The Collins Class Submarine Story
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5. Similar views to this were expressed by John Dikkenberg, Mike Houghton, Paul Greenfield and other submariners.
6. Similar views were expressed by Pelle Stenberg and Olle Person.
7. Olle Person thinks it is hard to calculate the effect of removing the flywheel, pointing out that the generator acts to some extent as a flywheel, while Ron
Dicker and Marcos Alfonso are among those who are more definite that
removing the flywheel caused problems.
8. Note to the authors, June 2007.
9. Similar views on the deficiencies of the specifications for noise were expressed by Peter Clarke, Don Chalmers, Greg Stuart, Olle Holmdahl and others.
10. This paragraph is based on interviews with David Whyllie, Peter Clarke, Eoin Asker, Ron Dicker and Olle Holmdahl.
11. This paragraph is based primarily on an interview with Peter Horobin, who, after his numerous roles in the submarine project, now works for Nautronix.
12. The almost identical shapes of the V ästerg ötland and the original design of the Type 471 are clearly illustrated in David Miller, Modern submarines,
Arco/Prentice Hall, New York, 1989, pp. 56–7 and 60–1.
13. Interview with Hans Peder Loid.
14. This paragraph is based primarily on an interview with Olle Holmdahl.
15. Note from Mark Gairey to author, June 2007.
16. Interview with Mark Gairey.
17. It has been argued that the improved performance of American-supplied
propellers after 1999 disproves this point (Peter Briggs to author, May 2007), but by then the submarine crews were more experienced in handling the
submarines.
18. Notes from Ron Dicker, May 2007.
19. This paragraph is based on interviews with Paul Greenfield, Mike Gallagher, John Dikkenberg and Ian Hill and the project office quarterly report for June 1998.
20. Interview with Paul Greenfield; project office quarterly report, March 1996.
Chapter 20. The role of Defence Science: noise and diesels
1. This section is based on interviews with Chris Norwood, David Simcoe and
David Wyllie.
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2. Unfortunately, Dr Schofield was unable to participate in this project. In 2006 he became a non-executive director of ASC and wished to avoid any possible
conflict of interest.
3. This is not quite true with cavitation, which appears with bubbles breaking away from the propeller blade. Nevertheless, vibration can play a role in this process.
4. This section is largely based on an interview with Dr Goodwin.
5. The authors are grateful to Janis Cocking for coordinating access to DSTO
personnel involved with the Collins submarine.
Chapter 21. ‘A patch on this and chewing gum on that’:
the combat system 1993–97
1. Managing director’s report in ASC Annual Report, 1994.
2. Chris Miller of Computer Sciences made this point strongly.
3. This discussion of the combat system draws on the project office quarterly reports and interviews with Peter Sinclair, Mike Gallagher, John Dikkenberg,
Chris Miller and Don Chalmers.
4. Interview with John Pascall.
5. Interviews with John Pascall, Chris Miller, Rod Farrow and Tony Houseman.
6. Interviews with Rick Neilson and Tony Smith.
7. A former Oberon commanding officer, Tony Smith was Peter Briggs’s deputy at the SWSC when Briggs was writing the requirements for Collins. Smith was then director of the centre while the contending systems were being evaluated. He left the navy at the end of 1987 to become the trials manager for Kockums at
Adelaide. In 1994 he was hired by Rockwell and then headed Boeing’s team on
the combat system. Later he joined Raytheon, where he was a keen participant
in the debates over the replacement combat system.
8. This section is based on interviews with Todd Mansell and Bob Clark and a
memoir prepared by Colin Cooper in early 2007.
9. In the convoluted evolution of the world’s arms suppliers, Thomson was
renamed Thales in 1999.
Chapter 22. ‘Hardly a day went by without the project
getting a hammering in the press’: the project in crisis
1997–98
1. Project office quarterly report, June 1997.
2. Interview with Mark Gairey.
3. Interview with Paul Greenfield.
4. Australian, 15 March 1997.
5. ibid., 13 September 1997.
6. Interviews with Eoin Asker and Doug Callow.
7. Interview with Eoin Asker.
8. Interviews with Paul Armarego and Wal Jurkiewicz.
9. Interview with Peter Clarke.
10. Interview with Hans Ohff. These views are endorsed by Paul Barratt, Secretary for Defence in 1998–99, who agrees that leaks designed to damage the project
seemed to emanate from navy sources (serving
and retired) and from at least one minister’s office. Note to authors, July 2007.
11. Interviews with Hans Ohff, Peter Clarke, Mark Gairey and Greg Stuart.
12. Daily Telegraph, 8 October 1998.
13. Paul Barratt, the Secretary for Defence at the time of the alleged report, says that: ‘The only US Navy reporting of which I was aware was favourable.’ Note
to authors, July 2007.
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14. Australian National Audit Office, Report No. 22, New submarine project, 1992.
15. Interviews with Ken Grieg and Hans Ohff.
16. For McLachlan’s leadership of the economic ‘dries’ in the 1980s see Paul Kelly, The end of certainty: Power, politics and business in Australia, rev. edn, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994 , pp. 253–4.
17. Unfortunately the authors were unable to interview Mr McLachlan for this
book. This assessment of his views is based on interviews with Hans Ohff, John Bannon, Eoin Asker, Peter Jennings and Paul Barratt.
18. Interview with Paul Barratt.
19. Interview with Chris Oxenbould.
20. Their view is supported by Paul Barratt, who comments: ‘I had the strong sense that some of the surface sailors felt that a dollar spent on submarines was a dollar not available to be spent on the surface fleet. No-one could accuse them of having the nation’s defence uppermost in their minds.’ Note to authors, July 2007.
21. Interview with Mark Gairey.
22. Interview with Paul Barratt.
23. Interview with Don Chalmers.
24. Admiral Riddell was the US Navy’s senior adviser to allied navies.
25. Interview with Admiral John Butler.
26. Australian, 16 May 2000.
27. In discussions with the authors several Americans referred to the possibility of supplying Australian submarine technology to ‘a third party’, and it was clear from the context they were referring to Taiwan.
28. Review of Auditor-General’s Report No. 34 1997–98, New submarine project, p. 64. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jpaa/
submarine/CHAPTER9.PDF
29. Essentially up to this point the submarines were ‘owned’ by the DAO and
responsibility for their operation and maintenance was ASC’s through the
contract between DAO and ASC. The navy is the DAO’s customer and as soon
as the navy accepts the submarine it is responsible for support and repairs.
30. Project office quarterly report, June 1998. Views on this issue are based on interviews with Don Chalmers, Hans Ohff, Paul Armarego, Wal Jurkiewicz,
Peter Briggs, Paddy Hodgman, Terry Roach and Hugh White.
Chapter 23. ‘Bayoneting the wounded’:
the McIntosh-Prescott report
1. In addition to the sources cited below, this chapter is based on interviews wit
h John Moore, Paul Barratt, Don Chalmers, Paul Greenfield, Mick Dunne, Paddy
Hodgman and Martin Edwards.
2. Note to authors, 12 August 2007.
3. Paul Barratt believes that this was at the express wish of the minister.
4. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Four corners program transcript, ‘Deep trouble’, broadcast 24 May 1999,
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s26752.htm
5. Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters (McIntosh-Prescott report), p. 3. The report is available at
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html
6. Paul Greenfield notes that: ‘It wasn’t until McIntosh and Prescott interviewed retired Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall that he explained the original mission
statement – “the capability to have two submarines on patrol, continuously for 365 days a year 2500 miles from home”. This high level mission statement had
been lost with time.’
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N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 8 4 – 3 0 2
7. ABC TV, 7.30 report, Transcript, 1 July 1999.
8. Interviews with Olle Holmdahl and Pelle Stenberg.
9. Interviews with Peter Clarke, Rick Shalders and John Dikkenberg.
10. John Moore interviewed by Alexandra Kirk, The world today, 1 July 1999.
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s32746.htm
Chapter 24. ‘That villain Briggs’ and the submarine
‘get-well’ program
1. Interview with Peter Briggs, 18 July 2006.
2. The minimum operational capability was seen as being about the same
capability as the Oberons, which was 60–70 per cent of the expected capability of the Collins class.
3. These words are vividly remembered by all who heard them, including Doug
Callow, Paul Greenfield and Jack Atkinson.
4. Interviews with Hans Ohff and Doug Callow.
5. Peter Briggs, ‘Some reflections on the submarine capability team set up
following the McIntosh-Prescott report, 1 July 1999–22 January 2001’,
unpublished notes, 2006, p. 6.
6. Project office report, March 1999.
7. For example, Olle Holmdahl thinks the changes helped ‘little if at all’ and Hans Ohff thought they did more for the appearance of the submarines than the noise signature.
8. Interview with Paul Armarego and Wal Jurkiewicz.
9. Draft courtesy Andy Millar.
10. E-mail courtesy Andy Millar.
11. Project office report, September 2000, p. 14.
12. Interview with Peter Clarke.
13. Interview with Hans Ohff.
Chapter 25. ‘Inside the American tent’: the saga of the
replacement combat system
1. Heads up: Asia Pacific online defence and aerospace newsletter,
7 August 2000.
2. In addition to the sources cited below, this section is based on interviews with Peter Briggs, Paul Greenfield, Peter Sinclair, Tony Smith, David Shackleton, John Dikkenberg and Peter Hatcher.
3. McIntosh-Prescott report, ch. 8.
4. Interview with Todd Mansell.
5. ibid.
6. Probity lawyers were constantly involved throughout the selection process. The quote is from an interview with Paddy Hodgman.
7. David Shackleton comments that at that time he was ‘immersed in a myriad of issues with significantly changing the navy’ and when asked about the combat
system replacement he expected that the computer operating system of the STN
Atlas system would meet the required security standards.
8. Interview with John Young, chairman of the management board of Atlas
Elektronik.
9. Members of the evaluation team point out that Raytheon proposed the changes after the tenders had been submitted, hence they could not be evaluated under the tender conditions unless all three tenderers were given the same opportunity, which would have set the evaluation back several months.
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 0 2 – 2 2
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10. Interviews with David Shackleton and John Moore; Australian, 22 and 23
December 2000.
11. Interview with Kevin Scarce.
12. Interviews with Peter Sinclair and Peter Briggs.
13. Project office report, September 2001, p. 16.
14. Interview with David Shackleton.
15. Notes from David Shackleton to authors, July 2007.
16. Interview with Peter Briggs.
17. Interview with David Shackleton.
18. ibid.
19. Notes from David Shackleton to author, July 2007.
20. Project office report, December 2000.
21. Interview with Peter Briggs.
22. Interview with David Shackleton.
23. Interview with Phil Davis.
24. Note to authors, August 2007.
25. ibid.
26. Interviews with Bob Clark and Ted Vanderhoek.
Chapter 26. ‘We’ll do it and get rid of the buggers’:
Kockums, ASC and Electric Boat
1. Interviews with Hans Saeger, Juergen Ritterhoff and Tomy Hjorth.
2. Briggs, ‘Reflections on the submarine capability team’, unpublished notes.
3. Interviews with Pelle Stenberg, Paul Armarego and Wal Jurkiewicz.
4. Interview with John Moore. Other comments in this section come from
interviews with Greg Stuart and Doug Jones.
5. Hans Ohff notes that the dividend made the ‘headline price’ to the
Commonwealth appear lower and was also preferred by Kockums to a capital
payment.
6. Interview with Greg Stuart.
7. Interview with Doug Callow.
8. Financial Review, 26 April 2000; A.W. Grazebrook, ‘US pressure in RAN
submarine competition’, Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 2000, p. 38.
9. Interview with David Elliston.
10. Interview with Bo Benell.
11. Press release by Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Hill, 28 June 2004.
12. Department of Defence, Annual Report 2003–04, ‘Financial overview’, http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/03–04/dar/01 02 04 finover 4.htm
13. Project office report, March 2001.
Chapter 27. ‘We would find that challenging’: comparison
and retrospect
1. Patrick Tyler, Running critical: The silent war, Rickover and General Dynamics, Harper & Row, New York, 1986 , pp. 137, 203.
2. ibid., p. 323.
3. United States General Accounting Office, ‘Navy ships – problems continue to plague the Seawolf submarine program’, Report to Congress, August 1993.
4. Jim Ring, We come unseen: The untold story of Britain’s Cold War submariners, John Murray, London, 2001 (paperback edition 2003), p. 238.
5. The Times, 18 July 2007.
6. Interview with Phil Davis.
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7. One of the authors was told by a senior minister during a conversation in a lift that: ‘Oh, so you’re writing about the submarines? They were a financial
disaster – they’ve cost us billions.’
8. The figures from DMO’s file on SEA1114 – the original Collins
project – are:
Original approved project – base date June 1986
$3892 m
Cost indexation
$1229 m
Current approved project cost
$5121 m
Expenditure to 2006
$5071 m
Real cost increase
$−38 m
(Source: ‘Summary of Collins-class submarine project and
rectification/enhancement project costs’, 2006.)
9. As military analyst Allan Behm said, ‘I think the Sea Sprite has been a pretty shocking project from
beginning to end, not that it’s ended and it probably
never will.’ ABC Television, 7.30 Report, 18 February 2008,
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s2165833.htm
10. The delivery dates for the submarines were:
01
Collins
15 Jul 96
18 months late
02
Farncomb
15 Dec 97
22 months late
03
Waller
30 Apr 99
27 months late
04
Dechaineux
21 Jul 00
31 months late
05
Sheean
25 Aug 00
21 months late
06
Rankin
26 Mar 03
41 months late
11. For example, Patrick Walters, Cutting edge: The Collins experience, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2006, p. 2.
12. Department of Defence, Portfolio budget statements 2007–08, n 9 above, p.
289.
I N D E X
Åberg, Carl Johan, 82
Australian Industry Development
Ada (computer language), 68, 154,
Corporation (AIDC) and ASC,
155, 251
79, 181
AE1 (submarine), 5, 6
shareholding, 182, 183–4
AE2 (submarine), 5, 6
bid to sell submarines to Malaysia,
Aeronautical and Maritime Research
204
Laboratories, 235, see also
position on Rockwell, 199
Defence Science and Technology
removes support for Don Williams,
Organisation (DSTO)
195
Ahlers, Klaus, 77
Australian Labor Party (ALP), 33
air-independent propulsion, 61, 100
attitude to project, 44, 265, 326
air purification system, 140
caucus briefing, 83–4
aircraft carrier replacement program
defence policy, 97
(RAN), 25–6, 31, 85
influence of Swedish model, 42
Albacore, USS, 60
Australian Marine Systems (AMS), 78
Alfonso, Marcos
campaign to change decisions, 111
on crew training, 208
liaison team, 93
joins Collins, 207
political support, 115
manuals, maintenance, 215
preliminary design baseline review,
shaft seal leaks, 233