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  not to take place until certain payments and conditions were satisfied.

  The object of these provisions, according to Keesing, was the frustration of the transfer upon the outbreak of the war.11

  We do not know what was in the minds of the Rothschilds. We do

  not know whether this financial empire was endowed with prophetic

  insights that enabled it to predict accurately the time when war was to

  start. We do know that the transaction was a painful one for the

  Rothschilds, and it is therefore likely that, in their choice between

  relinquishment of title for 36 percent of just compensation and retention of title in the hope that after the destruction of the Hitler regime, possession

  would

  be

  regained,

  the

  Rothschilds

  oscillated

  from

  one

  alternative to the other until war made the decision for them. Thus, in

  September 1939 the owners of the Witkowitz Works leaned back to find

  out who would last longer, the Nazi regime or the Rothschilds. But the

  waiting was not a very tranquil and peaceful proposition.

  In November 1939 the Germans attempted to secure the shares of

  the Freja Works by an action in a Swedish court. They failed.55 In

  January 1940 the Witkowitz Works, now no longer producing for the

  British navy, were placed under the “supervision” of a board consisting

  of the following members.55

  Dr. Delius, Hermann Goring Works

  Karl Hermann Frank, Staatssekretär, Protektorat Administration

  Generaldirektor Pleiger, Hermann Goring Works

  Generaldirektor Raabe, Hermann Goring Works

  Dr. Rasche, Dresdner Bank

  Dr. Rheinländer, Reichsstelle für Wirtschaftsausbau (Construction

  Planning Office, Four-Year Plan)

  Generalmajor

  Weigand,

  Armament

  Inspectorate,

  Prague

  Goring was now in the saddle. However, the Germans still wanted to

  make an agreement. The Witkowitz Works were English, and the Germans, though at war, still expected to come to terms with England. In short, physical possession did not solve the problem for them. Accordingly, in March 1940 Dr. Rasche wrote to the president of the Swedish subsidiary Freja, Mr. Sune Wetter, suggesting new negotiations.55 In 51 52 53 54

  51. Affidavit by Leonard Keesing, March 19, 1948, NI-15625.

  52. Affidavit by Leo F. Spitzer (General Counsel, Witkowitzer Bergbau), October

  15, 1948, NI-15678.

  53. Order by the Reichsprotektor in Prague (von Neurath), January 15. 1940, NI-

  15347.

  54. Rasche to Sune Wetter, March 11, 1940, NI-13654.

  108

  ARYANIZATIONS

  April, Rasche went to Stockholm to threaten drastic measures. If the

  Rothschilds were not prepared to negotiate on neutral soil, the Witkowitz

  Works would

  be “leased”

  to a German concern

  (Hermann Goring

  Works), to be run for the latter’s account. Thus the owners would be

  deprived of all war profits, and, in addition, claims against Freja would be

  instituted, this time “in a different direction.”” But the Rothschilds were

  not prepared to negotiate. Then, in June 1940, France fell.

  On the day of the armistice, the Dresdner Bank asked the High

  Command of the Army for a special pass to enable Rasche to travel to

  France. Reason: there was a rumor that the Freja stocks were located

  somewhere in Paris and could be seized.55 56 57 58 The shares were in fact

  located

  in

  the

  Paris

  Rothschild

  bank.5’

  The

  Rothschilds

  began

  to

  weaken. England was fighting a single-handed battle against Germany

  and Italy. The Nazi regime seemed more secure than it had been at any

  time, since it had, so far, met the test of war and emerged victorious

  everywhere.

  In December 1940 the foreign division of the Reichsbank called the

  chairman of the Vorstand of the Dresdner Bank, Gotz, to report that an

  American bank had inquired on behalf of the Rothschilds whether the

  Germans were interested in a resumption of negotiations about Witkowitz.” Rasche was a bit surprised that the Rothschilds took this step.

  He was no longer so eager for negotiations, but he suggested that talks

  be held in Spain.59 60 These discussions apparently did not take place

  either, but, for the moment, neither side made an aggressive move. As

  late as June 1941, the Freja Works made regular shipments of iron ore

  to Witkowitz, as though there were no expropriations and no war.“

  Early in 1941 a grotesque incident occurred. We may recall that

  there were 100 bearer certificates signifying ownership of the British

  corporation, which in tum owned the Witkowitz shares. These Witkowitz

  shares

  numbered

  223,312.61

  Fourteen

  thousand

  had

  been

  handed over to the Germans as part of the ransom arrangement for

  Louis Rothschild's release; 43,300 (a considerable parcel) had been left

  behind in Paris when Baron Eugene fled from the Germans. These

  shares were lying in a depot at Nevers, guarded by a French official

  55. Sune Wetter (Stockholm) to Oskar Federer (London), April 6,1940, NM3637.

  56. G. Stiller (Secretariat, Dr. Rasche) to Generalquartiermeister/Passierschein-

  hauplslelle (General Quartermaster/Main Pass Section), June 24. 1940, NI-1853.

  57. File note, Dresdner Bank, July 2, 1940. NM832.

  58. Götzto Rasche, December 21, 1940, Nl-13292.

  59. Rasche to Götz. December 28, 1940, NI-13292.

  60. G. Stiller (Secretariat, Dr. Rasche) to Assessor Zöppke (Legal Division.

  Foreign Office), June 21, 1941, Nl-1557.

  61. Note by Stiller, February 3, 1932, NI-2643.

  109

  EXPROPRIATION

  (Jannicot,

  director,

  Administration

  of

  Property

  and

  General

  Revenue

  Office, Department Seine) and a Rothschild representative. On January 8, 1941, a group of Germans (the Devisenschutzkommando, or

  “Currency Squad”) arrived at the depot, shoved the Frenchmen aside

  physically,

  and

  removed

  the

  shares.

  The

  Vichy

  government,

  considerably annoyed, countered this move by sequestering (blocking with

  a view to confiscation) all Rothschild properties in France.“ The Germans retreated, offering to purchase the shares for a suitable sum.“

  (This was part of a plan to get hold of a majority or all of the 223,000

  shares. However, the scheme was not very practical, because only the

  43,300

  shares

  discovered

  in

  Paris

  were

  actually

  “within

  reach

  [greifbar]'y*

  As a result, the Goring Works continued to be in possession of the

  enterprise without owning it. In a memorandum dated March 31, 1944,

  the Witkowitz Works are listed as part of the Goring complex, with the

  no
tation:

  “no

  capital

  participation—operational

  connection

  only.”“

  Notwithstanding the fact that the connection was “operational” only,

  the Goring Works pocketed the profits, which amounted to 2,400,000

  reichsmark during the business year 1941.“ And that is the history of

  the Witkowitz “Aryanization."

  We can see now the advance of techniques that marks the pre-

  Rothschild

  and

  Rothschild

  phases

  of

  “voluntary”

  Aryanizations.

  The

  pre-Rothschild

  arsenal

  contained

  the

  following

  principal

  weapons:

  (1)

  boycott,

  (2)

  allocation

  control,

  (3)

  buyers’

  agreements,

  and

  (4) elimination of “good will” by decree. The Witkowitz Aryanization

  reveals,

  in

  addition,

  the

  following

  methods:

  (S)

  negotiation

  by

  plenipotentiary

  (DresdnerBank),

  (6)

  exit-visa

  restriction,

  (7)

  attempted

  stealing of shares, (8) operation of the enterprise and collection of the

  profits.

  The Rothschild case, however, is not the best example of the effectiveness of German operative techniques. For practical purposes Goring had

  accomplished

  his aim,

  but

  he

  did

  fail to

  complete

  the

  transaction. There was no final transfer, and Witkowitz was not entered in the books as a German plant. Undoubtedly, this reluctance is 62 63 64 65 66

  62. Affidavit by Yvonne Delree Kandelafte, March 19,1948, NI-15552. Affiant was

  private secretary to Baron Eugene. Jannicot to Director General for Registration, Administration of Property, and Revenue (Vichy), January II. 1941, NI-15537.

  63. Marotzke (Office of the Four-Year Plan) to MitiUtrbefehlshaber Frankreichl

  Verwaltungsslab (Military Commander France/Administration), copy to Dr. Rasche,

  November 6, 1941, Nl-2647.

  64. Note by Stiller, February 3, 1943, Nl-2643.

  65. Reichswerke Hermann Gdring/Montanblock to Economy Ministry/Main Division UI/Division 5—Foreign Currency, March 31,1944, NG-2887.

  66. PleigertoGbring, Decembers, 1941, NI-15575.

  110

  ARYAN1ZATIONS

  traceable only to the fact that the Rothschilds had succeeded in making

  Witkowitz an English enterprise. The British flag stopped the Germans

  from installing themselves as the new owners of the Arm.

  In the cases of Weinmann and Petschek, the transfer was completed. Extraordinary pressure had to be applied against both of these families. The Reich itself finally stepped in, confiscated the enterprises

  and sold them at a profit to the interested buyers. Yet it must be

  emphasized that these “confiscations” were not part of any general

  confiscatory

  process.

  They

  were

  entirely

  individual

  measures

  which

  were taken only after the German negotiators, using all their tools and

  all their tricks, had gotten nowhere. In short, these “confiscations”

  were imposed as a sort of penalty for the obstinancy and the uncooperative attitude of the Jewish owners. The “provocations” in each case

  were

  not

  identical—the

  Weinmanns

  petitioned,

  the

  Petscheks

  defied. But their fate in the end was the same. Survival in Nazi Germany could not be assured by insisting on one's rights.

  The party most interested in the Weinmann and Petschek properties was the same that had acquired Witkowitz: the Hermann Goring Works. The Goring Works were originally and primarily a coal and

  steel concern. (These two branches could often be found in the same

  German enterprise. Steel corporations were always on the lookout for

  a “coal base”; that is, they were interested in the acquisition of

  sufficient coal mines to assure a dependable supply for the manufacture

  of steel.) Since the Goring Works were operated in the “state-political

  interest,” it was not difficult for Goring to obtain Economy Minister

  Funk’s agreement that all soft coal mines in the Sudeten area (annexed

  from Czechoslovakia in October 1938) should belong to his concern.4’

  To integrate the Sudeten coal mines into the Göring enterprise, a

  new corporation, the Sudetenländische Bergbau A. G., Brüx (Subag),

  was formed on June 10, 1939. Significantly, the first meeting of this

  Göring subsidiary was held not in the Sudetenland, in Brüx, but in

  Berlin, in the offices of the Dresdner Bank.4* The reason for this location was obvious. The properties of the Subag had not yet been acquired. The Aryanization still had to be carried out by the Dresdner Bank. The mines in question were still owned by the Weinmann and

  Petschek families.

  The smaller, but older, of the two concerns were the Weinmann 67 68

  67. Funk to Staatssekretär Körner, April t3, 1939. NI-12512.

  68. Minutes of first Aufsichtsrat meeting, June 10, 1939, NI-13910. Generaldirektor

  Pleiger was elected chairman. Other members were Unterstaatssekretär von Hannecken

  (Economy Ministry), Ing. Wolfgang Richter, Kehrl (Economy Ministry—Industry),

  Gabel (Economy Ministry—Mines), Ministerialrat Mundt, Dr. Rasche. Delius (Goring

  Works), and Ing. Nathow. For articles of incorporation, dated June 12, 1939, see NI-

  111

  EXPROPRIATION

  enterprises,

  with

  headquarters

  in

  Aussig,

  Sudetenland.

  The

  value

  of

  these enterprises was a subject of dispute from the beginning. Table 5-7

  shows the discrepancy in the estimates. It will be noted that the Germans offered only about half the amount wanted by the Weinmanns.

  The reason for that rather low valuation was to be found in the fact that

  the principal Weinmann enterprise, the Brucher Kohlenwerke, had for

  ten years been operated at a loss.” There are various ways of figuring

  out the value of a corporation. One method is to estimate plant value

  and “good will” (marketability of the product). That is evidently what

  the Weinmanns did. Another method is to project past earnings (or

  losses) into the future, measuring the value in terms of such past performance. That is what the Germans did.

  There was another difficulty that was even more important: the

  problem of foreign exchange. If the Germans had at least made their

  offer in pounds or dollars, the Weinmanns might have been happy. But

  the offer was made in a captive currency; Czech crowns. The Weinmanns had neglected to do what the Rothschild family had done. They had not established a British, Swiss, or American corporation to hold

  their property. In fact, during the summer of 1938, before the German

  invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Weinmann financial expert, Geiringer,


  had given assurances to Sudeten German interests that the enterprises

  would not be sold to the Czechs for foreign exchange or anything else.™

  The Weinmanns had taken only one precautionary measure. In 1936,

  they had made a loan to the Czech government that was repayable in

  foreign currency.’1 However, in March 1939 there was no longer a

  Czech government and, so far as the Germans were concerned, there

  was no longer a Czech state. The loan served only to excite German

  interest about the question of where the foreign currency that the

  Czech government had promised might come from. For that reason

  (and also because no agreement had been reached on the Aryanization

  of the Weinmann holdings), one of the Weinmanns (Hans), caught by

  the

  invasion

  in

  Prague,

  was

  not

  allowed

  to

  leave.

  Unlike

  Louis

  Rothschild,

  he

  was

  free,

  but

  to

  “guarantee

  readiness

  to

  negotiate

  [Kautionfiir Verhandlungsbereitschaft]” he was not given a passport.B

  To get Hans Weinmann out of Prague, Fritz Weinmann (in Paris)

  paid 20,000 Swiss francs for “a real passport." Then Hans Weinmann

  suddenly took off surreptitously, without any passport. When Rasche 69 70 71 72

  69. Memorandum by Ansmann, April 19, 1939. Nl-15607.

  70. Reinhold Freiherr von LUdinghausen (industrialist of the Sudeten area) to

  Rasche, enclosing summary of a conference attended by Sudeten German bankers and

  industrialists, July 28. 1938, Nl-13399.

  71. Affidavit by Geiringer, October 13, 1948, Nl-15679.

  72. Memorandum by Ansmann. April 18, 1939, NI-1S607.

  112

  T A B L E 5-7

  THE WEINMANN ENTERPRISES (VALUES IN THOUSANDS)

  Par Value of

  Weinmann

  German

  Stocks Held

  Estimate of

  Estimate of

  by Weinmanns

  Market Value

  Market Value

  Enterprise

  Crowns

  1939 Dollars

  Crowns

  1939 Dollars

  Crowns

  1939 Dollars

  B rucher Kohlenwerke A. G.

  100.000 to

  3,500 to

  40,000 to

  1,400 to

  (100 percent Weinmann)

  100.000

  3,500

  119,000

  4,165

  50.000

  1,750

  Westböhmischer Bergbau

  Aktienverein

  60,000 to

  2,100 to

  (40 percent Weinmann)

  50.000

  1,750

 

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