by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
RC-49.
14. Von Neurath to von Hindenburg, June 19, 1933, Neurath-11.
15. Fbank to Bavarian Staatsminister of the Interior Adolf Wagner, September 6,
1933, D-923. The SS was then part of the larger party formation, the SA.
35
ANTECEDENTS
“which
houses,
as
is
known,
almost
exclusively
criminal
characters
[¿as
bekanntlich
fast
ausschliesslich
Verbrechernaturen
beherbergt].’^
Still another consequence of the party's activities made itself felt in
the
economic
sector.
The
party’s
agitation,
particularly
the
party-
directed boycott, had unforeseeably disturbed the delicate balance of
the German business world. On August 20, 1935, an interministerial
conference on the economic effects of party action was held in the
office
of
Reichsbankpräsident
Schacht.
The
conference
was
attended
by
Interior
Minister
Frick,
Finance
Minister
von
Krosigk,
Justice
Minister
Dr.
Gürtner,
Education
Minister
Rust,
several
Staatssekretäre, and Staatsminister Adolf Wagner in his capacity as the party's representative.16 17
Schacht opened the discussion by pointing out that the “unlawful”
activity against Jewry would soon have to end (dass das gesetzlose
Treiben gegen das Judentum bald ein Ende nehmen müsse), or else he
would not be able to cope with his task of economic rearmament. To
give a few examples, the boycott chief, Streicher, was trying to force
German firms to dismiss their Jewish representatives in foreign countries. Now, it could not be forgotten, Schacht continued, that these Jewish
representatives
were
“especially
skilful.”
When
the
Jewish
agent of Alliance Insurance in Egypt was subjected to party chicanery,
he simply quit and took the business with him. The English had captured the market. Another example: In many cities, including Leipzig, Jews were not allowed in public baths. How was this going to work out
during
the
Leipzig
exhibition?
Furthermore,
this
“unlawful
activity”
(gesetzlose
Treiben)
had
provoked
counteraction
abroad.
A
French
importer had annulled a large order he had placed with Salamander
Shoes. The Bosch firm had lost its entire South American market. It
was often said that one could do without the Jewish business, but
whoever maintained that view, said Schacht, simply did not know the
world. The Jews were needed even for importations, for the trade with
rare products, needed by the armed forces, was in Jewish hands.
This did not mean, Schacht said, that all “single actions” (Einzelak-
tionen) against Jews were to be condemned. For example, he could see
no objections to the display of signs reading “Jews not wanted.” Such
signs could often be found in the United States, too. The case of
barring Jews from the resort town of Bad Tölz was more doubtful. The
16. Wagner to Frank, November 29, 1933, D-926.
17. Summary of Schacht conference on Jewish matters, held August 20, 1935,
dated August 22, 1935, NG-4067. The Reichsbank, a government institution, was the
central bank.
36
ANTECEDENTS
party’s ejection of Jews from Langenschwalbach was an “extremely
doubtful" case. But utterly impossible was the case that had occurred
in Amswalde. There the director of the local Reichsbank office, one of
Schacht's own men, had bought something from a Jew who had served
as a sergeant in the war and who had received the Iron Cross. Thereupon,
Streicher
had
displayed the picture of the Reichsbankrat on
three public bulletin boards," and under the picture had appeared the
words:
“Whoever
buys
from
a
Jew
is
a
traitor
to
the
people”
(Volksverräter). Schacht had immediately protested to the local party
official and had demanded an apology to be displayed on the same
bulletin boards. Then Schacht had sent a copy of his protest to the
highest regional party authority, Gauleiter Kube. Schacht's wishes had
not
been
satisfied.
Consequently
he
had
ordered
that
the
local
Reichsbank office be closed. But Schacht was especially disappointed
that Gauleiter Kube had not found it necessary to send a reply.
Interior Minister Frick was the next speaker. He too was of the
opinion that “wild single actions" (wilde Einzelaktionen) against Jews
would have to stop. His ministry was already working on a number of
decrees. The Jewish question was going to be solved in a perfectly legal
manner.
Staatsminister Wagner, the party’s representative, spoke next. He
too was against these “wild” actions. But the people would stop spontaneously, he said, as soon as they noticed that the Reich government was taking measures against the Jews.
A representative of the Propaganda Ministry then put in that from
his standpoint, nothing was wrong with Streicher’s condemnation of
the Reichsbankrat who had made a purchase from a Jew. Schacht
replied with indignation that he simply had never heard of such an idea.
As a non-party member he had a right to buy where he pleased. He
knew of no laws to the contrary. The Propaganda Ministry's representative evidently did not know that even government offices were placing orders with Jews. The Amswalde incident was “a case of the highest
perfidy
and
meanness
[ein
Fall
höchster
Perfidie
und
Gemeinheit].”
At the conclusion of the meeting, the conferees made the following
decisions: Some law was to be enacted to prevent the establishment of
new Jewish enterprises; the government was to make an effort to place
its orders only with German enterprises; Wagner was to submit some
party suggestions for more laws. Needless to say, these resolutions
were not very important. The decision on new Jewish enterprises was 18
18.
Stürmerkasten—used by Streicher to publicize the more defamatory materials
in his paper.
37
ANTECEDENTS
deadwood, the placement of business orders with German firms was
decreed later, and the additional party suggestions did not materialize.
It is important to stress at this point what Schacht was protesting
against and what he was trying to do. Schacht did not oppose anti-
Jewish action. He opposed “wild” party measures. He preferred the
“legal” way, that is, certainty instead of uncertainty. It was uncertainty
that hurt business. Schacht never opposed anti-Jewish decrees;19 20 21 to the
contrary, he welcomed them and was impatient when they were not
issued quickly enough," for, basically, he wanted “clarity” in order that
he might cope with the business mechanism.
On October 4, 1935, even Streicher declared that the Jewish question was being solved, “piece by piece,” in a legal manner. Whoever, said Streicher, recognized the tremendous importance of these decrees
would not allow himself to be dragged into ridiculous chicanery. “We
don't smash any windows and we don’t smash any Jews. We don't
have to do that. Whoever engages in single actions [Einzelaktionen] of
that kind is an enemy of the state, a provocateur, or even a Jew [oder
gar ein Jude]."1' But in November 1938, something happened that completely upset the applecart.
Certain sections of the party became restless and suddenly started
a riot that had far more serious consequences than the “wild” actions of
1933. It must be remembered that this outburst occurred in the sixth
year of the Nazi regime. There was no longer any need to remind the
bureaucracy
of
the
“people’s
wishes.”
The
destruction
process
was
well under way. Anti-Jewish decrees by the dozen had already been
published or were in preparation. Today we know the real reason for
these riots. The party, apart from the SS formation, no longer had
important functions in Jewish affairs. This was true especially of the
uniformed
brownshirts
(the
SA)
and
the
propaganda
apparatus. The
1938 riots were a bid for power. The party men wanted to play a role in
the actual implementation of the anti-Jewish destruction process, but
they failed miserably.
On November 9, 1938, a minor German Foreign Office official,
Legationsrat vom Rath, was assassinated by a Jew, Herschel Gryn-
zpan, in the German Embassy in Paris. This was not the first assassination of its kind. About three years before, a Jewish rabbinical student had fatally shot the leader of the Swiss branch of the Nazi party.3 The
19. Interrogation of Hjalmar Schacht, October 17,1945, PS-3729. In this testimony,
Schacht pointed out that the anti-Jewish decrees were “not important enough to risk a
break” with Hitler.
20. Schacht to Frick, October 30, 1935, protesting against delays in the issuance of
certain anti-Jewish implementing regulations, NG-4067.
21. Speech by Streicher before German Labor Front mass meeting. October 4,
1935, M-35. The German Labor Front was a party organization.
38
ANTECEDENTS
Swiss assassination did not have any repercussions, but the Paris incident was seized upon as an opportunity for party action. On the evening of
November
9,
1938,
the
Propaganda
Minister,
Dr.
Josef
Goebbels, told a group of party leaders in Munich that riots had started
against
Jews
in
the
districts
of
Kurhessen
and
Magdeburg-Anhalt.
Upon his suggestion, said Goebbels, the Führer (Hitler) had decided
that in the event that the riots spread spontaneously throughout the
Reich, they were not to be discouraged. The party leaders listened
attentively. To them Goebbels’s statement had only one meaning: the
party was not to appear outwardly as the architect of the demonstrations, but was to organize and execute them.”
The riots spread with lightning speed. The SA formation sent out
its brigades to bum down systematically all Jewish synagogues in the
country.“ The black-uniformed SS and the regular police had not been
notified. But late during the same evening, Gruppenführer Wolff, Chief
of Himmler’s Personal Staff, was still in his office, attending a conference. A call came at 11:15 p.m. to the effect that Goebbels had ordered a pogrom. Wolff immediately contacted Himmler. The chief of the SS
and Police arrived at 1 a.m. on November 10 and ordered his forces
into action to prevent large-scale looting and, incidentally, to fill his
concentration camps with 20,000 Jews." Having attended to the needs
of the hour, Himmler dictated a file memorandum in which he expressed his personal reactions to the Goebbels pogrom. The memorandum read
somewhat
as
follows:
“The
order
was
given
by
the
Propaganda Directorate, and I suspect that Goebbels, in his craving for
power, which 1 noticed long ago, and also in his empty-headedness
[Hohlköpfigkeit] started this action just at a time when the foreign
political situation is very grave.... When I asked the Führer about it, 1
had
the
impression
that
he
did
not
know
anything
about
these
events.”“
Himmler’s reaction appears to have been relatively mild. After all,
he too had something to gain from the action, although he generally 22 23 24 25 26
22. David Frankfurter, "I Kill a Nazi Gauleiter,” Commentary, February 1950,
pp. 133-41. The assassinated Nazi. Wilhelm Gustloff, actually was not a Gauleiter but a
Landesgruppenleiter. A Gauleiter was a party regional chief within the Reich: a Landesgruppenleiter was the party leader of German citizens in a foreign country.
23. Report by chief of the forty Court Walter Buch to Hermann Goring, February 13,
1939, PS-3063.
24. See six reports by SA-Brigaden, dated November 10 and November 11, 1938.
on destruction of synagogues, PS-1721.
25. Affidavit by Hauptsturmführer Luitpold Schallenneier, July 5, 1946, SS(A)-5.
For SS ranks, see chart in Appendix A. Schallenneier was Wolff's personal assistant.
A reference to 20.000 arrests is made in the report by Security Police Chief Hey-
drich to Goring, November 11, 1938, PS-3058.
26. Affidavit by Schallermeier, July 5, 1946, SS(A)-5.
39
ANTECEDENTS
preferred to make his own decisions. But the reaction of the other top
Nazis
was
not
so
indifferent.
When
Economy
Minister
Funk
(Schacht's successor) heard about the riots, he called up the Propaganda Minister on the telephone and spoke to him in the following vein: Are you crazy, Goebbels? To make such a mess of things [Sch
weinreien]!
One has to be ashamed to be a German. We are losing our whole prestige
abroad. I am trying, day and night, to conserve the national wealth, and
you throw it willy-nilly out of the window. If this thing does not stop
immediately, you can have the whole filthy mess [werfe ich den ganzen
Dreck hin].21
Goring was completely unaware of what was going on because, at
the time of the instigation of the riot, he was on board a train. The news
was communicated to him upon his arrival at the Berlin railway station.
Goring lost no time complaining to Hitler that Goebbels was very
irresponsible, that the effects on the economy, especially the “spirit of
conservation," would be disastrous and so forth. Hitler “made some
apologies for Goebbels” but agreed that such events were not to be
repeated. Later the same day (November 10), Goring and Hitler had a
second conference. This time Goebbels was also present. The propaganda chief began “his usual talk.” This was not the first murder committed by a Jew; such things could not be tolerated, and so forth. Then Goebbels suggested something that stunned Goring. The Jews were to
pay a fine. “Indeed, he wished that each Gau (party district] should
collect such a fine, and he named an almost incredibly high sum.”
Goring countered that such a procedure was utterly impossible. Since
Herr Goebbels was also the Gauleiter (regional party chief) of Berlin,
and since he had a large number of Jews right in his own Gau, he was
obviously “the most interested party.” If such measures were to be
taken, the state would have to collect the money. Hitler agreed, and
after some discussion “this way and that,” the sum of one billion
reichsmark was agreed upon.“ 27 28
27. Affidavit by Louise Funk, November 5, 1945, Funk-3. Affiant, the wife of the
Economy Minister, claims to have overheard the conversation. Whether Funk, a former
Staatssekretär in the Propaganda Ministry, expressed such strong sentiments to his former boss may be open to some question. Mrs. Funk was, however, the only witness.
28. Testimony by Göring, Trial of the Major War Criminals IX, 276-78. At the
official rate of exchange, one billion reichsmark equaled $400,000,000.
In neighboring Italy, Foreign Minister Ciano noted in his diary an interesting private
comment on the “fine" by Benito Mussolini: “The Duce is critical of the German decision
to impose a line of a thousand million marks. He agrees with reprisals of a personal
nature but considers the valuation of vom Rath's life at seven thousand million lire to be
excessive. Or rather absurd." Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano's Hidden Diary 1937-1936 (New
York, 1953), entry for November 13. 1938. p. 194. More will be said about the “fine’' in