by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
accounts credited to the office and labeled as receipts from disposal of Jewish textiles,
leather, and furs, respectively.
200. According to Winkler, the Main Trusteeship Office East collected RM
1,500,000,000. But this figure includes the value of Polish as weli as Jewish properties,
and it gives no clue to the confiscations in the Generalgouvemement. Affidavit by Winkler, September 9, 1947. NI-10727.
201. Trunk, Judenrat, pp. 282-83.
202. Ibid., p. 245. Schmidt & MQnstermann cumulative charges, aggregating over
1,300.000 reichsmark from 1941 through July 7. 1942, are detailed in its statement of
July 8, 1942. Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg (Akten Auerswald), Polen 365d, p. 303. See
also entries by Czemiakdw for December 2, 1941, and January 13, 1942, in Hilberg,
Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 304. 314-15.
203. See delivery certificate No. 200 from Izrael First (Economic Division) to Kom-
missar, June 20, 1942, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112.
204. Auerswald to SS and Police Leaderin Warsaw, December 27,1941, in Zentrale
Stelle Ludwigsburg. Polen 365d, pp. 288-89. Auerswald reported that Czemiakdw, haggling for exemptions, had told him that in Radom council members, physicians, and members of the Jewish Ordnungsdienst did not have to surrender their furs, and that in
L6d2 compensation in the form of food deliveries had been promised. On the other hand,
CzemiaktSw (according to Auerswald) had cooperatively pointed out that Jews would
attempt to store furs with Poles, and had advised Auerswald to start rumors that Poles
loo would have to give up their furs.
247
CONCENTRATION
Long lines were thereupon formed in the Warsaw ghetto as the entire
staff of the council bureaucracy was engaged in the counting of coats,
linings, pelts, and collars.*5 On the German side, the processing took a
long time and, as a consequence, large quantities of the furs were piled
up in a central warehouse in Krakdw as late as March 23, 1941—the
beginning of spring.2*
In addition to such organized confiscations, periodic attempts were
made to remove from the ghettos almost anything that was not bulky
and that might have some value. Already in 1940 several agencies
busied themselves with the task of “discovering” hidden ghetto treasures. Such activities led to accusations of “sabotage” and “corruption.” In L6d 1 a Criminal Police detachment had established itself inside the ghetto. From this vantage point the detachment hauled out
so many goods, gold, and valuables that the Gettoverwaltung complained of “sabotage.””’ On October 23, 1940, the Criminal Police and the Gettoverwaltung made an agreement to the effect that all goods
confiscated by the detachment in the ghetto would be delivered to the
Gettoverwaltung.
On
its
part,
the
Gettoverwaltung
declared
that
it
would have no objection if Criminal Police personnel “reflected” upon
certain items and wished to buy them at appraised prices.“*
The SS and Police were not so considerate when the shoe was on
the other foot. Himmler hated vices, and the vice that he hated most
was corruption. On March 5, 1942, Himmler, Bormann, and Lammers
met with Frank to discuss informally (kameradschaftlich) certain problem matters (Fragenkomplexe). The purpose of the discussion was to clear
up
these
problems
“without
bothering
the
Fiihrer
with
these
things.” Violently on the defensive, Frank spoke in a “theatrical manner” about his work and about corruption. Allegedly he was the chief corruptionist (Oberkorruptionist). He would not stand for such accusations. Himmler then spoke in a disparaging manner about the entire Generalgouvernement administration and remarked that an “impos- 205 206 207 208
205. See Czemiaköw's entries for December 25, 1941, to January 5, 1942, in Hil-
berg, Staron, and, Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 309-12, and subsequent entries,
passim. The Jewish police chief, Szeryhski, was arrested on suspicion of secreting furs
for safekeeping with Polish police officers. See Czemiaköw's entry for May 2, 1942,
ibid., p. 349.
206. See correspondence in Akten Auerswald. Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg. Polen
365d, pp. 286-97.
207. Memorandum by Kriminaloberassistent Richter, undated (probably fall of
1940), Dokumenty i materiafy, vol. 3, pp. 96-98.
208. Memorandum by Kriminaldirektor Zirpins (chief of Criminal Police in Löd t)
on his discussion with Biebow, October 23. 1940, ibid., pp 100-101.
248
POLAND
sible” situation had been created because of purchases by private persons in the ghettos. Himmler continued by pointing out that Fräulein Frank, the sister of the Generalgouvemeur, had personally conducted
negotiations
with
the
Jews,
that
the
“castle”
(Frank's
headquarters)
was stuffed with items from the ghetto, that these items had been
obtained at “arbitrary” prices, and so on. Next, Himmler brought up
the
"immense
corruption”
(Riesenkorruption)
of
Gouverneur
Dr.
Lasch of Radom, and Frank countered by demanding the withdrawal of
SS and Police Leader Globocnik of Lublin.1” (Incidentally, both Lasch
and Globocnik became casualties in the Himmler-Frank war). In the
meantime, the trusteeship offices looked forward to the second—and
major—haul upon the liquidation of the ghetto system. As we shall see,
they were to be disappointed.
LABOR EXPLOITATION
The expropriatory process in Poland had three components. Since the
Polish Jews were a poor people, the confiscations were fiscally and
otherwise the least important part of the expropriations. We may be
certain that the 800,000 Jews of the Reich, Austria, and the Protektorat
owned more property than the 2,500,000 Jews in the incorporated territories and the Generalgouvemement. To the Germans the economic importance of Polish Jewry was expressed in its numbers: two and a
half million people are an important productive factor. This was especially true in Poland, where the Jews constituted an unusually high percentage of the available skilled labor.
The initial impact of the war upon Poland had produced a vast
increase in unemployment. The whole economy was disrupted. Thus at
the beginning of the occupation 2,150,000 people were out of work,
while
6,420,000
(comprising
the
unemployed
and
their
dependents)
were directly affected by the upheaval.110 There was no need for a
forced labor system during this period, but, to the Germans, the sight
of thousands of Jews “milling around” (herumlungernde Juden) was a
challenge that had to be met right away. Even during the first few
weeks of the occupation, military and civilian offices seized the Jews in
the streets and forced them to clear rubble, fill antitank ditches, shovel
snow, and perform other emergenc
y tasks.111 209 210 211
209. Memorandum by Himmler, March 5, 1942, NG-3333.
210. Report by Armament Economy Inspectorate Ober-Ost (comprising all of occupied Poland). October 28. 1939, Wi/ID 1.49.
211. Krakauer Zeitung. February 4-5, 1940, GG page; May 19-20, 1940, GG page.
249
CONCENTRATION
On October 26, 1939, the Generalgouvernement administration established forced labor as a general principle. A decree of that date provided that Jews were liable to forced labor in “forced labor troops”
(Zwangsarbeitertroups).1'1 The forced labor troops, or Jewish columns
(Judenkolonnen), were the first form of labor utilization in Poland.
Whenever Jews were needed by a particular agency, they were picked
up in the street, organized into columns, and put to work. At the end of
the working day the Jews were released, and next day the same procedure was started anew.115
In Warsaw, the Judenrat addressed the street impressments as one
of the first items on Us agenda. It set up a labor battalion that could be
made available to the Germans as needed.21' Kriiger validated this measure by signing a decree on December 2, 1939, empowering all the Judenräte to organize forced labor columns.212 213 214 215 The average daily
strength of the Warsaw labor battalion was 8,000 to 9,000 workers.216
During the winter the battalion was, for all practical purposes, the
snow removal and street cleaning department of the city.217 218 219
The Germans appeared to welcome the system. Henceforth each
office in need of labor could make its wishes known to the Judenrat
either
directly
or,
indirectly,
through
the
police,
the
competent
Kreishauptmann,
or
the
local
Stadthauptmann.
Over
the
desks
of
Judenrat officials, charts with straight lines moving diagonally upward
indicated the increasing utilization of the forced labor columns.2’1 A
German
eyewitness
reported:
“Today
in
the
Generalgouvernement,
one can see Jewish troops, spades on shoulders, marching without any
German escort through the countryside. At the head of the column
marches likewise a Jew.”21’ Generalgouvemeur Frank praised the Jews
condescendingly for their diligence, as though he had reformed them:
“They work very well [sehr brav], yes, they are even eager about it [ja
212. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, p. 6.
213. Nothing else was considered feasible at the time. See report by Kruger in GG
conference of December 8, 1939, Frank diary, PS-2233.
214. Entries by Czemiaköw for October 19-20 and November 2, 1939, in Hilberg,
Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 84,86-87.
215. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, pp. 246-48.
216. Czemiaköw to Plenipotentiary of the District Chief for the City of Warsaw
(Leist). May 21. 1940, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1113.
217. Entry by Czemiaköw for March 3, 1940, in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz,
eds.. Warsaw Diary, p. 123.
218. See report by Dr. Dietrich Redecker about the Kraköw Judenrat in Krakauer
Zeitung, March 13, 1940.
219. “Die Juden im Generalgouvernement." Die Judenfrage, August 1, 1940, pp.
107-8.
250
POLAND
sie drängen sich dazu], and they feel rewarded when they are permitted to work in the ‘castle.’ Here we do not know the typical Eastern Jew; our Jews work.’”“
Nevertheless, a few problems remained unsolved. Some agencies
ignored the new system and continued to seize Jews in the streets.“'
The Higher SS and Police Leader in the Generalgouvernement, Krüger, proposed the compilation of a Zentralkartei, a central register listing
all
Jews
in
the
Generalgouvernement,
with
their
occupation,
age, sex, and other vital statistics.“2 Behind this demand lurked the
desire to seize the entire forced labor system.“5 But Frank conceded no
special jurisdiction to the SS and Police. Since Kruger already had his
fingers in the pie, Frank agreed only that in labor procurement matters
the Stadt- and Kreishauptmänner would work “in closest contact" with
the Security Police and Security Service.“* Toward the end of 1940,
Main Division Labor of the Generalgouvernement started to compile a
Zentralkartei,“5 but this project was a theoretical exercise.
The columns were a cheap source of manpower. Payments by German employers, if made at all, were erratic. In Kraköw the city administration made a small reimbursement to the Jewish Council for the utilization of labor,”6 and in Warsaw during the spring of 1941, a major
German employer, German army Rittmeister Schu, whose organization
collected scrap, declared that he did not want slaves ( Sklaventum) and
eventually paid Czemiaköw the daily wage of 2 zloty per worker.“7 The
principal responsibility for meeting the payroll of the labor columns
consequently fell to the councils, who attempted to solve the problem
by imposing surtaxes and labor registration fees, which were general,
and by instituting labor exemption payments, which were exacted from
registered able-bodied men who wished to purchase their freedom, and 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227
220. Verbatim minutes of interview of Frank by correspondent Kleiss of the Völkischer Beobachter, February 6, 1940, Frank diary. PS-2233.
221. See letter of Stadthauptmann Schmid of Kraków to the Kraków Judenrat,
May 8, 1940, in Cazeta Zydowska (Kraków), July 23, 1940. Schmid requested the Judenrat to report all cases of wild labor impressments.
222. Krüger in summary of conference of December 8, 1939, Frank diary, PS-2233.
223. The demand was brought up again during the conference in which Security
Police Commander Streckenbach asked for control over the Judenräte. Summary of
conference of May 30, 1940, Frank diary, PS-2233.
224. Ibid.
225. Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer, "Aufgaben und Organisation der Abteilung Arbeit im Generalgouvernement," Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, pt. 5, pp. 67-71.
226. Dunk, Judenrat, p. 256.
227. See Czemiaków's entries for November 13, 1939, and May 10 and 24,1940, in
Hilberg, Staron and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 89, 148, 153.
251
CONCENTRATION
which (in the case of Warsaw) amounted to 60-100 zloty monthly, with
reductions for “socially active” persons and for hardship cases.“*
During the summer of 1940 the chief of Main Division Labor in the
Generalgouvernement,
Frauendorfer,
directed
that
Jewish
laborers
be
paid 80 percent of the prevailing Polish wages. At a meeting of General-
gouvemement representatives and district labor officials held under his
chairmanship, the policy was criticized for allowing the Jews too much
compensation. Frauendorfer defended the principle on the ground that
it was essential to maintain the physical stre
ngth (Arbeitskraft) of the
Jews,but his action was opposed also at the local level. In the Pulawy
district (Lublin) the army replaced its Jews with Poles,“0 and in Czestochowa
the
Stadthauptmann
asserted
that
no
one
could
understand
why Jewish councils or “Jews as a whole” (die Juden in ihrer Gesamt-
heit) no longer had the means with which to pay the forced laborers. In
his opinion this was not the case in Czestochowa. Consequently, he
assumed that the directive could be “lost” locally, and he had acted
accordingly.“1
The columns were the first form of labor utilization. They were
suitable only for day-to-day emergency work and for some construction projects. As time passed, there grew out of the labor columns a new and more permanent type of forced labor, the labor camps.“*
Labor camps were set up for the purpose of employing Jews on a
larger scale in more formidable projects. The first proposal for a large-
scale project came, significantly, from Heinrich Himmler. In February
1940,
he
suggested
to
Commander-in-Chief
of
the
Army
von
Brauchitsch the construction of an enormous antitank ditch along the
newly formed frontiers of the east, facing the Red Army. For the building of this line Himmler dreamed of using all the Polish Jews.“5 228 229 230 231 232 233
228. Czemiakdw toLeist, May 21, 1940. Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1113. On labor
exemption payments in Krakbw, L6d t, and Lublin, see Think, Judenrol, pp. 2S0, 252,
253.
229. Summary, dated August 9, 1940, of Generalgouvernement conference on Jewish labor held on August 6. Yad Vashem document 06/11.
230. Report by Kreishauptmann Brandt for August, 1940. September 10,1940, Yad
Vashem microfilm JM 814.
231. Report for August 1940 by Stadthauptmann of Czsstochowa (Wendler), September 14, 1940, JM 814.
232. The labor columns continued in existence even after the ghettos were closed
off. In several ghettos passes were issued to enable the columns to leave and return daily.
See article in Krakauer Zeiiung entitled "JOdisches Wolmviertelauch in Kielce.” April 8.
1941, p. 6. In addition to the labor columns, a handful of individuals were employed in
installations outside the ghettos. This was known as Kleineinsaii (small-scale labor
utilization). See memorandum by Militdrbefehlshaberim Generalgouvemement/Chef des