Raul Hilberg

by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)

  accounts credited to the office and labeled as receipts from disposal of Jewish textiles,

  leather, and furs, respectively.

  200. According to Winkler, the Main Trusteeship Office East collected RM

  1,500,000,000. But this figure includes the value of Polish as weli as Jewish properties,

  and it gives no clue to the confiscations in the Generalgouvemement. Affidavit by Winkler, September 9, 1947. NI-10727.

  201. Trunk, Judenrat, pp. 282-83.

  202. Ibid., p. 245. Schmidt & MQnstermann cumulative charges, aggregating over

  1,300.000 reichsmark from 1941 through July 7. 1942, are detailed in its statement of

  July 8, 1942. Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg (Akten Auerswald), Polen 365d, p. 303. See

  also entries by Czemiakdw for December 2, 1941, and January 13, 1942, in Hilberg,

  Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 304. 314-15.

  203. See delivery certificate No. 200 from Izrael First (Economic Division) to Kom-

  missar, June 20, 1942, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112.

  204. Auerswald to SS and Police Leaderin Warsaw, December 27,1941, in Zentrale

  Stelle Ludwigsburg. Polen 365d, pp. 288-89. Auerswald reported that Czemiakdw, haggling for exemptions, had told him that in Radom council members, physicians, and members of the Jewish Ordnungsdienst did not have to surrender their furs, and that in

  L6d2 compensation in the form of food deliveries had been promised. On the other hand,

  CzemiaktSw (according to Auerswald) had cooperatively pointed out that Jews would

  attempt to store furs with Poles, and had advised Auerswald to start rumors that Poles

  loo would have to give up their furs.

  247

  CONCENTRATION

  Long lines were thereupon formed in the Warsaw ghetto as the entire

  staff of the council bureaucracy was engaged in the counting of coats,

  linings, pelts, and collars.*5 On the German side, the processing took a

  long time and, as a consequence, large quantities of the furs were piled

  up in a central warehouse in Krakdw as late as March 23, 1941—the

  beginning of spring.2*

  In addition to such organized confiscations, periodic attempts were

  made to remove from the ghettos almost anything that was not bulky

  and that might have some value. Already in 1940 several agencies

  busied themselves with the task of “discovering” hidden ghetto treasures. Such activities led to accusations of “sabotage” and “corruption.” In L6d 1 a Criminal Police detachment had established itself inside the ghetto. From this vantage point the detachment hauled out

  so many goods, gold, and valuables that the Gettoverwaltung complained of “sabotage.””’ On October 23, 1940, the Criminal Police and the Gettoverwaltung made an agreement to the effect that all goods

  confiscated by the detachment in the ghetto would be delivered to the

  Gettoverwaltung.

  On

  its

  part,

  the

  Gettoverwaltung

  declared

  that

  it

  would have no objection if Criminal Police personnel “reflected” upon

  certain items and wished to buy them at appraised prices.“*

  The SS and Police were not so considerate when the shoe was on

  the other foot. Himmler hated vices, and the vice that he hated most

  was corruption. On March 5, 1942, Himmler, Bormann, and Lammers

  met with Frank to discuss informally (kameradschaftlich) certain problem matters (Fragenkomplexe). The purpose of the discussion was to clear

  up

  these

  problems

  “without

  bothering

  the

  Fiihrer

  with

  these

  things.” Violently on the defensive, Frank spoke in a “theatrical manner” about his work and about corruption. Allegedly he was the chief corruptionist (Oberkorruptionist). He would not stand for such accusations. Himmler then spoke in a disparaging manner about the entire Generalgouvernement administration and remarked that an “impos- 205 206 207 208

  205. See Czemiaköw's entries for December 25, 1941, to January 5, 1942, in Hil-

  berg, Staron, and, Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 309-12, and subsequent entries,

  passim. The Jewish police chief, Szeryhski, was arrested on suspicion of secreting furs

  for safekeeping with Polish police officers. See Czemiaköw's entry for May 2, 1942,

  ibid., p. 349.

  206. See correspondence in Akten Auerswald. Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg. Polen

  365d, pp. 286-97.

  207. Memorandum by Kriminaloberassistent Richter, undated (probably fall of

  1940), Dokumenty i materiafy, vol. 3, pp. 96-98.

  208. Memorandum by Kriminaldirektor Zirpins (chief of Criminal Police in Löd t)

  on his discussion with Biebow, October 23. 1940, ibid., pp 100-101.

  248

  POLAND

  sible” situation had been created because of purchases by private persons in the ghettos. Himmler continued by pointing out that Fräulein Frank, the sister of the Generalgouvemeur, had personally conducted

  negotiations

  with

  the

  Jews,

  that

  the

  “castle”

  (Frank's

  headquarters)

  was stuffed with items from the ghetto, that these items had been

  obtained at “arbitrary” prices, and so on. Next, Himmler brought up

  the

  "immense

  corruption”

  (Riesenkorruption)

  of

  Gouverneur

  Dr.

  Lasch of Radom, and Frank countered by demanding the withdrawal of

  SS and Police Leader Globocnik of Lublin.1” (Incidentally, both Lasch

  and Globocnik became casualties in the Himmler-Frank war). In the

  meantime, the trusteeship offices looked forward to the second—and

  major—haul upon the liquidation of the ghetto system. As we shall see,

  they were to be disappointed.

  LABOR EXPLOITATION

  The expropriatory process in Poland had three components. Since the

  Polish Jews were a poor people, the confiscations were fiscally and

  otherwise the least important part of the expropriations. We may be

  certain that the 800,000 Jews of the Reich, Austria, and the Protektorat

  owned more property than the 2,500,000 Jews in the incorporated territories and the Generalgouvemement. To the Germans the economic importance of Polish Jewry was expressed in its numbers: two and a

  half million people are an important productive factor. This was especially true in Poland, where the Jews constituted an unusually high percentage of the available skilled labor.

  The initial impact of the war upon Poland had produced a vast

  increase in unemployment. The whole economy was disrupted. Thus at

  the beginning of the occupation 2,150,000 people were out of work,

  while

  6,420,000

  (comprising

  the

  unemployed

  and

  their

  dependents)

  were directly affected by the upheaval.110 There was no need for a

  forced labor system during this period, but, to the Germans, the sight

  of thousands of Jews “milling around” (herumlungernde Juden) was a

  challenge that had to be met right away. Even during the first few

  weeks of the occupation, military and civilian offices seized the Jews in

  the streets and forced them to clear rubble, fill antitank ditches, shovel

  snow, and perform other emergenc
y tasks.111 209 210 211

  209. Memorandum by Himmler, March 5, 1942, NG-3333.

  210. Report by Armament Economy Inspectorate Ober-Ost (comprising all of occupied Poland). October 28. 1939, Wi/ID 1.49.

  211. Krakauer Zeitung. February 4-5, 1940, GG page; May 19-20, 1940, GG page.

  249

  CONCENTRATION

  On October 26, 1939, the Generalgouvernement administration established forced labor as a general principle. A decree of that date provided that Jews were liable to forced labor in “forced labor troops”

  (Zwangsarbeitertroups).1'1 The forced labor troops, or Jewish columns

  (Judenkolonnen), were the first form of labor utilization in Poland.

  Whenever Jews were needed by a particular agency, they were picked

  up in the street, organized into columns, and put to work. At the end of

  the working day the Jews were released, and next day the same procedure was started anew.115

  In Warsaw, the Judenrat addressed the street impressments as one

  of the first items on Us agenda. It set up a labor battalion that could be

  made available to the Germans as needed.21' Kriiger validated this measure by signing a decree on December 2, 1939, empowering all the Judenräte to organize forced labor columns.212 213 214 215 The average daily

  strength of the Warsaw labor battalion was 8,000 to 9,000 workers.216

  During the winter the battalion was, for all practical purposes, the

  snow removal and street cleaning department of the city.217 218 219

  The Germans appeared to welcome the system. Henceforth each

  office in need of labor could make its wishes known to the Judenrat

  either

  directly

  or,

  indirectly,

  through

  the

  police,

  the

  competent

  Kreishauptmann,

  or

  the

  local

  Stadthauptmann.

  Over

  the

  desks

  of

  Judenrat officials, charts with straight lines moving diagonally upward

  indicated the increasing utilization of the forced labor columns.2’1 A

  German

  eyewitness

  reported:

  “Today

  in

  the

  Generalgouvernement,

  one can see Jewish troops, spades on shoulders, marching without any

  German escort through the countryside. At the head of the column

  marches likewise a Jew.”21’ Generalgouvemeur Frank praised the Jews

  condescendingly for their diligence, as though he had reformed them:

  “They work very well [sehr brav], yes, they are even eager about it [ja

  212. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, p. 6.

  213. Nothing else was considered feasible at the time. See report by Kruger in GG

  conference of December 8, 1939, Frank diary, PS-2233.

  214. Entries by Czemiaköw for October 19-20 and November 2, 1939, in Hilberg,

  Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 84,86-87.

  215. Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs, 1939, pp. 246-48.

  216. Czemiaköw to Plenipotentiary of the District Chief for the City of Warsaw

  (Leist). May 21. 1940, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1113.

  217. Entry by Czemiaköw for March 3, 1940, in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz,

  eds.. Warsaw Diary, p. 123.

  218. See report by Dr. Dietrich Redecker about the Kraköw Judenrat in Krakauer

  Zeitung, March 13, 1940.

  219. “Die Juden im Generalgouvernement." Die Judenfrage, August 1, 1940, pp.

  107-8.

  250

  POLAND

  sie drängen sich dazu], and they feel rewarded when they are permitted to work in the ‘castle.’ Here we do not know the typical Eastern Jew; our Jews work.’”“

  Nevertheless, a few problems remained unsolved. Some agencies

  ignored the new system and continued to seize Jews in the streets.“'

  The Higher SS and Police Leader in the Generalgouvernement, Krüger, proposed the compilation of a Zentralkartei, a central register listing

  all

  Jews

  in

  the

  Generalgouvernement,

  with

  their

  occupation,

  age, sex, and other vital statistics.“2 Behind this demand lurked the

  desire to seize the entire forced labor system.“5 But Frank conceded no

  special jurisdiction to the SS and Police. Since Kruger already had his

  fingers in the pie, Frank agreed only that in labor procurement matters

  the Stadt- and Kreishauptmänner would work “in closest contact" with

  the Security Police and Security Service.“* Toward the end of 1940,

  Main Division Labor of the Generalgouvernement started to compile a

  Zentralkartei,“5 but this project was a theoretical exercise.

  The columns were a cheap source of manpower. Payments by German employers, if made at all, were erratic. In Kraköw the city administration made a small reimbursement to the Jewish Council for the utilization of labor,”6 and in Warsaw during the spring of 1941, a major

  German employer, German army Rittmeister Schu, whose organization

  collected scrap, declared that he did not want slaves ( Sklaventum) and

  eventually paid Czemiaköw the daily wage of 2 zloty per worker.“7 The

  principal responsibility for meeting the payroll of the labor columns

  consequently fell to the councils, who attempted to solve the problem

  by imposing surtaxes and labor registration fees, which were general,

  and by instituting labor exemption payments, which were exacted from

  registered able-bodied men who wished to purchase their freedom, and 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227

  220. Verbatim minutes of interview of Frank by correspondent Kleiss of the Völkischer Beobachter, February 6, 1940, Frank diary. PS-2233.

  221. See letter of Stadthauptmann Schmid of Kraków to the Kraków Judenrat,

  May 8, 1940, in Cazeta Zydowska (Kraków), July 23, 1940. Schmid requested the Judenrat to report all cases of wild labor impressments.

  222. Krüger in summary of conference of December 8, 1939, Frank diary, PS-2233.

  223. The demand was brought up again during the conference in which Security

  Police Commander Streckenbach asked for control over the Judenräte. Summary of

  conference of May 30, 1940, Frank diary, PS-2233.

  224. Ibid.

  225. Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer, "Aufgaben und Organisation der Abteilung Arbeit im Generalgouvernement," Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, pt. 5, pp. 67-71.

  226. Dunk, Judenrat, p. 256.

  227. See Czemiaków's entries for November 13, 1939, and May 10 and 24,1940, in

  Hilberg, Staron and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 89, 148, 153.

  251

  CONCENTRATION

  which (in the case of Warsaw) amounted to 60-100 zloty monthly, with

  reductions for “socially active” persons and for hardship cases.“*

  During the summer of 1940 the chief of Main Division Labor in the

  Generalgouvernement,

  Frauendorfer,

  directed

  that

  Jewish

  laborers

  be

  paid 80 percent of the prevailing Polish wages. At a meeting of General-

  gouvemement representatives and district labor officials held under his

  chairmanship, the policy was criticized for allowing the Jews too much

  compensation. Frauendorfer defended the principle on the ground that

  it was essential to maintain the physical stre
ngth (Arbeitskraft) of the

  Jews,but his action was opposed also at the local level. In the Pulawy

  district (Lublin) the army replaced its Jews with Poles,“0 and in Czestochowa

  the

  Stadthauptmann

  asserted

  that

  no

  one

  could

  understand

  why Jewish councils or “Jews as a whole” (die Juden in ihrer Gesamt-

  heit) no longer had the means with which to pay the forced laborers. In

  his opinion this was not the case in Czestochowa. Consequently, he

  assumed that the directive could be “lost” locally, and he had acted

  accordingly.“1

  The columns were the first form of labor utilization. They were

  suitable only for day-to-day emergency work and for some construction projects. As time passed, there grew out of the labor columns a new and more permanent type of forced labor, the labor camps.“*

  Labor camps were set up for the purpose of employing Jews on a

  larger scale in more formidable projects. The first proposal for a large-

  scale project came, significantly, from Heinrich Himmler. In February

  1940,

  he

  suggested

  to

  Commander-in-Chief

  of

  the

  Army

  von

  Brauchitsch the construction of an enormous antitank ditch along the

  newly formed frontiers of the east, facing the Red Army. For the building of this line Himmler dreamed of using all the Polish Jews.“5 228 229 230 231 232 233

  228. Czemiakdw toLeist, May 21, 1940. Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1113. On labor

  exemption payments in Krakbw, L6d t, and Lublin, see Think, Judenrol, pp. 2S0, 252,

  253.

  229. Summary, dated August 9, 1940, of Generalgouvernement conference on Jewish labor held on August 6. Yad Vashem document 06/11.

  230. Report by Kreishauptmann Brandt for August, 1940. September 10,1940, Yad

  Vashem microfilm JM 814.

  231. Report for August 1940 by Stadthauptmann of Czsstochowa (Wendler), September 14, 1940, JM 814.

  232. The labor columns continued in existence even after the ghettos were closed

  off. In several ghettos passes were issued to enable the columns to leave and return daily.

  See article in Krakauer Zeiiung entitled "JOdisches Wolmviertelauch in Kielce.” April 8.

  1941, p. 6. In addition to the labor columns, a handful of individuals were employed in

  installations outside the ghettos. This was known as Kleineinsaii (small-scale labor

  utilization). See memorandum by Militdrbefehlshaberim Generalgouvemement/Chef des