by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
schedule
in
accordance
with
arrangements
concluded
with
the
Transport Ministry." Himmler wrote a more conciliatory letter to the
unhappy Regierungspräsident. “Naturally," he began, “it is not pleasant to get new Jews. But 1 should like to ask you in all cordiality to show for these things the same natural understanding which has been
extended by your Gauleiter.” The objections had obviously been drawn
up by some subordinate in an expert manner, but Himmler could not
recognize them. War production was nowadays the favorite reason for
opposing anything at all. No one had demanded that the Jews be quartered in factories. Since the ghetto population had declined, it could increase
again.
As
for
the
Gypsy
arsonists,
Himmler
advised
Uebelhoer to announce that for every fire in the ghetto, ten Gypsies
would be shot. "You will discover," said Himmler, “that the Gypsies
will be the best firemen you ever had.”™
Uebelhoer was now truly aroused. He wrote a second letter to
Himmler in which he explained that a representative of the Reich Security Main Office, Sturmbannführer Eichmann, had been in the ghetto and, with Gypsy-like horse-trading manners, had completely misrepresented to the Reichsführer-SS the true state of affairs. Uebelhoer then made a constructive suggestion. He requested Himmler to send the
Jews to Warsaw rather than to L6dt . Uebelhoer had read in a Berlin
68. Uebelhoer to Himmler. October 4, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
69. Heydrich to Himmler, October 18, 1941, enclosing his telegram to Uebelhoer,
Himmler Files, Folder 94.
70. Himmler to Uebelhoer, October 10, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
213
CONCENTRATION
newspaper
that the Warsaw ghetto in the Generalgouvernement still
had dance halls and bars. He had seen the pictures in the Berliner
Illustrierte. Conclusion: Warsaw was the place for the 20,000 Jews and
5,000 Gypsies.’1
This
time
Himmler
replied
in
a
gruff
tone:
“Mr.
Regierungspräsident, read your letter once again. You have adopted the
wrong tone. You have obviously forgotten that you have adressed a
superior.”
Henceforth
all
communications
from
Uebelhoer's
office
would not be accepted.” Heydrich wrote his own letter to Greiser,
protesting
specifically
against
the
remarks
concerning
SS
comrade
Eichmann,
whom
Uebelhoer
had
accused
of
the
Gypsylike
horse-
trading manners.”
On October 16 the first transports began to arrive. By November 4,
twenty transports had dumped 20,000 Jews into the ghetto: 5,000 from
Vienna, 5,000 from Prague, 4,200 from Berlin, 2,000 from Cologne,
1,100 from Frankfurt, 1,000 from Hamburg, 1,000 from Düsseldorf, and
500 from the occupied principality of Luxembourg. The Gypsies arrived too.’4 So crowded was the ghetto that many of the newcomers had to be quartered in the factories.”
On October 28, Greiser wrote a friendly letter to Himmler. The
Gauleiter had talked to the Regierungspräsident. Uebelhoer had succumbed to his “famous temper,” but the Regierungspräsident was an old Nazi who had always done his job. He had done everything to bring
this action to a successful conclusion.71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
Himmler replied that he had received Greiser’s letter. “As everyone
knows, I
bear
no
grudges
[Ich bin
bekanntlich nicht
nachtragend]." The good Uebelhoer was to take a vacation and rest his
nerves; then all would be forgiven.” Indeed, the incident was soon
forgotten, for on July 28, 1942, Uebelhoer had had occasion to thank
Himmler for a birthday gift: a porcelain figure with the inscription
“Standardbearer of the SS.’”*
The expulsions were over and the situation was stabilized.
71. Uebelhoer to Himmler, October 9, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
72. Himmler to Uebelhoer, October 9, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94. This letter
was actually dispatched before Himmler's first reply.
73. Heydrich to Greiser. October 11, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
74. Report by Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Künzel, November 13, 1941, Doku-
menty i materiafy, vol. 3, pp. 203-6. Detailed data in YIVO Institute, Lddt ghetto
collection No 58.
75. Armament Inspectorate XXI to OKW/Economy-Armament Office, December
12, 1941, Wi/ID 1.14.
76. Greiser to Himmler, October 28, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
77. Himmler to Greiser. November. 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
78. Uebelhoer to Himmler, July 29, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
214
POLAND
GHETTO FORMATION
From the fall of 1939 to the fall of 1941, three expulsion movements had
taken place from west to east: (1) Jews (and Poles) from the incorporated territories of the Generalgouvernement; (2) Jews (and Gypsies) from the Reich-Protektorat area to the Generalgouvernement; (3) Jews
(and Gypsies) from the Reich-Protektorat area to the incorporated territories. These movements are significant not so much for their numerical extent as for their psychological mainsprings. They are evidence of the tensions that then convulsed the entire bureaucracy. The period
1939-41 was a time of transition from the forced emigration program to
the “Final Solution" policy. At the height of this transition phase,
transports were pushed from west to east in efforts to arrive at “intermediary”
solutions.
In
the
Generalgouvernement
the
nervousness
was
greatest because 1,500,000 Jews were already in the area and there was
no possibility of pushing them farther east.
If
the
expulsions
were
regarded as
temporary
measures toward
intermediary goals, the second part of the Heydrich program, which
provided for the concentration of the Jews in closed ghettos, was intended to be no more than a makeshift device in preparation for the ultimate mass emigration of the victims. In the incorporated territories
the administration looked forward only to the expulsion of its Jews to
the
Generalgouvernement,
and
the
Generalgouvemeur
was
awaiting
only for a “victory” that would make possible the forced relocation of
all his Jews to the African colony of Madagascar. We can understand,
therefore, in what spirit this ghettoization was approached. During the
first six months there was little planning and much confusion. The
administrative preliminaries were finished quickly eno
ugh, but the actual formation of the ghettos was tardy and slow. Thus the walls around the giant ghetto of Warsaw were not closed until the autumn of 1940.
The Lublin ghetto was not established until April 1941.
The preliminary steps of the ghettoization process consisted of marking, movement restrictions, and the creation of Jewish control organs.
Inasmuch as these measures were being aimed at “Jews," the term had to
be defined. Characteristically, not much initial thought was being given in
the Generalgouvernement to the feelings or interests of the Polish community in matters of categorization. In December 1939, Stadtkommissar Drechsel of Petrikau (Piotrköw Trybunalski) decided that all persons with
a Jewish parent were Jews.” During the following spring the newly appointed specialist in Jewish affairs in the Generalgouvemement's Interior Division, Gottong, proposed a definition that would have included not
79.
Order by Drechsel, December 1, 1939, in Jüdisches Historisches Institut
Warschau, Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord (Berlin, 1961), pp. 74-75.
215
CONCENTRATION
only all the half-Jews but also the non-Jewish partners in undissolved
mixed marriages.“ Finally, in July 1940 the Nuremberg principle was
introduced into the Generalgouvernement by decree." By then, the process of concentration was already well under way.
As early as the beginning of November 1939, Frank issued instructions that all “Jews and Jewesses" (Juden und Jüdinnen) who had reached the age of twelve be forced to wear a white armband with a
blue Jewish star." His order was carried out by the decree of November
23,
1939."
In
the
incorporated
territories
a
few
Regierungspräsidenten
imposed
markings
of
their
own.
For
the
sake
of
uniformity, Reichsstatthalter Greiser of the Wartheland ordered that all
Jews in his Reichsgau wear a four-inch (ten-centimeter) yellow star
sewed on the front and back of their clothes.“ The Jews took to the
stars immediately. In Warsaw, for example, the sale of armbands became a regular business. There were ordinary armbands of cloth and fancy plastic armbands that were washable.”
In conjunction with the marking decrees, the Jews were forbidden
to
move
freely.
The
Generalgouvernement
decree
of
December
11,
1939, signed by the Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, Jews were
forbidden to change residence, except within the locality, and they
were forbidden to enter the streets between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m.“ Under
the decree of January 26, 1940, the Jews were prohibited also from
using the railways, except for authorized trips."
The most important concentration measure prior to the formation
of the ghettos was the establishment of Jewish councils (Judenräte).
According to the Generalgouvernement decree of November 28, 1939,
every Jewish community with a population of up to 10,000 had to elect
a Judenrat of twelve members, and every community with more than
10,000 people had to choose twenty-four.“ The decree was published 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
80. Circular letter by Gottong, April 6, 1940, ibid., pp. 55-56.
81. Decree of July 24, 1940, Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs 1, 1940,
p. 231. Cutoff dates were fixed to conform with the date of the decree entering into force.
Hie introduction of the Nuremberg principle into the incorporated territories followed in
May 1941.
82. Summary of discussion between Frank and Kraköw's Gouverneur, Dr. Wächter, November 10, 1939, Frank diary, PS-2233.
83. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, p. 61.
84. Order by Regierungspräsident in Kalisz (Uebelhoer), December II, 1939,
amending his instructions of November 14, 1939, Dokumenty i material·/, vol. 3, p. 23.
85. "Warschaus Juden ganz unter sich," Krakauer Zeitung, December 4, 1940,
Generalgouvernement page.
86. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, p. 231.
87. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs I, 1940, p. 45.
88. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, p. 72. For Statistical compilation of the Jewish population in eastern European cities, see Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum (Essen, 1938), pp. 713-18.
216
POLAND
after many of the councils had already been established, but its issuance signified an assertion of civil jurisdiction over the councils and a confirmation of their character as public institutions.
In Poland, as in the Reich, the Judenrate was filled with prewar
Jewish leaders, that is to say, men who were holdovers from Jewish
community councils that had existed in the Polish republic, or who had
served
on
municipal
councils
as
representatives
of
Jewish
political
parties, or who had held posts in Jewish religious and philanthropic
organizations.” As a rule, the prewar council chairman (or, in the event
of his unavailability, his deputy or some other willing council member)
would be summoned by an Einsatzgruppen officer or a functionary of
the new civil administration and told to form a Judenrat.w Often the
rapid selection of the membership resulted in many retentions and few
additions. In Warsaw and Lublin, for example, most of the remaining
old members were renamed, and new appointments were made primarily in order to assemble the required twenty-four men. If there was a subtle shift in the traditional alignment of leaders, it manifested itself in
the greater presence of men who could speak German and in fewer
inclusions of Orthodox rabbis, whose garb or speech might have been
provocative
to
the
Germans, or
of
socialists, whose past activities
might have proved dangerous.”
Radically different from the old days were the circumstances surrounding the newly installed Judenrate. However eager some of the Judenrat members might have been for public recognition before the
occupation, now they felt anxieties as they thought about the unknowns. One veteran Jewish politician chosen to serve in the Warsaw Judenrat recalls the day when Adam Czerniakdw (a chemical engineer
by training) met with several of the new appointees in his office and
showed them where he was keeping a key to a drawer of his desk, in
which he had placed a bottle containing twenty-four cyanide pills.”
Before the war, these Jewish leaders had been concerned with
synagogues,
religious
schools,
cemeteries,
orphanages,
and
hospitals.
From now on, their activities were going to be supplemented by
another, quite different function: the transmission of German directives
and orders to the Jewish population, the use of Jewish police to enforce
German will, the deliverance of Jewish property, Jewish labor, and
Jewish lives to the German enemy. The Jewish councils, in the exercise
of their hist
oric function, continued until the end to make desperate
attempts to alleviate the suffering and to stop the mass dying in the 89 90 91 92
89. Trunk, Judenrat, pp. 29-35
90. Ibid., pp. 8-10, 28.
91. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
92. Hartglas, “Czemiakow," Yad Vashem Bulletin 15 (1964): 7. Hartglas, a former
member of the Polish parliament, emigrated to Palestine at the beginning of 1940.
217
CONCENTRATION
ghettos. But, at the same time, the councils responded to German
demands with automatic compliance and invoked German authority to
compel the community’s obedience. Thus the Jewish leadership both
saved
and
destroyed
its
people,
saving
some
Jews
and
destroying
others, saving the Jews at one moment and destroying them at the
next. Some leaders refused to keep this power, others became intoxicated with it.
As time passed, the Jewish councils became increasingly impotent
in their efforts to cope with the welfare portion of their task, but they
made themselves felt all the more in their implementation of Nazi
decrees. With the growth of the destructive function of the Judenräte,
many Jewish leaders felt an almost irresistible urge to look like their
German masters. In March 1940 a Nazi observer in Kraköw was struck
by the contrast between the poverty and filth in the Jewish quarter and
the businesslike luxury of the Jewish community headquarters, which
was filled with beautiful charts, comfortable leather chairs, and heavy
carpets.” In Warsaw the Jewish oligarchy took to wearing boots.” In
L6di the ghetto “dictator,” Rumkowski, printed postage stamps bearing his likeness and made speeches that contained expressions such as
“my children,” “my factories,” and “my Jews.”” From the inside, then,
it seemed already quite clear that the Jewish leaders had become rulers, reigning and disposing over the ghetto community with a finality that was absolute. On the outside, however, it was not yet clear to
whom these absolute rulers actually belonged.
Under
the
Generalgouvernement
decree
of
November
28,
1939,
the Judenräte were placed under the Stadthauptmänner (in the cities)
and the Kreishauptmänner (in the country districts). Similarly, in the
incorporated territories the Judenräte were responsible to the Bürgermeister in the cities and to the Landräte in the country (see Table 6-10).