Raul Hilberg
Page 63
to be transmitted immediately to the competent office of the Security
Police and SD.”’
5. Himmler to Priitzmann, Jeckein. von dem Bach, and Globocnik, July 25, 1941,
T 454, roll 100.
6. Order by Daluege, November 6, 1941, T 454, roll 100. Some of the men were
taken into the Schutzmannschaft from the militias that had appeared during the first days
of the occupation, others were newly recruited from the population, still others (mainly
Ukrainians) were drawn from prisoner-of-war camps.
7. Order Police strength (Stärkenachweisung) for July I, 1942, German Federal
Archives R 19/266. Year-end data from Daluege to Wolff, February 28, 1943, NO-2861.
For a complete recapitulation, see Hans-Joachim Neufeldt, Jürgen Huck, and Georg
Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspotizei 1936-1945 (Koblenz, 1957), part II (by
Tbssin), pp. 51-68,101-9.
8. For example, the 4th, 7th, and 8th Lithuanian battalions, and the 17th, 23rd.
27th, and 28th Latvian battalions guarded Durchgangsstrasse IV in the Ukraine.
Neufeldt, Huck, and Tessin, Zur Geschichte Ordnungspolizei, pt. II, pp. 101-2. Many
Jewish laborers were employed in this road-construction project.
9. Agreement between the Wehrmacht and RSHA (signed by Canaris and Heydrich), March 1, 1942, in file note of commander of Rear Army Group Area South Ic/AO, October I, 1942, NOKW-3228.
370
THE SECOND SWEEP
T A B L E 7-11
SIZE OF THE EINZELDIENST DURING THE SECOND SWEEP
Ostland*
Ukrainet
Schutzpolizei
Gendarmerie
Schutzpolizei
Gendarmerie
Germans
4,428
3,849
5,614
Indigenous personnel
31,804
14,163
54,794
•As of October I, 1942.
tComprising the Reichskommissariat, military area to the east, and Crimea as of
November 25, 1942.
Data from Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei, pt. II, pp. 54,64-65.
During the second sweep, mobile killing operations were also carried
out
by
so-called
antipartisan
formations
( Bandenkampfverbdnde).
The employment of these formations derived from one of Hitler's orders, issued in the late summer of 1942, for the centralization of antipartisan fighting.10 Pursuant to the order, antipartisan operations in the civilian areas were to be organized by Himmler. In the military areas
the same responsibility was to be exercised by the chief of the army’s
General
Staff.
Himmler
appointed
as
his
plenipotentiary
von
dem
Bach, Higher SS and Police Leader Center, and gave him the title Chef
der Bandenkampfverbdnde (Chief of the Antipartisan Formations)." In
his capacity as antipartisan chief in the civilian areas, von dem Bach
could draw upon army personnel (security divisions, units composed
of indigenous collaborators, etc.), SS units, police regiments, and Ein-
satzgruppen, for as long as he needed them for any particular operation. These units became “antipartisan formations” for the duration of such an assignment.11 12 The device is of interest because, in the guise of
antipartisan activity, the units killed thousands of Jews in the woods
and in the swamps. The killing machinery of the second sweep is
summarized in Table 7-12, in which the terms “mobile” and "local” are
primarily intended to convey a difference in the radius of operations.
10. Order by Hitler, September 6, 1942, NO-1666.
11. Von dem Bach recommended himself, as the most experienced Higher SS and
Police Leader in the business, for the position. Von dem Bach to Himmler, September 5,
1942, NO-1661. The letter was written only a few months after von dem Bach had
suffered his nervous breakdown. Grawitz to Himmler, March 4, 1942, NO-600. He had to
wait for his title. Chef der Bandenkampfverbdnde, until 1943. Order by Himmler, June
21, 1943. NO-1621.
12. Affidavit by von dem Bach, January 21. 1947, NO-1906.
371
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
In the military area the second sweep was comparatively brief. As
we have noted, the density of the Jewish population decreased as the
mobile killing units pushed east. The slowing of the advance enabled
the units to work much more thoroughly. Einsatzgruppe A had little to
do in the rear area of Army Group North. Accordingly, it shifted some
of its Kommandos to the civilian areas of White Russia to work over
terrain through which Einsatzgruppe B had passed hurriedly in the
early months of the fall.13 14 15 Einsatzgruppe B spent the winter in the
Mogilev-Smolensk-Bryansk
sector.
Recoiling
from
the
Soviet
counteroffensive, the advance Kommandos pulled back, and in the course
of the contraction the Einsatzgruppe systematically killed the surviving
Jews in the rear areas of Army Group Center." In the meantime,
isolated Jews in the north and center, fleeing alone or in small groups,
were hunted down relentlessly by the Secret Field Police, Russian
collaborators
(Russischer
Ordnungsdienst),
an
Estonian
police
battalion, and other units.,s
To the south, Einsatzgruppen C and D were engaged in heavier
operations. In Dnepropetrovsk, 30,000 Jews at the time of the city’s
occupation were whittled down to 702 by February 1942.16 During
March 1942 several large cities east of the Dnieper, including Gorlovka,
T A B L E 7-12
KILLING MACHINERY OF THE SECOND SWEEP
Organization
Mobile
Local
Security Police and SD
Einsatzgruppen
BdS and KdS offices
Order Police
Police regiments and
Einzeldienst (German
Schuma battalions
and indigenous)
Army
Bandenkampfverbände
Army rear echelons
13. Draft report by Einsatzgruppe A, winter 1941-42, PS-2273.
14. During the period March 6-30 1942. the Einsatrgmppe killed 3,358 Jews as well
as 37J other people, including 78 Gypsies. RSHAIV-A-I. Operational Report USSR No.
194 (75 copies), April 21, 1942, NO-3276.
15. Operational report by Secret Field Police Group 703 (signed Fetdpolizeikom-
missar Gasch), June 24, 1942, NOKW-95. The unit operated in the Vyazma sector. 39th
Estonian Police Battalion via 281 st Security Division la to Higher SS and Police Leader
North, August 28, 1942, NOKW-2513. Secret Field Police Group 722 to 207th Security
Division Ic, etc., March 25, 1943, NOKW-2158. However, as late as July, 1943, the
Organisation Todt was still employing 1,615 Jews in the area of Army Group Center. Wi
In Mitte to WiStOst, August 5, 1943, Wi/ID 2.59.
16. "Das Schicksal von Dnjepropetrowsk,” Krakauer Zeitung, February 10, 1942.
372
THE SECOND SWEEP
Makeyevka, Artemovsk, and Stalino, were "cleared of Jews” (judenfrei gemacht)." In this area the army also tra
cked down escaping Jews.
One
security
division
actually
encountered
a
Jewish
partisan
group
(twenty-five men) in the Novomoskovsk-Pavlograd area.’8
Einsatzgruppe D in the Crimea reported on February 18,1942, that
almost 10,000 Jews had now been killed in Simferopol—300 more than
had originally registered there.” This discovery was the signal for a
systematic sweeping operation in the entire Crimea.“ The drive was
conducted with the help of local militia, a network of agents, and a
continuous flow of denunciations from the population.11 The army gave
the drive every assistance. On December 15, 1941, Major Stephanus,
antipartisan expert of the Eleventh Army, had ordered the Abwehr and
Secret Field Police to hand over escaped Jews to the Einsatzgruppe.“
The local Kommandanturen and the Gendarmerie also joined in the
operation.“ By spring the Crimea no longer had any Jews, except for
two groups in Soviet-held territory. Einsatzgruppe D caught them in
July.“
17. RSHA 1V-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 177 (65 copies), March 6. 1942,
NO-3240. RSHA IV-A-1, OperationaJ Report USSR No. 187, March 30, 1942, NO-3237.
RSHA Summary Report No. 11 for March, 1942 (100 copies), PS-3876.
18. Report by 444th Security Division la, January 22, 1942, NOKW-2868. The
Jewish partisans were referred to as Judengruppe Diyepropelrowsk. For other reports of
seizures by the military, see Generalmajor Mierzinsky of Feldkommandantur 245/la to
XLIV Corps/Qu, March 31, 1942, and other reports by same Feldkommandantur, in
NOKW-767. The seizures took place in the Slavyansk-Kramatorskaya area. Also, Feld-
kommandantur 194 in Snovsk (signed Oberst Ritter von Würfel) lo commander of Army
Group Rear Area South/Ia, April 7. 1942, NOKW-2803.
19. RSHA IV-A-I. Operational Report USSR No. 170, February 18. 1942, NO-
3339.
20. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 178 (65 copies), March 9, 1942.
NO-3241. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 184, March 23. 1942. NO-3235.
21. RSHA IV-A-l. Operational Report USSR No. 190 (65 copies), April 8, 1942,
NO-3359.
22. 11th Army Ic/Ia (signed Major Stephanus) to Einsatzgruppe D, Secret Field
Police, and Abwehr, December 15, 1941, NOKW-502. Secret Field Police Group 647 to
11th Army Ic/AO, July 26, 1942, NOKW-848. Affidavit by Heinz Hermann Schubert,
December 7, 1945, NO-4816.
23. Major Erxleben (Feldgendarmerie) to 11th Army OQu, February 2, 1942,
NOKW-1283. Ortskommandantur Karasubar to Army Rear Area, February 14, 1942,
NOKW-1688. Operational report by Feldkommandantur 810/Feldgendarmerie (signed
Lt. Pallmann), March 3, 1942, NOKW-1689. Feldkommandanlur 810 in Eupatoria to
Rear Army Area. March 16, 1942, NOKW-1851. Report by Sonderkommando
10b, March 27, 1942, NOKW-635. Feldgendarmerie Battalion 683 to llth Army OQu,
April 2, 1942, NOKW-1285. Feldkommandanlur 608 to Rear Army Area, April 28, 1942,
NOKW-1870.
24. Ortskommandanlur Kerch lo Army Rear Area/Qu, July 15, 1942, NOKW-1709.
Kerch is on the eastern end of the peninsula. Ortskommandantur Bakhchisaray to Army
Rear Area/Qu, July 16, 1942, NOKW-1698. Bakhchisaray is on the road to Sevastopol.
373
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
In the Romanian-administered territory between the Dniester and
the Bug (Transnistria), killings were conducted even more expeditiously than in the German military area. On November 11,1941, Governor Alexianu of Transnistria issued a decree requiring Jews to live in localities
specified
by
the Inspector
General
of
Gendarmerie.“ Pursuant to this ordinance, a large number of Jews in southern Transnistria
were moved from their homes to the southern districts of Berezovka
and Golta.
Berezovka was the arrival point of almost 20,00 Odessa Jews who
had survived the Romanian army massacres of October 1941. The
railroad station of the town of Berezovka, some sixty miles northeast
of Odessa, was situated in the middle of a cluster of Ukrainian and
ethnic German settlements. The Jews, brought there by train, were
marched to the countryside and shot by ethnic German Selbstschutz
stationed in the area.“ The death toll at Berezovka was swelled by
victims from smaller towns and villages. A cumulative figure was indicated by a member of the German Foreign Office in May. About 28,000
Jews had been brought to German villages in Transnistria, he wrote.
“Meanwhile
they
have
been
liquidated
[Inzwischen
warden
sie
li-
quidiert].”"
In the Golta prefecture the killings were carried out by the Romanians
themselves.
The
district,
under
the
prefect
Lt.
Col.
Modest
Isopescu, was located upstream on the Bug River. Three primitive
enclosures
were organized in
the district:
Bogdanovca
(Bogdanovka),
Acmecetca
(Akmechet),
and
Dumanovca
(Domanevka).
These
hastily
assembled
concentration
camps,
which
consisted
of
half-destroyed
houses, stables, and pigpens, held a total of 70,000 Jews, most of them
No documentary information is available about operations in Sevastopol itself. Possibly
no Jews remained there when the German army arrived.
25. Matatias Carp, ed., Cartea Seagra (Bucharest, 1947), vol. 3, p. 200. The inspector general was General C. Tobescu.
26. Ibid., pp. 202-5, and texts of reports from the following offices: Commander,
Gendarmerie in the Berezovka district (Mqjor Popescu), Inspector of Gendarmerie in
TVansnistria (Colonels Brojteanu and Iliescu), Military Command in Odessa/Pretor (Lt.
Col. Niculescu), Third Army/Pretor (Col. Barozi and Lt. Col. Poitevin), January-June
1942, ibid., pp. 211-12, 215, 217, 226-27. The Jews were transported from the "provisional” ghetto of Slobodka near the city as well as from Odessa itself. The use of German trains was noted in a report by Brojteanu, January 17, 1942, ibid. pp. 221-22. See also
Dora Litani, ‘The Destruction of the Jews of Odessa," Yad Vashem Studies 6 (1967):
135-154, at p. 144.
27. Note, probably by Diska, May 16, 1942, NG-4817. The Berezovka shootings
continued after May. Iliescu report, June 16,1942, in Carp, Cartea Neagra. vol. 3, p. 227.
Statement by Dr. Arthur Kessler (survivor), August 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History
957/78.
374
THE SECOND SWEEP
from
towns
and
hamlets,
some
from
Odessa.
Disease,
especially
typhus, was rampant, and food was scarce.
At Bogdanovca, the largest and most lethal camp, killings began on
; December 21. At first, 4,000 to 5,000 sick and infirm Jews were placed
in
several
stables, which
were covered
with
straw, sprinkled with
gasoline, and torched. While the stables were still burning, about
43,000
Jews were marched through the woods in groups of 300 to 400
to be shot, kneeling completely naked in the icy weather on the rim of a
precipice. This operation continued until December 30, with an interruption for the celebration of Christmas.“ During January and February 1942, about 18,000 Jews were killed in Dumanovca. At Acmecetca, where
Isopescu
took
pleasure
in
tormenting
and
photographing
his
victims, 4,000 were killed.“
Although
the
Berezovka
and
Golta
prefectures
accounted
for
nearly 100,000 Jewish dead, some tens of thousands, particularly in
northern
Transnistria,
were
permitted
to
languish
in
ghettos
and
camps, most of them crowded with Jewish expellees from Bessarabia
and Bukovina."
In the civilian territories under German administration, some attempts were made to be efficient as well as rational. These efforts, however, were not always successful. The problems and conflicts arising from repeated combings of the two Reichskommissariate became manifest in the Ostland as early as the fall.
On September 11, 1941, the Gebietskommissar of Siauliai (northern
Lithuania) sent a letter to Reichskommissar Lohse that contained a
short preview of what was going to take place in the coming months. In
Siauliai, Einsatzkommando 2 had left behind a small detachment (Restkommando} under an SS sergeant. One day, the chief of Einsatzkommando 3 (Jäger) dispatched his Obersturmführer Hamann (commander of the Rollkommando organized by Jäger), to Siauliai, where Hamann
looked up the sergeant and declared in
an “extraordinary arrogant
tone” that the Jewish situation in Siauliai was a dirty mess (ein Saustall)
and that all Jews in the city had to be "liquidated." Hamann then
visited the Gebietskommissar and repeated “in a less arrogant tone"
why he had come. When the Gebietskommissar explained that the
Jews were needed as skilled laborers, Hamann declared curtly that 28 29 30
28. Extract from indictment before Bucharest People's Court, in Carp, Cartea
Neagra, vol. 3, pp. 215-16. See also Eugene Levai, Black Book on the Martyrdom of