by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
1941, NO-3154.
108. This action took place in Radomyshl. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report
USSR No. 88 (48 copies), September 19, 1941, NO-3149. For other reports of Ukrainian
militia activity, see RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 106(48 copies), October 7, 1941. NO-3140; Ortskommandantur Snigerevka to KorQck 553 in Kherson, October 5, 1941, NOKW-1855; Ortskommandantur Kachovka to Korilck 553, copy to Feldkommandantur 810. October 20, 1941, NOKW-1598.
109. As of July 1943, the number was 7,000. PrOtzmann (Higher SS and Police
Leader South) to Himmler, July 28, 1943. T 175, roll 19. German settlements were
located primarily in the area between the Dniester and the Bug Rivers, which was
administered by the Romanians. The Selbstschutz in the German villages remained,
however, under SS jurisdiction. See Martin Broszat, "Das Dritte Reich und die
rumänische Judenpolitik,’’ Gutachten des Instituts fur Zeitgeschichte, March, 1958. pp.
160-61.
110. Interrogation of Biberstein, June 29, 1947, NO-4997.
314
THE FIRST SWEEP
tion that bad things came from Russia and good things from Germany.
The Jews were historically oriented away from Russia and toward
Germany. Not Russia but Germany had been their traditional place of
refuge. Such thinking was not entirely extinguished in October and
November 1939, when thousands of Jews moved from Russian-occupied
to German-occupied Poland. The stream was not stopped until the
Germans closed the border.'" Similarly, one year later, at the time of
Soviet mass deportations in the newly occupied territories, the Attaché
Division of the OKH and Amt Ausland-Abwehr of the OKW received
reports of widespread unrest in these areas. “Even Poles and Jews,”
read the reports, “are waiting for the arrival of a German army ISogar
Polen und Juden warten auf das Eintreffen einer deutschen Armee].”"1
When the army finally arrived in the summer of 1941, old Jews in
particular remembered that in World War I the Germans had come as
quasi-liberators.
These
Jews did
not
expect that now the Germans
would come as persecutors and killers.
The following note was handed by a Jewish delegation of the little
town of Kamenka in the Ukraine to a visiting German dignitary, Friedrich Theodor Prince zu Sayn und Wittgenstein, in the late summer of 1941:
We, the old, established residents of the town of Kamenka, in the
name of the Jewish population, welcome your arrival. Serene Highness
and heir to your ancestors, in whose shadow the Jews, our ancestors and
we, had lived in the greatest welfare. We wish you, too, long life and
happiness. We hope that also in the future the Jewish population shall live
on your estate in peace and quiet under your protection, considering the
sympathy which the Jewish population has always extended to your most
distinguished family."’
The prince was unmoved. The Jews, he said, were a “great evil" (grosses Übel) in Kamenka. Although he had no authority to impose any solutions (final or interim) upon his greeters, he instructed the local
mayor to mark the Jews with a star and to employ them without pay in
hard labor.1“
Another factor that blunted Jewish alertness was the haze with
which the Soviet press and radio had shrouded events across the border. The Jews of Russia were ignorant of the fate that had overtaken 111. Office of the Chief of District (Gouverneur), Kraköw (signed by Capt. Jordan)
to Minister (Gesandter) von WUhlisch, November 15, 1939, Wi/ID 1.210, Anlage 8.
112. OKW/Ausland-Abwehr to VAA (Pr) and Wehnnachtpropaganda IV, October
18, 1940, enclosing report by agent ”U 419,” OKW-687.
113. Report by Georg Reichart, General Referent of Geschäftsgruppe Ernährung in
the Office of the Four-Year Man, November 15, 1941, enclosing travel report of Prince zu
Sayn und Wittgenstein, August 28-September 1, 1941, Wi/ID .58.
315
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
the Jews in Nazi Europe. Soviet information media, in pursuance of a
policy of appeasement, had made it their business to keep silent about
Nazi measures of destruction.ns The consequences of that silence were
disastrous. A German intelligence official reported from White Russia
on July 12, 1941:
The Jews are remarkably ill-informed [auffallend schlecht unterrichtet]
about our attitude toward them. They do not know how Jews are treated in
Germany, or for that matter in Warsaw, which after all is not so far away.
Otherwise, their questions as to whether we in Germany make any distinctions between Jews and other citizens would be superfluous. Even if they do not think that under German administration they will have equal rights
with the Russians, they believe, nevertheless, that we shall leave them in
peace if they mind their own business and work diligently."*
We see therefore that a large number of Jews had stayed behind not
merely because of the physical difficulties of flight but also, and perhaps primarily, because they had failed to grasp the danger of remaining in their homes. This means, of course, that precisely those Jews who did not flee were less aware of the disaster and less capable of
dealing with it than those who did. The Jews who fell into German
captivity were the vulnerable element of the Jewish community. They
were the old people, the women, and the children. They were the
people who at the decisive moment had failed to listen to Russian
warnings and who were now ready to listen to German reassurances.
The
remaining
Jews
were,
in
short,
physically
and
psychologically
immobilized.
The mobile killing units soon grasped the Jewish weakness. They
discovered quickly that one of their greatest problems, the seizure of
the victims, had an easy solution. We have noted that in several places
the Einsatzgruppen had enlisted the army’s support in combing out
prospective
victims,
and,
as
far
as
possible,
Einsatzgruppen
commanders had relied also upon the local population to discover Jewish
residences
and
hideouts.
Now, however,
the Kommandos had found
their most efficient helpers: the Jews themselves. In order to draw
together and assemble large numbers of Jews, the killers had only to
“fool” the victims by means of simple ruses.
The first experiment with ruses was made in Vinnitsa, where a
search for members of the Jewish intelligentsia had produced meager
results. The commander of Einsatzkommando 4b called for “the most
114.
Wittgenstein report, August 28-September 1, 1941, Wi/ID .58.
] 15. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union, p. 310.
116.
Reichskotnmissar Ostland to GeneraJkotnmissar in White Russia, August 4,
1941, enclosing report by Sonderfilhrer Schröter, Occ E 3a-2.
316
THE FIRST SWEEP
prominent rabbi in town” and told him to collect within twenty-four
hours the most intelligent Jews
for “registration work." When the result still did not satisfy the Einsatzkommando, the commander sent the group back to town with instructions to bring more Jews. He repeated
this stunt once more before deciding that he had a sufficient number of
Jews to shoot.117 118 119 120 In Kiev, Einsatzkommando 4a followed the much
simpler expedient of using wall posters to assemble the Jews for “resettlement.”"* Variations of the registration and resettlement legends were used repeatedly throughout the occupied territories.11’
The psychological traps were effective not only for the seizure of
Jews within the cities; the Einsatzgruppen actually managed to draw
back large numbers of Jews who had already fled from the cities in
anticipation of a disaster. We have seen that the Jews who had taken to
the roads, the villages, and the fields had great difficulty in subsisting
there because the German army was picking up stray Jews and the
population refused to shelter them. The Einsatzgruppen took advantage of this situation by instituting the simplest ruse of all: they did nothing. The inactivity of the Security Police was sufficient to dispel
the rumors that had set the exodus in motion. Within a short time the
Jews flocked into town. They were caught in the dragnet and killed.'70
THE KILLING OPERATIONS AND THEIR REPERCUSSIONS
During the first sweep, the mobile killing units reported approximately one hundred thousand victims a month. By now we can understand how it was possible to seize so many people in the course of a 117. RSHA 1V-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. *7 (47 copies), August 9, 1941,
NO-2947.
118. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,
1941. NO-3157. The relative success of the Kiev operation is difficult to gauge. Before
the action started, Einsatzgruppe C expected to kill 50,000 Jews. RSHA 1V-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 97 (48 copies), September 28, 1941, NO-3145. After reporting 33,771 Jewish dead, Einsatzgruppe C claimed that only 5,000 to 6,000 Jews had been
expected to respond. RSHAIV-A-l. Operational Report USSR No. 128, NO-3145. After
the war, commander Blobel of Einsatzkommando 4a declared that he had shot in Kiev no
more than about 16,000 Jews. Affidavit by Paul Blobel, June 6, 1947, NO-3824.
119. For example. Ortskommandantur 1/287 in Feodosiya to Kortlck 553, November 16,1941, NOKW-163). Also report by Oberst Erwin Stolze, deputy toGeneralmajor Lahousen (OKW/Abwehr II), October 23, 1941, NOKW-3147. The Stolze report was
verified in an affidavit by Lahousen, March 17, 1948, NOKW-3230.
120. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 127 (55 copies), October 31,
1941. NO-4136. RSHA lV-A-t. Operational Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3, 1941, NO-3157. See also statement by Higher SS and Police Leader Center von dem Bach, in Aujbau (New York), September 6,1946, p. 40.
317
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
mobile operation. A simple strategy—combined with a great deal of
army
assistance,
native
collaboration,
and
Jewish
gullibility—had
transformed the occupied Soviet cities into a series of natural traps.
Now, however, we have to find out what happened after the Jews were
caught; for with the seizure of the victims, the administrative problems
of the Einsatzgruppen were not entirely solved, while the psychological difficulties were only just beginning.
In
their
daily
operations,
the
Einsatzgruppen
were
preoccupied
with preparations, logistics, maintenance, and reporting. They had to
plan their movements, select the sites for shootings, clean weapons,
and count the victims one by one—man, woman, or child, Jew, communist, or Gypsy.1,1 Depending on the size of a Jewish community selected for decimation or obliteration, the strength of a killing party
ranged from about four men to a full Einsatzkommando, supplemented
by units of the Order Police or the army. (The Higher SS and Police
Leaders could assign larger formations to an operation.) In almost
every major action the victims outnumbered their captors 10 to 1,20 to
1, or even 50 to 1; but the Jews could never turn their numbers into an
advantage. The killers were well armed, they knew what to do, and
they worked swiftly. The victims were unarmed, bewildered, and followed orders.
The Germans were able to work quickly and efficiently because the
killing operation was standardized. In every city the same procedure
was followed with minor variations. The site of the shooting was
usually outside of town, at a grave. Some of the graves were deepened
antitank ditches or shell craters, others were specially dug.1“ The Jews
were taken in batches (men first) from the collecting point to the
ditch.1“ The killing site was supposed to be closed off to all outsiders,
but this was not always possible, and, as we shall see, a lot of trouble
resulted from this fact. Before their death the victims handed their
valuables to the leader of the killing party. In the winter they removed
their overcoats; in warmer weather they had to take off all outergar-
ments and, in some cases, underwear as well.1“
From this point on, the procedure varied somewhat. Some Einsatzkommandos lined up the victims in front of the ditch and shot them 121. Such breakdowns appear in the statistics of the Jäger report, December l.
1941, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, UdSSR 108, him 3, pp. 27-38.
122. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5, 1945, PS-2620. Report by Hauptfeldwebel Sönnecken (received by Generalmajor Lahousen), October 24, 1941, PS-3047.
123. Affidavit by Wilhelm Förster (driver. Einsatzgruppe B), October 23, 1947, NO-
5520.
124. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5, 1945, PS-2620.
318
THE FIRST SWEEP
with submachine guns or other small arms in the back of the neck. The
mortally wounded Jews toppled into their graves.1“ Some commanders
disliked this method, which possibly reminded them of the Russian
NK.VD. Blobel, the commander of Einsatzkommando 4a, stated that
he
personally
declined
to
use
Genickschusspezialisten
(specialists
in
shooting in the neck).1“ Ohlendorf, too, spurned the technique because
he wanted to avoid “personal responsibility.”'” Blobel, Ohlendorf, and
Haensch are known to have employed massed fire from a considerable
distance.1“ There was, however, still another procedure which combined efficiency with the impersonal element. This system has been referred
to
as
the
“sardine
method”
( Olsardinenmanier and
was
carried out as follows. The first batch had to lie down on the bottom of
the grave. They were killed by cross-fire from above. The next batch
had to lie down on top of the corpses, heads facing the feet of the dead.
After five or six layers, the grave was closed.1“
It is significant that the Jews allowed themselves to be shot without
resistance. In all the reports of the Einsatzgruppen there were few
references to “incidents."151 The killing units never lost a man during a
shooting operation. All thei
r casualties were suffered during antipartisan fighting, skirmishes on the front, or as a result of sickness or accident. Einsatzgruppe C remarked:
Strange is the calmness with which the delinquents allow themselves
to be shot, and that goes for non-Jews as well as Jews. Their fear of death
appears to have been blunted by a kind of indifference [Abstumpfung]
which has been created in the course of twenty years of Soviet rule.1,1
This comment was made in September 1941. It turned out in later years
125. Interrogation of Ernst Biberstein (commander, Einsatzkommando 6), June 29,
1947, NO-4997. Affidavit by Albert Haiti, October9,1947, NO-5384. HartHRSHA IV-B)
watched shootings on an inspection trip.
126. Affidavit by Paul Blobel. June 6, 1947, NO-3824.
127. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5, 1945, PS-2620.
128. Affidavit by Blobel, June 6, 1947, NO-3824. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5, 1945, PS-2620. Statement by Walter Haensch, July 21, 1947, NO-4567.
129. The term was used by Generalmqjor Lahousen (Chief of OKW/Abwehr II)
after an inspection trip in the area of Army Group Center. See his report of November I,
1941, NOKW-3I46.
130. Affidavit by Alfred Metzner (civil employee who volunteered for shootings),
September 18, 1947, NO-5558.
131. Einsatzgruppe A reported that on (he way to a killing site near Zagore. the
Jews had attacked the guards. However, the Jews had quickly been brought under
control. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 155, January J4, 1942, NO-3279.
132. RSHA IV-A-l. Operational Report USSR No. 81 (48 copies), September 12.
1941, NO-3154.
319
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
that the non-Jewish “delinquents” could not be shot so easily after all,
but the Jews remained paralyzed after their first brush with death and
in spite of advance knowledge of their fate.
Although the Jews were being killed smoothly, the Einsatzgruppen
commanders were worried about possible repercussions on the population, the army, and their own personnel. Repercussions are problems that arise or continue after the completion of action. Like pebbles
thrown into quiet ponds, these aftereffects cause ripples that travel far
and wide from the scene of the event.
To minimize the shock of the shootings at its source, the Einsatzgruppen
commanders,
their
deputies,
and
their
adjutants
frequently visited the killing sites. Ohlendorf tells us that he inspected