by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
satzgruppe A), killed 10,600 people in Riga.28 29 30 31 32 33 34 In the center the Order
Police of Higher SS and Police Leader von dem Bach helped kill 2,278
Jews in Minsk50 and 3,726 in Mogilev.’1 (The beneficiary of this cooperation was Einsatzgruppe B.) In the south Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln
was
especially
active.
When
Einsatzkommando
4a
(Einsatzgruppe C) moved into Kiev, two detachments of Order Police Regiment South helped kill over 33,000 Jews." The role of the regiment in the
Kiev
massacre
was
so
conspicuous
that
Einsatzkommando
4a
felt obliged to report that, apart from the Kiev action, it had killed
14,000
Jews “without any outside help [ohne jede fremde Hilfe
erledigt."n
But Jeckeln did not confine himself to helping the Einsatzgruppen.
His mobile killing units were responsible for some of the greatest massacres
in
the
Ukraine.
Thus
when
Feldmarschall
Reichenau,
commander of the Sixth Army, ordered the 1st SS Brigade to destroy
remnants of the Soviet 124th Division, partisans, and "supporters of
the Bolshevik system” in his rear, Jeckeln led the brigade on a three-
day rampage, killing 73 Red Army men, 165 Communist party functionaries, and 1,658 Jews.“ A few weeks later, the same brigade shot 300 Jewish men and 139 Jewish women in Starokonstantinov "as a
28. Report by Major Schmidt von Altenstadt, May 19, 1941, NOKW-486.
29. RSHA, IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 156, January 16, 1942, NO-
3405. The action took place on November 30, 1941.
30. RSHA, IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 92, September 23, 1941, NO-
3143. The army's Feldgendarmerie also participated in this action.
31. RSHA 1V-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 133 (60 copies), November 14,
1941, NO-2825.
32. RSHA, IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 101 (48 copies), October 2,
1941. NO-3137.
33. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. Ill (50 copies), October 12,
1941, NO-3155. Einsatzkommando 4a had a total of 51,000 victims by that time.
34. OGruf. Jeckeln to 6th Army, copies to Himmler, Army Group Rear Area South
(General von Roques), Commander of 6th Army Rear Area (Generalleutnant von Putt-
kammer), and Chief of Order Police Daluege, August I, 1941, NOKW-1165.
297
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
reprisal measure for the uncooperative attitude of the Jews working for
the Wehrmacht.”
Next Jeckeln struck at Kamenets-Podolsky, shooting there a total
of 23,600 Jews.56 Another action followed in Berdichev, where Jeckeln
killed 1,303 Jews, “among them 875 Jewesses over twelve years of
age.’’35 36 37 38 39 40 In Dnepropetrovsk, where Jeckeln slaughtered 15,000 Jews, the
local army command reported that to its regret it had not received prior
notification of the action, with the result that its preparations to create
a ghetto in the city, and its regulation (already issued) to exact a “contribution” from the Jews for the benefit of the municipality, had come to naught.“ Yet another massacre took place in Rovno, where the toll
was also 15,000.* In its report about Rovno, Einsatzgruppe C stated
that, whereas the action had been organized by the Higher SS and
Police Leader and had been carried out by the Order Police, a detachment of Einsatzkommando 5 had participated to a significant extent in the shooting (an der Durchführung massgeblich beteiligt).*1
Although the total number of Jews shot by the Higher SS and
Police Leaders cannot be stated exactly, we know that the figure is
high. Thus in the single month of August the Higher SS and Police
Leader South alone killed 44,125 persons, “mostly Jews.”41 42
The mobile killing strategy was an attempt to trap the Jews in a
wave of Einsatzgruppen, immediately followed up by a support wave
of
Gestapo
men
from
Tilsit,
Einsatzkommandos
from
the
Generalgouvernement, and formations of the Higher SS and Police Leaders.
Together, these units killed about five hundred thousand Jews in five
months. (The locations of the mobile killing units in July and November 1941 are shown on Maps 2 & l.*) 35. RSHA1V-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 59 (48 copies), August 21, 1941,
NO-2847. For other killings by the 1st SS Brigade, see its activity reports for July-
September 1941. compiled by Europa Verlag, Unsere Ehre heisst Treue (Vienna-
Frankfurt-Zurich, 1965).
36. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 80 (48 copies), September 11,
1941. NO-3154.
37. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 88 (48 copies), September 19,
1941, NO-3149.
38. Report by Feldkommandantur 240/VI1 for period of September 15, 1941, to
October 15, 1941, Yad Vashem document 0-53/6. Sonderkommando 4a reported 10,000
killed in the city by Jeckeln on October 13, 1941. See RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report
USSR No. 135 (60 copies). November 19, 1941, NO-2832.
39. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 143 (65 copies), December 8,
1941, NO-2827. The action took place on November 7-8, 1941.
40. Ibid.
41. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 94 (48 copies), September 25,
1941, NO-3146.
42. Locations are cited in almost every RSHA IV-A-1 operational report.
298
THE FIRST SWEEP
MAP 2
POSITIONS OF THE MOBILE KILLING UNITS
JULY 1941
COOPERATION WITH THE MOBILE KILLING UNITS
Movement was the basic problem of the mobile killing units during the
first sweep. Once the killing units had arrived at a desired spot, however, they had to deal with a host of problems. The success of the 299
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
MAP 3
POSITIONS OF THE MOBILE KILLING UNITS
NOVEMBER 1941
operation from that point on depended on the attitudes of the military
authorities, the native population, and the victims themselves.
The army cooperated with the Einsatzgruppen to an extent that far
300
THE FIRST SWEEP
exceeded
the
minimum
support
functions
guaranteed
in
the
OKH-
RSHA agreement. This cooperation was all the more remarkable because
the
Security
Police
had
expected
little
more
than
grudging
acquiescence in the killing operations. On July 6, 1941, Einsatzkommando 4b (Einsatzgruppe C) reported from Tamopol: "Armed forces surprisingly
welcome
hostility
against
Jews
[Wehrmacht
erfreulich
gute Einstellung gegen die Juden].“' On September 8, Einsatzgruppe D
reported that relations with military authorities were "excellent” (ausgezeichnet).“
The
commander
o
f
Einsatzgruppe
A
(Brigadeführer
Dr.
Stahlecker) wrote that his experiences with Army Group North were
very good and that his relations with the Fourth Panzer Army under
Generaloberst
Hoepner
were
“very
close,
yes,
almost
cordial
[sehr
eng. ja fast herzlich].''“'
These testimonials were given to the army because it went out of
its way to turn over Jews to the Einsatzgruppen, to request actions
against Jews, to participate in killing operations, and to shoot Jewish
hostages in “reprisal” for attacks on occupation forces. The generals
had eased themselves into this pose of cooperation through the pretense that the Jewish population was a group of Bolshevist diehards who instigated, encouraged, and abetted the partisan war behind the
German lines.43 44 45 46 The army thus had to protect itself against the partisan
menace by striking at its presumable source—the Jews.47
The first consequence of army “security" policy was the practice of
handing over Jews to the Einsatzgruppen for shooting. In Minsk the
army commander established a civilian internment camp for almost all
the men in the city. Secret Field Police units and Einsatzgruppe B
personnel together “combed out” the camp. Thousands of "Jews,
43. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 14 (30 copiesl, July 6, 1941, NO-
2940.
44. Ohlendorf via Stubaf. Gmeiner to 11th Army Ic/AO (received and initialed by Chief
of Staff Wohler), September 8, 1941, NOKW-3234.
45. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180.
46. In line with this thinking, see letter by Gen. Eugen Müller (OKH morale chief)
to commanders of Army Group Rear Areas, North, Center, and South, July 25, 1941,
NOKW-182. Muller warned in that letter that the "carriers of the Jewish-Bolshevist
system" were now starting an all-out partisan war in the German rear.
47. An illustration of army credulity is the ease with which the military was persuaded without any evidence that the great fire in Kiev had been started by the Jews.
RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 97 (48 copies), September 28, 1941. NO-
3145. A subsequent Einsatzgruppen report disclosed that the Are had been set by a so-
called annihilation battalion—a type of partisan unit employed by the Russians during
the early days of the war in sabotage activities. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR
No. 127(55 copies), October 31, 1941, NO-4136.
301
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
criminals, functionaries, and Asiatics” were caught in the roundup* In
Zhitomir, General Reinhardt assisted Einsatzgruppe C in a “comb-out”
(Durchkammung) of the town* Outside the cities several military units
turned in stray Jews fleeing on the roads or in the woods.”
The second application of the theory that Jews were the instigators
of the partisan war was army initiation of action against the Jews. In
Kremenchug the Seventeenth Army requested Kommando 4b to wipe
out the Jews of the city because three cases of cable sabotage had
occurred there.48 49 50 51 52 53 In other towns army commanders did not even wait
for sabotage occurrences, but requested anti-Jewish action as a “precautionary” measure. Thus in the town of Kodyma an illiterate Ukranian woman who claimed to understand Yiddish was brought before
Hauptmann (Captain) Kramer of Secret Field Police Group 647 with
the XXX Corps. She revealed that she had overheard a Jewish plot to
attack the army in the city. That same afternoon, Einsatzkomman-
do 10a in Olshanka was asked to send a detachment to Kodyma. The
detachment, assisted by Secret Field Police men, then carried out the
killings.” At Armyansk in the Crimea, the local military commander
sent the following report to his superior:
For protection against the partisan nuisance and for the security of the
troops in this area, it became absolutely necessary to render the fourteen
local Jews and Jewesses harmless. Carried out on November 26, 1941.”
The third effect of the German theory of a “Jewish-Bolshevist”
conspiracy was a policy of taking Jewish hostages and suspects in the
occupied
territories.
The
Seventeenth
Army
ordered
that
whenever
sabotage or an attack on personnel could not be traced to the Ukrainian
population, Jews and Communists (especially Jewish Komsomol mem-
48. RSHA 1V-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 21 (32 copies), July 13, 1941,
NO-2937, RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 73 (48 copies), September 4,
1941, NO-2844.
49. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 38 (48 copies). July 30, 1941,
NO-2951.
50. For instance, the 99th Infantry Division of the 6th Army. See reports by 99th
Division Ic, September 27 and 29, 1941, NOKW-1294. See also 3rd Company of 683d
Motorized Feldgendarmerie Battalion to Feldkommandantur 810, November 2, 1941,
NOKW-1630. The Feldgendarmerie (not to be confused with the Secret Field Police) was
the army's military police. Many of its personnel had been drawn from the Order Police.
51. War diary, 17th Army Ic/AO, September 22, 1941, NOKW-2272. The commander of the 17th Army was General der Infanterie Heinrich von Stülpnagel.
52. XXX Corps Ic to 11th Army Ic, August 2,1941.NOKW-650. Sonderkommando
10a (OStubaf. Seetzen) to Einsatzgruppe D, August 3, 1941, NOKW-586.
53. Ortskommandantur Armyansk to Koriick 553/Qu in Simferopol, November 30,
1941, NOKW-1532.
302
THE FIRST SWEEP
bers) were to be shot in reprisal.5* The commander of the Southern
Army Group Rear Area explained a similar order in the following
terms:
We must convey the impression that we are just. Whenever the perpetrator of an act of sabotage cannot be found, Ukrainians are not to be blamed. In such cases reprisals are therefore to be carried out only against
Jews and Russians.”
Perhaps the most interesting order was issued by the Sixth Army
Ia/OQu at Kharkov. The order provided that Jews and other hostages
be placed in big buildings. It was suspected that some of these buildings were mined. Now that the supposed perpetrators were in the buildings, the military expected that reports of the location of the
mines would soon be made to army engineers.* At least one unit carried its suspicion of the Jews so far as to order, in one breath, that all Red Army men in uniform or civilian clothes caught “loafing around,”
Jews, commissars, persons who carried a weapon, and those suspected
of partisan activities were to be shot at once.55
It is difficult to estimate how many Jewish hostages or suspects fell
victim to the German army. Einsatzgruppe A reported that in White
Russia
alone.
Army
Group
Center
had
shot
19,000
“partisans
and
criminals, that is, in the majority Jews,” up to December 1941.“ The
Jewish victims of army action were thus no insignificant group of people. The army was pitching in very seriously to hel
p the Heydrich forces reduce the Jewish population of the east.
In all the examples cited so far, partisan activity was the explicit or
implicit justification for the army’s actions. Interestingly enough, however, there were instances after the start of operations when the military went out of its way to help the mobile killing units for no apparent reason save the desire to get things over with. The growth of this
callousness in the face of mass death is illustrated by the following two
stories.
54. 17th Army Ic/AO (signed by Stulpnagel) to corps commands, with copy to
commander of Southern Army Group Rear Area, July 30, 1941, NOKW-1693. The Komsomol was a Communist party youth organization.
55. Order by Southern Army Group Rear Area/Section VII (signed by Gen. von
Roques), August 16, 1941, NOKW-1691. For reports of‘'reprisal” shootings of Jews, see
proclamation by town commander of Kherson, August 28, 1941, NOKW-3436. Commander, Southern Army Group Rear Area Ic to Army Group South Ia/Ib, November 13, 1941, NOKW-1611. 202d Replacement Brigade la to Commander, Southern Army Group
Rear Area, November 13, 1941, NOKW-1611. There are many other such reports.
56. Order by 6th Army Ia/OQu, October 17, 1941, NOKW-184. The engineer chief
in Kharkov was Obersl (Colonel) Herbert Sell«, commander of the 677th Engineer Regiment.
57. Order by 52d Infantry Division Ic, September 11, 1941, NOKW-1858.
58. Draft report by Einsatzgruppe A, winter 1941-42, PS-2273.
303
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
In Dzhankoy on the Crimean peninsula, the local mayor had established a concentration camp for Jews without notifying anyone. After a while, famine raged in the camp and epidemics threatened to break out.
The
military
commander
(Ortskommandant)
approached
Einsatzgruppe D with a request to kill the Jews, but the Security Police
turned down the request because it did not have enough personnel.
After some haggling, the army agreed to furnish its Feldgendarmerie
for blocking the area off so that a Kommando of the Einsatzgruppe
could perform the killings.*
In Simferopol, the Crimean capital, the Eleventh Army decided
that it wanted the shooting to be completed before Christmas. Accordingly, Einsatzgruppe D, with the assistance of army personnel and with army trucks and gasoline, completed the shootings in time to permit
the army to celebrate Christmas in a city without Jews.“
From an initial reluctance to participate in the destruction process,
the generals had developed such an impatience for action that they
were virtually pushing the Einsatzgruppen into killing operations. The