Raul Hilberg
Page 47
comprised Offices IV and V (Gestapo and Kripo), while the Security
3. Heydrich, “Aufgaben und Aufbau der Sicherheitspolizei im Dritten Reich." in
Hans Pfundtner, ed„ Dr. Wilhelm Frick und sein Ministerium (Munich, 1937), p. 152.
4. Dr. Ludwig Münz, Führer durch die Behörden und Organisationen (Berlin.
1939), p. 95. For budgetary purposes the new Hauptamt was put under the Interior
Ministry.
5. Order by Himmler, September 27, 1939, L-361.
278
T A B L E 7 - 2
THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY
Newly Invaded Areas
Occupied Territories
Types of
Wehnnachtbefehls- Oberbefehls-
Militärbefehls- Befehlshaber
Kommandeur
territorial
haber(MB)
rückwärtiges
rückwärtiges
command
Befehlshaber
Heeresgebiet
Armeegebiet
of specified
(Korück)
Deutscher
General
in specified
Subordinated
Oberbefehlshader
ChefOKW
Oberbefehls
Oberbefehls
Army Group
des
(Keitel)
haber
haber
Commander
Commander
Commander
Heeres/Befehls-
des Heeres
des Heeres
haber
(Brauchitsch,
des Ersatz.·
succeeded by
a territorial
keeres
Hitler)
Oberbefehls
("Commander-
haber
in-Chief
of the
Army/the
Commander
Commander
of the
Replace-
Fromm)
note: The Wehrkreisbefehlshaber was the commander of an army district (designated by roman numeral). The WB, OR, or MB was the commander of a specified territory (such as the Ukraine, the Southeast, the Generalgouvemement). Sometimes a territorial command and a unit command (such as the OB Southeast and Commander of Army Group E) were united in the same person.
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
T A B L E 7-3
FORMATION OF THE RSHA
Slate
Party
Gestapo
Hauptamt
Sicherheitspolizei
Sicherheitshauptamt
(Main Office Security Police)
(Security Main Office)
/
Reichssicherheitshauptamt—RSHA
(Reich Security Main Office)
Service functioned in Offices III (Inland) and VI (Foreign).6 7 Heydrich
himself henceforth carried the title Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des
SD, abbreviated Chef SP und SD.
The RSHA had a vast regional network, including three types of
organization: one in the Reich and incorporated areas, another in occupied territories, a third in countries undergoing invasion. This network is portrayed in Table 7-5. It will be noted that outside the Reich the Security Police and SD were completely centralized, down to the
local (or unit) level. For the moment, however, we shall be concerned
only with the machinery in the newly invaded areas: the so-called
Einsatzgruppen. These groups were the first mobile killing units.’
The context for deploying the Einsatzgruppen was operation “Barbarossa”—the invasion of the USSR. A written notation of the mission appeared
in
the
war
diary
of
the
OKW’s
Wehrmachtfiihrungsstab
(WFSt) on March 3, 1941, at a time when invasion plans were already
far advanced. The topic of the entry was a draft directive to troop
commanders, which had been prepared by Warlimont’s office Landesverteidigung in the WFSt, and which had been submitted by WFSt 6. Office IV wad designated "Search for and Combat against Enemies" ICegner-Erforschung und Bekämpfung). Office V was “Combatting of Crime” (Verbrechensbekämpfung). Inland intelligence (Office III) styled itself "German Life Areas”
(Deutsche Lebensgebiete).
7. For a complete history of the Einsatzgruppen, see Helmut Krausnick and Hans-
Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges (Stuttgart, 1981). Part 1 (pp.
12-279), by Krausnick, deals with the development and operations of the Einsatzgruppen
as a whole. Part 2 (pp. 279-643), by Wilhelm, is a study of Einsatzgruppe A.
PREPARATIONS
Chief Jodi to Hitler for approval. The war diary contains Jodi’s enclosure of Hitler's comments, including a philosophical point defining the coming battle as a confrontation of two world views, and several
specific statements, in one of which Hitler declared that the “Jewish-
Bolshevik
intelligentsia
[Intelligenz]”
would
have
to
be
“eliminated
[beseitigt].” According to Hitler, these tasks were so difficult that they
could not be entrusted to the army. The war diary went on with Jodi’s
instructions to Warlimont for revising the draft in conformity with
Hitler’s
"guidelines.”
One
question
to
be
explored
with
the
Reichsfiihrer-SS, said Jodi, was the introduction of SS and Police organs in the army's operational area. Jodi felt that such a move was needed to assure that Bolshevik chieftains and commissars be “rendered harmless” without delay. In conclusion, Warlimont was told that he could contact the OKH about the revisions, and that he was to
submit a new draft for signature by Keitel on March 13, 1941.*
On the specified date, the revised directive was signed by Keitel.
The decisive paragraph was a statement informing the troop commanders that the Führer had charged the Reichsfiihrer-SS with carrying out special tasks in the operational area of the army. Within the framework of these tasks, which were the product of a battle to the
finish
between
two
opposing
political
systems,
the
Reichsfuhrer-SS
would act independently and on his own responsibility. He was going
to make sure that military operations would not be disturbed by the
implementation of his task. Details would be worked out directly between the OKH and the Reichsführer-SS. At the start of operations, the border of the USSR would be closed to all nonmilitary traffic,
except for police organs dispatched by the Reichsführer-SS pursuant to
directive of the Führer. Quarters and supplies for these organs were to
be regulated by OKH/GenQu (High Command of the Army/General
Quartermaster—Wagner).’ 8 9
8. Kriegslagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht fWehrmachtführungsslab)
1940-1945, ed. Percy Schramm and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt am Main, 1965),
vol. 1. pp. 340-42.
9. Directive by OKW/L (signed Keitel), March 13.1941, NOKW-2302. See also the
detailed account by Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht
1959-1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1962), pp. 166-87; and Waiiimont’s interrogation of October 25, 1962, by prosecution of Landgericht Munich II, Case Wolff, 10a Js 39/60, Z-Prot II/vol. 3, pp. 842-47, Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwalt
ungen. Ludwigsburg.
The use of mobile units as such was not unprecedented. See HSluf. Schellenberg to Obf.
Jost, September 13, 1938, USSR-509, on committing two Einsatzstäbe to Czechoslovakia. Einsatzgruppen appeared in Poland in 1939, and small Security Police detachments were dispatched to the west in 1940. According to Streckenbach, Einsatzgruppen were
planned for England, and two Kommandos were deployed in the Balkan campaign.
Interrogation of Bruno Streckenbach, November 13, 1962, Case Wolff, Z-Prot. II/vol. 3,
pp.977-87.
T A B L E 7 - 4
ORGANIZATION OF THE RSHA
1941
1943
Chief of SP and SD
OGruf. Heydrich
OGruf. Dr. Kaltenbrunner
Attache Group
Stubaf. Dr. Plôtz
1.
Personnel
Staf. Streckenbach
I Personnel 4t Organization
Bgf. Schulz
II. Organization and Law
Staf. Dr. Neckmann
II Administration & Finance
Staf. Prietzel
IIA Organization and Law
Stubaf. ORR. Dr. Bilfinger
IIA I Organization
HStuf. RcgAss. Dr. Schweder
IIA 2 Legislation
Stubaf. RR. Dr. Neifeind
IIA 3 Indemnification
Stubaf. RR. Suhr
II A 4 Reich Defense
Stubaf. RR. Renken
IIA 3 Confiscations
Stubaf. RR. Richter
II B Passports
Ministerialrat Krause
IV F
MinRat Krause
IIC a Budget SP
Staf. MinRat Dr. Siegen
II Cb Budget SD
OStubaf. Bracke
IIA Finance
OStubaf. ORR. Krekiow
II D Technical Matters
OStubaf. Rauff
IIC
OStubaf. ORR. Hafte
III. SD-Inland
Staf. Ohlendorf
III A Legal Practice
OStubaf. Dr. Gengenbach
Deputizing:
OStubaf. ORR. Neifeind
III
B Ethnos (Volksluml
Staf. Dr. Ehlich
IIIC Culture
Stubaf. Dr. Spengler
III D Economy
Stubaf. Seibert
IV. Gestapo
Gruf. Müller
Deputy for Border Police
Staf. Krichbaum
OStubaf. ORR. Huppenkothen
IV A Enemies
Ostubaf. ORR. Panzinger
IV
A I Communism
Stubaf. KD. Vogt
Stubaf. KD. Lindow
IV A 2 Sabotage
HStuf. KK. Kopkow
IV
A 3 Liberalism
Stubaf. KD. Litzenbei
IV A 4 Assassinations
Stubaf. KD. Schulz
IV B Sects
Stubaf. Hart!
IV B 1 Catholicism
Stubaf. RR. Roth
IV B 2 Protestantism
Stubaf. RR. Roth
IV B 3 Freemasonry
IV B 4 Evacuations & Jews
OStubaf. Eichmann
IV C Card Files
OStubaf. ORR. Dr. Rs
IVD Spheres of Influence
OStubaf. Dr. Weinmai
IV E Counterintelligence
Stubaf. RR. Schellenb
IV EI Treason
HStuf. KR. Lindow
V.
Kripo
Bgf. Nebe
V A Policy
Staf. ORR. KR. Went
V B Crimes (Eiiaalz)
RR. KR. Galzow
V C Identification
ORR. KR. Berger
V D Criminal Institute
Stubaf. ORR. KR. He
VI.
SD-Forelgn
Bgf. Jost
VIA General
OStubaf. Filbert
VIB Gennan-ItaUan sphere
vacant
VID West
vacant
VIE Investigalroii
Stubaf. Dt Knocben
VIF Technical Mat
OStubaf. Raaff
VU. Ideology
Staf. Dr. Sx
VU B Evaluation
Jews
vacant
note: Organization chart of the RSHA dating from 1941..
the war. Panzmger (IV-A) took over the Kripo. Organization cli
Deputizing:
Stubaf. Roth
Stubaf. RR. Hahnenbmch
OStubaf. Wandesleben
ng
Deputizing:
OStubaf. ORR. KR. Dr. Bemdorff
in
Staf. RD. Dr. Rang
erg
OStubaf. ORR. Huppenkothen
Stubaf. ORR. Renken
Stubaf. ORR. KR. Lobbes
RR. KR. Schulze
Obf. ORR. Schellenberg
Stubaf. RR. Herbert Muller
OStubaf. Steimle
OStubaf. ORR. Dr. Graf
Stubaf. RR. Dr. Raeflgen
Stubaf. RR. Dr. Hammer
Stubaf. Domer
IV Wi Economy
HStuf. Dr. Krallert
IV S Special
Stubaf. Skorzeny
OStubaf. Dr. Dittel
Deputizing:
Stubaf. Ehlers
HStuf. Ballensiefen
L-185. Organization chart of the RSHA, October 1,1943, L-219. Before the end of
iart of the Reich government in 194S, certified by Frick, PS-2903.
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Haider, Chief of the OKH, had been informed of Himmler’s “special task [ Sonderauftrag]” as early as March 5, and when the OKW
directive was issued eight days later, he made a cryptic notation of a
“Discussion Wagner-Heydrich: police questions, border customs.”10
The
circuitous
Hitler-Jodl-Warlimont-Halder-Wagner-Heydrich
chain of communications was certainly not the only one. Shorter and
more direct was the route from Hitler to Himmler and from Himmler to
Heydrich, but there is no record of instructions or “guidelines” passed
through this channel during the first two weeks of March.
The army’s correspondence goes on. It includes a draft of an agreement
resulting
from
the
Wagner-Heydrich
negotiations.
Dated
March
26, 1941, the Army-RSHA accord outlined the terms under which the
Einsatzgruppen could operate in the occupied USSR. The crucial sentence in the draft provided that “within the framework of their instructions and
upon
their
own
responsibility,
the
Sonderkommandos
are
entitled to carry out executive measures against the civilian population
[Die Sonderkommandos sind berechtigt, im Rahmen ihres Auftrages in
eigener
Verantwortung
gegenüber
der
Zivilbevölkerung
Exekutivmassnahmen zu treffen]." The two agencies also agreed that the mobile
units could move in army group rear areas and in army rear areas. It
was made clear that the Einsatzgruppen were to be administratively
subordinated to the military command but that the RSHA was to retain
functional control over them. The armies were to control the movements of the mobile units. The military was to furnish the Einsatzgruppen with
quarters,
gasoline,
food
rations,
and,
insofar
as
necessary, radio communications
. On the other hand, the killing units
were to receive “functional directives” (fachliche WeisungenI from the
Chief of the Security Police and SD (Heydrich) in this way:
Commander in Chief
of the Army
(von Brauchitsch)
territorial
functional
RSHA·
Einsatzgruppen
The relations of the Einsatzgruppen with the army’s Secret Field Police
(Geheime Feldpolizei, or GFP) were to be based on a strict separation
of jurisdictions. Any matter affecting the security of the troops was to
be handled exclusively by the Secret Field Police, but the two services
were
to
cooperate
by
prompt
exchange
of
information,
the
Einsatzgruppen to report to the GFP on all matters of concern to it, and,
10. Haider, Kriegstagebuch, ed. Jacobsen, vol. 2, pp. 303, 311.
284
T A B L E 7 - 5
THE REGIONAL MACHINERY OF THE RSHA
Reich
Occupied Territories
I/eroded Areas
(Mobil* Unía)
Inspekteure SP und SD
Befehlshaber SP und SD Einsatzgruppen
(IdS)
(BdSI
STAPOUeiOslellen
KJUPOUeiiUiellen
SDileiltabschniiie
Kommandeure SP und SD Einsatzkommandos
(Gestapo
(Kripo directorates
(SD directorates
(KdS)
directorates
and offices)
and sectors)
Gestapo offices
in small cities)
Aussenslellen der
(Haupt)aussensielle
Sonderkommandos
STAPO
KRIPO dtr
des SD
SP und des SD
(Field offices of
(Field offices of
(Main field offices
(Field offices of
the Gestapo)
the Kripo)
and field offices
the SP and SD)
of the SD)
■ : Based on affidavits by Hóttl and Ohlendorf, October 28,1945, PS-2364.
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
conversely, the GFP to turn over to the Einsatzgruppen all information
pertaining to their sphere of competence (Aufgabenbereich)."
The final discussions between the army and the RSHA were carried out in May 1941. At first the negotiators were Generalquartiermeister Wagner and Gestapo chief Müller. The two could come to no
final agreement. At the request of Wagner, Müller was therefore replaced
by
a
subordinate,
SS-Sturmbannführer
Regiemngsrat
Schellenberg, then chief of IV E. Schellenberg, who was chosen because of his
experience in matters of protocol, drew up the final terms. They differed from the earlier draft in only one important respect. The Einsatzgruppen were to be permitted to operate not only in army group rear areas and army rear areas but also in the corps areas right on the