Raul Hilberg
Page 49
rough approximations based on 1926 census data in Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum (Essen, 1939). pp. 716-18.
3. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union, p. 16.
4. Arthur Ruppin, Soziologie der Juden (Berlin. 1930). vol. 1, pp. 348, 391, 398,
401.
5. Data in Seraphim, Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum, pp. 716-18.
291
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Jewish Population
(percentage of
total population
City and Census Year
in parentheses)
Odessa (1926)
153,200
(36.4)
Kiev (1926)
140,200
(27.3)
Moscow (1926)
131,200
( 6.5)
Lw6w (Lvov] (1931)
99,600
(31.9)
Leningrad (1926)
84,400
( 5.3)
Dnepropetrovsk (1926)
83,900
(36.0)
Kharkov (1926)
81,100
(19.4)
Chi§in£u [Kishinev] (1925)
80,000
(60.2)
Wilno [Vilnius, Vilna] (1931)
55,000
(28.2)
Minsk (1926)
53,700
(40.8)
Cem4u(i [Chernovtsy] (1919)
43,700
(47.7)
Riga (1930)
43,500
( 8.9)
Rostov (1926)
40,000
(13.2)
Bialystok (1931)
39,200
(43.0)
Gomel (1926)
37,700
(43.6)
Vitebsk (1926)
37,100
(37.6)
Kirovograd (1920)
31,800
(41.2)
Nikolaev (1923)
31,000
(28.5)
Kremenchug (1923)
29,400
(53.5)
Zhitomir (1923)
28,800
(42.2)
Berdichev (1923)
28,400
(65.1)
Kherson (1920)
27,600
(37.0)
Kaunas [Kovno] (1934)
27,200
(26.1)
Uman (1920)
25,300
(57.2)
Stanislawdw [Stanislav] (1931)
24,800
(51.0)
R6wne [Rovno] (1931)
22,700
(56.0)
Poltava (1920)
21,800
(28.4)
Bobniysk (1923)
21,600
(39.7)
BrzeSiS [Brest-Litovsk] (1931)
21,400
(44.2)
Grodno (1931)
21,200
(43.0)
Pirisk (1931)
20,300
(63.6)
Vinnitsa (1923)
20,200
(39.2)
Tighina (1910)
20,000
(34.6)
Luck [Lutsk] (1931)
17,400
(48.9)
PrzemySl (1931)
17,300
(34.0)
STRATEGY
The geographic distribution of Soviet Jewry determined to a large extent the basic strategy of the mobile killing units. To reach as many cities as fast as possible, the Einsatzgruppen moved closely on the
heels of the advancing armies, trapping the large Jewish population
292
THE FIRST SWEEP
centers before the victims had a chance to discover their fate. (It was
for this reason that the RSHA had insisted on the right to send its
mobile units to the front lines.) In accordance with the agreement,
units of Einsatzgruppe A entered the cities of Kaunas, Liepäja, Jel-
gava, Riga, Tartu, Tallinn, and the larger suburbs of Leningrad with
advance units of the army.6 Three cars of Einsatzgruppe C followed the
first tanks into Zhitomir.1 Kommando 4a of the same Einsatzgruppe
was in Kiev on September 19, the day that city fell.* Members of
Einsatzgruppe D moved into Hotin while the Russians were still defending the town.’
Such front-line movements did entail some difficulties. Occasionally
the
Einsatzgruppen
found
themselves
in
the
middle
of
heavy
fighting. Einsatzkommando 12, moving on the coastline east of Odessa
to perform mass shootings of Jews, was surprised by a Soviet landing
party of 2,500 men and fled hurriedly under fire.1’ Sometimes an army
commander took advantage of the presence of the mobile killing units
to order them to clear out an area infested by partisans or snipers."
Only in rare cases, however, did an army order direct the suspension of
a killing operation because of the front-line situation.’2 On the whole,
the Einsatzgruppen were limited in their operations only by their own
size in relation to the ground they had to cover.
The Einsatzgruppen did not move as compact units. The Kommandos generally detached themselves from the group staffs and operated independently. Often the Kommandos themselves split up into advance
detachments (Vorkommandos), keeping pace with the troops and platoon-size working parties (Teilkommandos) that penetrated into remote districts off the main roads.
The relative thoroughness of the killings was a function of the
6. Summary report by Einsatzgruppe A to October 15, 1941, L-180. The report,
with annexes of various dates, is well over 100 pages long. Although forty copies were
prepared, it was evidently written for the RSHA. It is generally referred to as the first
Stahlecker report, to distinguish it from a subsequent summary.
7. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,
1941. NO-3157.
8. RHSA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 97 (48 copies). September 28,
1941. NO-3145.
9. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 19 (32 copies), July II. 1941, NO-
2934.
10. 11th Army AO to l Ith Army Ic. September 22,1941. NOKW-1525.
11. 11th Army Ic/AO (Abwehr 111), signed by Chief of Staff Wohler, to Einsatzgruppe D, August 8, 1941, NOKW-3453. The struggle against partisans “is a job for the Security Ftolice." Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941. L-180.
12. War Diary, 17th Army/Operations. December 14,1941, NOKW-3350. The order
read: “Upon order of the chief of staff, Jewish Actions [Judenaklionen] in Artemovsk
will be postponed, pending a clarification of the front-line situation." The commander of
the 17th Army was Generaloberst Hermann Hoth. Einsatzgruppe C operated in the area.
293
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
density of Jewish settlement and the speed of the German advance.
Several districts, such as Biatystok, Galicia, and Bessarabia, were covered rather rapidly and sporadically. In those areas many Jews were subsequently deported to camps. In the Baltic region, on the other
hand, detachments of Einsatzgruppe A stayed behind to move back
and forth for more extensive killing operations. A summary report of
Einsatzkommando 3 in Lithuania reveals a series of such repetitive
movements. The Kommando covered a large part of the Lithuanian
area, with salients in Dvinsk (Daugavpils), Latvia, and near Minsk in
White Russia. Its report, dated December 1,1941, contains 112
entries
of shootings. One or another entry refers to several adjacent localities
or several consecutive days. The number of place names is seventy-
one, and in fourteen of these communities the Kommando struck more
than once. Thus the towns of Babtai, Kedainiai, Jonava, and RokiSkis
were raided twice; VandZiogala, Utena, Alytus, and Dvinsk, at least
three
times;
RaSeiniai
and
Ukmerge,
four;
Marijampole,
five;
Paneveiys, six; Kovno (Kaunas), thirteen; and Vilna (Vilnius), fifteen
times. The interval between raids in these cities ranged from a fraction
of a day to forty-two days, and the median pause was a week. Some of
the major massacres occurred after the third, fourth, or fifth round.1’
The Einsatzkommandos that moved with the armies farther to the
east encountered fewer and fewer Jews. The victims were thinning out
for two reasons. The first was geographic distribution. By October-
November 1941, the largest concentrations of Jews had already been
left behind. In the eastern Ukraine and beyond the White Russian areas
around
Smolensk,
the
Jewish
communities
were
smaller
and
more
widely dispersed. The second reason was the decreasing percentage of
Jews who stayed behind. With increasing distance from the starting
line, the Soviet evacuation of factory and agricultural workers gained
momentum. Many Jews were evacuated, and many others fled on their
own. On September 12, 1941, Einsatzgruppe C reported that “across
the lines, rumors appear to have circulated among the Jews about the 13 * 15
13. Report by Staf. Jäger, December I, 1941, Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen, Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, film 3, pp. 27-38. To cover Lithuania in this manner, Jäger had organized a raiding party
Ostuf. Hamann. The raiding party was dispatched almost daily from Kaunas to outlying
points, where local Lithuanians assisted in roundups and shootings. In neighboring Latvia, Einsatzkommando 2 was also held behind the lines. Up to the end of October 1941, its major killings took place at the coast (Liepäja and Riga), the center (Jelgava), and the
Lithuanian region around Siauliai (Shavli, or Schaulen). Stahlecker Report to October
15, 1941, L-180. Einsatzkommando 2 was augmented by a Latvian Sonderkommando of
more than one hundred men (eventually two companies of three platoons each) under a
Latvian with legal training and police experience, Viktor Arajs. Indictment of Arajs by
prosecutor with Landgericht Hamburg, 141 Js 534/60, May 10, 1976, pp. 55-66, and
judgment of Hamburg court in Arajs case, (37) 5/76, December 21, 1979.
294
THE FIRST SWEEP
fate which they can expect from us [Bei den Juden scheint sich auch
jenseits der Front herumgesprochen zu haben, welches Schicksat sie
bei uns erwartet}." The Einsatzgruppe which operated in the central
and eastern Ukrainian territories found that many Jewish communities
were reduced by 70 to 90 percent and some by 100 percent.”
Such reports began to multiply in the fall. In Melitopol an original
Jewish
population
of
11,000
had
dwindled
to
2,000
before
Einsatzgruppe D arrived.'5 Dnepropetrovsk had a prewar Jewish community of 100,000; about 30,000 remained.14 15 16 17 In Chernigov, with a prewar Jewish
population
of
10,000,
Sonderkommando
4a
found
only
309
Jews.”
In
Mariupol
and
Taganrog,
Einsatzgruppe
D
encountered
no
Jews at all.18 19 20 On the road from Smolensk to Moscow, Einsatzgruppe B
reported that in many towns the Soviets had evacuated the entire Jewish
population,”
while
in
the
frozen
areas
near
Leningrad,
Einsatzgruppe A caught only a few strayed Jewish victims.“ These figures
are not an accurate indication of the number of Jews who succeeded in
getting away, for many of the victims fled only a short distance and—
overtaken by the German army—drifted back into the towns. Nevertheless, a comparison of the original number of Jewish inhabitants with the total number of dead will show that upwards of 1,500,000 Jews did
succeed in eluding the grasp of the mobile killing units. Most Jews,
however, were trapped.
The Einsatzgruppen had moved with such speed behind the advancing army that several hundred thousand Jews could be killed like sleeping flies. Einsatzgruppe A reported on October 15, 1941, that it
had killed 125,000 Jews.21 Einsatzgruppe B reported on November 14,
14. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 81 (48 copies), September 12,
1941, NO-3154.
15. Ortskommandantur 1/853 Melitopol to Kortlck 533, October 13, 1941, NOKW-
1632.
16. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 135 (60 copies), November 19,
1941, NO-2832.
17. Ibid.
18. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 136 (60 copies), November 21,
1941, NO-2822.
19. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 123 (50 copies), October 24,
1941, NO-3239. Schwarz, in The Jews in the Soviet Union, pp. 220-22, states that there is
no evidence of a Soviet evacuation plan for Jews in particular.
20. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180.
21. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180. In addition, about 5.000 non-
Jews had been killed. The most lethal unit in the Einsatzgruppe was Einsatzkommando
3. Its count as of February 9, 1942, was 138,272 people killed (including 136,421 Jews).
Handwritten note by Jäger to Einsatzgruppe A, February 9, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg. UdSSR 108, film 3, p. 27.
295
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
1941, an incomplete total of 45,000 victims.“ Einsatzgruppe C reported
on November 3, 1941, that it had shot 75,000 Jews.“ Einsatzgruppe D
reported on December 12, 1941, the killing of 55,000 people.“
Although over a million Jews had fled and additional hundreds of
thousands had been killed, it became apparent that many Jewish communities had hardly been touched. They had been bypassed in the hurried advance. To strike at these Jews while they were still stunned
and helpless, a second wave of mobile killing units moved up quickly
behind the Einsatzgruppen.
From Tilsit, in East Prussia, the local Gestapo sent a Kommando
into Lithuania. These Gestapo men shot thousands of Jews on the
other side of the Memel River.“ In Kraköw the Befehlshaber der
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS) of the Generalgouvernement, SS-
Oberführer
Schöngarth,
organized
three
small
Kommandos.
In
the
middle of July these Kommandos moved into the eastern Polish areas
and,
/>
with
headquarters
in
Lw6w,
Brest-Litovsk,
and
Biatystok,
respectively, killed tens of thousands of Jews.“ In addition to the Tilsit
Gestapo
and
the
Generalgouvernement
Kommandos,
improvised
killing units were thrown into action by the Higher SS and Police Leaders.
In the newly occupied Soviet territories, Himmler had installed three
of these regional commanders:27
HSSPf Nord (North):
OGruf. Priitzmann (Jeckeln) 22 23 24 25 26 27
22. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 133 (60 copies), November 14,
1941, NO-2825.
23. RSHA IV-A-1. OperaUonal Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,
1941. NO-3157. In addition, the Einsatzgruppe had shot 5,000 non-Jews.
24. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 145 (65 copies), December 12,
1941, NO-2828.
25. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 19 (32 copies), July 11, 1941,
NO-2934. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 26, July 18,1941, NO-2941. The
Stahlecker mentions that the Tilsit unit had killed 5,500 persons. Stahlecker Report to
October 15, 194I.L-180.
26. Order by Commander, Rear Army Group Area South, Ic (signed von Roques),
July 14, 1941, NOKW-2597. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 43 (47
copies), August 5, 1941, NO-2949. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 56(48
copies), August 18, 1941, NO-2848. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 58,
August 29,1941, NO-2846. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 66, August 28,
1941, NO-2839. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 67, August 29,1941, NO-
2837. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 78 (48 copies), September 9, 1941,
NO-2851. These reports, which do not cover all the operations of the three Kommandos,
mention 17,887 victims.
27. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 129 (55 copies), November 4,
1941, NO-3159. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 141 (66 copies), December 3, 1941, NO-4425. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 149 (65 copies), December 22, 1941, NO-2833.
296
THE FIRST SWEEP
HSSPf Mitte (Center):
OGruf. von dem Bach-Zelewski
HSSPf Slid (South):
OGruf. Jeckeln (Priitzmann)
Each Higher SS and Police Leader was in charge of a regiment of Order
Police and some Waffen-SS units.“ These forces helped
out considerably.
In the northern sector the Higher SS and Police Leader (Prtttz-
mann),
assisted
by
twenty-one
men
of
Einsatzkommando
2
(Ein-