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  producing war materiel for the German army, and concluded by asking

  the Gestapo to stop this “time-consuming“ correspondence.”* On April

  19, 1943, Biebow wrote to Oberbürgermeister Ventzki that the food

  supply to the ghetto could no longer guarantee the continuation of

  production. For months the Jews had received no butter, no margarine,

  and no milk. In the soup kitchens, vegetables of B- and C- quality had

  been cooked in water with a little oil. No fat and no potatoes had been

  added to the soup. The total expenditure for food had now dropped to 277 278

  277. This description of the L6di food controls is taken from the article by Bendet

  Hershkovitch, “The Ghetto in Litzmannstadt (Lodz),” VIVO Annual of Jewish Social

  Science, 5 (1950): 86-87, 104-5. Incoming food parcels were consumed by the ghetto

  police. Food smuggling and parcel-post packages were not tolerated, because the Eldest

  of the Jews, Rumkowski. wanted his Jews to depend entirely on his rations. Ibid., p. 96.

  278. Biebow to Gestapo Office L6di (att. Kommissar Fuchs), March 4,1942, Doku-

  meniy i maieriaty, vol. 3, pp. 243-45.

  263

  CONCENTRATION

  30pfennige(12cents)per person per day. No Jewish labor camp and no

  prison had hitherto managed with so little."’

  By the beginning of 1944, the L6di ghetto was obtaining even less.

  Staples arrived irregularly. Along with shipments of flour, some cooking

  oil,

  margarine,

  salt,

  carrots,

  turnips,

  or

  “vegetable

  salad,"

  the

  ghetto might receive some shoe polish and coffee mixture, but no

  potatoes. In stark language the official Jewish chronicler of the council

  noted on January 12, 1944: “The ghetto is hungry.” During the following two weeks the situation became worse. The vegetable salad was not delivered, the gas was shut off in the council’s kitchens, and the

  curfew was changed from the evening to the daytime hours, forcing

  people to shop after work at night."0

  In the free economy of the Warsaw ghetto, the amount of food

  people ate depended on the money they could spend. Czemiak6w

  estimated in December 1941 that the ghetto had about 10,000 inhabitants with capital, 250,000 who could .support themselves, and 150,000

  who were destitute."1 Only “capitalists" could afford to sustain themselves on a steady diet of smuggled foods at the following black market prices (figures listed are price per pound in June I941):ai

  Potatoes.................... ____ 3 zloty

  Rye bread................. ......... 8 zloty

  Horse meat................------- 9 zloty

  Groats................................ 11 zloty

  Com bread......................... 13 zloty

  Beans...................... .......... 14 zloty

  Sugar................................. 16 zloty

  Lard........................ .......... 35 zloty

  Employed groups and those with some savings could buy the

  rationed products: bread, sugar, and typical ghetto vegetables such as

  potatoes, carrots, and turnips. At the beginning of 1942, the basic 279 280 * 282

  279. Biebow to Ventzki, April 19, 1943, ibid., pp. 245-48. When 1,000 eggs were

  delivered at the end of 1942, the anonymous chroniclers of the Jewish Council referred to

  them as a food that had become “unknown." Entry of December 17, 1942, in Danuta

  Dabrowska and Lucjan Dobroszycki, eds., Kronika Celia Lddzkiego (L6dt, 1966), vol.

  2, pp. 588-89.

  280. Entries for January 12, 14, 15, and 16, and February 26, 1944. Typewritten

  manuscript through the courtesy of Dr. Dobroszycki.

  28t. Czemiakbw's entry of December 6, 1941. in Hilberg, Staron. and Kermisz,

  eds., Warsaw Diary, p. 305.

  282.

  From Isaiah Trunk, “Epidemics in the Warsaw Ghetto," YIVO Annual of

  Jewish Social Science 8 (1953): 94. Think's statistics are taken from Ringelblum Archives No. 1193; other black-market prices in Berg. Warsaw Gheito, pp. 59-60,86, 116, 130-31.

  264

  POLAND

  individual allotment of bread was about 4'/2 pounds (2 kilograms) a

  month. For laborers in armament and important export firms, and for

  council employees and other usefully occupied persons, in all 31,000,

  the bread ration was doubled, and for the two thousand men of the

  Order Service it was quintupled.“5 For one tolerably well situated family subsisting on rationed and (for higher prices) black market food, a monthly budget around the end of 1941 consisted of the following:55*

  Income (Actual)

  Expenses (Actual)

  Father’s salary

  235 zloty

  Rent

  70 zloty

  Son's salary

  120 zloty

  Bread

  328 zloty

  Public assistance

  —

  Potatoes

  115 zloty

  Side income

  80 zloty

  Fats

  56 zloty

  435 zloty

  Allotments

  80 zloty

  Fees

  11 zloty

  Electricity, candles

  28 zloty

  Fuel

  65 zloty

  Drugs

  45 zloty

  Soap

  9 zloty

  Miscellaneous

  3 zloty

  810 zloty

  That month this particular family balanced its budget by selling a

  clothes closet, its last dispensable item of furniture, for 400 zloty.

  The poorest 150,000 persons, though exempted from paying the

  bread tax,“5 could barely afford the meager allotments. For indigents,

  refugees, and poverty stricken children, there were soup kitchens that

  in January 1942 handed out fewer than 70,000 daily midday meals.556

  The food pyramid in the Warsaw ghetto was in fact an array of the

  population in the order of their vulnerability to debilitation and death.

  Auerswald himself recognized the implications of this inequality when

  he observed in an official report that allotted rations were grossly

  insufficient (bei weitem nicht ausreichend) and that smuggled food was

  reaching

  only

  the

  Jews

  with

  means.“’

  This

  state

  of

  affairs

  was

  confirmed in a study of food consumption made by Jewish ghetto doctors at the end of 1941. At that time council employees averaged 1,665

  calories per day; artisans 1,407, shopworkers 1,225, and the “general 283 284 285 286 287

  283. Report by Czemiakiw for March 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Akten

  Auerswald, Polen 36$e. pp. $88-603.

  284. From the diary of Stanistaw Rozycki. in Faschismus-Geiro-Massenmord,

  pp. 152-56.

  285. Entry by Czemiakdw, January 6, 1942, in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds.,

  Warsaw Diary, p. 312.

  286. Report by Czemiak6w for January 1942, Polen 365e. pp. 546-59.

  287. Auerswaid's report of September 26, 1941, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 1112.

  265

  CONCENTRATION

  population” 1,125.“* Beggars and refugees might have been able to

  subsist

  for

  several

  months

  on

  ghetto

&nb
sp; soup

  amounting

  to

  600-800

  calories.“9 In Czemiakdw’s words, written as early as May 8, 1941:

  “Children starving to death.””0

  SICKNESS AND DEATH IN THE GHETTOS

  The incarceration of the Jews was an act of total spoliation. The enfeebled ghetto Jews, without significant capital or valuables, had been rendered helpless. The German agencies continued to take what they

  could—furs,

  bed

  sheets,

  musical

  instruments—and

  they

  encouraged

  the creation of a Jewish work force that might produce new values for

  German enrichment. They had to make some shipments of their own,

  however, if only to maintain the ghetto system and to keep alive its

  laborers. In the main, they regarded their deliveries of food, coal, or

  soap as a sacrifice, and they thought about these supplies often enough

  to conjure up an image of themselves not as willing spoliators of the

  Jewish community but as unwilling contributors to its welfare. They

  did not hesitate to reduce the contribution to levels clearly below the

  bare essentials, and they made these decisions without inquiring into

  the consequences. Soon enough the effects were clearly visible.

  Disease was one manifestation of the constrictions. On October 18,

  1941, the director of Subdivision Health in the Radom district. Dr.

  Waisenegger, noted that typhus (Fleckfieber) was virtually confined to

  the Jews. The reasons, he said, were insufficient coal and soap, excessive room density resulting in the multiplication of lice, and lack of food lowering resistance to disease in toto.a' In the Warthegau the

  summer epidemics of 1941 took on such proportions that Bürgermeister and Landräte clamored for the dissolution of the ghettos and the transfer of 100,000 inmates to the overcrowded L6di ghetto. The chief

  of the Gettoverwaltung in L6di, Biebow, vigorously opposed this suggestion and warned that the “frivolous” transfer of such masses of people into his ghetto would be devastating.2,1 On July 24, 1941, Regierungspräsident Uebelhoer prohibited the transfer of any sick Jews 288 289 290 291 292

  288. Think, Judenrat, pp. 356, 382; Ysrael Gutman, The Jews of Worstin' (Bloomington, Ind.. 1982), p. 436.

  289. Leonard TUshnet, Die Uses of Adversity (New York, 1966). p. 62 ff. The

  author was an American physician, and his book is a study of medical aspects of the

  Warsaw ghetto.

  290. Hilberg, Staron. and Kermisz. eds.. Warsaw Diary, p. 232.

  291. Waisenegger’s remarks In Generalgouvernement conference of October 18,

  1941, in Präg and Jacobmeyer, eds., Diensttagebuch, pp. 432-34.

  292. Memorandum by Biebow, June 3, 1941, Dokumenry i malertaty, vol. 3, p. 184.

  266

  POLAND

  from the small Warthegau ghettos into L6d£.”’ On August 16, 1941,

  Uebelhoer ordered drastic measures in the stricken Warthegau ghettos:

  the victims of the epidemic were to be completely isolated; entire

  houses were to be evacuated and filled with sick Jews.254

  The situation in the Warsaw ghetto also deteriorated. The Warsaw

  epidemics started in the synagogues and other institutional buildings,

  which housed thousands of homeless people."5 During the winter of

  1941-42, the sewage pipes froze. The toilets could no longer be used,

  and human excrement was dumped with garbage into the streets.”6 To

  combat the typhus epidemic the Warsaw Judenrat organized disinfection brigades, subjected people to “steaming action” (parowka); set up quarantine

  stations, hospitalized serious cases, and as a last resort

  instituted “house blockades," imprisoning in their homes the sick and

  the healthy alike.”7 The one useful article, serum, was almost unavailable. A single tube of antityphus medicine cost several thousand zloty.”*

  Although typhus was the ghetto disease par excellence, it was not

  the only one. A L6dl ghetto chronicler, writing early in 1944, saw

  disease as unending: intestinal typhus in the summer, tuberculosis in

  the fall, influenza in the winter. His “superficial statistic”: about forty

  percent of the ghetto was ill.1”

  The second rising curve in the ghettos was that of mortality. As

  ghetto hunger raged unchecked, a primitive struggle for survival began.

  On March 21, 1942, the Propaganda Division of the Warsaw district

  reported laconically:

  The death figure in the ghetto still hovers around 5,000 per month. A

  few days ago, the first case of hunger cannibalism was recorded. In a

  Jewish family the man and his three children died within a few days. From

  the flesh of the child who died last—a twelve-year-old boy—the mother

  ate a piece. To be sure, this could not save her either, and she herself died

  two days later.'06

  293. Dr. Marder (Office of the Oberbürgermeister) to Gettoverwaltung. July 26,

  1941. ibid-, p. 186.

  294. Uebelhoer to Landräte, Oberbürgermeister in Kalisz, and Polizeipräsident in

  L6dl, August 16, 1941, ibid., p. 187.

  295. Goldstein, The Start Bear Witness, p. 73.

  296. Berg, Warsaw Ghetto, p. 117.

  297. Trunk, "Epidemics in the Warsaw Ghetto,” pp. 107-12. In June 1941 the number of blockaded houses in the ghetto was 179. Think, citing Ringelblum Archives No.

  223, p. 107.

  298. Berg, Warsaw Ghetto, p. 85.

  299. Entry of January 13, 1944. Manuscript in the collection of Dr. Dobroszycki.

  300. Generalgouvemement/Main Division Propaganda consolidated weekly reports

  by the district propaganda divisions for March 1942 (marked "Top Secret—to be destroyed immediately"), report by the Warsaw Division, March 21, 1942, Occ E 2-2. See also reports by a survivor and the Polish underground in Philip Friedman, ed.. Martyrs

  and Fighters (New York, 1954), pp. 59,62-63.

  267

  CONCENTRATION

  The ghetto Jews were fighting for life with their last ounce of

  strength. Hungry beggars snatched food from the hands of shoppers.“1

  Yet, after persistent undernourishment, the victim was no longer able

  to digest his bread normally. His heart, kidneys, liver, and spleen

  shrank in size, his weight dropped, and his skin withered. “Active,

  busy, energetic people,” wrote a ghetto physician, “are changed into

  apathetic, sleepy beings, always in bed, hardly able to get up to eat or

  go to the toilet. Passage from life to death is slow and gradual, like

  death from physiological old age. There is nothing violent, no dyspnea,

  no pain, no obvious changes in breathing or circulation. Vital functions

  subside simultaneously. Pulse rate and respiratory rate get slower and

  it becomes more and more difficult to reach the patient’s awareness,

  until life is gone. People fall asleep in bed or on the street and are dead

  in the morning. They die during physical effort, such as searching for

  food, and sometimes even with a piece of bread in their hands.”5®

  Indeed, a common sight in the ghetto was the corpses lying on the

  sidewalk, covered with newspapers, pending the arrival of cemetery

  carts.“5

  The

  bodies,

  said

  Gouverneur

  Fischer

  to

  Czerniak6w,

  were

  creating a bad impression.“*

  The Je
wish community of Poland was dying. In the last prewar

  year, 1938, the monthly average death rate of L6d£ was 0.09 percent. In

  1941, the rate jumped to 0.63 percent, and during the first six months

  of 1942 it was 1.49.5,5 The same pattern, compressed into a single year,

  may be noted for the Warsaw ghetto, where the monthly death rate

  during the first half of 1941 was 0.63, and in the second half 1.47.5“ In

  their rise to this plateau, the two cities were almost alike, even though

  L6di was a hermetically closed ghetto, which had its own cun-ency and

  in which the black market was essentially the product of internal barter, whereas Warsaw was engaged in extensive smuggling “quietly tol- 301 302 303 304 305 306

  301. Friedman. Martyrs and Fighters, pp. 56-57.

  302. The quote is from Dr. Julian Fliederbaum, “Clinical Aspects of Hunger Disease in Adults." in Myron Winlck, ed., Hunger Disease (New York, 1979), pp. 11-36, at p. 36. Additional descriptions by other ghetto physicians in Warsaw during 1942 are

  contained in the same volume.

  303. Goldstein, The Stars Bear Witness, p. 74.

  304. Czemiakdw's entry of May 21, 1941, in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds.,

  Warsaw Diary, p. 239.

  305. Statistics from L6di Ghetto Collection, No. 58, p. 23.

  306. Monthly statistics for 1941 in report by Czemiakdw to Auerswald, February

  12. 1942, in Zentraie Stelle Ludwigsburg, Akten Auerswald, Polen 365e. pp. 560-71, at

  p. 563. The annual death rate was 10.44 percent. During January-June 1942, before the

  onset of deportations, the monthly average was 1.2 percent. Data for that period, in

  absolute figures per month only, in Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord. p. 138.

  POLAND

  erated” by the Germans.*” The birthrates in both cities were extremely

  low: Lt5d2 had one birth for every twenty deaths,” while in Warsaw at

  the beginning of 1942 the ratio was 1:45.” The implication of these

  figures is quite clear. A population with a net loss of one percent a

  month shrinks to less than five percent of its original size in just

  twenty-four years.

  In absolute figures the long lasting Lddi ghetto, with a cumulative

  population (including new arrivals and births) of about 200,000, had

  more than 45,000 dead.510 The Warsaw Ghetto, with around 470,000

  inhabitants over the period from the end of 1940 to the end of the mass

  deportations in September 1942, buried 83,000 people.3" The two ghettos contained less than a fourth of the Polish Jews, and although there were communities with attrition rates lower than those of L6dt and

 

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