by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
Died, shot
1,116
TUmed over to SD
111
One
Einsatzgruppe
encountered
a
few
complications.
Einsatzgruppe C reported that in Vinnitsa the camp commander had initiated court martial proceedings against his deputy for having handed over 362 Jewish prisoners of war. At the same time, the Einsatzgruppe
was barred from the transit camps. However, these difficulties were
ascribed to the fact that orders had been delayed, and Einsatzgruppe C
praised
the
commander
of
the
Sixth
Army,
Feldmarschall
von
Reichenau, for his full cooperation with the Security Police.16 17 18
While the screening teams had few complaints about the army, not
everybody
in the army was happy about the screening operations,
particularly about the way in which they were conducted. In the summer of 1941, shortly after the killing of prisoners of war had begun, a high-level conference took place under the chairmanship of General
Hermann Reinecke.1* The RSHA was represented by Gestapo Chief
Müller; in addition, Reinecke’s subordinate, the prisoner-of-war camps
chief,
Oberst
Breyer,
was present; another interested party, Admiral
Canaris, was deputized by Oberst Lahousen. Canaris himself did not
participate, because he did not want to show “too negative an attitude"
vis-à-vis the representative of the RSHA.
Reinecke opened the discussion with a few remarks to the effect
that the campaign against the USSR was not a mere war between states
and
armies
but
a
contest
of
ideologies,
namely
between
National
Socialism and Bolshevism. Since Bolshevism opposed National Socialism “to the death,” Soviet prisoners could not expect the same treatment as the prisoners of the Western enemies. The harshness of the orders that had been issued was only a natural defense against Bolshevist
subhumanity
in
the
sense
that
the
carriers
of
Bolshevist
thought, and thus also of the Bolshevist will to resist, were to be
annihilated.
Oberst Lahousen then spoke up. He protested that the morale of
the German army was impaired because executions were carried out
before the eyes of the troops. Second, the recruitment of agents from
the ranks of the prisoners had become more difficult. Third, any sur-
16. 11th Army OQu/Qu 2 to Army Group South lb, reports for January-September,
1942, NOKW-1284, NOKW-1286.
17. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,
1941, NO-3157.
18. Affidavit by Erwin Lahousen, April 17,1947, NO-2894.
338
THE KILLING OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR
render messages to the Red Army would now be unsuccessful, with the
result
that
bloody
German
losses
would
increase
to
even
greater
heights.
Gestapo chief Müller was aroused to defend his police. In the
course of the “sharp argument” that ensued, Lahousen pointed out
further that the “special treatment" meted out by the Security Police
and SD was proceeding in accordance with very peculiar and arbitrary
viewpoints
(nach
ganz
eigenartigen
und
willkürlichen
Gesichtspunkten). For example, one Einsatzgruppe had confined itself to students,
while another had used only race considerations. As a consequence of
one
selection,
several
hundred
Moslems,
probably
Crimean
Tatars,
had
been
“conveyed
to
special
treatment”
(der
Sonderbehandlung
zugeführt) on the assumption that they were Jews. Muller acknowledged that mistakes had been made but insisted that the operation continue
according
to
“world-philosophical
criteria"
(weltanschauliche
Grundsätze).
Reinecke
concluded
the
discussion
by
pointing
once
more to the necessity for harshness.
Lahousen tells us that he was motivated during the conference to
help the prisoners, but the arguments he presented served only to
increase the efficiency of the operations. Thus on September 12, 1941,
Heydrich
sent
out
another
directive
in
which
he
cautioned
the
screening teams to be a little more careful. An engineer was not necessarily a Bolshevist. Moslems were not to be confused with Jews.
Ukrainians,
White
Russians,
Azerbaijanians,
Armenians,
Georgians,
and Northern Caucasians were to be “treated according to directive"
only if they were fanatical Bolshevists. Above all, the shootings were
not to be carried out in the middle of camps. “It goes without saying,”
said Heydrich, “that executions must not be public. Spectators must
not be allowed, on principle."'9
As a result of all the discussions and directives, the screening
teams appear to have improved their techniques considerably. So far as
we know, they no longer shot Moslems en masse. In the Reich the
shooting operation was transferred from the prisoner-of-war camps to
concentration camps, where it could take place in complete privacy.“
There were, in short, no longer any controversies over these questions
between the army and the RSHA. This does not mean that all differences of opinion had ended. In fact, there were to be new disputes, only this time the viewpoints were almost reversed. 19 20
19. Heydrich to Einsatzgruppen, Higher SS and Police Leaders. Inspekteure der
SP und des SD, BdS in Kraköw, BdS in Metz, BdS in Oslo. KdS in Kraköw, KdS in
Radom, KdS in Warsaw, KdS in Lublin, and State Police offices tStaaispolizeileitstetien)
(250 copies). September 12, 1941. NO-34U5.
20. See death lists of the Mauthausen concentration camp. May 10. 1942, PS-495.
339
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
In November 1941, Sturmbannführer Vogt of the RSHA sent a
letter to the Gestapo office in Munich to notify the office that the
Wehrmacht
had
complained
of
“superficial”
examinations
of
Soviet
prisoners of war in Wehrkreis VII. During one screening, for example,
only 380 prisoners had been selected from 4,800.21
The Gestapo in Munich replied as follows: There had been 410
selections out of 3,088 prisoners. The 410 men consisted of the following categories:
Communist
party
functionaries
3
Jews
25
Intellectuals
69
Fanatical Communists
146
Instigators, agitators, and thieves
85
Refugees
35
Incurables
47
The selection represented an average of 13 percent. It was true that the
Gestapo offices in Nuremberg and Regensburg had shown percentages
of 13 and 17, but these offices had accepted many Russians who had
been handed over by camp officers for small offenses against camp
discipline. The Gestapo office in Munich only followed RSHA orders.
If the figure was still too low, the army was to blame, because the
counterintelligence officer (AO) had preferred to use Jews as interpreters and informers.22 23
Another example of changed army mentality is even more striking.
During 1942 a number of conferences were held under the chairmanship
of
Generalmajor
von
Graevenitz,
Oberst
Breyer’s
successor
as
prisoner-of-war
chief.
The
RSHA
was
usually
represented
by
Oberführer
Panzinger
(IV-A)
or
by
Sturmbannführer
Lindow
and
Hauptsturmführer
Königshaus.
During
one
of
these
conferences,
Graevenitz and a number of other Wehrmacht officers, including doctors, requested Lindow and Königshaus to take over all Soviet prisoners of war who were suffering from some "incurable” disease, such as tuberculosis or syphilis, and to kill them in a concentration camp in the
usual
manner.
The
Gestapo
men
refused
with
indignation,
pointing
that, after all, they could not be expected to act as hangmen for the
Wehrmacht (Die Staatspolizei sei nicht weiter der Hänker der Wehrmacht).a
21. RSHAIV-A-I (signed Stubaf. Vogt) to Slapoleitstelle Munich, attention Stubaf.
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Isselhorst. November II, 1941, R-178.
22. Report by Stapoleitstelle Munich (signed Scheraier), November 15, 1941, R-
178.
23. Affidavit by Kurt Lindow, July 29. 1947, NO-5481.
340
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
Throughout
occupied
Russia,
Poland,
Germany,
Alsace-Lorraine,
and
even
Norway,
wherever
Soviet
prisoners
were
sent,
Heydrich’s
screening teams were at work." After one year of operations, in July
1942, Müller felt that he could order the withdrawal of screening teams
from the Reich and confine further selections to the eastern territories.
Needless
to
say
(selbstverständlich),
any
requests
by the army for
additional searches in the Reich were to be complied with at once.23
On December 21, 1941, in Berlin, Müller revealed some figures to
General
Reinecke
and
representatives
of
several
ministries.
He
reported that 22,000 Soviet prisoners (Jewish and non-Jewish) had been
selected (ausgesondert) so far; approximately 16,000 had been killed.“
No later figures are available, and the total number of Jewish victims is
unknown.
T H E I N T E R M E D I A R Y S T A G E
During the first sweep the Einsatzgruppen rolled for six hundred miles.
Splitting up, the killing units covered the entire map of the occupied
territory, and small detachments of five or six men combed through the
prisoner-of-war
camps.
An
administrative
task
of
drastic
proportions
had been tackled successfully, but it was by no means solved. Of
4,000,000 Jews in the area of operations, about 1,500,000 had fled. Five
hundred thousand had been killed, and at least 2,000,000 were still
alive. To the Einsatzgruppen the masses of bypassed Jews presented a
crushing burden.
When
Einsatzgruppe
C
approached
the
Dnieper,
it
noted
that
rumors of killing operations had resulted in mass flights of Jews. Although the rumors were actually warnings that frustrated the basic strategy of the mobile killing operations, the Einsatzgruppe went on to
say: “Therein may be viewed an indirect success of the work of the
Security
Police,
for
the
movement
[Abschiebung]
of
hundreds
of
thousands of Jews free of charge—reportedly most of them go beyond
the Ural—represents a notable contribution of the solution of the Jew- 24 25 26
24. The territorial extent is indicated in the distribution list of the Heydrich order of
September 12, 1941, NO-3416.
25. Muller to Stapoleitstellen, Higher SS and Police Leaders in Reich, BdS in
Kraköw, liaison officer Kriminalkommissar Walter in Königsberg, and Liaison Officer
Stubaf. Liska in Lublin, July 31, 1942, NO-3422.
26. Ministerialrat Dr. Letsch (Labor Ministry) to Ministerialdirektor Dr. Mansfeld,
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Beisiegel, Ministerialrat Dr. Timm, Obenegierungsrat Dr. Hoelk.
ORR Meinecke, and Regierungsrat Dr. Fischer, December 22, 1941, NOKW-147.
341
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
ish question in Europe.“' The mass departure of Jews had lightened the
load of the mobile killing units, and the Einsatzgruppen welcomed this
development.
All
Einsatzgruppen
commanders,
with
the
possible
exception
of
the relentless Dr. Stahlecker, realized that the Jews could not be killed
in a single sweep. In one report there is even a note of despair over the
Jewish refugees who were drifting back into the cities from which they
had fled. The report was written by Einsatzgruppe C, which prided
itself
with
the
“extremely
skilful
organization”
(überaus
geschickte
Organisation) of its trapping operation in Kiev. “Although 75,000 Jews
have been liquidated in this manner so far,” a report of Einsatzgruppe
C stated, “today it is already clear that even with such tactics a fi
nal
solution of the Jewish problem will not be possible.” Whenever the
Einsatzgruppe had left a town, it returned to find more Jews than had
already been killed there.1 2 3 On September 17, 1941, the same Einsatzgruppe, already struck by the immensity of its task, had gone so far as to suggest that the killing of the Jews would not solve the major
problems of the Ukrainian area anyhow. The following passage is
unique in Nazi literature:
Even if it were possible to shut out Jewry 100 percent, we would not
eleminate the center of political danger.
The Bolshevist work is done by Jews, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, Latvians, Ukrainians; the Bolshevist apparatus is by no means identical with the Jewish population. Under such conditions we
would miss the goal of political security if we replaced the main task of
destroying the Communist machine with the relatively easier one of
eliminating the Jews. . ..
In the western and central Ukraine almost all urban workers, skilled
mechanics, and traders are Jews. If we renounce the Jewish labor potential in full, we cannot rebuild Ukrainian industry and we cannot build up the urban administrative centers.
There is only one way out—a method that the German administration
in the Generalgouvernement failed to recognize for a long time: final solution of the Jewish question through complete labor utilization of the Jews.
This would result in a gradual liquidation of Jewry—a development
which would be in accord with the economic potentialities of the country.’
Not often have Nazis made such a clear separation between Jewry
1. RSHA 1V-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 81 (48 copies). September 12,
1941, NO-3154, italics added.
2. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 128 (55 copies), November 3,
1941, NO-3157.
3. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 86 (48 copies), September 17,
1941. NO-3151.
342
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
and Communism. But the demands of the killing operations, coupled
with a realization that the vast Communist apparatus in the occupied
areas
continued
to
operate
unhampered,
opened
the
eyes
and
the
minds of even the most indoctrinated Nazi elements.
The inadequacy
of the first sweep necessitated an intermediary
stage during which the first three steps of the destruction process—
definition,
expropriation,
and
concentration—were
implemented
with
bureaucratic thoroughness. However, something happened to the usual
order of procedure, for in the wake of the killings the bureaucrats
thought first of ghettoization and only later of economic measures and
definitions.