by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
reserves.
The
Rothschilds,
Weinmanns,
and Petscheks were prepared to fight with weapons not available to
poor Jews, weapons such as foreign holding corporations and the argument of “indispensability.” The German side, on its part, was aware of the difficulties. The Germans knew that the Aryanization of these enterprises would require concentrated pressure and ruthless tactics unprecedented in
the
history
of
German
business.
This
pressure
and
ruthlessness were supplied, in part, by a unique industrial institution:
the Hermann Goring Works.
The Gdring Works were formed in the early days of the Nazi regime by Hermann Gdring and a few of his ace troubleshooters as a Reich-owned enterprise. Goring acquired mines and land by a very 26
26. Memorandum by Dr. P. Binder (Dresdner Bank) May 23, 1938, NI-6906.
102
ARYANIZATIONS
simple method. He presented to practically every major steel producer
an ultimatum to transfer some of his property to Goring.2’ He had a
simple
argument
to
justify
this
method:
the
Goring
Works
were
operated not for profit but in the “state-political interest” for the
benefit of the Reich. Such persuasive arguments, when offered by the
number-two man in Germany, proved to be irresistible. When Germany began to expand in 1938, the Göring Works naturally wanted to expand too. Its great opportunities were in the acquisition of major
non-German enterprises in the new territories. Therefore, it is hardly
surprising that Göring should have cast a longing eye on the properties
of Rothschild, Weinmann, and Petschek. He elected himself as chief
Aryanizer
of major
Jewish
concerns; “The
Aryanization
of all the
larger establishments naturally is to be my lot.”” Goring thus became
the driving force behind the coalition of businesmen and ministerial
officials who were sent, like infantry men, into the conference rooms to
do battle with the Jews.
One of these battles had to be fought with the Rothschilds. The
family
was
spread
out
in
several
countries.
There
was
a
Baron
Rothschild in Vienna (Louis), another baron in Prague (Eugene), a
third in Paris (Dr. Alphons). The Rothschild investments were similarly
dispersed, for the family had been careful not to place all its eggs in one
basket. In addition, the holdings were intertwined. Thus the Vienna
Rothschild
had
interests
in
Czechoslovakia,
the
Prague
Rothschild
held properties in France, and so on. This setup gave the Rothschild
family a certain resilience. One could not strike at the whole empire at
once, and one could not attack any part of it without incurring the
danger of countermeasures from other strongholds of the structure.
In
Czechoslovakia,
near
Moravskä
Ostrava,
the
Rothschilds
owned a major steel enterprise in which the Germans were interested:
the
Witkowitz
Bergbau-
und
Eisenhütten
Gewerkschaft.
In
February
1937, more than two years before the fall of Czechoslovakia, the
Rothschilds transferred ownership of the Witkowitz shares to the Alliance
Assurance
Company
of
London.
Alliance
Assurance
in
turn
issued
bearer
certificates,
expressed
in
units,
which
represented
the
actual participation in
the capital of Witkowitz.” These units were
owned by the Rothschilds and by a friendly group, the Gutmanns. This
was the first move that was to make life difficult for the Nazis, for
Alliance Assurance was a British firm, and the Rothschilds now looked
upon Witkowitz as British property. In March 1938 the Germans 27 28 29
27. Memorandum by Flick (steel industrialist), December 5, 1939, Nl-3338.
28. Goring in conference of November 12, 1938, PS-1816.
29. Affidavit by Leonard Keesing (Rothschild interests), March 19,1948, NI-15625.
103
EXPROPRIATION
marched
into
Austria.
Two
days
after
the
Anschluss,
the
Vienna
Rothschild (Baron Louis) was arrested.30 This was the first move that
was to make life difficult for the Rothschilds. Baron Louis was not
released, and soon it became evident that he was being held as a
hostage. His arrest was probably the first employment of the exit-visa
method of Aryanization.
On December 29, 1938, the Länderbank Wien A. G. sent to the
Reichswerke
A.
G.
für
Erzbergbau
und
Eisenhütten
“Hermann
Goring” an expert valuation report on Witkowitz. The valuation had been
made on December 31, 1935, and the Länderbank pointed out that in
view of subsequent Czech currency devaluation as well as plant improvement, the present value was higher.31 In February 1939, a month before
the
invasion
of
Czechoslovakia,
the
Prague
Rothschild
(Eugene), who had in the meantime become a French citizen, went to
London “to obtain support from the British government for the sale of
Witkowitz to the Czechoslovak government.”32 A Czech negotiator. Dr.
Preiss, who was president of the largest Czech financial institution, the
Zivnostenska Banka (Zivno Bank), was also present. The negotiators
discussed a tentative price of £10,000,000 in British currency.33 34 (We
might note in passing that this sum was identical to the amount promised by the British to the Czechoslovak government in compensation for the Munich agreement.) In March the Germans occupied the rest of
Czechoslovakia,
including
Witkowitz,
and
the
negotiations
fell
through.
The next move was made by the Germans. Preparations were
made to buy Witkowitz. On March 23, 1939, a week after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the chief of the industrial division of the Economy Ministry, Kehrl, empowered Dr. Karl Rasche, a Vorstand member of the Dresdner Bank, and Dr. Jaroslav Preiss, president of the Zivno
Bank and the very same man who had one month previously negotiated
on behalf of the Czechoslovak government, to enter into negotiations
with the Rothschilds for the purchase of the property on behalf of the
Reich.
In
his
authorization
Kehrl
mentioned
that
foreign
exchange
could be made available.3*
On March 27, 1939, a German delegation arrived in Paris and met
30. Ibid.
31. LAnderbank Wien to Hermann Gdring Works, attention Attorney Spick, December 29, 1938, NI-5697.
32. Affidavit by Keesing, March 19,1948, Ni-15625.
33. Ibid.
34. Kehrl to Rasche, March 23, 1939, Nl-13407.
104
ARYANIZATIONS
with the Rothschild group. The participating negotiators included the
following representatives.”
German: Dr. Rasche (Dresdner Bank)
Präsident Preiss (Zivno Bank)
Direktor Wolzt (Vorstand member, Länderbank Wien)
Jewish:
Baron Eugene Rothschild (Prague-Paris)
Baron Alphons Rothschild (Paris)
Baron Willi Gutmann
Direktor Keesing
Direktor Schnabel
Generaldirektor Federer (chairman of the Aufsichtsrat, or
Board of Directors, Witkowitz)
At the outset of the conference the German group made an offer.
For the transfer of the Witkowitz interests, including the subsidiary
Bergwerks Aktiebolaget Freja in Stockholm (iron mines, capitalization
SKr
2,600,000),“
the
Germans
offered
1,341,000,000
Czech
crowns.
This sum was to be paid in Czech currency, except for a small part
payable in foreign exchange.”
Before
the
collapse
of
Czechoslovakia,
1,341,000,000
Czech
crowns had been worth approximately £10,000,000. But now Czech
currency,
like
Czechoslovakia
itself,
was
imprisoned.
Czech
crowns
were useless to the Rothschilds. Such a large amount of money could
not be reinvested, nor could it be sold to anyone in England, the United
States,
Switzerland,
and so on, without great loss. The Rothschild
group consequently rejected the offer, demanding instead the payment
of
£10,000,000
in
sterling.
The
Rothschild-Gutmann
representatives
pointed out that the seller of the shares was a British corporation,
namely the Alliance Assurance Company. This British corporation, the
Rothschilds
explained,
did
not
discriminate
between
the
nationalities
of the various owners. It paid dividends to all owners (holders of bearer
certificates) in one currency: pounds sterling.“
The meeting was adjourned, and on the next day the negotiators
35. The attendance list and the account of the meeting is taken from the German
conference summary enclosed in a letter by Wolzt to Rasche, April 1, 1939, NI-14473.
36. Memorandum in files of Hermann Göring Works. March 31, 1944, NG-2887.
Skr 2,600,000 equaled $628,000, or £113,000, at the March 1939 cable rates of exchange.
37. The Germans offered foreign currency to those owners who were considered
foreigners under the Reich currency laws. The currency law of December 12, 1938,
RGBl 1, 1734, defined a foreigner as a nonresident alien or emigrant who had assets in
the Reich.
38. The availability of this currency derived from the sale by Witkowitz of virtually
all its output—steel plates—to the British navy. Memorandum by Regierungsbaurat
Teuber, June 22, 1939, NI-9043.
105
EXPROPRIATION
met again. The second get-together was a little more explosive. The
Germans learned for the first time that the far-flung Rothschild apparatus had gone into action. Various Witkowitz accounts deposited in Swiss, Dutch, and American banks had been attached; that is, court
orders had been obtained to prevent the payment of money from such
accounts pending a clarification of legal rights. A credit of £200,000 to
Freja had been blocked.
The Germans were indignant. Under the Reich currency laws, all
Inländer (resident nationals) had to offer their foreign holdings to the
Reich in exchange for marks. The Rothschild move was a violation of
the law, and it would bring penalties. Baron Eugene Rothschild (the
Prague Rothschild) thereupon asked for a counteroffer. The Germans
offered £2,750,000 in sterling. This was an offer that the Rothschilds
could
discuss,
and
after
some
haggling,
the
price
was
upped
to
£3,600,000 in sterling. In other words, the Germans were to get Witkowitz and its Swedish subsidiary, Freja, while the Rothschilds were to get a little over a third of the sterling they had asked for, and Baron
Louis.
In order to ransom Baron Louis, part of the transfers had to be
made before his release. Accordingly the Rothschild machinery was
set into motion with a flood of letters and telegrams to Kuhn, Loeb and
Company,
the
Bank of Manhattan, Coha-Bank, Nederlandschen Handels Mij, Amstelbank, Blankart et Cie, and other financial institutions, to lift attachments and hold at the disposal of the Germans moneys and
securities on condition “that Louis Rothschild shall have freely left
Germany over the Swiss or French frontier on or before May 4."” On
the German side, Kehrl (Economy Ministry) sent letters to Rasche,
authorizing him to negotiate with Baron Louis, and to the Gestapo
office in Vienna, requesting permission for a meeting between Rasche
and Rothschild."
After the release of Louis Rothschild, the Germans moved to complete arrangements for transfer. On June 15, 1939, a group of armament experts met to discuss the inclusion of Witkowitz in the Panzer program. Some of the participants expressed some doubts about entrusting armament secrets to Witkowitz. The Aryanization would have to be completed and the necessary personnel changes made from top to 39 40
39. See Dr. Kail von Lewinski (German attorney retained by the Rothschilds) to
Regierangsrat Dr. Britsch (“trustee" in charge of Rothschild matters in the Economy
Ministry), April 25, 1939, NI-15550. Also, Keesing (in Paris) to Bankhaus S. M. von
Rothschild in Vienna (under German control), April 28, 1939, NI-15550.
40. Kehrl to Rasche, April 14, 1939, NI-13792. Kehrl to Staatspolizeileitstelle in
Vienna, April 14, 1939, NI-13790.
106
ARYANIZATIONS
bottom before Witkowitz could be considered German.“ A week later
it turned out that Witkowitz expected to fulfill orders from the British
navy until the end of the year."
In the meantime, however, Direktor Rasche of the Dresdner Bank
was shuttling between Paris and Berlin to conclude the agreement,4’
even while a board member of the competing Deutsche Bank w
as
complaining to Staatssekretär Pleiger of the Hermann Goring Works
that his banking house was being excluded from such “large engagements”
(grossen
Engagements).“
In
Prague
the
Czech financial
authorities
(Finance
Minister
Kalfus
of
the
“autonomous”
Czech
administration) were protesting that the Germans planned to cover the
purchase price with foreign currency belonging to the “Protektorat.”"
That is to say. Minister Kalfus had discovered that the Czechs were to
pay for the enterprise.
In July the final agreement was drawn up. The parties agreed to the
transfer of 80 of the 100 bearer certificates for a price of £3,200,000.
The vendor was entitled to offer, and the purchaser was obliged to
accept, the remaining twenty shares at a price of £400,000. The profits
of the business year 1938 were to be collected by the buyer.41 42 43 44 45 46 These
were the terms that, in substance, had been agreed upon in March. The
contract was to enter into operation by the end of September.4’ This,
too, had been agreed upon in March.48 49 The Germans were happy. On
July 13 the agreement was signed in Basel." On August 2 Rasche sent a
letter to Gruppenführer Wolff, chief of the Personal Staff of SS and
Police Chief Himmler, in which the Dresdner Bank expressed its appreciation for the assistance rendered by the police (arrest of Baron Louis) in bringing down the price.50 Then, suddenly, there was a snag.
On September 1, 1939, the war broke out, and the agreement could
not enter into operation. According to the postwar account by Direktor
41. Memorandum by Regierungsbaurat Teuber on conference of military armament
officials under the chairmanship of Oberstleutnant Nagel, June 15, 1939. NI-9043.
42. Memorandum by Teuber, June 22, 1939, NI-9043.
43. Summary of Dresdner Bank Vorstand meeting, Götz presiding, June 29, 1939,
Nl-1395. Also, Vorstand meeting of July 7, 1939, NM5368.
44. Memorandum by Kimmich, June 28, 1939, in Eichholtz and Schumann, eds..
Anatomie des Krieges, pp. 219-20.
45. Memorandum by Herbeck (Vorstand member, Dresdner Bank), June 23, 1939,
NM4474.
40. Text of contract (undated), in Nl-15551.
47. Summary of Vorstand meeting, Dresdner Bank, July 7, 1939, NI-15368.
48. See memorandum on Baris conference, April 1, 1939, NI-14473.
49. Herbeck to Rasche, July 13, 1939, NI-15547.
50. Rasche to Wolff. August 2, 1939, NI-13669.
107
EXPROPRIATION
Keesing, the Rothschilds' financial expert, the contract had purposely
been drafted by the Rothschilds in such a way that transfer of title was