by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
housing
groups. All carpenters were assigned to live in one section, all tailors in
another.2“
Whereas the workshop ghettos forced their inmates into rigid living
patterns, the private enterprise ghettos tossed their victims into an
economic jungle. The Warsaw ghetto, for example, had a formidable
upper class composed of bureaucrats, traders, and speculators. These
privileged groups were large enough to be conspicuous. They frequented nightclubs, ate in expensive restaurants, and rode in man-drawn
rikshas.2“
The
Germans
photographed
them
and
spread
the
news of ghetto prosperity.“5 But there was little prosperity in the Warsaw ghetto. A German newspaperman who visited the ghetto described the situation as follows:
Everything that has an office in this Jew ghetto—and above all a great deal
of police—makes a prosperous impression; whoever can work has something to eat, and whoever can trade manages quite well, but for those who cannot integrate themselves into this process nothing is done.“*
The two ghetto systems were indistinguishable in the type of products they turned out. No manufacture involving secrecy was allowed,“’
whereas labor intensive projects were favored. Typical ghetto production
consequently
consisted
of
the
following:
uniforms,
ammunition
boxes, leather and straw and wooden shoes, metal gadgets and metal
finishing
work,
brushes,
brooms,
baskets,
mattresses,
containers,
toys, and the repair of old furniture and of old clothes.2“ The chief
customers for these goods were the armed forces, the SS and Police
agencies
helping
ethnic
Germans
(Stabshauptamt
and
Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle), the labor service organizations such as the ethnic German
Baudienst
in
the
Generalgouvernement,
and
many
private
firms.
Gradually, however, the army emerged as the most important pur- 263 264 265 266 267 268
263. Krakauer Zeitung, August 26, 1942, p. 5.
264. Bernard Goldstein, The Stars Bear Witness (New York, 1949), p. 91; Mary
Berg, Warsaw Ghetto (New York, 1945), pp. 55, 65, 87, 111.
265. Photographs of rikshas in Krakauer Zeitung, May 18, 1941, p. 5, and in
Donauzeitung (Belgrade), November 22, 1941, p. 8.
266. Carl W. Gilfert, "Ghetto Juden und Ungeziefer gehören zusammen (Ghetto
Jews and Vermin Belong Together]," Donauzeitung (Belgrade), November 22, 1941, p. 8.
267. RUstungsinspektion Generalgouvernement to OKW/Wi Rü/Rü 111 A. covering
July 1, 1940, to December 31, 1941, May 7, 1942, p. 153, Wi/ID 1.2.
268. Krakauer Zeitung, January 23, 1942. p. 5; April 10. 1942, p. 4; April 24, 1942,
p. 5; June 10, 1942, p. 5; July 24, 1942, p. 5. On iA&t ghetto, described by Biebow as
"Europe's greatest tailor workshop" and “Germany’s biggest workshop,” see memorandum by Merkel, March 18, 1941, Wi/ID 1.40; and pt. 2 of report by RUstungsinspektion XXI, covering October I, 1940, to December 31, 1941, pp. 33-34 and Anlage 6, Wi/ID
1.20.
258
POLAND
chaser of ghetto products, crowding out other buyers. The ghettos thus
became an integral part of the war economy, and this development was
to cause considerable difficulty during the deportations. The Germans
came to depend on the output of the Jewish labor force. General*
gouvemeur Frank himself recognized this dependence, for on September 12, 1940, just after he had ordered the creation of the Warsaw ghetto, he added the following remarks to his speech in secret conference:
As for the rest, the Jews in the Generalgouvernement are not always
decrepit creatures [verlotterte Gestalten] but a necessary skilled-labor
component of the total structure of Polish life. . . . We can teach the Poles
neither the energy nor the ability to take the place of the Jews [Wir können
den Polen weder die Tatkraft noch die Fähigkeit beibringen, an Stelle der
Juden zu treten J. That is why we are forced to permit these skilled Jewish
laborers to continue in their work.““
Indeed, the Jews had a powerful motivation to labor diligently. In their
indispensability they saw their chance for survival.
FOOD CONTROLS
The survival of the ghetto population depended, in the first instance,
upon the supply of food and fuel. By decreasing and choking off the
food supply, the Germans were able to turn the ghettos into death
traps. And that is what they did.
With the establishment of the ghettos, Jews could no longer buy
food in the open market. Aside from certain devious purchases on the
black market, smuggling, and food growing in the ghettos—all of which
amounted to very little—the only food supply was purchased by the
Judenrate. The food came in at the same place that manufactured
products went out: at the check points (Umschlagplatze) established
by the respective TVansferstelle, Gettoverwaltung, or municipal administration. The Germans therefore had a very clear view of how much food was shipped into the ghetto. Since food allocations were made in
bulk for weekly or monthly periods, the temptation to scale down the
quantities, which on paper looked formidable, was irresistible. German
food policy in Poland was very simple. As much as could possibly be
looted was sent to Germany. The Poles were to be kept alive. The
Jews, automatically placed at the bottom, were suspended between life
and death. 269
269.
Verbatim remarks by Frank in conference of main division chiefs, September
12. 1942, Frank diary. PS-2233.
259
CONCENTRATION
On October 25, 1940, in Löd2, a number of local officials under the
chairmanship
of
Regierungsvizepräsident
Dr.
Moser
discussed
the
question of supplying the ghetto with food. Dr. Moser pointed out that
the ghetto, “that is, the Jew community," was a most unwelcome institution but a necessary evil. The Jews, most of whom were living a useless life at the expense of the German people, had to be fed; that in
this connection they could not be considered normal consumers in the
framework of the food economy required no comment. The quantities,
Moser continued, would have to be determined by the Gettoverwaltung after consultations with food experts. As for the quality of the food, Moser explained that "preferably the most inferior merchandise”
should be diverted from normal trade channels and delivered to the
ghetto. The prices charged by the food growers would have to be
controlled very closely, for it seemed natural that the price level would
have to be brought into harmony with the quality of the “more or less
dubious merchandise.””0
Translated into statistics, the Moser policy meant that for purposes
of food allocation the Lddi ghetto was considered a prison. Deliveries
were to assure a prison die
t. Actually, in 1941 the food supply fell
below the prison level."1 Table 6-14 shows deliveries for a period of
seven months.
The
statistics
are
psychologically
misleading.
To
be
understood
properly, each figure has to be divided by approximately 150,000,
which gives the monthly ration for the individual. Ninety-eight tons of
meat are thus reduced to less than 'h pounds per individual, 192,520
eggs amount to little more than 1 egg per individual, and 794 tons of
potatoes equal 12 pounds per individual. That is not very much food for
a whole month. Moreover, the statistics do not indicate the quality of
the food. They do not reveal the German policy of shipping to the
ghetto damp, rotten, or frozen potatoes and “dubious” merchandise of
so-called B- and C- quality.
In the Generalgouvernment, too, there was a reluctance to supply
the Jews with food. It seems that for a brief period right after the
establishment of the Warsaw ghetto food deliveries were stopped altogether, and stocks were so low that Frank seriously entertained the thought of disbanding the ghetto as a means of easing the food situa- 270 271
270. Summary of L6di ghetto conference (signed by Palflnger of the Ernährungsund Wirtschaftsseite Cello), October 25, 1940, Dokumenty i materiaty. vol. 3, pp. 241-42. The Ernährungs- und Wirtschaftssielie Getto was later transformed into the Gettoverwaltung.
271. Biebow to Gestapo L6di (attention Kommissar Fuchs), March 4, 1942, ibid.,
pp. 232-35.
240
T A B L E 6-14
THE tQDt GHETTO FOOD SUPPLY (1941, IN METRIC TONS)
January 30-
February 27-
March 27-
May 29-
June 30-
¡urns
Febnuuy 26
March 26
April 30
May 1-28
June 29
A ugust 3
August 4-31
Bread
892
142
Flour
838
1,736
2,438
1,202
1,312
1,560
1,210
Meat
98
126
76
82
104
84
36
Fat
38
49
55
85
70
71
65
Milk (liters)
72,850
69,338
142,947
118,563
187,772
230,856
181,760
Cheese
1
Eggs (pieces)
192,520
190.828
14,000
Fish
15
Potatoes
794
1,596
3,657
916
1,067
346
1,576
Vegetables
700
2,772
3,532
2,324
672
679
3,507
Salt
90
169
132
55
105
198
97
Sugar
48
48
48
48
211
256
229
Coffee mixture
15
35
61
56
19
7
12
Artificial honey
76
36
37
36
35
43
36
Marmalade
1
1
1
Miscellaneous foods
160
171
149
132
186
148
98
Fodder
8
34
10
21
13
17
Hay
3
3
3
5
18
Straw
3
19
9
15
35
36
II
Charcoal
175
28
17
25
10
49
42
Coal
2,826
2,395
997
622
723
871
634
note: Oberbürgermeister Ventzki of LOdi. enclosing report with statistics, to Regierungspräsident Uebelhoer, September 24, 1941. Himmler Files. Folder 94.
CONCENTRATION
lion."3 By May 1941 the army described the situation in the ghetto as
“catastrophic.”
Jews
were
collapsing
from
weakness
in
the
streets.
Their only ration was ll/i pounds of bread per week. Potatoes, for
which the Judenrat had advanced several millions, had not been delivered.
Diseases
were
multiplying
and
mortality
had
tripled
in
two
months.1” Fischer, recognizing the insufficiency of official deliveries,
stated to Bischof that month that under the circumstances the “silent
toleration" of smuggling was necessary,”4 but when Czemiaköw requested Bischof a few weeks later to allow the use of Judenrat funds for the purchase of potatoes and other items on the free (Polish) market, Bischof, hesitating, asked his predecessor Palfinger for an opinion and received the advice that such permission would constitute an “insult to authority.””5 By October, Fischer was sufficiently concerned about starvation in the ghetto to ask for increases in food allocations.
Main Division Chief of Food and Agriculture Naumann turned down
the proposal. He could not possibly ship an additional 10,000 tons of
wheat into the Warsaw ghetto, nor could the meat ration be increased.
However, he thought it might be possible to send some eggs and some
quantities of sugar, fat, and marmalade. Frank thereupon voiced his
opinion that no increases could be granted to Jews. Such a thing was
utterly inconceivable to him.”6
To make matters worse for the Jewish population, there were two
food controls. The first, which was in the hands of the Germans, determined the total supply of food available to the ghetto inhabitants. The second system, which was instituted within the ghetto by the Judenräte, determined how much of the available supply was distributed to individual Jews. From the very beginning, the interior controls were 272 273 274 275 276
272. Summary of Generalgouvernement conference, January 15, 1941, Frank diary,
PS-2233.
273. Kommandantur Warschau (signed von Unruh) to Militärbefehlshaber.
Generalgouvernement, May 20, 1941, Polen 75022/5. The folder was located at the Federal Records Center. Alexandria, Va., after the war.
274. Memorandum by Bischof. May 8. 1941, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112. See
also army report referring to “silently permitted smu
ggling" (den stillschweigend
zugelassenen Schmuggel), Kommandantur Warschau (signed von Unruh) to Militärbefehlshaber in Generalgouvernement, August 21, 1941, Polen 75022/6, T 501, roll 217.
275. Czemiaköw's entry of June 3, 1941, in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds.,
Warsaw Diary, pp. 245-46. Palfinger had served in Lödi before moving to Warsaw, where
he was in charge of the Transferstelle under Schön.
276. Summary of Generalgouvernement conference, October 15,1941, Frank diary,
PS-2223. The ghetto Jews tried to increase the food supply by devious methods of food
smuggling and by the conversion of vacant lots to vegetable patches. Berg, Warsaw
Chetlo, pp. 59-62,86,112, 116, 130-31, 134. Goldstein, The Stars Bear Witness, pp. 75-
78.
262
POLAND
aimed to promote the well-being of some people at the expense of
others. When the food supply is very limited, unequal distribution
means disaster for the unfortunate victims. Inequality was in evidence
everywhere.
Even in such a tightly compartmentalized, totalitarian economy as
that of the L6di ghetto, favoritism, stealing, and corruption were rampant. Originally the L6d2 ghetto had party-controlled soup kitchens.
There were Bund kitchens for socialists, Zionist kitchens for Zionists,
and so forth. This impossible situation was remedied by the “nationalization” of the soup kitchens. But those who worked in the kitchens not only ate their fill but also appropriated food for profit.
Aside from the soup kitchens, the ghetto also had food stores that
were “cooperatives.” In these “cooperatives” a part of each food shipment was distributed at fixed prices, but the rest was sold under the counter. Under such conditions only the rich could eat. The “cooperatives,” too, were consequently nationalized, but those who handled the food
continued
to
enjoy
good
living
conditions.
Finally,
the
L6di
ghetto had its built-in “legalized”
corruption. The ghetto distributed
supplementary rations (so-called talons) to heavy laborers, physicians,
pharmacists,
and
instructors.
But
by
far
the
biggest
supplementary
rations were made available to officials and their families. The weekly
supplements
were
posted
in
store
windows,
where
starving
people
could see what they were deprived of.”7
Early in 1942 the Gestapo in L6di sent a letter to the chief of the
Gettoverwaltung, Biebow, suggesting that the ghetto was receiving too
much food and that such allocations could not be justified. In an angry
response, Biebow pointed to the epidemic and to collapsing workers