Raul Hilberg
Page 16
leading
Jewish
directors of the Böhmische Escompte Bank did not profit much from
the sale. Directors Dr. Feilchenfeld and Dr. Lob died in a killing center;
Director Dr. Kantor was hanged.1”
The Kreditanstalt and Böhmische Escompte Bank are both cases
in which the threat was felt across the border and reaction came before
the Germans were in a position to use force. The Jews anticipated the
force and complied with it in advance.
Jewish
enterprises
that
chose
to
wait
for
further
developments
were subjected to a broad pressure, which was designed to increase
their readiness to sell at the lowest possible price. This pressure was
applied not against any particular Jewish firm but against Jewish business as a whole. Mainly, an attempt was made to cut off the Jewish companies from their customers and their suppliers. The alienation of
the customer was to be carried out by means of an anti-Jewish boycott;
the severance of supplies was to be accomplished through a series of
allocation measures. These efforts, it must be emphasized, were not
compulsory
Aryanization
procedures.
They
were
designed
only
to
facilitate voluntary transfers.
The boycott was initially organized by the party, which established
a boycott committee on March 29, 1933. Its membership was as follows:"
Julius Streicher, Chairman
Robert Ley, German Labor Front
Adolf Hühnlein, SA 8 9 10 11
8. Ibid. See also affidavit by Joham, September 13, 1947, Nl-10998.
9. Affidavit by Georg von Schnitzler, March 10, 1947, NI-5194. Von Schnitzler, a
Vorstand member of the I. G., was chairman of the 1. G. Commercial Committee. To gain
complete control of the Pulverfabrik, the I. G. had to buy out the interest of the Deutsche
Bank.
10. Interrogation of Engineer Jan Dvoracek (Zivno Bank), November 22, 1946,NI-
11870. See also affidavit by Dvoracek, February 2, 1948, Nl-14348.
11. Announcement by the Central Committee for Defense against Jewish Horror
and Boycott, March 29, 1933, PS-21S6.
97
EXPROPRIATION
Heinrich Himmier, SS
Reinhold Muchow, Nazi Party Factory Cells
Hans Oberlindober, Nazi Party Organization for Care of War Victims
Jakob Spenger, Nazi League for Public Officials
Walter Darre, Party Chief for Agricultural Matters
Dr. von Renteln, Party Leader for the Middle Class
Dr. Theodor Adrian von Renteln, Party Leader for the Middle Class
Dr. Hans Frank, Party Legal Chief
Dr. Gerhard Wagner, Party Health Chief
Willy Kôrber, Hitler Youth
Dr. Achim Gercke, Party Information Department
The committee carried out its work by calling mass meetings, which
were addressed by such personalities as Streicher and Goebbels, and
by placing in front of Jewish stores “defensive guards” assigned by the
brown-shirted SA and the black-uniformed SS. The guards were ordered only to “inform” the public that the proprietor of the establishment was a Jew.12 13 14 Sometimes the information was conveyed by smearing the show windows with the word Jude."
It
should
be
pointed
out
that
the
party's
boycott
committee
launched its campaign not so much in order to facilitate the purchase of
Jewish firms by German concerns as to remind the ministries of the
“popular” hostility against Jewry and thus to influence the civil service
in taking action against the Jews. However, the boycott had distinct
economic effects which were intensified and widened.
We have already seen that at the conclusion of the Schacht conference on August 20, 1935, it was decided to withhold all public contracts from Jewish firms. This decision was implemented by amending the
Directive of the Reich Cabinet Concerning Awards of Public Contracts.“ At the same time, the boycott was made compulsory not only for Reich agencies but also for Reich employees. Upon the initiative of
the Interior Ministry, it was ruled that civil servants could no longer
receive subsidies for services obtained from Jewish physicians, lawyers, dentists, hospitals, drugstores, and—by suggestion of the Justice Ministry—also from maternity homes and funeral parlors.15 The compulsory boycott applied also to party members. In one particular case a party member, Dr. Kurt Prelie, was hauled before a party court be12. Order signed by Streicher, March 31, 1933, PS-2154.
13. When Austria was occupied. German stores in Vienna sometimes found it
necessary to mark their establishments Arisches Geschâft ("Aryan store”). Gauleiter
BQrckei (Vienna) to Hess. March 26,1938, PS-3577.
14. Instructions by Reich Propaganda Ministry, enclosing the amended directive,
March 26, 1938, G-61.
15. Pfundtner to Highest Reich Authorities, May 19, 1936, NG-26I2. Stuckart to
Highest Reich Authorities, September 9, 1936, NG-2612.
ARYANIZATIONS
cause his wife had, without his knowledge, bought 10 pfennig worth of
picture postcards in a store owned by a Jew named Cohn. Prelle was
expelled by the party court and, upon request of the deputy of the
Führer (Hess), was also to be forbidden to practice his profession as a
notary, because there was doubt whether he was ready to support and
defend the National Socialist state at all times. '*
That efforts should have been made to enforce the boycott among
party members, civil servants, and Reich agencies is not surprising, for
the “movement” and the Reich were supposed to be in the vanguard of
political action. They were to set the example, and the people were to
follow. In its very nature, however, a total boycott was unwieldy
enough to generate unwanted effects. In particular, the rapid collapse
of a Jewish firm without the corresponding expansion of a German
enterprise could result in the joblessness of non-Jewish employees, the
erosion of economic activity, and a loss of tax revenues as well. For
cities with a significant volume of Jewish business, such prospects
could be sobering.16 17 18
All the same, the pressure was intensified. From the middle of the
1930s, attempts were made to isolate Jewish producers not only from
customers but also from suppliers. Shipments of raw materials could
be reduced in three ways; (1) voluntary refusal by German suppliers to
sell to Jews; (2) action by cartels, in which raw material quotas of
Jewish members could be cut or eliminated; (3) the downward adjustment of foreign currency allocations by the state with a view to depriving Jewish
producers
of
imported
materials.
These
controls
were
cumbersome and by no means fully effective, but they were invoked as
part of the general scheme to depress the price of Jewish firms."
16. Decree ordering investigation of Prelle, signed by Staatssekretär Dr. Schlegelberger of the Justice Ministry, December 6, 1938, NG-901. See also investigation or
der signed by Schlegelberger concerning another notary. Dr. Wolfgang Rotmann, who bought
cigars in a Jewish store, June 3, 1939, NG-901.
17. File memorandum of Economic Office tWirlschaftsamt) in the city of Frankfurt, February 17, 1934, Kommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden, Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden 1933-1945. (Frankfurt am
Main, 1963) pp. 178-85.
18. See letter by Rohde to Steinbrinck (internal correspondence. Flick steel concern). November 22, 1937, NI-1880. Rohde reported that the Jewish steel enterprise Rawack and Grünfeld was no longer authorized to purchase ores, "which should certainly influence the market value of {Rawack and Griinfeld] shares."
See also the circular letter by Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisenschaffende Industrie (Economy Group Iron-Producing Industry) to Fach- and Fachuntergruppen and member firms, January 13, 1938, NI-8058. Also. Wirtschaftsgruppe Gross- Ein- und Ausfuhrhandel/
Fachgruppe Eisen- und Stahlhandel (Economy Group Large Import and Export TVade/
Branch Group Iron and Steel TVade) to member firms and the Wirtschaftsgruppe
Eisenschaffende Industrie, March 28, 1938, NI-8059. Germany was an importer of iron
99
EXPROPRIATION
As a result of allocation control, boycott, and the Jewish apprehension that more was still to come, many Jewish businessmen were ready to sell their holdings. There was now a “market." German enterprises
by the thousands were surveying the country in search of suitable
Jewish firms. In German business parlance, the Jewish enterprises had
now become Objekte (objects). Since it was not always easy to find an
Objekt, the process of searching became a specialized business in itself. The institutions that specialized in this business were the banks. It was a lucrative activity. The banks collected threefold profits from the
Aryanization transactions: (I) commissions (ca. 2 percent of the sales
price) for work done in bringing together buyers and sellers, (2) interest
on loans extended to buyers, and (3) profits from subsequent business
contracted between the bank and the Aryanized firm. (Such business
usually derived from a provision in the contract between prospective
buyer and bank pursuant to which the buyer was to designate the bank
as “principal banking connection" for his newly acquired firm.)19 20
Moreover, the banks were not only agents—steering Objekte to interested buyers—they were buyers themselves, and they missed no opportunity to buy out a Jewish bank or some choice industrial shares.
Every type of German business was in the scramble, but the banks
were in the very midst of it.
Jewish casualties in the Aryanization boom were heavy, but by the
beginning of 1938 there were signs of a general weakening in the German business sector. Jewish holdouts survived their own fears and German pressure. In May 1938 an official of the Dresdner Bank complained that there were more Jewish enterprises than German buyers.
It was especially difficult to find buyers for the large Jewish holdouts.
In analyzing this reversal of the trend, the Dresdner Bank expert drew
only one major conclusion: the price had to come down."
To decrease the price of Jewish “objects,” direct pressure was
needed. In order to apply direct pressure on Jewish enterprises, competition among buyers had to cease. In the words of an economic journal: "The temptation to swallow a formerly strong [Jewish] competitor, or even to snap such a delicious morsel from under the nose of another [German] competitor, must surely have led to overvaluation in
many cases.”21 With the elimination of buyers’ competition, the Jewish
owner would face either one German negotiator or a united front.
19. See report on Aryanizations by Böhmische Escompte Bank (Dresdner Bank
subsidiary), signed by Kanzler and Stitz, August 6, 1941, NI-13463. For a '‘principal
banking connection” clause, see contract between Böhmische and Oswald Pohl, October
5,1940, NI-12319. The Böhmische, originally under Jewish control, had been Aryanized
itself.
20. Memorandum by Dr. P. Binder, May 7, 1938, N1-Ö906.
21. Der Volkswirt 12 (September 9,1938): 2409.
100
ARYAN1ZATIONS
The means by which such concerted action was brought about was
the buyers' agreement, of which there were two types: one covered the
purchase of one Jewish enterprise by several buyers acting together;
the other provided for the allocation of several Jewish enterprises to
specific buyers. The first type of agreement is exemplified by a contract
concluded
on
November
30,
1937,
by
Mitteldeutsche
Stahlwerke
(Flick) and L. Possehl and Company for the purchase of shares of the
Jewish firm Rawack & Grünfeld on a fifty-fifty basis. The agreement
provided that after the purchase and before January 1, 1943, neither
party could dispose of its shares without the consent of the other. After
January 1, 1943, neither party could dispose of its shares unless it
offered half its package to the other party.“ A single Jewish enterprise
could also be taken over by a consortium of companies varying in their
financial strengths, provided that credit-worthy firms in the group were
willing to back weaker participants seeking necessary loans in banks.“
When several parties were interested in several Objekte, it was
customary to assign one Objekt to each purchaser. For example, on
March 23,1939, the Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank, and Kreditanstalt
der Deutschen agreed to parcel out three Jewish-controlled banks. The
Dresdner Bank was to acquire the Böhmische Escompte Bank, the
Deutsche Bank was to purchase the Böhmische Union Bank, and the
Kreditanstalt der Deutschen was to take over the Länderbank.2* Both
types of agreements were designed to deprive the Jewish owners of a
chance to bargain. As a general rule, Jews affected by such agreements
could sell at the buyer’s price or not sell at all.
On April 26, 1938, the ministerial bureaucracy took another decisive step for the depression of price levels. Henceforth a contract for the transfer of a business from a Jew to a German would require official
approval.“ A month after this decree was issued, Regierungsrat Dr.
Gotthardt of the Economy Ministry explained to a Dresdner Bank 22 23 24 25
22. Agreement between Mittelstahl and Possehl, November 30, 1937, Nl-1944.
23. Allusion to such an Aryanization is found in a draft memorandum by Karl
Kimmich, Vorstand member of the Deutsche Bank, undated (probably November or
early December 1938), as excerpted in Dietrich Eichholtzand Wolfgang Schumann, eds.,
Anatomie des Krieges (East Berlin, 1969), pp. 197-98.
24. Summary of bank discussion held on March 21. 1939, in the building of the
Czech Ministry of Commerce (signed by Kiesewetter), March 23, 1939. NI-13394. The
list of participants was as follows:
Dr. Köster, German Economy Ministry; Dr. Schicketanz. Office of the Reichskommissar in the Sudetenland; Dr. Rasche, Dresdner Bank; FreiherT von Lüdinghausen, Dresdner Bank; Dr. Rösler, Deutsche Bank; Pohle, Deutsche Bank; Osterwind,
Deutsche Bank; Dr. Werner, Vereinigte Finanzkontore. Berlin; Kiesewetter, Kreditanstalt der Deutschen; Dr. Baumann, Kreditanstalt der Deutschen; Pulz, Kreditanstalt der Deutschen. The conference was held in Prague barely a week after German troops had
marched into the
city. The Dresdner Bank had already swallowed its morsel.
25. Decree of April 26,1938, RGBl I, 415.
101
EXPROPRIATION
official the purpose and effect of the measure. According to Gotthardt,
purchasers had in the past paid not only for the plant value of an
enterprise but also for such intangibles as “good will” (trademarks,
reputation,
sales
contracts,
and
other
factors
enhancing
the
value).
From now on, buyers were no longer to pay for “good will,” because
nowadays
non-Aryan
concerns
had
no
good
will.
Furthermore,
the
German purchaser was to deduct from the purchase price such sums as
he might have to pay after transfer for the unilateral breach of contracts,
including
employment
contracts,
contracts
with
Jewish
wholesalers, and so on. In general, therefore, the Economy Ministry
would give its approval only to such contracts that provided for the
payment of 66% to 75 percent of the original value.*
The choice presented to the Jewish owners was now clear: they
could sell at prescribed terms, or they could wait for further developments. No Jew thought that further developments would ease the situation, but a few, owners of some of the most powerful firms, were
ready to face the future.
In the central German coal belt, which stretches into Czechoslovakia, three Jewish families, in control of vast properties, were determined to hold out, come what might. These three families, who were unwilling to give up their holdings for any price in German currency,
were the Rothschilds, the Weinmanns, and the Petscheks. The battle
that they put up was not a Jewish battle. Rather, there were three
separate struggles waged for three separate interests in a vain attempt
to live through, if not with, Nazism. The determination to resist the
pressure of buyers was bom of the conviction that the losses resulting
from the clash would be smaller than the sacrifice that was inherent in
the sale of the shares, for these Jews measured their resources not in
the current market value of the stocks but in production statistics,
plant
capacity,
ore
and coal