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to the parties” with no further action. As counselor, they hoped to educate the
parties, preventing subsequent disputes. “I have endeavored to collect the debts
by getting the parties together and advising them,” wrote Abner Doubleday of
baseball fame and the honor of fi ring the fi rst shot in defense of Fort Sumter, “if
necessary, to compromise in preference to going to the law.” Whenever possible,
they dismissed charges aft er promises to act better. Samuel C. Sloan settled “by
force of personality alone, never assessing a fi ne” with apparent satisfaction to
all. As historian Sara Rapport stated, agents mattered, not issues.
At times, Bureau men cast a skeptical eye toward claims by employers against
their hands. Suspicion sometimes guided their policy toward whites. “It is not
to be expected,” thought F. D. Inge at Leona, “that the slave owner (who is now
the employer of the freedmen) who from time ‘immemorial’ has used the
whip[,] lash[,] and stick will give it up at once, unless in the presence of a power
that is capable of enforcing.” Guided by their experience with the two groups,
agents took the former slave’s word more seriously. Even when they were at
fault, they tempered their punishment, or as one agent put it, punished them
“mild but fi rm.” Agents had jurisdiction in any case involving a freedperson.
Cases, however, were to be limited to minor disagreements, or what one histo-
rian calls “small quarrels and petty disputes.” Superiors worried subordinates
lacked the legal expertise to try felonies like grand larceny, rape, or murder. On
a few rare occasions, though, Bureau men did punish whites for attempted rape
and murder. In later years, they could arrest off enders accused of felonies, but
they then had to release them to military offi
cials or civil authorities. (Bureau
offi
cials in Texas subsequently acknowledged the benefi t of legal training and
pushed for men who were state judges.) Further inhibiting was the Supreme
Court. In Ex parte Milligan (1866) the court ruled the application of military
tribunals to citizens unconstitutional where civil courts were in operation. Th
is
not only cast continuing doubt on the Bureau’s court operations but also insured
the continuation and, at times, predominance of local judicial proceedings for
the citizenry’s redress. All the same, most cases comprised these categories:
contract violations (on the part of whites or blacks), wages, or settlement resolu-
tion; denial of parental rights (either apprenticeship or custody); property dis-
putes; and minor threats and assaults (see Table 4- 4). Such approximated 91
percent of all proceedings. Th
is breakdown continued until early 1867. Th
en
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Table 4- 4 Black Plaintiff s Economic and Nonviolent Criminal Complaints
Percentage
of
Neither
Number
All Cases
Won by
Lost by
Won nor
Type of Case
of Cases
(n=,)
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Lost
Settlement of Crop/Contract
.
Wages/Money Owed/Debts
, ,
,
Contract Violation/Interference
.
All Economic Disputes
,
.
,
,
Possession/Destruction
.
of
Property/Th
eft
Fraud/Blackmail/Bribery
.
Slander/Defamation
.
All Nonviolent Criminal Issues
.
,
Note: Cases came from the Register of Complaints in each subdistrict.
Assistant Commissioner Charles Griffi
n limited proceedings to labor contract
disputes, with all others transferred to the civil courts.
Of the cases tried, an overwhelming majority dealt with settlement disputes
(disputes about crop division), monetary and wage disputes (disputes concern-
ing money/wages owed), and contract violations/interference (disputes about
contract stipulations): collectively equaling 4,439 cases, or 65.3 percent of all
cases: settlement (n=640), monetary and wages (n=3,324), and contract viola-
tion/interference (n=475). Less than three- quarters (74.9 percent) involved a
black plaintiff and white defendant. Slightly more than one in ten (10.8 percent)
comprised the inverse, while 13 percent were all freedpeople aff airs. Fift y- six
cases did not fi t these categories (1.3 percent). One would suspect the high per-
centage involving black complaints against whites would correspond to a simi-
lar percentage of cases where the plaintiff wins. Th
is does not appear to be the
case. Collectively, the plaintiff won 1,952 of the 4,439, or approximately 44
percent.
As Table 4- 5 shows, the number of economic and nonviolent cases brought
before agents increased each year, peaking in 1867. (Table 4- 6 shows the number
of such cases by region.) Congressional Reconstruction’s ascendancy and
Charles Griffi
n’s tenure, who distrusted hostile civil courts, explains the zenith
in 1867. Nearly 50 percent or more of the cases of an economic or nonviolent
criminal nature occurred in 1867 alone: settlement of crop/contract (45 percent),
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Bureau Expansion, Bureau Courts, and the Black Code
Table 4- 5 Number of Economic and Nonviolent Criminal Cases Year by Year
Type of Case
Settlement of Crop/Contract
Wages/Money Owed/Debts
,
,
Contract Violation/Interference
All Economic Disputes
,
,
Possession/Destruction of Property/Th
eft
Fraud/Blackmail/Bribery
Slander/Defamation
>
All Nonviolent Criminal Issues by Year
Total Number
,
,
Note: Cases came from the Register of Complaints in each subdistrict.
wages/debts/money owed (50.2 percent), contract violation/interference (58.9
percent), possession/destruction of property (43.1 percent), fraud/blackmail/
bribery (55.6), and slander/defamation (63.6). With congressional Reconstruc-
tion waning and Griffi
n’s successor readying for the not- so- distant day when
the Bureau ceased operations, numbers in every case except settlement of crop
and contract began tapering- off the following year. One would expect with the
winding- down in late 1867 complaints not concerning contracts would eff ec-
tively disappear. Th
at was not the case. Where white Texans began to see it as a
dead letter in 1868, the freedpeople continued to bring complaints of all types
for redress to the organization.
Table 4- 6 Number of Economic and Nonviolent Criminal Cases by Region
North
South
East
Gulf
Central
Type of Case
Texas
Texas
Texas Coast
Texas
Settlement of Crop/Contract
Wages/Money Owed/Debts
,
Contract Violation/Interference
All Economic Disputes
,
,
,
Possession/Destruction of Property/Th
eft
Fraud/Blackmail/Bribery
Slander/Defamation
All Nonviolent Criminal Issues by Region
Total Number
,
,
,
Note: Cases came from the Register of Complaints in each subdistrict. For counties of each
Region, see Appendix B.
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If he found an employer guilty of nonpayment, an agent generally ordered
him to pay his laborers. To increase the likelihood of payment, he sometimes
placed a lien against the crop. On occasion, agents confi scated personal prop-
erty for sale to pay the owed wages. Even this did not always guarantee payment.
Both uncooperative local offi
cials and the lack of troops in the immediate vicin-
ity to help enforce decisions contributed to white noncompliance. “Give me
Military backing and I can get along well,” Charles Haughn declared. “Without
troops I can only settle claims referred to me by both parties. Th
ose who wish
to cheat the [freedmen] will not come before me . . . .” Nesbit B. Jenkins at
Wharton stated that “the apathy of the civil authorities and the want of power
to enforce any order or decision I may give constitute my chief diffi
culty.”
Because of the proceeding’s nature, compliance rested a great deal on the
off ending party’s faith, desire, and capability to “do the right thing.” Field
agents oft en used practical arguments to increase compliance. “I do not wish to
interfere if you can make any satisfactory arrangement with” the plaintiff , the
SAC at Austin informed one defendant. “A failure to comply with the above
[decision],” wrote John F. Stokes, “will cause more inconvenience than so simple
a matter would warrant.” Patrick F. Duggan warned one that failure “on your
part to return the property may cause you more trouble than the [property]
would be worth. ”
Even when civil courts settled cases involving freedpeople, agents still off ered
protection. Superiors authorized subordinates to oversee civil proceedings to
ensure impartiality, and so long as civil authorities were, they were not to inter-
fere. If a freedperson did not receive justice, agents could abrogate the decision
and retry the individual. Since Bureau courts operated under martial law, con-
stitutional questions of double jeopardy did not apply. In response to such moves,
however, civil offi
cers criticized Bureau courts, calling them unconstitutional, a
travesty of justice, and discriminatory. Even with a hostile state judiciary, Bureau
offi
cials were rather ambivalent about circumventing civil courts. Th
ey hoped to
secure “the co- operation of the civil authorities” and preferred not to interfere
until local authorities forced their hands. When that happened, agents were to
intervene and retry the individual. If local authorities protested, they were not to
“pay any attention [to anything from them] that interferes with your job.” Agents
determined whether local offi
cials had been unbiased. Such a policy founded on
“one’s best judgment” only caused many more letters to headquarters for con-
currence and guidance. “I therefore feel a delicacy in acting on these complaints,”
admitted Jacob C. DeGress, expressing the sentiments of many a fi eld agent,
“unless I will be sustained by you in my action. ”
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Bureau Expansion, Bureau Courts, and the Black Code
Although a few local administrators tolerated this federal intervention, such
instances proved the exception. Th
roughout the state, local authorities resisted
Bureau interference. “It [was] generally understood that it was my intention to
release (by force if necessary) all [controversial] cases from duress and examine
into the facts myself,” wrote Samuel C. Sloan at Richmond. “Th
e counsel for the
defense shrewdly took advantage of it as an argument before the jury & the
consequence was that no freedman was sentenced to imprisonment . . . I have
every reason to believe that such action on the part of the offi
cers of the Bureau
is absolutely necessary to insure the freedmen any justice before the civil
authorities.” J. Ernest Goodman disputed with Colorado County authorities,
who continuously arrested one freedman only to have Goodman intervene each
time to have him released. Th
ey rewarded Goodman’s “good deed” with an
indictment of his own, which Bureau offi
cials simply ignored. “In all their
actions concerning the Bureau,”
Stanton Weaver at Crockett assured superiors,
“they illustrate perfectly the fable of the ‘mountain which . . . shook like an
earthquake, and produced a mouse.’ ”
Two possible remedies came with General Ulysses S. Grant’s General Orders
No. 44 and the recently passed Civil Rights Act of 1866. Th
e former authorized
the military to arrest civilians accused of violence against United States govern-
ment personnel when civil authorities neglected to bring such individuals to
trial. Once in custody, the military could hold them until civil authorities were
willing or capable to try them. Th
e Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed the
former slaves equality before the law. Th
ose violating the bill’s provisions would
be tried in federal, not state, courts. Enforcement was left to federal offi
cials,
including Bureau agents, to arrest anyone suspected of violating the act. Th
ese
measures were hardly a panacea. Grant’s order allowed Bureau agents to make
arrests, but that was possible only with troops, which by 1866 were in short
supply in the interior. Also, so long as General Orders No. 26, which required
the military to transfer all citizens they arrested to the civil authorities for trial
if the civil tribunals were functioning, was believed to apply to Texas, Grant’s G.
O. No. 44 was only a “stopgap” measure. Jacob C. DeGress, for example, com-
plained whites in southeastern Texas thought G. O. No. 44 had been revoked.
Th
ey became “defi ant or something to that eff ect [and are] refusing to acknowl-
edge the authority or power of this Bureau to arrest parties for abusing negroes,”
he remarked. “Th
ere seems to be a general system of whipping and abusing
freedmen as the Planters say ‘because they can,’ that the Military are now sub-
ordinate to the civil authorities, and that the Freedmen’s Bureau nuisance is
done away with.” According to historian Donald G. Nieman, the Civil Rights
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Act of 1866 had limitations. Bureau and military offi
cials, aware of the presi-
dent’s desire to transfer cases to the civil authorities, failed to coordinate a
uniform policy. Individual agents ultimately determined if the bill was violated,
which created an inconsistent and tempered policy. Indiff erence and hostility
from certain politicians in Washington and the diffi
culty in obtaining convic-