Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  3. ADAP E 6, No. 311.

  4. Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus in Dänemark und Norwegen (1940–1945), ed. Fritz Petrick (Berlin and Heidelberg, 1992), No. 240.

  5. Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘Polizeiliche Kooperation unter deutscher Besatzung. Mechanismen der Repression in der “Repubblica Sociale Italiana” ’, in Klinkhammer et al., Die ‘Achse’, 487.

  6. Klinkhammer, Bündnis; Carlo Gentile, Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS und Polizei im Kampf gegen Partisanen und Zivilbevölkerung in Italien 1939–1945 (Paderborn and Munich, 2012).

  7. On Jewish persecution in Italy after September 1943 see Liliana Picciotto Fargion, ‘Italian’, in Benz (ed.), Dimension, 199–227; Meir Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews. German–Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy 1922–1945 (Oxford, 1978), 342ff.; Klinkhammer, Bündnis, 530ff.

  8. Ibid., 535.

  9. On the deportations see Errikos Sevillias, Athens–Auschwitz (Athens, 1983) (from the former Italian zone of occupation); Gerhard Grimm, ‘Albanien’, in Benz, (ed.), Dimension, 227; Hagen Fleischer, ‘Griechenland’, in Benz (ed.), Dimension, 265ff. (Greek islands); Sundhaussen, ‘Jugoslawien’, in Benz (ed.), Dimension, 325.

  10. On German Jewish policy in France after the collapse of Italy see Klarsfeld, Vichy, 276ff.; Jonathan Steinberg, Deutsche, Italianer und Juden. Der italienische Widerstand gegen den Holocaust (Göttingen, 1992), 1206ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 180ff.; Poznanski, Jews, 390ff.

  11. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 278ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 181ff.

  12. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 289.

  13. Walter Stucki, Von Petain zur Vierten Republik. Vichy 1944 (Berne, 1947), 160ff. On the reshuffle of the French government see Jäckel, Frankreich, 283ff.

  14. Ibid., 293ff.

  15. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 298ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 190ff.; Bernd Kasten, ‘Gute Franzosen’. Die französische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungsmacht im besetzten Frankreich, 1940–1945 (Sigmaringen, 1993), 120ff.

  16. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 574ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 197ff.

  17. BAB, NS 19/3302, Best to Himmler, 22 August 1943; see Herbert, Best, 351; see also ADAP E 6, No. 259.

  18. Ibid., No. 268.

  19. In January 1943 Best had already pointed out to Berlin that an increase in Jewish persecution in Denmark would mean the end of his policy of cooperation with the Danish government (ADAP E 5, Nos 39 and 344). Luther, Ribbentrop, and Himmler had agreed with this view (PAA, Inland II g 184, Luther to Ribbentrop, 28 January 1943, and Ribbentrop’s marginalia on this document of 1 February 1943). In June Himmler decided that no further measures involving Jewish policy in Denmark should be taken until he issued a new order (ibid., Wagner to Kaltenbrunner, 30 June 1943). On these events see Herbert, Best, 361f.

  20. ADAP, E 6, No. 287. On the interpretation of this telegram see, in particular, Herbert, Best, 362ff. Best also wanted to secure the command over all police troops deployed in Denmark and to establish a special court under his chairmanship. See ADAP E 6, No. 271.

  21. Ibid., No. 332.

  22. Ibid., No. 344.

  23. Gunnar S. Paulsson, ‘“The Bridge over Oeresund”. The Historiography on the Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-occupied Denmark’, in Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995), 437.

  24. For details see Yahil, Rescue, 223ff. On the rescue operation and its background see also Paulsson, ‘“Bridge” ’, a reply from Hans Kirchhoff, ‘Denmark. A Light in the Darkness of the Holocaust? A Reply to Gunnar S. Paulsson’, in Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995), 465–79, and Kirchhoff, ‘The Rescue of the Danish Jews in October 1943’, in David Bankier and Israel Gutman (eds), New Europe and the Final Solution ( Jerusalem, 2003), 539–55.

  25. PAA, Inland II g 184, Telegram, 5 October 1943.

  26. Führer edict 20 August 1943 (RGBl. 1943 I, 527).

  27. Lammers explained it in this way in a circular of 8 May in BAB, R 43 II/1512. On Bormann’s appointment see Longerich, Stellvertreter, 167ff.

  28. Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 401.

  29. See Speer, Erinnerungen, 326f.

  30. Eichholtz, Geschichte 2, 146ff.; Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 28 June 1943, 28.

  31. Führer edict concerning Concentration in the War Economy (RGBl. 1943 I, 529); Müller, ‘Speer’, 337f.; Speer, Erinnerungen, 287ff.

  32. Eichholtz, Geschichte 2, 148ff.; Müller, ‘Speer’, 343f.; BAB, R 3/1562, Göring edict, 4 September 1943.

  33. Müller, ‘Speer’, 341f.; Eichholtz, Geschichte, 2, 162ff.; BAB, R 3/306, Speer edict, 29 October 1943, concerning the Distribution of Responsibilities in the War Economy.

  34. Goebbels TB, 25 June 1943; on positive assessments see also 20 May, 8 June, 10 and 28 August, 29 September, and 3 October 1943.

  35. Speer, Erinnerungen, 325.

  36. Ibid., 325ff.; Müller, ‘Speer’, 339f. Speer’s Posen speech is in BAB, R 3/1548.

  37. Heinrich Himmler, Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen, ed. Bradley F. Smith and Agnes Peterson (Frankfurt a. M., 1974), 162ff.

  38. Goebbels TB, 7 October 1943.

  39. Edict concerning the Preparations for the Reconstruction of Bomb-damaged Cities, 11 October 1943 (RGBl. 1943 I, 575f.); Speer, Erinnerungen, 327f.

  40. Müller ‘Speer’, 378.

  41. On the meeting see IMT 27, 1292-PS, 104ff.; Kroener, ‘“Menschenbewirtschaftung” ’, 901ff.; Eichholtz, Geschichte, 2, 225ff.; Speer, Erinnerungen, 333f.: Hitler’s behaviour towards him was ‘cold and impolite’.

  42. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 30 September 1943, 22; Speer, Erinnerungen, 322ff.; for the literature see Kroener, ‘“Menschenbewirtschaftung” ’, 899ff.

  43. Herbst, Krieg, 267ff.; Eichholtz, Geschichte, 2, 164ff.; Müller, ‘Speer’, 348ff.

  44. Goebbels TB, 7 and 20 October 1943, 6 and 12 January 1944.

  45. See above, p. 729.

  46. On his illness and his estrangement from Hitler see Speer, Erinnerungen, 339ff.; Fest, Speer, 268ff.

  47. Speer, Erinnerungen, 339ff.; Müller, ‘Speer’, 382ff. The events are principally covered in the files BAB, R 3/1572, 1573, 1575, 1588, 1590, and 1605. On the tense relationship with Bormann see Goebbels TB, 6 February 1944.

  48. BAB, R 3/1515, Memoranda, 25 January 1944; Speer, Erinnerungen, 340f.; Eichholtz, Geschichte 3, 11ff.; Müller, ‘Speer’, 380f.

  49. Goebbels TB, 10 September and 28 October 1943.

  50. Bernd Martin, ‘Deutsch-sowjetische Sondierungen über einen separaten Friedenssschluß im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Bericht und Dokumentation’, in Inge Auerbach (ed.), Felder und Vorfelder russischer Geschichte. Studien zu Ehren von Peter Scheibert (Freiburg i. Br., 1985), 286.

  51. These considerations are above all reflected in his directive No. 51, 3 November 1943, and the supplementary directive 51a (Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen).

  52. See the contributions by Frieser, ‘Rückzug’, esp. 301ff., ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, esp. 362ff., and ‘Das Ausweichen der Heeresgruppe Nord von Leningrad ins Baltikum’, in Frieser, Ostfront esp. 282f.

  53. Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 367ff.

  54. Manstein, Siege, 554.

  55. Goebbels TB, 9 November 1943.

  56. Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen, 486ff.: Hitler claimed that for Army Group South counter operations were ‘the equivalent of bolting’ (p. 493). Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 387ff.

  57. On this conversation see Manstein, Siege, 569ff. Detailed account in Kershaw, Hitler 2, 800ff.; Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 391.

  58. Guderian, Erinnerungen, 294ff.

  59. BAB, NS 18/189, Bormann to Rosenberg, 13 December 1943 (Akten Partei-Kanzlei, Teil I, Regest 21943).

  60. Bormann to Rosenberg, 30 November 1943, further elucidation to Rosenberg on 12 and 29 December 1943, and further groundwork by Bormann in Akten Partei-Kanzlei, Teil I, Regest 27691. The introduction of the term NS Leadership Officer occurred through the OKH edict of 28 November 1943. See Volker Berghahn, ‘NSDAP und “geistige Führung” der Wehrmacht 1939–1943’, in Vf Z 17 (1969)
, 51ff.; Arne W. G. Zoepf, Wehrmacht zwischen Tradition und Ideologie. Der NS-Führungsoffizier im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt a. M., 1988), 65ff. Hitler had already outlined the basic idea of a politically indoctrinated officer in October 1943 in an address to officers in Bad Schachen. See Berghahn, ‘NSDAP’, 51.

  61. According to Bormann’s explanation to Rosenberg in his letter of 30 November 1943; Hitler’s agreement is clear from statements during the meeting of 7 January 1944 (BAB, NS 8/174, 189, and 190).

  62. Waldemar Besson, ‘Zur Geschichte des nationalsozialistischen Führungs-Offiziers (NSFO)’, in VfZ 9 (1961), Doc. 5. The wording and style indicate Bormann’s authorship.

  63. Ibid., Doc. 7, where the ‘sole responsibility of the commanding officer for the political-ideological leadership and training’ is established; this source contains further basic documents concerning the NS-Leadership Officer.

  64. Documented in Weinberg, ‘Adolf Hitler und der NS-Führungsoffizier (NSFO)’, in VfZ 12 (1964), 443–58.

  65. On the annoyance this propaganda caused Hitler and his entourage see Rudolf Schmundt, Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamtes General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt, fortgef. von Wilhelm Burgdorf, ed. Dermot Bradley and Richard Schulze-Kossens (Osnabrück, 1984), 12 September 1943; Wegner, Die ‘Aporie des Krieges’, in Frieser, Ostfront, 225f.

  66. Complete text in If Z, F 19/3.

  67. Zoepf, Wehrmacht, 247ff.: 1. Conference in Posen, 24–26 January 1944 for over a hundred generals and admirals, with a subsequent address by Hitler in the Führer headquarters; 2. conference in Sonthofen, April 1944; 3. Conference in Sonthofen 5–7 May 1944; 4. Conference in Sonthofen, 23–26 May 1944; 5. Conference in Sonthofen, 19–22 June 1944, with a concluding speech by Hitler in the Plattlerhof. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offizieren am 26. Mai 1944’, in MGM 20 (1976), 134, mentions conferences on 27 January, 26 April, 26 May, 22 June, and 13 July 1944; Text of the speech on 22 June 1944 in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Werner Jochmann (eds), Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1945 (no page numbers).

  68. Manstein, Siege, 579ff. Manstein’s quotation of the speech and his interjection is a reproduction of the content and not the actual wording of the original (If Z, F 19/3). The quarrel intensified when Hitler claimed that a personal letter from the field-marshal dealing with the situation of his army group was an attempt to protect his back.

  69. Schmundt, Tätigkeitsbericht, 27 January 1944. Hitler had contemplated dismissing Manstein the previous autumn. See ibid., 25 October 1943.

  70. Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 393ff.

  71. Ibid., 392ff., Manstein, Siege, 576f.

  72. Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 394ff.

  73. Frieser, ‘Rückzug’, 312ff.

  74. Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 420ff.

  75. Klaus Schönherr, ‘Der Rückzug der Heeresgruppe A über die Krim bis Rumänien’, in Frieser (ed.), Ostfront., 469ff.

  76. Frieser, ‘Ausweichen’, 284ff.

  77. Schreiber, ‘Ende’, 145ff.

  78. Goebbels TB, 4 March 1944.

  79. This is emphasized by Michael Salewski in ‘Die Abwehr der Invasion als Schlüssel zum “Endsieg”?’, in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds), Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität (Munich, 1999), 210–23.

  80. Evening situation conference on 20 December 1943. See Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen, 440ff.; Goebbels TB, 4 March 1944.

  81. KTB OKW 4, 270.

  82. Kehrl, Krisenmanager, 362f., according to statements by Keitel.

  83. Detlef Vogel, ‘Deutsche und alliierte Kriegführung im Westen’, in Horst Boog et al. (eds), Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive. Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen, und in Ostasien 1943–1944/45 (Stuttgart and Munich, 2001), 478.

  84. Ibid., 463ff.

  85. Gröhler, Bombenkrieg, 188.

  86. Goebbels TB, 20 December 1943.

  87. Ibid., 21 December 1943; ‘Führer-Erlasse’, No. 288.

  88. Longerich, Goebbels, 605ff.

  89. On the condition of German society at the end of the war see Sven Keller, Volksgemeinschaft am Ende. Gesellschaft und Gewalt 1944/45 (Munich, 2013); Bernd Rusinek, Gesellschaft in der Katastrophe. Terror, Illegalität, Widerstand – Köln 1944/45 (Essen, 1989).

  90. Goebbels TB, 10 February 1944. In the SD reports (Berichte zu Inlandsfragen) the speech was not mentioned at all, a remarkable contrast to earlier Führer speeches, which were normally followed by reports of a substantial increase in confidence in the leadership.

  91. Ibid., 28 February 1944.

  92. Ibid., 18 April 1944.

  93. Ibid., 16 and 17 February, 4, 11, 14, and 15 March 1944.

  94. Ellen Gibbels, Hitlers Parkinson-Krankheit. Zur Frage eines hirnorganischen Psychosyndroms (Berlin, 1990); Gibbels, ‘Hitlers Nervenkrankheit. Eine neurologisch-psychiatrische Studie’, in VfZ 41 (1994), 155–200; Hans-Joachim Neumann and Henrik Eberle, War Hitler krank? Ein abschließender Befund (Bergisch-Gladbach, 2009); Ernst-Georg Schenck, Patient Hitler. Eine medizinische Biographie (Düsseldorf, 1989).

  95. Kershaw, Hitler, 2, S. 797.

  96. Medical historians are largely in agreement that Hitler’s illnesses and his consumption of medicines did not significantly impair his abilities as a politician. For example, right up until the end he could sustain his concentration during lengthy meetings, make detailed statements, and compose substantial texts. See Neumann and Eberle, Hitler, 290ff (summing up). Gibbels assumes a ‘slight organic change in Hitler’s personality as a result of his Parkinson’s disease’, but it is unlikely to have influenced his political or military decisions (Gibbels, ‘Nervenkrankheit’, 214). However, these diagnoses are to be understood more in terms of a certification of competence: Hitler should not be regarded primarily as a ‘sick person’ and – crucially – should be considered fully responsible for his actions. However, in the case of such an extreme personality, the link between his physical condition and his political actions is much more complex. It cannot be proved that Hitler was dependent on drugs, as is claimed in the volume by Ohler that appeared shortly before the publication of this book (Norman Ohler, Der totale Rausch. Drogen im Dritten Reich (Cologne, 2015), 141ff.). The only written evidence for the assertion that he was dependent on cocaine as a result of his medical treatment the 20 July is the statement of ErwinGiesing, the doctor treating him; but this cannot be regarded as a reliable source. The injection of the stimulant, Eudokal, by Morell is confirmed only for certain phases (in summer 1943 and from September to December 1944), which argues against drug dependency. Ohler himself concedes that certain striking features of Hitler’s behaviour, which he attributes to the consumption of drugs (in particular excessive activity, a torrent of words, a complete lack of empathy, illusory states of euphoria), were part of his personality.

  97. Goebbels TB, 18 January 1944; during Speer’s stay in the sanatorium he gave his state secretary, Naumann, the task of maintaining direct contact. See ibid., 6 February and 9 March 1944.

  98. Ibid., 29 February 1944.

  99. Ibid., 15 March 1944.

  100. Ibid., 25 January, also 15 March and 18 April 1944.

  101. Kerekes (ed.), Allianz, No. 122.

  102. See Goebbels TB, 22 January, 22 March, and 7 May 1943.

  103. ADAP E 7, No. 236–238.

  104. Goebbels TB, 15 March 1944 on the preparations for the action.

  105. On the meeting between Hitler and Horthy see Schmidt, Statist, 587f.; Nikolaus von Horthy, Ein Leben für Ungarn (Bonn, 1953), 253ff.

  106. Warlimont, Hauptquartier, 442f.

  107. Igor Philip Matic´, Edmund Veesenmayer. Agent und Diplomat der nationalsozialistischen Expansionspolitik (Munich, 2002); Krisztián Ungváry , ‘Kriegsschauplatz Ungarn’, in Frieser (ed.), Ostfront., 857ff.

  108. Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 419ff. and 432ff.

  109. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 53, which also includes the t
ext of the attachments to this directive.

  110. Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 424ff.

  111. Goebbels TB, 3 and 11 March, 14 April 1944.

  112. Ibid., 22 and 29 February, 11 and 14 March 1944.

  113. See also Manstein, Siege, 602f.

  114. Goebbels TB, 20 March 1944, who may, however, have overestimated the success of the event as he wanted to claim responsibility for it. Schmundt, Tätigkeitsbericht, 3 and 19 March 1944.

  115. Ibid., 16 April 1944.

  116. Manstein, Siege, 610ff.; Frieser, ‘Rückzugsoperationen’, 438f.

  117. Ibid., 440ff.

  118. Ibid., 448.

  119. Manstein, Siege, 615f.

  120. Klaus Schönherr, ‘Ferdinand Schörner – der idealtypische Nazigeneral’, in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds), Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches – 27 biographische Skizzen (Berlin and Frankfurt a. M., 1995).

  121. Wehrmachtberichte 3.

  122. On the persecution and deportation of the Hungarian Jews see Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary, 2 vols (New York, 1994); Christian Gerlach and Götz Aly, Das letzte Kapitel. Realpolitik, Ideologie und der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944/1945 (Stuttgart and Zurich, 2002).

  123. Goebbels TB, 27 April 1944.

  124. PAA, Inland II g 210, published in Braham, Destruction, 700f. On this set of issues see also Braham, Politics, S. 884f.

  125. ADAP E 8, No. 22f.

  126. Goebbels TB, 27 April 1944.

  127. For details see Longerich, ‘Davon’, 298ff.

  128. Wilhelm, ‘Ansprache’.

  Defeat Looms

  1. Wolfgang Schumann (ed.), Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 5 (Berlin, 1984), 354; Gröhler, Bombenkrieg, 213f.; Eichholtz, Geschichte, 3, 14ff.; Müller, ‘Speer’, 390ff.; Speer, Erinnerungen, 343f. According to Goebbels TB, 3 April 1944, Bormann objected to Hanke’s appointment.