Raul Hilberg
Page 24
10. Summary of interministerial conference in the offices of the Economy Ministry,
September 22, 1937, NG-4075.
11. Correspondence and conferences. 1937 to 1938, in documents NG-1889, NG-
4075, and NG-3580.
141
EXPROPRIATION
accounts were under the supervision of the Devisenstellen, which were
administratively part of the offices of the Obeifinanzpräsidenten (regional offices of the Finance Ministry) but which received directives from the Economy Ministry.12 The Devisenstellen were empowered to
permit the exploitation of blocked accounts for only three major purposes: (1) to grant credit to a German, (2) to make insurance payments, and (3) to acquire real estate. These provisions were intended not for
the benefit of the emigrating Jews but for non-Jewish foreigners interested in
making such investments. However,
the fact that blocked
marks, or Sperrmark, were released for some purpose gave them at
least some value. In fact, some Jews were able to sell their blocked
holdings at an exchange rate of 20 cents per Sperrmark or even a little
better—that is, at a loss of not more than 50 percent.” Those Jews who
did not sell their Sperrmark accounts lost the accounts when, in the
course of later confiscations, they were gobbled up by the Finance
Ministry.
9.
The smuggling out of currency in contravention of the law was
practiced by some poor Jews who had only a little money and who
wanted
to
exchange
it
quickly,
without
middlemen.
Since
money
smuggled out in cash had to be smuggled back to be of use to anyone
except a souvenir hunter, the exchange rate of such transactions was
only 10 to 13 cents per mark.1' The Czech crown, which was worth 3.43
cents before the Germans marched into Prague, was sold in New York
banks a week later for less than 1 cent.”
10.
Another illicit but common transaction was a private arrange·
ment for which three Jewish parties were needed: an emigrating Jew
with German currency, a destitute Jewish family that remained behind,
and a foreign relative of the destitute family willing to extend help.
Under the agreement, the emigrant gave his reichsmark to the poor
family and later collected the intended gift dollars (or pounds or francs)
from the helping relatives abroad.
11. Since, under the currency law, foreign holdings belonging to
12. Currency Law, December 12, 1938, RGBl I, 1734. Implementation decree by
the Economy Minister, December 22, 1938, RGBl I, 1851. The Currency Law and the
implementation ordinance are codifications of earlier regulations. For complete compilation—with expert comment—of currency regulations to 1939, see Regierungsrat Hans Gurski and Regierungsrat Friedrich Schulz, cds., Devisengeselz (Berlin, 1941).
13. Edward J. Condlon, "Shoppers for Foreign Exchange Benefit As Stocks Here
Increase," The New York Times, March 19, 1939, pp. 1, 5. Release of Sperrmark for
furthering the emigration of Indigent Jews was apparently approved as well. The accounts were purchased from their owners by foreign Jewish relief organizations. S. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime, 1933-1939 (Tübingen, 1974), pp.
179-81.
14. The New York Times, March 19, 1939, pp. 1,5.
15. Ibid.
142
BLOCKED MONEY
German nationals had to be reported to the Reich, the retention of
foreign holdings was equivalent to a currency transfer. There were
only two ways of keeping foreign investments: by not reporting them
or by obtaining permission to keep them. Both methods were rare.
12.
Since many Jews were so poor that they could not afford to
pay for their fare, Security Police Chief Heydrich decided upon some
unconventional forms of relief by means of a typical Heydrich method.
During the conference of November 12, 1938, Heydrich explained it
this
way:
“Through
the
Jewish
Kultusgemeinde
[Jewish
community
organization in Vienna] we extracted a certain amount of money from
the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount, and an
additional sum in foreign exchange [drawn from Jewish accounts in
foreign countries], they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to
leave. The problem was not to make the rich Jews leave but to get rid
of the Jewish mob." Goring was not enthusiastic about this procedure:
“But, children, did you ever think this through? It doesn't help us to
extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you ever
thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign currency
that in the end we won’t be able to hold on?" Heydrich, in his defense,
said, “Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.”16
The problem of the poor Jews was so great that it received attention from many quarters. Toward the end of 1938, Reichsbank Präsident Schacht, then no longer Economy Minister but still a powerful figure, went to London with a plan for the emigration of some 150,000
Jews. The Jews were to leave their assets behind, and their resettlement was to be financed by a foreign syndicate. This foreign group was to advance 1.5 billion reichsmark, to be repaid (with interest) by the
Reich in the form of “additional exports” over a long period of time.17
Schacht’s motivation, and that of his backers, seems to have run along
the following lines: First, the scheme was a way of combatting the
foreign propaganda that accused Germany of robbing the Jews of all
property, turning them out destitute. (At that very time, the Germans
16. Minutes of Gering conference, November 12,1938, PS-1816. See also summary
of Heydrich's remarks at a meeting of the committee of the Reichszentrale fur die
jüdische Auswanderung, held on February II, 1939, in Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen
Politik 1918-1945. Ser. D, Vol. V, Doc. 665.
17. Unterstaatssekretär Wörmann (Foreign Office/Political Division) to Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop, Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, Deputy Chief of Political Division,
Chiefs of Legal Division, Culture Division, Economy Division, and Referat Deutschland
(all in Foreign Office), November 14, 1938, NG-1522. Ambassador Dirksen (London) to
Foreign Office, December 16, 195%, Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1933-1945,
Ser. D, Vol. V, Doc. 661. The Schacht plan was not intended to help the “capitalists" in
the Haavara manner. The intent was to finance the emigration of the poor Jews with the
funds of the rich, in the process getting rid of both.
EXPROPRIATION
were making identical charges with respect to the treatment of Sudeten
Germans in Czechoslovakia.)18 19 20 21
A more important reason was Schacht’s conviction that Germany
would ultimately profit more from “additional exports” than from the
unindemnified taking of Jewish property. The additional exports, after
all, were going to create many new consumers of German goods. Once
a customer, always a customer; once a market, always a market. The
exports would in the long run pay for themselves. Schacht was co
nvinced of that. On the other hand, if war should interrupt the exports, all problems would be solved immediately. The Jews would be out, the
Jewish assets would be in. Either way, Germany could not lose.
The Schacht scheme did not materialize, in part at least because of
the opposition of the German Foreign Office. Ribbentrop saw no reason why the Jews should be permitted to transfer, in one form or another, what he regarded as stolen German property.1’ Behind this
reasoning there was a grievance that had nothing to do with the Jews.
The negotiations were being conducted in London by Schacht himself,
and the Foreign Office was shut out. Its jurisdiction was ignored. Rankled by this procedure, the Foreign Minister expressed his disapproval of the whole idea.® Property and Jews remained behind.11
F O R C E D L A B O R A N D W A G E
R E G U L A T I O N S ______________________
In 1939 the remaining Jewish community, shrunken to half its original
size, was already impoverished. The professionals had lost their pro18. Prof. Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven to Vortragender Legationsrat Geheimrat Dr. Albrecht (Foreign Office), July 26, 1938, NG-3443. Von Freytag-Loringhoven had written an article about the Czechs and was embarrassed by countercharges against
Germany. He asked the Foreign Office for an explanation. Albrecht replied, on August 9,
1938, NG-3443: "Any representation of the actual facts must refrain from confessing that
the position of German foreign exchange does not permit that emigrating Jews transfer
their property at home for the corresponding value abroad."
19. Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker (Foreign Office) to German missions abroad,
July 8, 1938, NG-3702.
20. Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, Wörmann (Chief, Political Division), Deputy Chief
of Political Division, Chief of TFade-Political Division, Chief of Referat Deutschland,
December 20, 1938, NG-1321. Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, etc., Janauary 4, 1939. NG-
1318. A few days later Ribbentrop agreed to the "quiet" organization of the emigration,
provided that the Foreign Office could participate. Weizsäcker memorandum, January
13, 1939, NG-t532. Nothing came of the matter.
21. About half the 800,000 Jews in the Reich-Protektorat area emigrated. Report by
SS statistician Korherr, March 23. 1943, NO-3194.
144
FORCED LABOR AND WAGE REGULATIONS
fessions, the capitalists had lost their capital, and ordinary workers
were losing their jobs.1 2 3 4 Many Jewish employees of Jewish enterprises
could not survive the dissolution or Aryanization of the companies that
had employed them. As Jewish firms were taken over by Germans, the
personnel force, too, was "Aryanized.”1
The remaining Jews were less able to sustain themselves with hard
labor than were those who had emigrated. The Jews who were left
behind had less capacity for survival, since the emigration had drawn
off the younger elements and had left a large surplus of women. In the
Old Reich (1933 boundaries), the percentage of Jews over forty had
changed from 47.7 in 1933 to 73.7 in 1939.5 The percentage of women
had risen from 52.2 in 1933 to 57.7 in 1939.“ In short, the Jewish community had acquired the characteristics of a large family of dependents. But a relief campaign was the last solution in the minds of the bureaucrats.
Under the decree of March 29,1938, Jewish relief institutions were
deprived of their tax exemptions.1 On November 19, 1938, a decree
signed by Frick, von Krosigk, and Labor Minister Seldte stipulated
that Jews were to be excluded from public relief.6 7 During the following
year, the destitute Jews were pushed into hard menial labor.
In a decree published on March 4, 1939, the president of the Reich
Labor
Exchange
(Reichsanstalt
für
Arbeitsvermittlung),
Staatssekretär Syrup, in agreement with the Economy Ministry and the Food
and
Agriculture
Ministry,
established
the
principle
that
unemployed
Jews be put to work in construction and reclamation projects, segregated from non-Jewish laborers.’ At the beginning of 1941 about 1. The impact on these groups is described in some statistical detail by S. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime 1933-1939 (Tübingen, 1974) pp. 121-
49.
2. See, for example, the letter by the 1. G. Farben trustees in the I. Petschek mines
at Falkenau (signed Kersten and Prentzel) to Regierungsrat Dr. Hoffmann of the Economy Ministry on Säuberungsaktion (''cleansing action"), resulting in dismissal of 209
employees, January 18, 1939, NI-11264. Note also text of contract for the Aryanization
of the Frankfurt firm J. & C. A. Schneider, December 17. 1938, by Lothar and Fritz
Adler, Jewish owners, and Bruno Seletzky, purchaser, with detailed provisions for the
separation of Jewish employees, including the stipulation that payments in settlement
were to be the responsibility of the Adlers. T 83, roll 97.
3. From figures in Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt (Berlin), November 10, 1939.
4. From figures in "Die Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge im Dritten Reich,"
Wirtschaft und Statistik, vol. 20, p. 84.
5. RGBl 1,360.
6. RGBl I, 1694. For Jewish community relief activities, see Adler-Rudel, Jüdische
Selbsthilfe, pp. 158-82.
7. Text in Jewish Black Book Committee, The Black Book (New York, 1946),
p. 506.
I4S
EXPROPRIATION
30,000 Jews were working in groups on hard labor projects.1 The remaining employable Jews were laboring in factories and in the growing network of Jewish community organizations. A few professionals were
eking out a living as Krankenbehandler and Konsulenten, catering to
the community's health and legal needs.
Since the Jews had already lost their positions, their property, and
their money, they lost themselves in the hope that henceforth they
would be left alone if only they worked hard and minded their own
business. After all, the Jewish "citadels of power” had been smashed
and the looting was over. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy could not stop
in the middle. The destruction process had to continue. Whereas pre-
1939
anti-Jewish measures
were aimed
at
investments,
the wartime
decrees dealt with income. From now on, the bureaucracy took from
the Jews their earnings. The income expropriations yielded much less
than the property confiscations, but to the Jews the new measures were
more serious. Poor people spend a larger proportion of their income on
necessities than rich people do, and very poor people spend all their
income on necessities. In the step-by-step manner of the bureaucratic
destruction process, the Jews were deprived of an ever-increasing slice
of their bare necessities. Survival became more and more difficult.
It is characteristic that just as in the case of Jewish property, so
also in the matter of Jewish income, the business sector had the first
pick. First, Jewish wages were reduced. What was left was taxed.
The formulation of a wage policy for Jews was begun in the Labor
Ministry at the end of 1939, on the principle that German labor laws
should be modified
so as to exclude certain payments to Jews.' While
the ministerial bureaucrats discussed the details of the proposed measure, industry began to take measures of its own. A number of firms refused to pay wages for legal holidays, and Jewish employees countered by going to court. The Labor Court in Kassel naturally held for the companies, reasoning that Jews had “no inner tie” to the performance of labor, that to a Jew labor was only a commodity, and that a Jew had no loyalty to his employer. Hence a Jew was not entitled to receive
pay for holidays.'0
At the beginning of 1940, the draft of a law regulating wage payments to Jews was drawn up in the Labor Ministry. The draft provided 8 9 10
8. Report by Kaiser (Reich Chancellery) to Reichskabinettsrat Dr. Killy (also in the
Reich Chancellery). January 9, 1941, NG-1143.
9. Labor Minister Seldte to Chief of the Reich Chancellery Lammers, April 16,
1940, NG-1143.
10. Dietrich Wilde. "Der Jude als Arbeitnehmer,” Die Judenfrage. July 13. 1940,
p. 93. The identical conclusion was reached by Staatssekretär Stuckart of the Interior
Ministry in his proposal to Lammers, April 30, 1940, NG-1143.
146
FORCED LABOR AND WAGE REGULATIONS
that Jews be deprived of pay for holidays, family and children’s allowances, birth or marriage subsidies, death benefits, bonuses, anniversary gifts, compensatory payments in the event of accidents, and—in cases of workers far from their homes—all but one yearly allowance
for travel pay to visit family members." The proposed decree met with
a number of objections, chiefly because it contained an enumeration of
exceptions rather than a positive principle (such as the rule that Jews
be paid only for work actually performed).12 These objections hurt the
jurisdictional pride of the Labor Minister, and therefore he decided to
implement his ideas by issuing the appropriate instructions to his regional offices without waiting for the concurrence of other ministries."
At the end of the year, the Labor Ministry was invited by the
Interior Ministry to attend a conference on the labor status of the Jews.
Accepting the invitation, Staatssekretär Syrup, writing in behalf of the
Labor Ministry, added the following words: “I consider it self-evident
that 1 am in charge of formulating all questions concerning labor laws,