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  rough approximations based on 1926 census data in Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum (Essen, 1939). pp. 716-18.

  3. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union, p. 16.

  4. Arthur Ruppin, Soziologie der Juden (Berlin. 1930). vol. 1, pp. 348, 391, 398,

  401.

  5. Data in Seraphim, Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum, pp. 716-18.

  291

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  Jewish Population

  (percentage of

  total population

  City and Census Year

  in parentheses)

  Odessa (1926)

  153,200

  (36.4)

  Kiev (1926)

  140,200

  (27.3)

  Moscow (1926)

  131,200

  ( 6.5)

  Lw6w (Lvov] (1931)

  99,600

  (31.9)

  Leningrad (1926)

  84,400

  ( 5.3)

  Dnepropetrovsk (1926)

  83,900

  (36.0)

  Kharkov (1926)

  81,100

  (19.4)

  Chi§in£u [Kishinev] (1925)

  80,000

  (60.2)

  Wilno [Vilnius, Vilna] (1931)

  55,000

  (28.2)

  Minsk (1926)

  53,700

  (40.8)

  Cem4u(i [Chernovtsy] (1919)

  43,700

  (47.7)

  Riga (1930)

  43,500

  ( 8.9)

  Rostov (1926)

  40,000

  (13.2)

  Bialystok (1931)

  39,200

  (43.0)

  Gomel (1926)

  37,700

  (43.6)

  Vitebsk (1926)

  37,100

  (37.6)

  Kirovograd (1920)

  31,800

  (41.2)

  Nikolaev (1923)

  31,000

  (28.5)

  Kremenchug (1923)

  29,400

  (53.5)

  Zhitomir (1923)

  28,800

  (42.2)

  Berdichev (1923)

  28,400

  (65.1)

  Kherson (1920)

  27,600

  (37.0)

  Kaunas [Kovno] (1934)

  27,200

  (26.1)

  Uman (1920)

  25,300

  (57.2)

  Stanislawdw [Stanislav] (1931)

  24,800

  (51.0)

  R6wne [Rovno] (1931)

  22,700

  (56.0)

  Poltava (1920)

  21,800

  (28.4)

  Bobniysk (1923)

  21,600

  (39.7)

  BrzeSiS [Brest-Litovsk] (1931)

  21,400

  (44.2)

  Grodno (1931)

  21,200

  (43.0)

  Pirisk (1931)

  20,300

  (63.6)

  Vinnitsa (1923)

  20,200

  (39.2)

  Tighina (1910)

  20,000

  (34.6)

  Luck [Lutsk] (1931)

  17,400

  (48.9)

  PrzemySl (1931)

  17,300

  (34.0)

  STRATEGY

  The geographic distribution of Soviet Jewry determined to a large extent the basic strategy of the mobile killing units. To reach as many cities as fast as possible, the Einsatzgruppen moved closely on the

  heels of the advancing armies, trapping the large Jewish population

  292

  THE FIRST SWEEP

  centers before the victims had a chance to discover their fate. (It was

  for this reason that the RSHA had insisted on the right to send its

  mobile units to the front lines.) In accordance with the agreement,

  units of Einsatzgruppe A entered the cities of Kaunas, Liepäja, Jel-

  gava, Riga, Tartu, Tallinn, and the larger suburbs of Leningrad with

  advance units of the army.6 Three cars of Einsatzgruppe C followed the

  first tanks into Zhitomir.1 Kommando 4a of the same Einsatzgruppe

  was in Kiev on September 19, the day that city fell.* Members of

  Einsatzgruppe D moved into Hotin while the Russians were still defending the town.’

  Such front-line movements did entail some difficulties. Occasionally

  the

  Einsatzgruppen

  found

  themselves

  in

  the

  middle

  of

  heavy

  fighting. Einsatzkommando 12, moving on the coastline east of Odessa

  to perform mass shootings of Jews, was surprised by a Soviet landing

  party of 2,500 men and fled hurriedly under fire.1’ Sometimes an army

  commander took advantage of the presence of the mobile killing units

  to order them to clear out an area infested by partisans or snipers."

  Only in rare cases, however, did an army order direct the suspension of

  a killing operation because of the front-line situation.’2 On the whole,

  the Einsatzgruppen were limited in their operations only by their own

  size in relation to the ground they had to cover.

  The Einsatzgruppen did not move as compact units. The Kommandos generally detached themselves from the group staffs and operated independently. Often the Kommandos themselves split up into advance

  detachments (Vorkommandos), keeping pace with the troops and platoon-size working parties (Teilkommandos) that penetrated into remote districts off the main roads.

  The relative thoroughness of the killings was a function of the

  6. Summary report by Einsatzgruppe A to October 15, 1941, L-180. The report,

  with annexes of various dates, is well over 100 pages long. Although forty copies were

  prepared, it was evidently written for the RSHA. It is generally referred to as the first

  Stahlecker report, to distinguish it from a subsequent summary.

  7. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,

  1941. NO-3157.

  8. RHSA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 97 (48 copies). September 28,

  1941. NO-3145.

  9. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 19 (32 copies), July II. 1941, NO-

  2934.

  10. 11th Army AO to l Ith Army Ic. September 22,1941. NOKW-1525.

  11. 11th Army Ic/AO (Abwehr 111), signed by Chief of Staff Wohler, to Einsatzgruppe D, August 8, 1941, NOKW-3453. The struggle against partisans “is a job for the Security Ftolice." Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941. L-180.

  12. War Diary, 17th Army/Operations. December 14,1941, NOKW-3350. The order

  read: “Upon order of the chief of staff, Jewish Actions [Judenaklionen] in Artemovsk

  will be postponed, pending a clarification of the front-line situation." The commander of

  the 17th Army was Generaloberst Hermann Hoth. Einsatzgruppe C operated in the area.

  293

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  density of Jewish settlement and the speed of the German advance.

  Several districts, such as Biatystok, Galicia, and Bessarabia, were covered rather rapidly and sporadically. In those areas many Jews were subsequently deported to camps. In the Baltic region, on the other

  hand, detachments of Einsatzgruppe A stayed behind to move back

  and forth for more extensive killing operations. A summary report of

  Einsatzkommando 3 in Lithuania reveals a series of such repetitive

  movements. The Kommando covered a large part of the Lithuanian

  area, with salients in Dvinsk (Daugavpils), Latvia, and near Minsk in

  White Russia. Its report, dated December 1,1941, contains 112
entries

  of shootings. One or another entry refers to several adjacent localities

  or several consecutive days. The number of place names is seventy-

  one, and in fourteen of these communities the Kommando struck more

  than once. Thus the towns of Babtai, Kedainiai, Jonava, and RokiSkis

  were raided twice; VandZiogala, Utena, Alytus, and Dvinsk, at least

  three

  times;

  RaSeiniai

  and

  Ukmerge,

  four;

  Marijampole,

  five;

  Paneveiys, six; Kovno (Kaunas), thirteen; and Vilna (Vilnius), fifteen

  times. The interval between raids in these cities ranged from a fraction

  of a day to forty-two days, and the median pause was a week. Some of

  the major massacres occurred after the third, fourth, or fifth round.1’

  The Einsatzkommandos that moved with the armies farther to the

  east encountered fewer and fewer Jews. The victims were thinning out

  for two reasons. The first was geographic distribution. By October-

  November 1941, the largest concentrations of Jews had already been

  left behind. In the eastern Ukraine and beyond the White Russian areas

  around

  Smolensk,

  the

  Jewish

  communities

  were

  smaller

  and

  more

  widely dispersed. The second reason was the decreasing percentage of

  Jews who stayed behind. With increasing distance from the starting

  line, the Soviet evacuation of factory and agricultural workers gained

  momentum. Many Jews were evacuated, and many others fled on their

  own. On September 12, 1941, Einsatzgruppe C reported that “across

  the lines, rumors appear to have circulated among the Jews about the 13 * 15

  13. Report by Staf. Jäger, December I, 1941, Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen, Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, film 3, pp. 27-38. To cover Lithuania in this manner, Jäger had organized a raiding party
  Ostuf. Hamann. The raiding party was dispatched almost daily from Kaunas to outlying

  points, where local Lithuanians assisted in roundups and shootings. In neighboring Latvia, Einsatzkommando 2 was also held behind the lines. Up to the end of October 1941, its major killings took place at the coast (Liepäja and Riga), the center (Jelgava), and the

  Lithuanian region around Siauliai (Shavli, or Schaulen). Stahlecker Report to October

  15, 1941, L-180. Einsatzkommando 2 was augmented by a Latvian Sonderkommando of

  more than one hundred men (eventually two companies of three platoons each) under a

  Latvian with legal training and police experience, Viktor Arajs. Indictment of Arajs by

  prosecutor with Landgericht Hamburg, 141 Js 534/60, May 10, 1976, pp. 55-66, and

  judgment of Hamburg court in Arajs case, (37) 5/76, December 21, 1979.

  294

  THE FIRST SWEEP

  fate which they can expect from us [Bei den Juden scheint sich auch

  jenseits der Front herumgesprochen zu haben, welches Schicksat sie

  bei uns erwartet}." The Einsatzgruppe which operated in the central

  and eastern Ukrainian territories found that many Jewish communities

  were reduced by 70 to 90 percent and some by 100 percent.”

  Such reports began to multiply in the fall. In Melitopol an original

  Jewish

  population

  of

  11,000

  had

  dwindled

  to

  2,000

  before

  Einsatzgruppe D arrived.'5 Dnepropetrovsk had a prewar Jewish community of 100,000; about 30,000 remained.14 15 16 17 In Chernigov, with a prewar Jewish

  population

  of

  10,000,

  Sonderkommando

  4a

  found

  only

  309

  Jews.”

  In

  Mariupol

  and

  Taganrog,

  Einsatzgruppe

  D

  encountered

  no

  Jews at all.18 19 20 On the road from Smolensk to Moscow, Einsatzgruppe B

  reported that in many towns the Soviets had evacuated the entire Jewish

  population,”

  while

  in

  the

  frozen

  areas

  near

  Leningrad,

  Einsatzgruppe A caught only a few strayed Jewish victims.“ These figures

  are not an accurate indication of the number of Jews who succeeded in

  getting away, for many of the victims fled only a short distance and—

  overtaken by the German army—drifted back into the towns. Nevertheless, a comparison of the original number of Jewish inhabitants with the total number of dead will show that upwards of 1,500,000 Jews did

  succeed in eluding the grasp of the mobile killing units. Most Jews,

  however, were trapped.

  The Einsatzgruppen had moved with such speed behind the advancing army that several hundred thousand Jews could be killed like sleeping flies. Einsatzgruppe A reported on October 15, 1941, that it

  had killed 125,000 Jews.21 Einsatzgruppe B reported on November 14,

  14. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 81 (48 copies), September 12,

  1941, NO-3154.

  15. Ortskommandantur 1/853 Melitopol to Kortlck 533, October 13, 1941, NOKW-

  1632.

  16. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 135 (60 copies), November 19,

  1941, NO-2832.

  17. Ibid.

  18. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 136 (60 copies), November 21,

  1941, NO-2822.

  19. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 123 (50 copies), October 24,

  1941, NO-3239. Schwarz, in The Jews in the Soviet Union, pp. 220-22, states that there is

  no evidence of a Soviet evacuation plan for Jews in particular.

  20. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180.

  21. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180. In addition, about 5.000 non-

  Jews had been killed. The most lethal unit in the Einsatzgruppe was Einsatzkommando

  3. Its count as of February 9, 1942, was 138,272 people killed (including 136,421 Jews).

  Handwritten note by Jäger to Einsatzgruppe A, February 9, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg. UdSSR 108, film 3, p. 27.

  295

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  1941, an incomplete total of 45,000 victims.“ Einsatzgruppe C reported

  on November 3, 1941, that it had shot 75,000 Jews.“ Einsatzgruppe D

  reported on December 12, 1941, the killing of 55,000 people.“

  Although over a million Jews had fled and additional hundreds of

  thousands had been killed, it became apparent that many Jewish communities had hardly been touched. They had been bypassed in the hurried advance. To strike at these Jews while they were still stunned

  and helpless, a second wave of mobile killing units moved up quickly

  behind the Einsatzgruppen.

  From Tilsit, in East Prussia, the local Gestapo sent a Kommando

  into Lithuania. These Gestapo men shot thousands of Jews on the

  other side of the Memel River.“ In Kraköw the Befehlshaber der

  Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS) of the Generalgouvernement, SS-

  Oberführer

  Schöngarth,

  organized

  three

  small

  Kommandos.

  In

  the

  middle of July these Kommandos moved into the eastern Polish areas

  and,
/>
  with

  headquarters

  in

  Lw6w,

  Brest-Litovsk,

  and

  Biatystok,

  respectively, killed tens of thousands of Jews.“ In addition to the Tilsit

  Gestapo

  and

  the

  Generalgouvernement

  Kommandos,

  improvised

  killing units were thrown into action by the Higher SS and Police Leaders.

  In the newly occupied Soviet territories, Himmler had installed three

  of these regional commanders:27

  HSSPf Nord (North):

  OGruf. Priitzmann (Jeckeln) 22 23 24 25 26 27

  22. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 133 (60 copies), November 14,

  1941, NO-2825.

  23. RSHA IV-A-1. OperaUonal Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,

  1941. NO-3157. In addition, the Einsatzgruppe had shot 5,000 non-Jews.

  24. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 145 (65 copies), December 12,

  1941, NO-2828.

  25. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 19 (32 copies), July 11, 1941,

  NO-2934. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 26, July 18,1941, NO-2941. The

  Stahlecker mentions that the Tilsit unit had killed 5,500 persons. Stahlecker Report to

  October 15, 194I.L-180.

  26. Order by Commander, Rear Army Group Area South, Ic (signed von Roques),

  July 14, 1941, NOKW-2597. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 43 (47

  copies), August 5, 1941, NO-2949. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 56(48

  copies), August 18, 1941, NO-2848. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 58,

  August 29,1941, NO-2846. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 66, August 28,

  1941, NO-2839. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 67, August 29,1941, NO-

  2837. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 78 (48 copies), September 9, 1941,

  NO-2851. These reports, which do not cover all the operations of the three Kommandos,

  mention 17,887 victims.

  27. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 129 (55 copies), November 4,

  1941, NO-3159. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 141 (66 copies), December 3, 1941, NO-4425. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 149 (65 copies), December 22, 1941, NO-2833.

  296

  THE FIRST SWEEP

  HSSPf Mitte (Center):

  OGruf. von dem Bach-Zelewski

  HSSPf Slid (South):

  OGruf. Jeckeln (Priitzmann)

  Each Higher SS and Police Leader was in charge of a regiment of Order

  Police and some Waffen-SS units.“ These forces helped

  out considerably.

  In the northern sector the Higher SS and Police Leader (Prtttz-

  mann),

  assisted

  by

  twenty-one

  men

  of

  Einsatzkommando

  2

  (Ein-

 

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