The Somme

by Robin Prior

  To what extent was the command aware that in most sections its counter-battery programme was deficient? There was much information for Fourth Army staff to draw on. Each corps and division kept a daily record of enemy artillery retaliation on their front and these were sent to Fourth Army head-quarters for collating and analysing.

  Overall they should have made sobering reading. Of the fifteen reports received from VIII, X, and III Corps, only two described enemy artillery retaliation as light or fairly light. And even these last were hardly comforting. They occurred during the first two days of the preliminary bombardment on the front of 32 Division (X Corps) and were soon superseded by others for the remainder of the bombardment period which described enemy shelling as heavy or fairly heavy.57

  Their situation may be contrasted with the reports of the two southern corps (XV and XIII). They sent in twelve reports. Nine described German artillery fire as light or fairly light. Even so, reports on the eve of battle noted that hostile shelling had increased to levels described by XIII Corps as ‘active’ and XV Corps as ‘considerable’.58

  Given these reports, Rawlinson can have been under little illusion as to the ineffectual nature of his counter-battery programme. Yet his diary shows little sign of this. Only in the area of VIII Corps did he note that the counter-battery programme had not worked well. When battle was joined on 1 July he would find that the problem was much more widespread than that, as the 598 field guns and 246 howitzers of the enemy that had survived the British counter-batteries brought down a curtain of fire on the advancing troops.

  VIII Corps, 1 July

  7 ‘A Short Life’: VII & VIII Corps on 1 July

  I

  Two miles north of the main operation, the diversionary attack on the Gommecourt salient was to be undertaken by two divisions of the Third Army's VII Corps. It may be dealt with quickly. As the two divisions (56 and 46) replaced the battalion that held the line at Gommecourt, the Germans responded by moving up an extra division.1 To that extent the diversion worked. To a greater extent it did not. What was to stand in the way of the Fourth Army's attack to the south was not so much enemy troops as enemy artillery. And the German defences in the Gommecourt salient were so formidable that the enemy command did not deem it necessary to relocate even one gun to support their troops. Their confidence was borne out by events. A total of 6,800 men from VII Corps fell in the attack for precisely no gains.2 A feint attack was probably all that was required at Gommecourt, but that was not Haig's way.

  II

  Further south in the area of the main attack, VIII Corps planned to capture the first and second German trench systems. They were then to establish a strong defensive flank in order to secure the advance of the cavalry further south from counter-attack. The German position was formidable. First they had good observation from their front line over the whole of the VIII Corps sector and from further back more extensive vistas were possible as the ground rose amphitheatre-like beyond Serre and Beaucourt.3 And should the attackers capture the enemy front system they would be faced some 500 yards further on with the fortress-villages of Serre and Beaumont Hamel. Serre was situated on the crest of a ridge and the machine-gunners who manned its encircling defences could direct their fire on most sections of no man's land.4 Beaumont Hamel lay in a valley shielded by the front defences situated on a ridge. Should these fall to an attack, the many machine-gun posts hidden in rear of the village were sited to take a heavy toll on troops advancing down the bare slope.5

  A major natural feature along this section of front was Y Ravine, which bisected the area to be attacked by 29 Division. Its steep sides provided shelter for an entire battalion of enemy troops.

  The other feature that presented attackers with a difficulty was Hawthorn Ridge, which dominated the ground to its north and south. At its tip the Germans had placed a concentration of machine-gun posts called Hawthorn Redoubt.6 General Hunter-Weston's (the Commander of VIII Corps) solution to this problem was to place 40,000 pounds of explosive under the ridge and detonate it four hours before zero, thereby seizing it well before the main attack. His rationale for this time gap being that the delay would reduce German fears of an impending assault.7

  General Headquarters objected and insisted that all mines be exploded at zero hour.8 For reasons that are not clear (and appear to make no sense) VIII Corps decided to fire the Hawthorn mine at 7.20 a.m., ten minutes before zero.9 At that point two companies of troops would rush across no man's land so that the tip of the crater would be in British hands when the main attack commenced.10

  Arguably, the decision to detonate the mine at 7.20 a.m. had a disastrous consequence. So that the troops advancing to occupy the crater might not be hit by their own artillery, the gunners were ordered to lift their fire to the German rear positions the moment the mine was detonated.11 This decision made sense if applied just to those batteries firing on the Hawthorn Redoubt. But in the event the entire corps artillery was ordered to lift from the front to rearward defences. Apparently this was done to keep the corps troops in step as they attacked the main rearward German defences in this sector. Whatever the wisdom of this, lifting the heavy artillery barrage along the entire front of VIII Corps at ten minutes before zero allowed the German defenders in those areas ample time to man their parapets and bring up their machine-guns from their dug-outs.

  As it happened, the crater stratagem proved ineffective. Prompt on the explosion German forces in rear lines moved forward to occupy the lip of the crater nearest to them, just as British forces were advancing across no man's land to occupy the other crater lip. As the German positions were closer to the crater, they arrived at their lip first and directed withering machine-gun fire on to the advancing British troops. The crater remained in German hands.12

  Then at 7.30 a.m. the main attack by VIII Corps commenced. Their initial advance by no means conformed to the stereotypical view of soldiers leaving their trenches in one body and proceeding across no man's land, shoulder to shoulder at a slow walk. In the far north the battalions of 31 Division had left the trenches ten minutes earlier: they then advanced to within close proximity of the German wire and lay down ready to rush the German front line at zero. The follow-up battalions moved forward in similar fashion.13

  In the centre, the battalions of 4 Division adopted various stratagems. Some moved into no man's land before zero hour and ‘pushed’ forward at a good pace.14 Others such as the King's Own Regiment adopted very complicated formations involving leading groups of specially trained skirmishers and snipers followed by Lewis gun teams. In turn they were followed by the main body of the battalion in highly complex, irregular formations.15

  The 29 Division also adopted various attack formations. Some units, such as the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers on the right of the attack, ‘marched’ up to the enemy front line and – where they were not held up by intact belts of wire – advanced on the support line. Others such as the Lancashire Fusiliers rushed forward in columns from advanced positions in no man's land.16

  The main comment that can be made about VIII Corps' attack procedures is that most divisions or brigades or battalions chose those tactics which seemed most appropriate to the conditions confronting them. Certainly there was no slavish adherence to the Fourth Army ‘Tactical Notes’, except to that section of them which gave commanders carte blanche.

  III

  In the event the variety of tactics adopted by the units of VIII Corps availed them nothing.

  The situation was most poignant on the very left of the attack. Here was situated the 31 Division. It was a Kitchener Army unit formed in the main from North Country ‘pals’ battalions, that is groups from the same local area who had volunteered for service in the first days of the war.17 They entered battle with high hopes. One of their brigadiers (Brigadier-General H.C. Rees) told them:

  You are about to attack the enemy with far greater numbers than he can oppose to you, supported by a huge number of guns...

  You are about to figh
t in one of the greatest battles in the world, and the most just cause.

  Remember that the British Empire will anxiously watch your every move, and that the honour of the North Country rests in your hands.

  Keep your heads, do your duty, and you will utterly defeat the enemy.18

  As we saw, the lead battalions of 31 Division moved into no man's land before zero and lay down close to the German wire. They then discovered to their horror that the British bombardment had (according to corps instructions) moved beyond the front German trenches, and that the German machine-gunners and riflemen were lining the parapet. Almost immediately heavy machine-gun fire ripped through the prostrate forms in no man's land. In essence the attack had collapsed before zero hour. By then hundreds were dead and hundreds more wounded. One battalion had no functioning officers by 7.28 a.m., two minutes before the intended commencement of the attack. A few men from the leftward brigade did reach the German front line and pressed towards Serre. They were never seen again.19

  Such was the chaos that even troops in close proximity to the front were unsure of what was happening. Morris Bickersteth was a company commander with the 15 West Yorkshire. He was to go over with the eighth wave. His brother, who assembled this story from survivors' accounts, takes up the narrative:

  ‘Come on lads’, he [Morris] cried, ‘Here's to a short life and a good one’ ... After going ten yards, they found the remainder of 7 and 6 platoons only a few of whom were left alive lying just behind the rising ground ... Morris apparently gave the order to lie down for a moment to try and disentangle the living from the dead, although there were very few of the former .... Morris ... [then] looked around to see if there was any support from the trenches behind and at that moment a shrapnel bullet struck him in the back of the head; a second later another bullet passed right through his head, coming out through his forehead ... He just rolled over without a word ... quite dead.20

  In all, the 15 West Yorkshire, or the Leeds Pals as they were better known, suffered 539 casualties out of 750 attacking. Of these, 230 were killed.21

  The melancholy fact was acknowledged by the brigadier who had so encouraged his unit with visions of success. As he left his men to take up another command he issued another special order of the day which said in part, ‘I bid goodbye to the remnants of as fine a Brigade as has ever gone into action’.22 They had tried to do their duty. But so far from defeating the enemy, they had gained not one yard of ground.

  Nor did the follow-up battalions of this division fare any better. By 7.25 a.m. the Germans, in addition to the constant heavy machine-gun fire, had dropped a heavy barrage on the British front line and on the assembly trenches to the rear. Some were wiped out before they reached their own front line.23 Of those who attempted to deploy in no man's land the experience of the 12 York & Lancasters (Sheffield Pals) was typical. As they left their trenches they found that

  they had to pass through a terrible curtain of shell fire, and German machine guns were rattling death from two sides. But the lines growing even thinner, went on unwavering. Here and there a shell would burst right among the attackers ... Whole sections were destroyed; one section of 14 platoon was killed by concussion, all the men falling to the ground without a murmur. The left half of ‘C’ Company was wiped out before getting near the German wire ... The third and fourth waves suffered so heavily that by the time they reached No-Man's-Land they had lost at least half their strength ... The few survivors took shelter in shell-holes in front of the German line and remained there until they could get back under cover of darkness. What torture the troops endured in the shell holes they alone knew.24

  Even worse was the experience of the 16 West Yorkshire. Their battalion was so badly hit that reconstruction of their ordeal was not possible in their war diary. However, survivors were interviewed and the account of one of them (Sergeant Major Cussins) is so graphic that it deserves to be quoted at length:

  Five minutes before 7:25 the enemy Machine Gun, Rifle Fire, and Shrapnel were directed against the parapet of our Assembly trench the Southern half of Bradford trench causing us to suffer considerably. A lot of men never got off the ladder, but fell back; and many fell back from the parapet, in getting over.

  On getting out of the trenches to take up our position in front, we lost heavily through the line of shrapnel, machine gun, and rapid rifle fire; by the time we attained our position in front of Bradford trench, most of the Officers, N.C.O's, and many men, were knocked out.

  At zero we advanced, and continued to advance until the Company Headquarters, with which I was, found ourselves in front of the Battalion all in front having been hit. We found ourselves then half way between ‘Leeds’ [trench] and the front line. At this point I continued the advance Capt Smith having been knocked out and carried on until we got to the front line.

  In our advance, we passed the majority of ‘A’ Co. halfway between ‘Leeds’ trench and the [British] front line, lying on the ground, killed or wounded. I found in the front line, a good many of the 15th W.Yorks, what was left of the D.L.I. Co. attached to us, also a few of the K.O.Y.L.I. I found no officers or N.C.O's. of any of the above regiments, or of my own regiment. The order came to ‘ease off to the left’ I proceeded to do this, and found Lt. Jowett, of my Regiment, who ordered me to try to collect and organise the few men who were left, with a view to advancing again. At this moment, the enemy started shelling our front line, very heavily, with Shrapnel and High Explosive this would be nearly one hour after zero, but, of course, I cannot give correct time.

  Within a very short time, all the men we had collected were knocked out including Mr Jowett, who gave me instructions to make my way back to Brigade Headquarters and report that there were no men left. He told me that he had already sent back to Battalion Headquarters 3 or 4 times, but without success ... I made my way to what I took to be Brigade Headquarters, as I saw a notice board to that effect, but it turned out to be the 94th Brigade who telephoned my information to the Division, and also gave me orders to proceed to the 93rd Brigade Headquarters. This took some time ... [as along the way I was] ordered, with others, to line ... [a] trench, with a view to quelling a German counter attack which had just started. As soon as the necessity for this was over, I reported myself to the 93rd Brigade Headquarters, who told me that what was left of the 16th West Yorks were being collected in [a trench called] Sackville Street, and I was to return there and look after them.

  In the day somewhere between 3 and 4 in the afternoon I was ordered to form up the remainder of the Battalion in Legend Street, near Brigade Headquarters. After two hours I was ordered to take the 16th down to ‘Dunmow’ trench, which I did.

  During the wait at Brigade Headquarters, I took the names and numbers of the men of the regiment, that I had with me about 50 in all. Just as I was going down to Dunmow trench, first re-enforcement's, in the form of Officers and N.C.O's. arrived. Until the arrival of these re-enforcement's, I had no N.C.O. above the rank of Lance/Corporal.25

  It should be emphasised that the entire scene described by Sergeant Major Cussins took place behind the British front line. Almost all the casualties suffered by the 16 West Yorkshires were incurred without them seeing an enemy soldier or getting one of their men into no man's land.

  All attempts to try and press home the attack failed. Troops to the rear could hardly struggle forward through trenches filled with dead and wounded. Those who left the trenches and attempted to proceed above ground such as the 13 York & Lancaster Battalion suffered 400 casualties before reaching their own front line.26 To persist in these conditions was useless. By noon orders had at last got through to halt any further attacks and to improve the original front line for defence against a German counter-offensive. Even this proved costly. The 18 Durham Light Infantry were given this task. Just holding the line and the support trenches between 1 and 5 July cost them 482 casualties, or almost half their infantry strength.27 In all, nine battalions from the two forward brigades had attacked (about 6,750 men).
Of these, 4,300 became casualties.28 As attacking formations, the 93 and 94 Brigades had ceased to exist.

  On the southern section of the VIII Corps stood the 29 Division. The Gallipoli veterans had been much reinforced since 1915 and on 1 July contained the only troops from outside Britain to attack that day, the 790 officers and men from the Newfoundland Regiment. Essentially, the story here was the same as in the northern section of the front. In the main the wire had not been cut, the enemy machine-gunners not subdued, the German artillery not destroyed or neutralised.29 Even imaginative tactics availed little in these circumstances. On the left the Lancashire Fusiliers had connected a sunken road which extended halfway across no man's land to the British front line via a tunnel. Then two leading companies of the battalion moved via this tunnel to the sunken road on the early morning of the 1st. At zero they dashed forward in extended order. They were wiped out within a few yards by massed German machine-gunners who had emerged unscathed by the bombardment which of course had lifted from the enemy front trenches ten minutes previously to accommodate the explosion of the mine. The follow-up companies hardly fared any better. Not one of the Fusiliers reached the wire, let alone the German front line.30 From a shell hole near the German wire one of the most advanced troops, Corporal Ashurst, surveyed the scene.

  in my shell-hole ... I could look back over no man's land towards our own trenches. Hundreds of dead lay about and wounded men were trying to crawl back to safety ... As I lay there watching their painful efforts to get back to our line I watched these poor fellows suddenly try to rise on their feet and then fall in a heap and lie very still ... Shells whistled over my head and dropped amongst the poor fellows, blowing dead men into the air and putting others out of their agony.31