by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
80. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 27 (36 copies), July 19, 1941,
NO-2942.
81. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 81 (48 copies), September 12,
1941. NO-3154.
82. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 127 (55 copies), October 31,
1941, NO-4136. The Poles in the Biatystok region were also reported to have engaged in
"spontaneous denunciations" (Erstattung von Anzeigen). RSHA IV-A-I, Operational
Report USSR No. 21 <32 copies), July 13, 1941, NO-2937.
From the Crimea, Einsatzgruppe D reported: “The population of the Crimea is anti-
Jewish and in some cases spontaneously brings Jews to Kommandos to be liquidated.
The starosls (village elders] ask for permission to liquidate the Jews themselves." RSHA
IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 145 (65 copies), December 12. 1941, NO-2828.
On Crimea, see also report by OStubaf. Seibert (Einsatzgruppe D) to 11th Army Ic, April
16, 1942, NOKW-628. During the Soviet reoccupation of the Crimean city of Feodosiya
in the winter of 1941-42. collaborators were said to have been killed with pickaxes as
they were asked: “Why did you tolerate it that the Germans shot all the Jews?" AOK 11/
IV Wi to WiStOst/FU, February I, 1942, Wi/ID 2.512.
309
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
What are pogroms? They are short, violent outbursts by a community against its Jewish population. Why did the Einsatzgruppen endeavor to start pogroms in the occupied areas? The reasons that prompted the killing units to activate anti-Jewish outbursts were partly
administrative,
partly
psychological.
The
administrative
principle
was
very simple: every Jew killed in a pogrom was one less burden for the
Einsatzgruppen. A pogrom brought them, as they expressed it, that
much closer to the “cleanup goal” (Sduberungsziel).t< The psychological
consideration
was
more
interesting.
The
Einsatzgruppen
wanted
the population to take a part—and a major part at that—of the responsibility for the killing operations. “It was not less important, for future purposes,” wrote Brigadefuhrer Dr. Stahlecker, “to establish as an unquestionable fact that the liberated population had resorted to the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy, on its own
initiative and without instructions from German authorities.”** In short,
the pogroms were to become a defensive weapon with which to confront an accuser, or an element of blackmail that could be used against the local population.
It may be noted in passing that Einsatzgruppen and military interests diverged on the matter of pogroms. The military government experts, like the civilian bureaucrats at home, dreaded any kind of uncontrollable
violence.
One
rear
(security) division,
issuing
a long
directive for anti-Jewish measures, included also this sharply worded
paragraph in Us order: “Lynch justice against Jews and other terror
measures are to be prevented by all means. The armed forces do not
tolerate that one terror [the Soviet one] be relieved by another.”*5 Most
of the pogroms, therefore, took place in those areas that had not yet
been placed in the firm grip of military government experts.
The Einsatzgruppen were most successful with “spontaneous” outbursts in the Baltic area, particularly in Lithuania. Yet even there Dr.
Stahlecker observed: “To our surprise, it was not easy at first to set in
motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews.”*5 The Lithuanian pogroms grew out of a situation of violence in the capital city of Kaunas.
As soon as war had broken out, anti-Communist fighting groups had
gone into action against the Soviet rear guard. When an advance
detachment
of
Einsatzkommando
lb
(Einsatzgruppe
A)
moved
into
Kaunas, the Lithuanian partisans were shooting it out with retreating
Red Army men. The newly arrived Security Police approached the 83 84 85 86
83. Stahlecker Re_portto October 15, 1941, L-180.
84. ibid.
85. Directive by 454th Security Division/la to Ortskommandanturen in its area,
Septembers, 1941, NOKW-2628.
86. Stahlecker Report to October 15.1941, L-180.
310
THE FIRST SWEEP
chief of the Lithuanian insurgents, Klimaitis (misspelled by the Germans Klimatis), and secretly persuaded him to turn his forces on the Jews.
After
several
days
of
intensive
pogroms,
Klimaitis
had
accounted for 5,000 dead: 3,800 in Kaunas, 1,200 in other towns.81 Moving farther north, Einsatzgruppe A organized a pogrom in Riga, Latvia.
The Einsatzgruppe set up two pogrom units and let them loose in the
city; 400 Jews were killed.“ Both in Kaunas and in Riga, the Einsatzgruppe
took
photographs
and
made
films
of
the
“self-cleansing
actions”
(Selbstreinigungsaktionen)
as
evidence
“for
later
times”
of
the severity of native treatment of the Jews.“ With the disbanding of
the anti-Communist partisans, the northern pogroms ended. No other
outbursts took place in the Baltic states.87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
In
addition
to
Stahlecker’s
Einsatzgruppe
in
the
north,
Einsatzgruppe C had some success with pogroms in the south. The southern pogrom area was largely confined to Galicia, an area that was formerly Polish territory and that had a large Ukrainian population.
The Galician capital of Lw6w was the scene of a mass seizure by local
inhabitants.
In
“reprisal”
for
the
deportation
of
Ukrainians
by
the
Soviets, 1,000 members of the Jewish intelligentsia were driven together and handed over to the Security Police.” On July 5, 1941, about seventy Jews in Tarnopol were rounded up by Ukrainians when three
mutilated German corpses were found in the local prison. The Jews
were
killed
with
dynamite
(mil
geballter
Ladung
erledigt).
Another
twenty Jews were killed by Ukrainians and German troops.”
In
Krzemieniec
(Kremenets),
100
to
150
Ukrainians
had
been
killed by the Soviets. When some of the exhumed corpses were found
without skin, rumors circulated that the Ukrainians had been thrown
into kettles full of boiling water. The Ukrainian population retaliated by
seizing 130 Jews and beating them to death with clubs.9’ Although the
Galician pogroms spread still further, to such places as Sambor” and
87.
Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180. RSHA 1V-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 8 (25 copies). June 30, 194], NO-4543.
88. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 15 (30 copies), July 7, 1941, NO-
2935. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180.
89. Stahlecker Report to October 15,1941, L-180.
90. Ibid.
91. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 11 (25 copies), July 3, 1941, NO-
4537. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 14 (30 copies), July 6, 1941, NO-
2940.
92. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 14 (30 copies), July 6, 1941, NO-
2940.
93. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 28 (36 copies), July 20, 1941.
NO-2943.
94. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 24 (33 copies), July 16, 1941,
NO-2938.
311
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Czortköw,” the Ukrainian violence as a whole did not come up to
expectations. Only Tarnopol and Czortkbw were scored as major successes.*
Three observations about the pogroms may be noted. First, truly
spontaneous
pogroms,
free
from
Einsatzgruppen
influence,
did
not
take place. All outbreaks were either organized or inspired by the
Einsatzgruppen. Second, all pogroms were implemented within a short
time
after
the
arrival
of
the
killing
units.
They
were
not
self-
perpetuating, nor could new ones be started after things had settled
down. Third, most of the reported pogroms occurred in buffer territory, areas in which submerged hostility toward the Jews was apparently greatest and in which the Soviet threat of a return could most easily
be
discounted,
for
the
Communist
government
had
been
in
power there for less than two years.
We come now to a second and somewhat more efficient form of
local cooperation, namely the help extended to the Einsatzgruppen by
auxiliary police. The importance of the auxiliaries should not be underestimated. Roundups by local inhabitants who spoke the local language resulted in higher percentages of Jewish dead. This fact is clearly indicated by the statistics of Kommandos that made use of local help. As in the case of the pogroms, the recruitment of auxiliaries was most successful in the Baltic and Ukrainian areas.
In
the
Baltic
states
the
auxiliary
police
were
organized
very
rapidly. The Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisans, who had been engaged in
the pogroms, became the first manpower reservoir. Before disarming
and
disbanding
the partisans,
Einsatzgruppe
A
picked
out “reliable”
men and organized them into five police companies.” The men were
put to work immediately in Kaunas* The ensuing “actions” in that city
were, in Standartenführer Jäger’s words, “like shooting at a parade
[Paradeschiessen].”* In July 1941, 150 Lithuanians were assigned to
participate in the “liquidation”
of the Jewish community in Vilna,
where
every
morning
and
afternoon
they
seized
and
concentrated
about five hundred people, who were “subjected to special treatment
on the very same day [noch am gleichen Tage der Sonderbehandlung 95 96 97 98 99
95. RSHA IV-A-l. Operational Report USSR No. 47 <47 copies), August 9. 1941,
NO-2947.
96. Ibid.
97. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 14 (30 copies), July 6,1941, NO-
2940.
98. Ibid. RSHA IV-A-l. Operational Report USSR No. 19 (32 copies), July II.
1941, NO-2934.
99. Report by Jäger, December I, 1941, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108,
film 3, pp. 27-38.
312
THE FIRST SWEEP
unterzogen By
mid-September
1941,
a
detachment
of
Einsatzkom-
mando
3
had
swept
through
the
districts
of
RaSeiniai,
RokiSkis,
Sarasai, Persai, and Prienai and, with the help of local Lithuanians,
rendered them “free of Jews” ]udenfrei).m The operations assisted by
the Lithuanians accounted for more than half of the Einsatzkomman-
do’s killings by that date."“
In Latvia auxiliaries were similarly used by Einsatzkommandos lb
and 2.100 101 102 103 104 105 106 Like the Lithuanians, the Latvians were able helpers. There
was only one case of trouble. A Latvian Kommando was caught in
Karsava by German army men while stuffing its pockets with the belongings of dead Jews. The Latvian detachment in question had to be disbanded.In the northernmost country, Estonia, the army had set up
an indigenous auxiliary (Selbstschutz) which was taken over by Son-
derkommando 1 a of Einsatzgruppe A to do its entire dirty work of
shooting a handful of Jews left behind after the Soviet retreat.'“
In addition to the Baltic Selbstschutz used by Einsatzgruppe A, a
Ukrainian militia (Miliz) was operating in the areas of Einsatzgruppen
C and D. The Ukrainian auxiliaries appeared on the scene in August
1941,'“ and Einsatzgruppe C found itself compelled to make use of
them because it was repeatedly diverted from its main task to fight the
“partisan
nuisance.”
The
network
of
local
Ukrainian
militias
was
paid by the municipalities, sometimes with funds confiscated from
100. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 21 (32 copies). July 13, 1941,
NO-2937.
101. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 88 (48 copies), September 19,
1941, NO-3149. See also Director of Lithuanian Police Reivytis (Kaunas) to OStuf.
Hamann (commander of detachment), August 23, 1941, pointing out that in the course of
continuous seizures in Prienai, the number of concentrated Jews had risen to 493, that
epidemics were breaking out, and that it was imperative that Hamann take them from the
collecting points as soon as possible. B. Baranauskas and K. Ruksenas, comps.. Documents Accuse (Vilnius, 1970), p. 216. Jäger’s report lists a total of 1,078 shot there on August 27.
102. The figure was nearly 47,000 out of about 83,000. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational
Report USSR No. 88 (48 copies), September 19, 1941, NO-3149. See also the detailed
summary report by Jäger. On Lithuanian shootings without German participation, see
Lithuanian Department of Internal Affairs/Chief of Sakiai District (Karalius) to Director
of Lithuanian Police (Reivytis) about the 1,540 people killed in the area on September 13
and 16. Baranauskas an
d Ruksenas, Documents Accuse, p. 223.
103. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 24 (33 copies). July 16. 1941,
NO-2938.
104. War diary, 281st Security Division, August I, 1941, NOKW-2150.
105. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. Ill (50 copies). October 12,
1941, NO-3155.
106. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 60 (48 copies), August 22, 1941,
NO-2842. Report by Sonderkommando Ita (Einsatzgruppe D), covering August 22-
September 10, 1941, NOKW-636.
313
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Jews.1® The Ukrainians were used principally for dirty work. Thus
Einsatzkommando 4a went so far as to coniine itself to the shooting of
adults while commanding its Ukrainian helpers to shoot children.'®
In the south the SS drew upon a sizable population of resident
ethnic Germans to organize a Selbstschutz of several thousand men.118
Einsatzgruppe D discovered that the local Germans were eager volunteers during shootings. In that connection, a former chief of Einsatzkommando 6 (Biberstein) commented after the war: “We were actually frightened by the bloodthirstiness of these people [Das hat uns direkt
erschreckt, was die fur eine Blutgier batten].""“
The Einsatzgruppen profited from the assistance of the military,
and they made what use they could of local help. More important than
the cooperation of the army and the attitude of the civilian population,
however, was the role of the Jews in their own destruction. For when
all was said and done, the members of the Einsatzgruppen were
thousands. The Jews were millions.
When we consider that the Jews were not prepared to do battle
with the Germans, we might well ask why they did not flee for their
lives.
We
have
mentioned
repeatedly
that
many
Jews
had
been
evacuated and that many others fled on their own, but this fact must
not obscure another, no less significant phenomenon: most Jews did
not leave. They stayed. What prompted such a decision? What chained
the victims to cities and towns that were already within marching reach
of the approaching German army? People do not voluntarily leave their
homes
for
uncertain
havens
unless
they
are
driven
by
an
acute
awareness of coming disaster. In the Jewish community that awareness
was blunted and blocked by psychological obstacles.
The first obstacle to an apprehension of the situation was a convic- 107 108 109 110
107. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 80(48 copies). September II,