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question, however, is to what extent. Were subassistant commissioners tools of
the Republican party, and did they use their positions for political aggrandize-
ment? A noticeable number in Texas, although refraining from openly cam-
paigning for the Republican ticket, infl uenced the freedpeople’s vote and
worked hard to ensure Republican victory. Alfred T. Manning, Charles E. Cul-
ver, and George T. Ruby joined or organized patriotic clubs, such as the Union
League, which was a Radical Republican organization to “evangelize” and
mobilize the newly enfranchised freedmen. Ruby even became the club’s presi-
dent in 1868.
Mathew Young squelched a Democratic meeting at Belton, considering “it
detrimental to the peaceness [sic] and quietness of the Government and this
County in particular.” He further added those “who are not Citizens of the US
have no right to express their views in public . . . those that are Citizens are duty
bound by their oath not to [allow] language incendiary to the acts of Congress
or the Government of the United States [and] any violation of the above will be
severely dealt with by this offi
ce.” “I shall go tomorrow to Sabine County,”
reported agent and Union League member Albert A. Metzner, “in order to
secure the vote of the colored for Mr. [William] Philips [Radical Republican in
the county]. All the most infl uential colored men of Sabine Co. have already
received instructions to that eff ect and I am confi dent that he will be elected.”
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Word spread in Cotton Gin that the SAC was to give a speech about politics.
Both races turned out, each for diff erent reasons. Dismayed at the crowd of
whites, Charles E. Culver gave a speech fi lled with platitudes about free labor
and fair play, but with a hidden message. Not wanting the freedpeople fooled by
those claiming to be their friends, Culver told them to ignore all until they
received a “sign” from him. His sign would come tomorrow, he informed supe-
riors, and “I will defy any one to get it, or make [the freed community] vote [for
them] without getting the sign.” With a child’s giddiness, Culver admitted,
“Th
e best of the joke is I done it right under the noses of those who came . . . As
it is [the whites in attendance] went away fully satisfi ed that ‘the Bureau’ took no
interest in politics.” At Marlin Falls, F. B. Sturgis, with freedpeople coming for
“advice,” told them “they must vote with the party that shed their blood and
spent their money in giving them liberty.” He fi nally reminded them if they
“voted with the south,” they would be “legislatured [sic] back into slavery.”
Whenever agents discovered Democrats campaigning to win the freed com-
munity’s vote, they oft en intervened. Planters in Sterling worried about being
disfranchised by the Radical Republicans. “Th
ey propose to get enough Union
men,” Joshua L. Randall wrote, “to off set the Radicals.” Randall, fearful the
emancipated might be swayed to the Democrats, investigated the situation and
reported “the Freedmen possess more intelligence that [sic] they are credited for
having. Th
e very fact that Planters want them to vote one way, they say is a suf-
fi cient reason why they should not vote that way.” Th
e freedpeople, he assured
offi
cials, “will vote as the Bureau Agent instructs [because they] believe in him
[and] know what he is sent among them for and will obey him in every respect.”
Randall was so confi dent about their voting Republican he ran as a delegate to
the state’s Republican convention aft er his tenure.
At Waco, Charles Haughn reported the “feeling has been very bitter though
the hatred seems to have abated as the [freedmen] seem to have become recon-
ciled to join the Democratic party.” Griffi
n quickly passed this on to Commis-
sioner Howard in Washington. Th
e agent at Lockhart notifi ed superiors about a
similar situation in his district. “Th
e disposition of the white people towards the
freed people is not so bad as heretofore,” wrote Th
omas H. Baker. “Th
e Rebels
have come to the conclusion that their only alternative to get into power again
is to infl uence the collored [sic] vote.” Charles Schmidt likewise saw whites
“forming democratic clubs among the freedmen.” Although concerned, he
resisted intervening too forcefully because the Democrats’ attempts to win
favor with the emancipated had “produced a better feeling between the races, as
the whites are trying to induce the freemen to believe them their friends.” In his
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Bureau Agents, Politics, New Order
monthly reports, John Dix oft en reported the “disposition of the Rebels, Cop-
perheads, and Democrats appear to be to induce the Negroes to vote for them,
and then Disfranchise them, if by the aid of their vote, they can get into power.”
During the 1868 presidential canvass, F. P. Wood informed not only superiors in
Galveston, but also Commissioner Howard about freedpeople joining Demo-
cratic clubs. Agents in Texas never willingly did anything to help Democrats
and rarely countenanced any attempts by the “opposition. ”
Th
ese attitudes were encouraged and accepted by superiors. Even the most
important agent in Texas openly admitted this active role in politics. William H.
Sinclair, on one of his many inspection tours in April 1867, commented on the
infl uence Bureau men had with freedmen voters and recommended ways to use it
to help the Republican party. Aft er inspecting Fred W. Reinhard and James C.
Devine, the agents at Leon and Walker Counties respectively, Sinclair commented
on the superior ability of these two men, especially Reinhard, who he called “one
of the best agents we have.” Part of their superior ability, according to the inspec-
tor, was their ability to “control nearly all the freedpeople in their counties when
any move is made towards reorganizing the state.” He continued:
I respectfully suggest that it will be well to change as few agents as possible
from this time until the vote shall be taken for an adoption of the Sherman
bill [Reconstruction Act of 1867] for they can control more of the freedpeoples
[sic] votes than any other class of persons. A word from the ‘Bureau’ or a ticket
from him will be received with the most confi dence and they will act as he
suggests before that of any one else. Agents throughout the state understand
the infl uence they will have in the coming reorganization and intend to use it,
but where there are no agents the planters will generally control the votes of
their laborers. Old long established agents can do much more than those
newly appoi
nted and who have not secured the confi dence of the freedpeople.
Th
e state is so large and agents so scarce that it will be diffi
cult to control a
majority of the freedpeoples [sic] votes without the infl uence of agents in the
localities where they are stationed but they need no instructions in regard to
this matter. I mean that it will take the infl uence of agents in localities where
they are stationed to control [and] infl uence the votes of the freedpeople in
such a way as to give a majority against the side that will be most popular with
the white population, which will be the secession side.
From George T. Ruby encouraging the “Party of Lincoln” to Mathew Young
preventing Democratic speeches, from William H. Sinclair infl uencing the
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The Charles Griffin Era, Early 1867
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freedmen’s vote to Alex Ferguson investigating a Democratic candidate accused
of buying freedmen’s votes, Bureau agents winked at the idea of being nonpar-
tisan. Considering their work, it was diffi
cult to be anything but politically
involved. Fearing white violence, offi
cials cautioned about being too partisan
publicly. Nonetheless, fi eld agents understood a strong Republican party in
Texas would not only aid their work, but also help protect the freedpeople. If the
state’s civil offi
ces “were in the hands of original Union men,” believed Anthony
M. Bryant, “the country would be redeemed in a very short time.” Philip How-
ard went so far as to declare “the Bureau might be done away with if we had
loyal men in our county offi
ces. But so long as a Rebel is in offi
ce . . . the Freed-
men require protection.” All they had to do was think about the source of many
of their problems to help the freed community: the “Rebel community;” those
who made war against the United States and resisted the Bureau at every turn.
Th
at community embodied the Democratic party. To that end, they worked for
its defeat. Whether protecting a laborer’s wages or ensuring a freedwoman’s
right to her children, an agent’s work, at its foundation, was political. It benefi ted
the freedpeople and helped to defi ne them as new citizens. Th
at which benefi ted
the emancipated aided the Republican cause.
As noted, one of the political responsibilities was to recommend civil offi
cials
for removal. Dismissal from offi
ce, however, was a double- edged sword. Suspi-
cious of civilian agents, Griffi
n considered some not far removed from the state’s
Democratic offi
ceholders. He preferred to fi ll his organization with military
offi
cers, but this was not always possible. His desires gave way to reality. Nearly
half the SACs during Griffi
n’s administration were civilians, even with greater
“militarization” of the Bureau. Since the agency needed them, headquarters
wanted to ensure their commitment, and those not meeting expectations (man-
power needs or not) were dismissed. Griffi
n instituted a network of surveillance
(inspectors, traveling agents, SACs, and, at times, even loyal citizens), hoping to
remove troublesome and ineff ective personnel.
Part of what Griffi
n wanted to do with this inspection system was to discover
those with a Confederate past. Information surfaced that civilian agents Edwin
Finch, James Burke, D. S. Hunsaker, A. P. Delano, H. S. Johnson, and a few
others had supported the Stars and Bars. When the accusations were proven,
most were dismissed, being unable to take the ironclad oath. For example, D. S.
Hunsaker, a local doctor, was appointed as Bureau agent to his home county
(Trinity). Soon loyal whites questioned his Unionism, calling him a “rabid
secessionist” and revealing he disliked President Abraham Lincoln and fi red a
shot at the president’s effi
gy in 1861. A former slaveholder, Hunsaker, according
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Bureau Agents, Politics, New Order
to the accusations, showed his “extreme pro- slavery proclivities” by “idioticly
[sic] and barbarously without provocation” beating his $1,800 slave. Avoiding
Confederate service by hiring a substitute, whom he never paid, Hunsaker
moved to another county and eventually to Mexico, “not because he was prin-
cipaled [sic] against secession . . . but because he was too big a coward and pol-
troon to stand up to the principals [sic] he had time and again avowed.” Another
accusation appeared in the local paper alleging “grossly improper conduct”
while in Bureau service. Wanting to defend himself and believing Griffi
n would
dismiss any accusations appearing in a “Rebel” newspaper, Hunsaker sent copies
to him. He misjudged Griffi
n, who, despite freedpeople expressing their support
for Hunsaker, summarily dismissed the doctor from offi
ce.
A single standard did not exist. Certain indiscretions could be overlooked.
John Dix and Anthony M. Bryant, for example, were both “scalawag” agents
appointed by Griffi
n. Many white loyalists attested to Dix’s Unionist creden-
tials. But the former Rebel community had no such love for him. Th
ey expressed
their anger in a letter to Griffi
n, accusing Dix of oppression and giving “sub-
stantial aid and comfort to the enemies of the Union—that [he] took the oath of
allegiance to the confederate states.” Th
ey additionally claimed he armed Con-
federate gunboats. Such charges resulted in the dismissal of others, but not Dix.
He had power and infl uence on his side. In addition to the endorsement of the
leading Radical Republican in the state, Edmund Jackson Davis, Dix had the
confi dence of Griffi
n, who knew his patriotism and loyalty to be unquestioned.
Griffi
n apparently dismissed the accusations, since no further mention of the
charges exist in the records.
Anthony M. Bryant, a long- time resident of Texas, wealthy farmer, former
slaveholder, and county judge during Andrew Jackson Hamilton’s adminis-
tration, was appointed agent at Sherman, Texas, in March 1867. Information,
however, soon surfaced he had run for a position (as a Unionist candidate) in
the Rebel government in late 1861. Although Bryant lost to his Rebel oppo-
nent, there was some doubt if he could take the ironclad oath. “I can take any
other part of the oath,” he stated. “I can swear that I did not run for the offi
ce
to aid the Rebellion but to the very reverse.” Because the oath also disqualifi ed
those who “sought” political offi
ce in the Confederacy, Bryant’s appointment
was in jeopardy. Griffi
n, nonetheless, intervened
, retaining him in service. He
concluded he “sought offi
ce not to aid but resist the rebellion. . . .” By the end
of the year, aft er a commendable tenure, Bryant left the agency for political
offi
ce.
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In April 1867 the AC followed his orders on registration with “the most cel-
ebrated act of military interference with civil courts during Reconstruction.”
Griffi
n designed Circular Order No. 13 to bring about fairness and justice. Based
on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it intended “solely to protect loyal residents in
their lives and property.” Th
e order precluded those disqualifi ed by the “iron-
clad oath” from serving on juries and required all prospective jurors to take the
oath. Required of all federal employees since 1862, the oath disqualifi ed any
person who voluntarily gave “aid, countenance, counsel or encouragement to
persons engaged in armed hostilities” against the U.S. Under the Reconstruc-
tion Act of 1867, General Orders No. 26, which required the military to transfer
all citizens arrested to the civil authorities for trial, was now nullifi ed. Griffi
n
now had the option to try individuals by civil courts or military commissions.
Bureau offi
cials, preferring to work through the civil courts if impartial,
banked the mere threat would prompt civil authorities to act fairly. In conjunc-
tion with the threat, Circular Order No. 13 allowed an infl ux of freedmen to the
jury box, to ensure justice and possibly remedy the problem of uncooperative
state courts.
Along with confusion, fi eld agents immediately met resistance to the order.
Most oft en, complaints were about conscious eff orts to evade the order. In July
1867, one month aft er telling superiors troops were unnecessary in his district,
A. H. Mayer requested their presence. He did not need them to quell white vio-
lence, but to force judicial offi
cials in Liberty to abide by the order. Charles E.
Culver experienced the same diffi
culty with those in Cotton Gin. “I fi nd that
they did not even make as much as an inquiry as to whether there were or were
not men in the County [who] could take the prescribed Oath,” reported Culver.