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  Warsaw, were cut off from suppliers and customers alike. Jobs that had 157 158

  157. Remarks by Emmerich, Gate, and Schön in conference of April 3, 1941, ibid..

  pp. 343-45. On May 5, 1941, Gale talked to Czemiaköw in the ghetto. Hilberg, Staron,

  and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, p, 229. On the following day. Palfinger of the "Ibansfer-

  stelle asked Czemiaköw what Gate had been doing there. Czemiaköw's entry of May 6,

  1941, ibid., p. 230. Czemiaköw writes “Gater."

  158. Memorandum by Bischof, April 30. 1941, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112.

  Fischer, encouraging him, promised subsidies if needed.

  23«

  POLAND

  still been held outside the ghetto boundaries were lost. The ghetto

  economy had to be built from the bottom up.

  The

  hypothetical

  production

  discussed

  by

  Generalgouvernement

  economists in conferences was not within reach overnight, and hardly

  any ghetto had any immediate prospect of supporting itself, even theoretically, by means of exports alone. This was going to be the case regardless of whether all shipments would have to be sent out through

  official channels or whether some could be directed, for higher prices,

  to the black market. At the outset the ghetto inhabitants were therefore

  forced to use their private assets (in the main, leftover past earnings

  consisting of cash, valuables, furnishings, or clothes) for essential purchases. These resources were finite—once used up or sold, they were gone. Thus the survival of the ghetto was predicated in the first instance on the ability of the organizers of production to replace diminishing personal reserves in time, a precarious proposition for sustaining an export-import balance.

  The ghetto was facing not only the necessity of external payments;

  it had internal problems as well. There were people with a few possessions and there were those without means, some with work and many more who were unemployed. Unredressed, this imbalance had ominous implications for a large part of the ghetto population, but any method of redistribution or equalization was going to be difficult. The

  charitable effort was inherently limited, and the raising of taxes was

  confounded, particularly in Warsaw, by the many black-market transactions that, in their very nature, were unrecorded. In general, taxes could be levied only at the point at which money was surfacing in

  nonillicit payments. Revenue was consequently made up of a mix that

  typically included most of the following:1”

  Payroll taxes

  Head taxes

  Taxes on rationed bread

  Payments by persons exempted from forced labor

  Rental taxes

  Cemetery taxes

  Postal surcharges

  Fees for drugs

  Registration fees

  In Warsaw, where the bread tax was important, the revenue structure

  had the appearance of exactions from the poor to keep alive the destitute. For this reason, Czemiakdw also attempted to obtain contribu- 159

  159. Trunk, Judenrai, pp. 236-58, 282-83.

  237

  CONCENTRATION

  tions from Jewish entrepreneurs, by strong-arm methods if need be.'60

  In the business sector of the ghetto, his tactic gave rise to the complaint

  that he was ruining the capital market.160 161 162 163 164

  The chronic deficiency of funds in ghetto treasuries resulted in

  such “borrowing” as nonpayment of employees’ wages.1“ Given the

  sheer number of ghetto employees who did not have much to do and

  whose main reason for clinging to their positions was eligibility for

  greater food rations and other privileges, much of this free labor was

  not really labor and not really free. Even so, Czemiakdw was concerned that his Order Service was not being paid,1“ for he wanted it to be a professional force.

  The Germans on their part understood the limited capacity of the

  ghetto economy, and they were aware of the role of the councils as

  stabilizers in a situation of massive, abject poverty. To the extent that

  German agencies had to maintain a ghetto, they had to reinforce the

  power of its council to deal with elementary needs, lest it become

  incapable of carrying out German demands and directives altogether.

  From time to time, German officials would therefore make "concessions” to the councils, allowing them to borrow sums from sequestered Jewish funds,166 or considering a rebate to a Jewish charitable organization of social welfare taxes paid by Jews to Polish municipalities that no longer helped the Jewish poor,165 or supporting requests by the councils

  to raise new revenues from the Jewish population. When Czemiakdw

  asked for permission to levy a variety of such taxes and fees, the

  deputy

  chief

  of

  the

  Resettlement

  Division,

  Mohns,

  backing

  Czer-

  niakdw’s proposal, stated that "it lies in the interest of the difficult

  administration of the Jewish district that the authority of the Jewish

  160. Czemiakdw’s entries of January 31 and February 2, 1942, in Hilberg, Staron,

  and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 320-21. See also Aleksander Ivanka, Wspom-

  nienia skarbowca 1927-1945 (Warsaw, 1964), p. 536. Ivanka was treasurer in the Polish

  city administration and occasionally talked to Czemiakiw.

  161. File note by Auerswald, March 4, 1942, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112.

  162. Statistical bulletin No. 3 of the Jewish Council, June 2, 1940, containing

  financial report for January-April 1940, in Szymon Datner, “Dziatalno£d warszawskiej

  'Gminy Wyznaniowej Zydowskiej' w dokumentach podziemnego archiwum getta Wars-

  zawskiego CRingelblum ID,” Biuieryn Zydowskiego Institutu Historycwego No. 74

  (April-June, 1970): 103-5.

  163. Czemiakdw’s entry of October 2, 1941, in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds.,

  Warsaw Diary, p. 291. Order Service men engaged in special tasks would sometimes

  receive special pay.

  164. An emergency measure prior to ghettoization in Warsaw. See Czemiakdw's

  entries of February 16 and 20, 1940, ibid., pp. 117,119-20.

  165. Report by Kreishauptmann of Petrikau (Radom district), March 7, 1941, Yad

  Vashem microfilm JM 814. See also Czemiakdw’s entry on May 8, 1941, in Hilberg,

  Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, p. 231.

  238

  POLAND

  Council be upheld and strengthened under all circumstances.”166 167 168 This

  line of reasoning was enunciated even more explicitly by the Warsaw

  ghetto Kommissar, Auerswald, a few months later. “When deficiencies

  occur,” he wrote, ’’the Jews direct their resentment against the Jewish

  administration and not against the German supervision.”'67

  Even though these German supervisors had a vital interest in assuring a basic orderly life behind the walls, they did not refrain from implementing

  measures

  against

  the

  Jewish

  population

  that

  seriously

  weakened the ghetto’s viability. The three principal means by which

  German agencies added to deprivation were (1) confiscatory acts eroding the ghetto’s ability to export products through legal or illegal channels, (2) labor exploitation, whereby outside employers could increase their profits at the expense of Jewish wages, and (3) food embargoes,

  which made it impossibl
e for the ghettos to convert the proceeds of

  exports into effective purchasing power for the acquisition of bread,

  thereby forcing many individual Jews to buy black-market food at

  much higher prices.

  The Jewish councils on their part attempted to surmount every

  reversal, but they were playing a determined game in that the German

  agencies, which had originally created the problem, were ultimately in

  control of the solutions. The councils were thus enmeshed in a dilemma from which they could no longer extricate themselves: they could not serve the Jewish people without automatically enforcing the

  German will. Jewry, without weapons, clung only to hope. “The Jews,”

  said Auerswald, “are waiting for the end of the war and in the meantime conduct themselves quietly. There has been no sign of any resistance spirit to date.”16*

  CONFISCATIONS

  In the Reich-Protektorat area the expropriations preceded the concentration process. Insofar as any sequence of steps is recognizable, the bureaucracy thought first of expropriations and only later of ghettoization measures. The opposite was true in Poland. The destruction process

  was

  introduced

  into

  Poland

  with

  the

  elaborate

  Heydrich

  166. Czemiakôw to Transferstelle, January 8, 1941, and Mohns to Leisl, January

  II, 1941, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1113. In his letter Czemiakôw mentioned a daily

  income of twenty thousand zloty and daily expenses of forty to fifty thousand zloty. The

  total debt was two million zloty.

  167. Auerswald to Deputy of the Plenipotentiary of the Generalgouvemeur, Dr. von

  Medeazza, in Berlin, November 24, 1941, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112.

  168. Ibid.

  239

  CONCENTRATION

  concentration plan. This plan became the focal point of anti-Jewish

  action in the Polish territories, and expropriatory measures were conceived and carried out in terms of the ghettoization process. They were a part of the institution of the ghetto.

  The confiscation

  of

  property,

  conscription of

  labor, and deprivation of food were administrative operations on an elaborate scale.

  In Germany the gains from property expropriations far outweighed the

  proceeds from labor and food measures, for the Jewish community in

  Germany had a great deal of capital but relatively few people. In Poland the situation was reversed. The Polish Jewish community had little wealth, but its acquisition was not going to be neglected. In fact,

  the confiscatory process caused jurisdictional disputes among agencies

  interested not only in the property but also in the preservation or

  aggrandizement of their powers.

  The first

  problem

  arose

  when

  Goring

  decided to

  do

  all the

  confiscating in Poland. For this purpose he set up the Main Trusteeship

  Office East (Haupttreuhandstelle Ost), which had its headquarters in

  Berlin, in the Office of the Four-Year Plan.169 The Main Trusteeship Office

  East immediately set up branches in Danzig (Reichsgau Danzig-West

  Prussia),

  Poznan

  (Wartheland),

  Ciechandw

  (East

  Prussia),

  Katowice

  (Silesia), and Krakdw (GeneraJgouvemement). The head of the Main

  Trusteeship office was the retired Burgermeister Max Winkler.1™

  The creation of an office with headquarters in Berlin and competence in the Generalgouvemement was a violation of Frank’s sacred rule of the unity of administration. It was an act of hineinregieren

  (“reigning into” his territorial sphere) and therefore intolerable. Accordingly, Frank countered the Gdring move by setting up his own trusteeship

  office

  under

  Ministerialrat

  Dr.

  Plodeck.'’'

  Goring

  decided

  not to make an issue of the matter.1™ Henceforth there were two

  trusteeship offices in Poland: one under Winkler, with jurisdiction in

  the incorporated territories; the other under Plodeck, with functions in

  the Generalgouvemement. It goes without saying that neither of these

  offices bought anything. The trusteeship offices confiscated property

  169. Announcement (signed Goring), November 1, 1939, Deutscher Reichsanzeiger und Preussischer Staatsanzeiger, No. 260.

  170. Ibid. Winkler had previously been the Reich's Chief Trustee. Affidavit by

  Winkler, September 9,1947, Nl-10727.

  171. The office was set up on November 15, two weeks after the establishment of

  the Main Trusteeship Office East. See Plodeck, "Die Tteuhandverwaltung im Generalgouvemement," in du Prel. ed.. Das Generalgouvemement (Würzburg, 1942), pp. 110— 172

  172. Testimony by Buhler (Staatssekretär, Generalgouvemement), in Trial of the

  Major War Criminals. XII, 67.

  240

  POLAND

  and sold it to interested buyers in accordance with certain priority

  criteria. The proceeds from such sales in the incorporated territories

  accrued to the Reich, while the profit in the Generalgouvernement was

  retained by the Kraköw administration.

  To pave the way for smooth and efficient confiscations, both offices

  took certain preliminary steps. In the incorporated territories only one

  such measure was enacted: the decree of September 17, 1940, signed

  by Goring, for the sequestration of Jewish property. The object of that

  decree was to prohibit the owners of sequestered property to dispose

  of it in any way.1’*

  The administration of the Generalgouvernement was more elaborate in its preparatory work. By November 1939 the chief of the Foreign Currency and Trade Division of the Generalgouvernement had

  ordered all Jewish deposits and accounts in banks to be blocked. The

  Jewish depositor was permitted to withdraw only 250 zloty (RM 125, or

  $50) weekly, or a larger amount if needed for the upkeep of his business. At the same time, Jews had to deposit all cash reserves in excess of 2,000 zloty (RM 1,000, or $400), while debtors of Jews had to make

  all payments in excess of 500 zloty (RM 250, or $100) into the blocked

  account.1’* Needless to say, this measure discouraged the sale of Jewish

  property. The discouragement was turned into a prohibition with the

  sequestration decree of January 24, 1940, signed by Generalgouverneur Frank.'” On the same day the Generalgouvernement administration enacted a registration

  decree. This

  measure,

  unlike the Reich

  decree of April 26, 1938, required the registration of all kinds of property, including even clothes, cooking utensils, furniture, and jewelry.

  Moreover, no allowances were made for small amounts.1”

  The actual confiscatory process was divided into three phases. At

  first, the confiscations were confined to skimming off the cream. It was

  during this phase that the trusteeship offices and some of their unauthorized

  competitors

  plundered

  warehouses

  and

  requisitioned

  fine

  homes.'” The second phase, which was pivotal and crucial, was tied to

  ghettoization.

  As the Jews moved into the ghetto, they left most of their property

  behind. This “abandoned" property was
confiscated. It can readily be 173 174 175 176 177

  173. RGBl 1, 1270. The decree was a trifle late.

  174. Krakauer Zeitung. November 26-27, 1939, Wirtschafts-Kurier page. See also

  draft directive by OKH/GenQu/Z(W), mid-September, 1939, Wi/1.121.

  175. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs I, 1940, p. 23.

  176. Ibid., p. 31.

  177. For unauthorized competition, see letter by Brigadefllhrer Schäfer to L6d2

  press, January 17,1940, Dokumente i materialy, vol. 3, pp. 63-64. Schäfer authorized the

  Jews to demand official papers from requisitioners and to call the police if necessary.

  241

  CONCENTRATION

  understood now that the choice of the ghetto location was of utmost

  importance to the success of the operation. As a rule, the preferred

  ghetto site was a slum, for in that way the better houses, apartments,

  and furniture were left behind. But this solution also had its difficulties,

  because the slums were often filled with warehouses and factories.

  Thus it was discovered during the formation of the L6d2 ghetto that the

  largest textile warehouses lay within the proposed ghetto boundaries.

  Naturally, the local merchants were disturbed. “It could hardly have

  been intended," wrote one of these commercial men, “to leave these

  enormous values in the ghetto district. So far as at all possible, these

  things will have to be seized and stored in yards outside the ghetto.”178 179 180

  Almost equally important were the sudden and precise (schlagariige)

  moving schedules, which were designed to stun the Jews into leaving

  most of their movables behind. The Jews were given no time to prepare

  for the transport of all their possessions into the ghetto, and they did

  not have time to find adequate storage space in the overcrowded ghetto

  districts.175

  During the third phase of the confiscations, the trusteeship offices

  reached into the ghettos to administer property or to haul out valuables.

  This

  phase

  was

  not

  very

  productive,

  because

  the

  agencies

  looked upon the ghettos as transitory institutions. It was obviously

  easier to seize everything upon the liquidation of the ghettos than to

  search them for hidden property. That is why we shall have to say

  something more about the confiscations in the deportation chapter.1*

  Undoubtedly, the most interesting part of the confiscatory process

 

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