The Somme

by Robin Prior

  What was particularly ominous about this was the realisation that, after two months of a great Allied endeavour on the Somme, the Germans had still not been deprived of strategic initiative on all fronts. The principal justification for the Somme offensive had become its capacity to force the Germans on to the defensive in east and west. Now the fragility of this clim was becoming all too evident.

  The 1 Division on the Somme, July–September

  19 One Division's Somme: The First Division, July–September

  I

  What was the experience of just a single British division in the Battle of the Somme? The earlier statistical discussion of Haig's armies in the period 15 July to 12 September indicated that no division could be said to have had a ‘typical experience’. However it seems worthwhile to look in more detail at one of the British divisions to see exactly how it experienced the battle and coped with its effects.

  The 1 British Division entered the line on 11 July and exited on 28 September – a period of 80 days. During this time it had three tours of duty in the line – 15 days from 11 to 25 July, 27 days from 16 August to 11 September, and 8 days from 21 to 28 September. Overall then the division was ‘in the line’ for 50 days and resting, refitting, or training for 30 days.1

  During these tours of duty the division suffered the following casualties:2

  Several aspects of these figures are remarkable. The first is that although the division almost entirely avoided the major encounters of 1 July, 14 July, 15 September, and 25 September, it still suffered almost 100 per cent infantry casualties while it was in battle, 200 on average for every day in the line. The second is that by the end of the battle the division must have been a quite different formation from that which had entered. About 3,000 of its officers and men were missing or killed3 and just over 7,000 wounded. Although many in this last category would have suffered only light wounds and returned to their unit, many would not. It seems likely that at least 2,000 of the wounded would have been regarded as ‘serious’ and never returned. In other words no less than 11 per cent of the infantry of the division present on 11 July would not have been present on 28 September.

  How did the 1 Division survive this kind of ordeal and still emerge as an effective fighting unit? A partial understanding might come from a closer investigation of the structure of an infantry division.

  In 1916 a division consisted of approximately 17,000 men. Of these, 4,000 belonged to the divisional artillery (4 × 4 batteries of 18-pounder guns and 2 × 4 batteries of 4.5-inch howitzers) and an additional 1,000 men consisted of headquarters troops, machine-gun detachments, and miscellaneous troops. In general these men, who often operated well behind the front and, in the case of the artillery, often stayed in the line when the infantry moved out, will not be considered here. We will focus our attention on the 12,000 infantry, which constituted the backbone of the division. During the Somme a British infantry division was organised into three brigades of approximately 4,000 men and each brigade contained four battalions, nominally (although few were up to strength) of 1,000 men each. An organisational chart of the division as it entered the Somme fighting looked thus:

  All modern European armies had adopted a similar structure, for the good reason it is were very flexible. So at the Somme when we say that the 1 Division was ‘holding the line’ what we often mean is that only one of its brigades was actually in the front trench system. A second brigade could be 1,000 to 2,000 yards behind in support and the third perhaps some 3,000 yards behind the second, in reserve. The brigade holding this front would be subjected to the most intense enemy fire and would be the unit that went ‘over the top’ in a battle. The brigade in support would still be under fire but probably of a less intense nature. It was so placed to reinforce the front brigade in case of a success in battle (hardly ever a factor at the Somme). Alternatively, it could be available to provide a quick replacement for units shattered in an attack (a very frequent occurrence) or to be on hand to stem an enemy attack (again hardly ever a factor during the Somme campaign). German attacks during the Somme fighting were frequent but usually only had the purpose of recapturing positions recently lost. Few penetrated (or tried to penetrate) so far as the area held by the support units. The reserve brigade would merely take the place of the support brigade if it had been called upon to fulfil any of the above roles. Of course these dispositions represent a typical situation. During a large offensive the front might be held by more than one brigade. This was the case on 18 August when both 1 and 2 Brigades of 1 Division took part in the offensive. A map showing 1 Division's dispositions on this occasion is given on p. 202.

  Yet the picture could even be more complicated. If a brigade held the front line it might place just one of its four battalions in the front trench. This hardly meant that the other three battalions were not in danger. They were almost certainly located in the front ‘system’ of trenches, which might mean that even the rearward unit was within 500 yards of the front – well within the areas habitually shelled by the German artillery and swept by machine-guns.

  It needs to be emphasised that no unit of a division holding the line was exempt from the risk of injury or death. All the battalions near the front were well within range of the German artillery, although the rearward groups would probably not experience much enemy machine-gun fire. Positions further back were not immune from fire. Heavy German guns could penetrate as far back as Albert during the 1 Division's tour of duty. Only the training area could be said to be truly safe.

  II

  If we divide the battlefield into six ‘areas of activity’ from the rear to the front – training or resting; in reserve; in support; in close support; holding the front line; and attacking – we may depict the number of days spent on each by the battalions of 1 Division (see over).

  This table can be taken as a reasonable representation of the experiences of the battalions of 1 Division on the Somme.4 The first thing to notice about it is its apparent uniformity. It seems clear that each unit was rotated into the various areas for as even a period as the exigencies of battle would allow. Thus each battalion spent approximately 15 days of the 80 in the front line, 12 to 13 in close reserve and about 28 in training. The number of attacks carried out during this period varies – from 1.5 to 4 – but this is often a reflection of the level of casualties suffered in particular battles. In some ways, however, this uniformity is deceptive. Units in support could suddenly be thrown into battle, and units in reserve could find themselves engaged in front-line duty. In other words, the actual experience of a unit could be much more chaotic than the table suggests.

  A major point to note about the attacks is that they did not happen very often. On average, in this period, a battalion attacked three times – or once every four weeks. What this reveals is that for most divisions, fighting at the Somme was not a matter of incessant attacks until the unit was destroyed. Just 5 per cent of 1 Division's time was spent in going over the top. However, the time spent in the front line and close support could be just as dangerous as launching an attack – because of continual German machine-gunning and shelling. And no less than an additional 35–40 per cent of a unit's time could be spent in these areas. In short, a soldier could be in mortal danger for four days in ten spent in the battle, which for 1 Division soldiers meant a total of 32 days.

  III

  We will now look at each of the six categories of activity in more detail so that we can establish as exactly as possible what the Somme experience meant for the infantrymen of 1 Division.

  For example, what did it actually mean when a battalion was designated ‘resting or training’? A typical battalion was the South Wales Borderers, which had two periods out of the battle: from 27 July to 14 August and from 11 to 17 September.5

  The battalion came out of the line after a totally unsuccessful and ill-planned attack on Munster Alley which caused around 100 casualties.6 It marched to billets in Millencourt, a small village two miles west of Albert where it woul
d be based for the entire rest period. The first few days at Millencourt were spent ‘as a holiday for rest and refuelling’ and absorbing new drafts to make up for the casualties suffered.7 This period came to an end on 31 July. From then until 14 August the battalion undertook a regular programme of drill, training, and recreational activities. Recreation took the form of sports, horse shows, and concert parties, all run by the officers on public school lines. The favourite sport was boxing, possibly because it was thought ‘manly’ and instilled the controlled aggression considered necessary for infantrymen. The main tournament was held between 1 and 4 August. The Borderers were quite successful in this competition, Drummer Jones winning the heavyweight division and Private Young winning the middleweight division.8

  Other sports played were tug-of-war, sack racing, relay and sprint races and a battalion special, the V.C. Race. This event is best described by the War Diary:

  At a given signal the competitors had to leap on to the bare back horses, gallop the hundred yards between the flags, dismount and pick up a dummy corpse, mount again and gallop back to the tape. After several collisions, and much excitement, Sgt Freeman won on Minnie.9

  Among the other activities were frequent horse shows, an indication of the dependence of armies in this period on the horse to transport guns, cart supplies from the railheads, and carry out many other tasks. Time was also spent at concert parties, although the only one mentioned in the 1 Division diaries is the ‘Follies’, which belonged to another division. There were also such bizarre activities as boot races, one of which caused a casualty when a boot was flung with ‘unnecessary vigour’.10 The absence of team games involving large numbers of men as participants, not just onlookers, can only be deemed surprising.

  The main activity was of course training. At its most basic this consisted of PT, drill, and rifle and bayonet practice, all carried out on most mornings. An inordinate amount of time seems to have been spent on bayonet practice, considering the limited opportunities for using a bayonet in trench warfare. No doubt this was thought to instil the bloodthirstiness needed for a successful infantry attack. (Just 0.004 per cent of all casualties in the war were inflicted by bayonets.)

  One other form of training consisted of rehearsing night attacks. The battalion practised this manoeuvre on four occasions. Twice the exercise was judged unsuccessful because there was ‘too much talking and coughing’.11 On the third occasion the attack was pronounced a success, the ‘only fault being’ a tendency among the men to stop when they were within a few yards of the trench, as if they were not quite sure what to do.12 After this fiasco the battalion was taken to watch a night attack carried out by day, presumably to show them the correct procedure.13 On their last experience of night fighting they had to advance behind a barrage ‘represented by a big drum [which] raged for 3 minutes’.14

  Attempts to practise with contact patrol aeroplanes fared no better. The watches carried by the airmen and the infantry were not synchronised, so that by the time the planes appeared the battalion had gone back to billets ‘rendering’ in the words of the War Diary, ‘the whole scheme meaningless’.15

  Regrettably no detail is given on this battalion's only incursion into wood fighting.16

  In between such activities there were always the stirring speeches by higher commanders. These talks were no doubt intended to raise morale. On 1 August the Borderers were addressed by General Pulteney, GOC III Corps of which 1 Division was a part. After inspecting the troops Pulteney

  thanked the Brigade for their share in recent operations and hoped that the men clearly understood that they were now in open warfare and must use their own initiative without waiting for the commands of their superiors.17

  As the battalion had just engaged in a period of particularly grim trench fighting in which every attempt to capture the German front line (on average just 50 yards from the British) had failed with heavy casualties and which in two weeks hardly gained a yard of ground, their reaction to the news that they had been engaged in ‘open warfare’ operations may well have been ribald.

  The training areas were beyond the range of enemy machine-guns and artillery. The only danger posed to the men by the Germans came from aircraft, which could either machine-gun them or drop bombs. However, for most of the Somme campaign the British possessed air superiority and in any case targets favoured by enemy aircraft were headquarters, crossroads, known ammunition dumps, artillery concentrations, and troops entering or leaving the line. Training areas had a low priority and the 1 Division war diaries do not mention one instance of men in training being attacked by enemy planes.

  Closer to the front were areas designated for units in reserve. For 1 Division these were around Albert (either in the town itself or nearby in Black Wood, Bécourt Wood, or Maxse Redoubt (see map, ‘The 1 Division on the Somme’, p. 202). The units in these areas were normally on standby to replace troops in the line, reinforce attacks, or to halt successful enemy counter-attacks. As noted, on the Somme the last two circumstances hardly ever occurred, so the reserve areas were usually staging posts for troops on their way to the front or to the rest areas in rear.

  So what did troops ‘in reserve’ actually do and what danger were they in? The degree of danger varied enormously. Some units such as the Black Watch recorded heavy shelling for each of the days in July that they were in reserve.18 Similarly, the 1 Gloucesters recalled that Albert ‘was frequently hit by heavy stuff ’.19 They noted a direct hit on a house on 13 July which killed twelve gunners from the field artillery, a billet being demolished by a shell with a delayed action fuse on the 14th and a shell bursting (harmlessly, as it happened) among the headquarters staff as they sunned themselves in a garden on the 15th.20

  The unluckiest of the battalions in reserve was perhaps the 2 Welch. They arrived in Albert on 10 July and almost at once were hit by a heavy shell which killed six troops and wounded twenty-one more.21

  Being in reserve could be accompanied by other dangers. ‘Reserve’ troops were often regarded by the divisional command as being underutilised and they were liable to be used to carry stores up to the front. So on 19, 20, and 21 July, the 1 Gloucesters, who had just come out of the line, were required to provide ‘large fatigue parties’ for, among other things, repairing the wire which protected the front-line trench. These parties suffered twenty casualties while carrying out those duties.22 Another battalion, 1 Northamptonshire, described its experience of these tasks in rather bitter terms:

  Working party of 400 under 2nd in cmnd marched to Lozenge Wood, and thence carried wire, stores etc thro Contalmaison to the front line – considerable shelling in the village, some casualties. Party carried back some 70 wounded, mostly German, from the cellars of Contalmaison – a work which would seem to have been the duty of the 2nd Field Ambulance, which was stationed at Fricourt for the purpose.23

  Five days later the War Diary reported that they were still carrying wire, tools, and water to the front line.24

  Closer to the front were the ‘support’ areas. These shifted slightly after the advances made on 14 July and 15 September but could broadly be defined as anywhere in advance of Bécourt Wood and short of the front system of trenches. The main areas inhabited by the support battalions of 1 Division were Lozenge Wood, the Quadrangle, Mametz Wood and, after 15 September, Bazentin-le-Petit Wood.

  There were varying degrees of danger in these positions. All troops in these areas could be brought under artillery fire from almost all types of German gun. Closer to the front they could be targets of machine-gun fire as well.

  In July a typical tour in the area was undertaken by the South Wales Borderers. On the 14th the battalion was ordered to move from Albert to Lozenge Wood with the rest of 3 Brigade. In this position they were to wait in general support of operations until they received more specific orders.25 The position occupied at Lozenge was reasonably secure. The battalion was located in the old German front-line trenches and found shelter in ‘several excellent deep dugouts’.26
On the 15th however, further orders arrived – they were to move to Mametz Wood and be prepared to support an attack by 2 Welch on the following day.27 While in the wood they experienced heavy shelling which included gas shells. The attack by the Welch failed but another was immediately scheduled and the carrying parties were now required to move bombs, tools, and barbed wire up to the front line. These carrying parties were heavily shelled and gassed and casualties began to mount.28 On the 18th they were withdrawn to the relative safety of Lozenge Wood but were immediately ordered to provide small working parties to construct keeps in front of Contalmaison. These duties resulted in yet heavier casualties as the men came under machine-gun fire as well as shrapnel and gas.29 Finally, on the 19th, they were withdrawn first to Bécourt Wood and then to Albert. They had been in support for seven days, and suffered intense shelling on six of these days, resulting in 50 casualties. Yet, apart from the working parties, they had not come within 500 yards of the front line.

  There could be more gruesome tasks for troops in support than carrying ammunition and equipment. The War Diary of the 10 Gloucesters (a new army unit) recounts a five-day period it spent near Fricourt:

  moved up to the line (from Albert) at the dingle about a mile north of Fricourt and came into Brigade support. The ground occupied had only just been won from the enemy and was strewn with corpse's between four and five hundred of which we buried. On 11/7/16 Lt. J.W. Gray was hit in the hand and sent back.... Between 10/7/16 and 12/7/16 we had 5 killed and 24 wounded practically all from shellfire. The battalion was mainly employed in improving existing and digging fresh communication trenches to Contalmaison.30