by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
shootings. For many, undoubtedly, the task became just another job, to
be done correctly and mechanically, i.e., the men made some sort of
“adjustment” to the situation. However, every once in a while a man
did have a nervous breakdown,174 and in several units the use of alcohol
172. RSHA IV-A-l. Operational Report USSR No. 124 (48 copies), October 25,
1941, NO-3160.
173. RSHA IV-A-l, Operational Report USSR No. 88 (48 copies), September 19,
1941, NO-3149. It was in this action that the children were shot by Ukrainian militia men.
174. Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180.
175. Affidavit by Ohlendorf. April 24, 1947, NO-2890.
176. Affidavit by Hauptscharfiihrer Robert Barth (Einsatzgruppe D), September
12,1947, NO-4992.
331
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
became routine.1” At the same time, indoctrination was continued, and
occasionally
commanders
made
speeches
before
major
operations.'™
Once, in mid-August, 1941, Himmler himself visited Minsk. He
asked Einsatzgruppe B Commander Nebe to shoot a batch of a hundred people, so that he could see what one of these ‘'liquidations''
really looked like. Nebe obliged. All except two of the victims were
men. Himmler spotted in the group a youth of about twenty who had
blue eyes and blond hair. Just before the firing was to begin, Himmler
walked up to the doomed man and put a few questions to him.
Are you a Jew?
Yes.
Are both of your parents Jews?
Yes.
Do you have any ancestors who were not Jews?
No.
Then I can't help you!
As the firing started, Himmler was even more nervous. During
every volley he looked to the ground. When the two women could not
die, Himmler yelled to the police sergeant not to torture them.
When the shooting was over, Himmler and a fellow spectator engaged in conversation. The other witness was Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski, the same man who was later delivered to a hospital. Von dem Bach addressed Himmler:
Reichsfiihrer, those were only a hundred.
What do you mean by that?
Look at the eyes of the men in this Kommando, how deeply shaken
they are! These men are finished [fertig] for the rest of their lives. What
kind of followers are we training here? Either neurotics or savages!
Himmler was visibly moved and decided to make a speech to all
who
were
assembled
there.
He
pointed
out
that
the Einsatzgruppe
were called upon to fulfill a repulsive (widerliche) duty. He would not
like it if Germans did such a thing gladly. But their conscience was in
no way impaired, for they were soldiers who had to carry out every
order unconditionally. He alone had responsibility before God and Hitler for everything that was happening. They had undoubtedly noticed that he hated this bloody business (dass ihm das blutige Handwerk
zuwider wäre) and that he had been aroused to the depth of his soul. 177 178
177. Report by Generalmajor Lahoosen, November I, 1941, NOKW-Î146.
178. Affidavit by Barlh, September 12, 1947, NO-4992.
332
THE FIRST SWEEP
But he too was obeying the highest law by doing his duty, and he was
acting from a deep understanding of the necessity for this operation.
Himmler told the men to look at nature. There was combat
everywhere, not only among men but also in the world of animals and
plants. Whoever was too tired to fight must go under (zugrunde gehen).
The most primitive man says that the horse is good and the bedbug is
bad, or wheat is good and the thistle is bad. The human being consequently designates what is useful to him as good and what is harmful as bad. Didn't bedbugs and rats have a life purpose also? Yes, but this has
never meant that man could not defend himself against vermin.
After the speech Himmler, Nebe, von dem Bach, and the chief of
Himmler's Personal Staff, Wolff, inspected an insane asylum. Himmler
ordered Nebe to end the suffering of these people as soon as possible.
At the same time, Himmler asked Nebe “to turn over in his mind”
various other killing methods more humane than shooting. Nebe asked
for permission to try out dynamite on the mentally ill people. Von dem
Bach and Wolff protested that the sick people were not guinea pigs, but
Himmler decided in favor of the attempt. Much later, Nebe confided to
von dem Bach that the dynamite had been tried on the inmates with
woeful results.1”
The eventual answer to Himmler’s request was the gas van. The
RSHA's technical branch (II-D) reconstructed a truck chassis in such a
way that the carbon monoxide of the exhaust could be conducted
through a hose to the van’s interior.1“ This invention lent itself to
stationary killings in Poland and Serbia. By early 1942, two or three
vans were sent to each of the Einsatzgruppen as well.179 180 181 Throughout
179. The story of the Himmler visit, as told by von dem Bach, was printed in
Aufbau (New York), August 23, 1946, pp. 1-2. See also statements by other witnesses in
Case Wolff, 10a Js 39/60, particularly Z-Prot II/vol. 2. The approximate date may be
ascertained from vol. I of von dem Bach’s diary, Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwal-
tungen, Ludwigsburg. Volume 1, a doctored version of the original, was given by von
dem Bach to the German Federal Archive in 1953. Archive (signed Kinder) to Zentrale
Stelle, enclosing the copy. November 18. 1966.
180. Wilhelm in Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Wellanschauungskrieges,
pp. 543-51. Vehicles equipped with bottled, chemically pure carbon monoxide had already been used in 1940 for gassing East Prussian mental patients in Soldau. a camp located in the former Polish corridor. Indictment of Wilhelm Koppe by prosecutor in
Bonn, 8 Js 52/60 (1964), pp. 174-89. See also Adalbert ROckerl, NS-Verrichtungslager
(Munich, 1977), pp. 258-59.
181. See UStuf. Dr. Becker (in Kiev) to OStubaf. Rauff(ll.D). May 16. 1942. and
subsequent correspondence in document PS-501. Each vehicle could hold sixty to seventy victims standing tightly pressed together. Interrogation of Obersekret&r Josef Ruis of the Criminal Police by Soviet authorities. Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Fb 82/2.
Ruis was stationed in Minsk, where two of the vans were employed in 1942. During
killing operations, each van could make four or five daily trips.
333
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
that time the vans were being tested for proper operation in the
Kriminaltechnisches
Institut
(RSHA
V-D)
of
Sturmbannführer
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Heess and his assistant for biology and chemistry,
Obersturmführer Dr. Widmann. The young Obersturmführer had been
in Minsk, where he had blown up the mental patients. He had been
under the impression that the vans would be used only for the killing of
the insane. When he found out about their application in the east, he
complained to Heess that one could not, after all, employ this device
again
st normal people. Dr. Heess addressed him in a familiar tone:
“But you see, it is done anyway. Do you want to quit by any chance?
[Du siehst, es geht doch, willst Du etwa abspringen?}"'a Dr. Widmann
remained at his post and was promoted to Hauptsturmführer.10
There were many technical and psychological problems with the
gas vans in the field. Some of the vehicles broke down in rainy
weather; after repeated use they were no longer tightly sealed. Members of Kommandos who unloaded the vans suffered from headaches.
If a driver stepped too hard on the accelerator, the bodies removed
from the van had distorted faces and were covered with excrement.'**
Clearly, alcohol, speeches, and gas vans did not eliminate the psychological problems generated by the killings. Yet there was no breakdown in the operations as a whole. To the contrary, the men of the Einsatzgruppen were given additional tasks, one of which was the
killing of prisoners of war in German army camps.
T H E K I L L I N G O F T H E
P R I S O N E R S O F W A R
More
than
5,700,000
Soviet
soldiers
surrendered
to
German
forces
during the war, and more than 40 percent of these men died in captivity.
Some 3,350,000 had been taken prisoner by the end of 1941, and during
that winter deaths from exposure and starvation occurred en masse.' It
182. Wilhelm, quoting from Stuttgart court judgment against Dr. Albert Widmann,
September IS, 1967, in Die Thtppe des Weltansckauungskrieges, pp. 549-52.
183. Organization chart of the RSHA, October I, 1943, L-219.
184. Becker to Rauff, May 16, 1942, PS-501. Testimony by Ohlendorf, in Trial of
the Major War Criminals, IV, 322-23, 332-34. Naumann (Einsatzgruppe B) asserts that
he did not avail himself of vans. See Naumann's affidavit, June 24, 1947, NO-4150.
Einsatzgruppe A, on the other hand, asked for another one. HStuf. TKihe (BdS Ostland/
1-T) to Pradel (RSHA Il-D-3-a), June 15, 1942, PS-501.
I.
See recapitulation in OKW report covering June 22, 1941. to May I. 1944,
NOKW-2125, and the major study by Christian Streit, Heine Kameraden (Stuttgart,
1978), pp. 244-49.
334
THE KILLING OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR
is in this context that a relatively small but insistent undertaking was
pursued to kill a particular segment of the Soviet prisoners. On July 16,
1941, barely four weeks after the opening of the eastern campaign,
Heydrich concluded an agreement with the chief of the General Armed
Forces
Office
(Allgemeines
Wehrmachtsamt),
General
Reinecke,
the
text of which provided that the Wehrmacht was to “free itself” from all
Soviet prisoners of war who were carriers of Bolshevism.2 3 The central
administrators of that program are listed in Table 7-7.J
The two partners came to an understanding that the situation required “special measures,” which were to be carried out in a spirit free from bureaucratic controls. On the next day, Heydrich alerted his regional machinery to prepare for the selection (Aussonderung) of all
“professional revolutionaries,” Red Army political officers, “fanatical”
T A B L E 7-7
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATORS FOR KILLING PRISONERS OF WAR
Army
RSHA
Directly Concerned Interested
OGruf. Heydrich General Reinecke Admiral Canaris
I
I
(deputized by
Generalmajor
Lahousen)
RSHA IV
Gruf. Muller
Chief of PW Camps
Oberst Breyer
(succeeded by
Generalmajor
von Graevenitz)
RSHA IV-A Obf. Panzinger
RSHA IV-A-1 Stubaf. Vogt
(succeeded by
Stubaf. Lindow)
RSHA IV-A-l-c HStuf. Königshaus
2. Operational Order No. 8 (signed Heydrich) (530 copies), July 17.1941, NO-3414.
3. Affidavit by Kurt Lindow (RSHA IV-A-1), September 30, 1945, PS-2545.
Affidavit by Lindow, July 29, 1947, NO-5481. Affidavit by Lahousen, April 17,1947, NO-
2894.
335
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
T A B L E 7-8
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR KILLING PRISONERS OF WAR
Screening Teams
SS-Liaison
C,
Einsatzgruppen
Army Prisoner
Collecting Points
sammelstellen)
and TVansit Camps
{Durchgangslager, or
Dulag) in newly
occupied territories
BdS Kraköw
Kriminalkommissar
Generalgouvernement
Raschwitz (succeeded
by Stubaf. Liska)
attached to Generalleutnant Herrgott,
commander of GG camps
Gestapo offices
Kriminalrat Schiffer
Permanent PW camps
in Reich
(succeeded by
{Stammlager, or Stalag)
Kriminalkommissar Walter)
in Reich
attached to Generalmajor
von Hindenburg,
commander of PW camps
in East Prussia
Communists, and "all Jews.’’* Since Soviet prisoners of war were already pouring through the transit camps into the Generalgouvernement and the Reich, Heydrich had to set up screening teams in the newly
occupied territories, in Poland, and in Germany. The plan consequently
called for a three-pronged operation, as shown in Table 7-8. The bulk of
the work was to be done by the Einsatzgruppen, because the Gestapo
offices at home were already understaffed.’
While the screening teams were in the process of formation, military authorities began to segregate and exploit their Jewish prisoners.
The Second Army ordered that Jewish prisoners and “Asiatics” be
retained by the army for labor before their transport to Dulags in the
Army Group Rear Area.* The XXIX Corps (Sixth Army) at Kiev or-
4.
Operational Order No. 8. July 17, 1941, NO-3414. See also earlier draft referring
to "all Jews” by RSHA IV-A-l, June 28, 1941, PS-78.
J. Operational Order No. 8, July 17,1941, NO-3414.
6.
Second Army OQu/Qu 2 to Commander of Rear Army Area, Corps Commands,
Army tc. Army tVa, and Army IVb (54 copies), August 5, 1941, NOKW-2145.
336
THE KILLING OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR
dered that Jews from Dulags in the area be employed in dangerous
mine-clearing operations.’In Dulag 160 at Khorol, the Jewish prisoners
were marked with a star. Since the Khorol camp had no latrines, the
marked men had to pick up the dirt with their hands and drop it into
barrels.* In Army District XX (Danzig), one impatient Stalag commander ordered his own men to kill Communist and Jewish prisoners at once. Three hundred were shot.’
The
screening
teams
entered
the
prisoner-of-war
camps
without
difficulty, since camp commanders were notified in advance by their
superiors.10 One of these notifications will suffice to point once more to
beteiligen,
um
gegebenenfalls
entsprechende
Elemente
auszusondern].""
The teams were relatively small, comprising one officer and four to
six men." The SS men therefore had to rely on the preparatory work by
the army, the cooperation of the counterintelligence officer (AO) in the
Dulag or Stalag, and their own “ingenuity.”"
On the whole, the army was cooperative. The commander at Boris-
pol, for instance, invited Sonderkommando 4a to dispatch a screening
team to his camp. In two separate actions the team shot 1,109 Jewish
prisoners. Among the victims were seventy-eight wounded men who
had been handed over by the camp physician.1* Other reports were
similarly matter of fact. Einsatzgruppe A reported on August 28 that it
had screened prisoners of war on two occasions; the results were
“satisfying” ( zufriedenstellend).'s From the prisoner-collecting point 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
7. XXIX Corps la/lc to Divisions in Corps. September 22, 1941, NOKW-1323. The
coips commander was General der Infanterie Obstfelder. ·
8. Affidavit by Henrik Schaechter, October 21, 1947, NO-5510. Affiant, a Jewish
Red Army man captured at Kharkov, did not step forward during the selection.
9. Affidavit by Generalleutnant von Österreich, December 28, 1945, USSR-151.
The shooting had been ordered by one of his subordinates, Oberstleutant Dulnig, commander of Stalag XX-C. One SS unit did not even bother to deliver its Jewish prisoners to the rear. The Jews were shot on the spot. OStubaf. Zschoppe, Deputy Commander of
8th SS Infantry Reg. (mot.), to XVII Corps. August 20. 1941, NOKW-1350.
10. Affidavit by Oberst Hadrian Ried (PW commander, Brest-Litovsk), October 22,
1947, NO-5523.
11. Order by General von Roques (Commander, Southern Army Group Rear Area),
August 24, 1941, NOKW-2595.
12. Operational Order No. 8, July 17, 1941, NO-3414.
13. Preliminary order by RSHA IV, June 28, 1941, PS-69.
14. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 132, November 12, 1941, NO-
2830.
15. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 71 (48 copies), September 2,
1941, NO-2843.
337
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
(Armeegefangenensammelstelle) of the Eleventh Army, Jewish soldiers were handed over every month, around the clock. A sample of the monthly prisoner-of-war reports from that army reads as follows:1*