe, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. Wirtschaft, Technik und Politik 1904–1945 (Berlin, 1990), 722ff., discusses the system using the example of the General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions relating to the Production of Chemicals, Karl Krauch.

  55. Gerhard Th. Mollin, Montankonzerne und ‘Drittes Reich’. Der Gegensatz zwischen Monopolindustrie und Befehlswirtschaft in der deutschen Rüstung und Expansion 1936–1944 (Göttingen, 1988), 70ff. and 102ff.; Matthias Riedel, Eisen und Kohle für das Dritte Reich. Paul Pleigers Stellung in der NS-Wirtschaft (Göttingen, 1973), 156f.

  56. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 106f.; Riedel, Eisen, 233ff.

  57. On exploiting the labour market see Tooze, Ökonomie, 306ff.; Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939 (Opladen, 1975), Doc. 144f.

  58. Sarholz, Auswirkungen, 305.

  59. On labour conscription see in particular Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 665ff., with the relevant documents. The practice of continually extending conscription required a new version of the decree of 22 June (RGBl. 1938 I, 652f.; new version in RGBl. 1939 I, 206ff.).

  60. Darré gave this figure at the 6th Reich Peasant Congress in Goslar 1938. See Corni/Gies, ‘Blut’, Doc. 113. The SD’s annual report for 1938 stated on the basis of figures from the Reich Food Estate that there was a shortage of 600,000 agricultural workers and of 333,000 marriageable women in agriculture. See Heinz Boberach (ed.), Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938–1945. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS, 17 vols (Herrsching, 1984), 2, 161. On the shortage of agricultural workers see also Sopade 1938, 724ff.

  61. Meldungen, 2, 161; Kershaw, Opinion, 55ff.

  62. Meldungen, 2, 161; on the continuing shortages see Sopade 1938, 631ff.

  63. Excerpts from Heydrich’s express letter of 1 June in Wolfgang Ayass, ‘“Ein Gebot der nationalen Arbeitsdisziplin”. Die Aktion “Arbeitsscheu Reich 1938” ’; in Ayass, Feinderklärung und Prävention. Kriminalbiologie, Zigeunerforschung und Asozialenpolitik (Berlin, 1988), 54f.; Ayass, ‘Asoziale’ im Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1995), 139ff.

  64. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 745ff.; Decree on the Setting of Wages (RGBl. 1939 I, 779).

  65. BAB, R 2501/6581, Economic and Statistical Department 23 July 1938: Confidential Reich Bank matter. On the Development of the German Prices and Wages Situation since 1933. This picture of only a slight increase in real wages has been confirmed by economic historians. Rüdiger Hachtmann, ‘Lebenshaltungskosten und Reallöhne während des “Dritten Reiches” ’, in Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 75 (1988), 32–73 claims that the net wages of industrial workers increased by 25 per cent between 1932/33–1938, while prices increased by around 15–20 per cent. After discussing maximum and minimum values, André Steiner in ‘Zur Neuschätzung der Lebenshaltungskostenindex für die Vorkriegszeit des Nationalsozialismus’, in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2005/2) 129–52 estimates the increase in the real weekly wages of industrial workers between 1932 and 1938 as probably 1 per cent.

  66. Hachtmann, ‘Lebenshaltungskosten’, 69.

  67. Kershaw, Opinion, 98ff.; numerous examples in Sopade 1938, 713ff.

  68. Kershaw, Opinion, 105ff.

  69. Meldungen, 2, 166ff.; Sopade 1937 notes as early as September an increasing rejection of the regime among the middle class (1231ff.); Kershaw, Opinion, 132ff.

  70. Tooze, Ökonomie, 303. Private housing construction was also virtually brought to a standstill by the ban on mortgage credit by the Reich Bank. See Tilman Harlander, Zwischen Heimstätte und Wohnmaschine. Wohnungsbau und Wohnungspolitik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (Basel, 1995), 139. If Z, 5328-NG: Göring issued a circular on 18 June banning all public and private building work apart from that which was for the defence of the Reich or the redevelopment of cities. Exceptions were permitted only for projects of special importance such as workers’ housing estates and the construction of small flats. Excerpts from Göring’s directive were published by the Reich Finance Minister on 5 July (ibid.).

  71. Tooze, Ökonomie, 304f.; Alfred C. Mierzejewski, Hitler’s Trains. The German National Railway and the Third Reich (Stroud, 2005); BAB, R 2501/658, Economic and Statistical department of the Reich Bank, 4 August 1938: Table of the length of journeys on some important railway sections. See also Sopade 1938, 613ff.

  72. BAB, R 2501/6581, German morale, hygiene,
and culture statistics of the past 10 years, 15 July 1938. The basic conclusions of this report are confirmed by Jörg Baten and Andrea Wagner, ‘Mangelernährung. Krankheit und Sterblichkeit im NS Wirtschaftsaufschwung (1933–1937)’, in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2003/1), 99–123.

  73. Meldungen 2, 157ff., quotes 157f.

  74. Sopade 1937, see above, p. 1104, note 1; 1938, 67ff and 631ff.; 1939, 624ff. and 859ff.

  75. Sopade 1938, 684ff.: Little enthusiasm for war (except among young people), similarly 704ff. (Supplement), 913ff. (Fear of war), see also 970ff. (Supplement).

  76. Meldungen, 2, 72f.; Kershaw, Hitler-Mythos, 164f.; Auerbach, ‘Volksstimmung’, esp. 281f.

  77. Goebbels TB, 30 May 1938; VB (B), 30 May 1938, ‘Scharfe Abrechnung mit den Friedensstörern’ (about the speech).

  78. Goebbels TB, 1 and 3 June 1938; PA 1938, Nos 1551 and 1565; VB (B), 3 June 1938; MNN, 2 and 3 June 1938; DAZ, 2 June (M und E); Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 313f.

  79. Judging by his diary entries (Goebbels TB, 4, 5, and 8–12 June), the performance of the press lagged behind the propaganda minister’s expectations. See PA 1938, Nos 1601 and 1613. On the start of the press campaign see, for example, FZ, 3 June 1938 (leader) and 7 June (contributions on ‘incidents’). The DAZ reported until 11 June regularly on its front page about such incidents; the VB (B) carried headlines from 2–9, 11–13, and 18 June 1938.

  80. Goebbels TB, 17 June 1938.

  81. Ibid., 18 June 1938; FZ, 19 June 1938, ‘Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels in Königsberg’.

  82. Goebbels TB, 1 and 2 July 1938; PA 1938, Nos 1974, 1981, 1988, and 2008. In the second half of the month the German press polemics against Prague died down, which is evident in the pages of the VB, FZ, and DAZ. See also Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 314ff.