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the term “Bureau Court” and “Freedmen’s Court” to mean any agent who a
white person had to appear before. Reynolds further reminded that numerous
congressional statutes and several circulars and general orders had granted his
men the power to adjudicate cases involving freedmen.
Hancock, however, responded those “may have been in force under previous
District Commanders but nothing therein contained inconsistent with the
orders and instructions of the present commander will be sanctioned or practi-
cal in this command.” He reminded Reynolds the civil tribunals were opera-
tional and all cases had to go through them. Wanting to underscore his point,
Hancock told Reynolds that his argument might have worked with others but
no longer. Hancock ended with “the authority of the District Commander can-
not be interfered with in any manner by” the head of the Freedmen’s Bureau in
Texas. Th
e very Reconstruction Act of 1867 referenced granted him the sole
power to deal with all legal matters in his district.
To Hancock, Bureau courts confl icted with his policy and would not be toler-
ated. Reynolds, not meaning to meddle or disobey, simply wanted to protect the
integrity of his personnel and protect the freedpeople. Believing his predeces-
sors’ policies confusing with “unsatisfactory results,” Reynolds desired unifor-
mity in his command in Texas. He reiterated his desire to transfer power to civil
authorities. Th
is paralleled Hancock’s wishes. Wanting to secure his agency’s
authority, he nonetheless, reminded Hancock that so long as the Bureau existed
“the freedpeople cannot be properly prevented from appealing to the Agents for
advice and action.” Reynolds even appeared to question his superior’s judgment
in issuing an order for a state that he knew little about. “Th
e condition of aff airs
generally in Texas,” he stated, “is not comprehended by people out of the State,
and to fully appreciate [it] must be experienced. ”
As it appeared the Bureau’s authority had been all but eliminated, Hancock
resigned as commander of the Fift h Military District in early spring 1868. He
resigned aft er superiors reversed some of his decisions to remove individuals
from offi
ce in Louisiana. According to David M. Jordan, General Hancock’s
biographer, “It was clear to Hancock that the reversal . . . had fatally compro-
mised his eff ectiveness in the district. . . .” Seeing an opportunity, Reynolds
moved quickly to reestablish his agency’s authority and to “insure greater uni-
formity of action” within Texas. In General Orders No. 4, which was very simi-
lar to his previous proposal to Howard countermanded by Hancock, Reynolds
outlined his plan to establish uniformity, to correct the many “unauthorized
things” agents had done, and to sustain fi eld personnel “in the exercise of their
legitimate authority.” Admitting that a few agents had exceeded their authority
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The Freedmen’s Bureau’s End
and realizing their limited legal knowledge, Reynolds limited subordinates to
minor cases involving freedpeople. Although all major cases were to be decided
in civil courts, Bureau agents’ “jurisdiction will not be limited by the amount in
[question].” When a freedperson’s case went before a civil magistrate, Reynolds
wanted to “give advice and if necessary personal supervision in important
cases” and to ensure the proceeding’s impartiality. G. O. No. 4 did not “restrict
the power already exercised by Agents of the Bureau,” but authorized them “to
order the Civil Offi
cers to execute their orders.” Local law enforcement had to
honor all writs and warrants issued, and any civil offi
cial deemed derelict could
be replaced. Reynolds, to ensure honesty, had inspectors who would routinely
measure their performance.
Reynolds’s order reestablished fi eld agents’ authority to handle certain cases.
By limiting agents to minor cases, Reynolds hoped to solve the problems that
plagued his predecessors. Th
e same diffi
culties experienced in judicial matters
during Gregory’s, Kiddoo’s, and Griffi
n’s tenures, in fact, continued during
Reynolds’s administration. Many were still uncertain about their authority and
what was to be left to the civil authorities. To a large extent, this confusion
stemmed from the ever changing policies from above. T. M. K. Smith at Mar-
shall wanted to know if he had the authority “under recent orders” to fi ne indi-
viduals for breach of contract and assault. William G. Kirkman likewise
confessed he did not know the state’s laws concerning the jurisdiction of a jus-
tice of the peace. William H. Rock not only requested a copy of “Sayle’s Treatise”
(contains the proceedings for justice of peace), but also inquired whether his
jurisdiction extended to criminal cases. F. P. Wood at Brenham inquired if he
could “set aside” decisions by “Civil Tribunals such as Mayors and Justices” if
the decisions were “unjust and onerous.” Because of the many changing orders,
Charles Schmidt was hesitant to “assume authority.” With such uncertainty and
in some cases unwillingness to “assume authority,” whites were emboldened to
“defy . . . authority” with words as well as violent actions.
With so much confusion among fi eld personnel and resistance from whites
against the Bureau’s judicial proceedings, Reynolds ordered Sinclair to investi-
gate further the effi
cacy of Bureau men settling disputes. Aft er his tour, he
proposed that General Orders No. 4 be revoked, and for agents “hereaft er to
turn over to the civil authorities all cases . . . and act as advisor and council for
the freedpeople.” (A policy very similar to Hancock’s.) When there are “civil
offi
cers who fail to execute the criminal laws of the state” the inspector wrote,
they “generally [are] so plain that any violation or disregard of the laws govern-
ing them can be easily detected by an agent watching the course of the proceed-
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The J. J. Reynolds Era, Sept. 1867–Dec. 1868
155
ings.” Sinclair understood “the freedpeople must soon look for redress in all
cases to the civil law and it is better that the change be gradual and while they
have some one to advise them, than [wait] up to the last moment [when] agents
. . . suddenly leave them as it were in the dark.” He wanted Reynolds to focus on
the “greater good . . . agents do” instead of their mediation. Th
e “real business
they do does not by any means represent the actual value they are to the freed-
people.” Th
ey work in a “silent manne
r,” with a “presence” to prevent innumer-
able outrages against freedpeople.
Sinclair also investigated the labor situation, specifi cally any adverse eff ects
from Hancock’s orders. He discovered planters, believing the Bureau irrelevant,
had been using the old labor laws passed in the state’s Black Code to deprive
workers of their wages. Reminding superiors of the Bureau’s past policy to “set
aside and disregard” these laws, Sinclair advised Reynolds to guarantee “that
the fi rst lien upon the crop should be for those [freedpeople] who made it.” If
they did not “guarantee . . . wages as the fi rst lien,” he believed, it would greatly
hinder the ability to “secure to the freedpeople the fruits of their labor.” Sinclair
wanted to convey the “helpless condition the freedpeople are left in when they
have no recourse but through the laws of the state to recover . . . the fruits of
their labor. ”
In conjunction with the labor problems was increased violence. Unlike prior
administrations, Reynolds’s time, for the most part, witnessed unabated resis-
tance, numerous instances of outrages against freedpeople, and constant verbal
and physical attacks against subordinates. As Figure 8–1 shows, fi eld agents
reported a constant level of “bad” or “worsening” white sentiment toward union-
ist forces throughout 1868.
More conspicuous was the precipitous drop in “good,” “improving,” or
“indiff erent” feeling. Th
e intensity of resistance against reconstruction eff orts
perhaps may not have increased at all. It appears the level of support or apathy
from the white community instead decreased. According to the monthly
reports from October 1867 through December 1868, agents collectively reported
“bad” or “worsening” opinion from the white community in ten of the fi ft een
months. Th
e worse months for rebellious attitudes were April and June 1868,
with hostile sentiments reported in 67 percent of the reports (April=16/24 and
June=20/30). It would be too simplistic to indicate this trend to any one event,
with that year having several divisive aff airs. More than likely, the political col-
lisions throughout the year synthesized a constant level of hostility. Whether
caused by President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment in the spring and early
summer of 1868 or the increased political activity of the freedpeople and agents,
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The Freedmen’s Bureau’s End
25
20
15
10
Good
Bad
5
0
Figure 8–1. Monthly Reports of White Attitudes Toward Freedpeople.
white Texans resisted federal authority at every turn. At Marlin, Charles F.
Rand, who routinely stated he had no troops and required none, fi nally admit-
ted the situation required soldiers. In Seguin in summer 1868, C. C. Raymond,
who also routinely stated not needing troops, likewise reported that “white men
in disguise” were a disruptive force. Th
e situation in Charles Haughn’s district
was bad enough for him to state that slavery, at least, off ered some protection to
the freedpeople. “In time of slavery,” he wrote, “they had to bear only the abuse
of their masters. Now they bear the abuse of every drunken, worthless, murder-
ing villain in the country.” In Tyler, Gregory Barrett admitted the “disposition
of the whites toward the freedpeople, is as bad as can be.”
Many attributed the resistance to the impeachment trial of President
Andrew Johnson and the upcoming presidential and state elections. T. M. K.
Smith noticed prominent businessmen refusing to hire any freedman “who
does not produce a certifi cate membership of the Democratic club and who
does not pledge himself to vote as his employer shall dictate.” In Corpus
Christi, a place that generally had good race relations, John Dix detected “a
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157
strong disposition to break down Negro suff erage [sic].” He predicted whites
would now bring “all the means that can be brought to bear upon the subject,
except violence, and many rebels would use violence, if not restrained by fear
of military authority.” According to Dix, planters threatened not to hire any
former slave who voted Republican. Th
ey ridiculed the thought of black politi-
cal participation. Following the canvass, Dix reported good relations between
the races. Meanwhile, the deteriorating conditions soon spread to quiet dis-
tricts; or so it was reported by at least a few who thought it would spread. Con-
sider the case of Arthur B. Homer, who reported all was quiet in Columbia in
August 1868, “but I fear trouble during the election.” When no trouble occurred,
he later admitted race relations were “improving [and] outside of [the] political,
there is no trouble—and only talk of that.” Improving to the point, indeed, he
needed no troops.
Deteriorating conditions raised a new concern for some: the emancipated
arming (or rumors of arming) themselves for protection. Th
is problem was not
widespread, and only a few actually had to deal with it. Consider the case of F.
P. Wood in Brenham. According to Wood, freedpeople armed themselves aft er
they heard about Ku Klux Klan terror. Th
ey even carried weapons to the fi elds
for protection. Th
e trouble began when the Austin County sheriff arrested two
freedmen. Many considered this an excuse by the Klan to detain them until
they could be “dealt” with later. Hearing of the arrests, the freed community
immediately organized and set out to fi nd the sheriff . When confronted, he
released the two. Th
e sheriff , who was not part of any Klan conspiracy, actually
arrested the two for killing several oxen. For unknown reasons, however, he did
not inform the two the reason of their arrest or to the others who witnessed it,
causing them to think the worst. Wood believed the whole situation was caused
by “rumors and vague statements” and “distempered imaginations” in the freed
community, usually from past “evil designs” by whites. Wood had soldiers
patrol the town and disarm any who tried to enter armed. A later inspection,
nonetheless, placed much of the blame for the problems in the county on the
action (and in this case, nonaction) by Wood. “[I]nstead of attending to their
cases [claims by freedpeople against whites] and seeing that they had a speedy
examination or were released,” the inspector concluded, Wood went “to his
plantation.” Although Wood was not relieved from duty, probably because the
harvest season was near, Reynolds instead removed Austin County (Hemp-
stead) from his district. Alex B. Coggeshall was appointed to the new district.
Conditions quic
kly improved and Coggeshall informed he neither had troops,
nor needed them.
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The Freedmen’s Bureau’s End
VRC offi
cer N. H. Randlett had to deal with more than just rumors.
Appointed in early 1866, Randlett served at Navasota, Courtney, and Palestine
before going to Bryan, Brazos County. Reynolds thought very highly of Rand-
lett, reappointing him as a civilian agent in early 1868 aft er his muster out. He
experienced few problems at Bryan. But that changed in the early summer of
1868, when “the Ku Klux attempted to frighten the freedmen by marching
through their village.” Not easily cowed, the freedpeople took pot shots at the
disguised men. Th
ey beat a hasty retreat. Th
e Klan vowed revenge. Th
e emanci-
pated mobilized for protection. With former slaves drilling and “forming a
military organization,” whites in Brazos County appealed to Randlett to “stop
the carrying of arms by the freedmen.” Th
e agent, however, told them he would
disarm them only aft er “the whites put a stop to . . . the K Ks.” Th
e whites agreed,
and he ordered the blacks to disarm and to disband. Military offi
cials dispatched
troops to ensure compliance. Th
e soldiers did not remain long, leaving Randlett
alone. All was quiet until mid- July when rumors surfaced Miles Brown (freed-
man) had been hanged. Black leaders organized a party to search for Brown and
marched out of town in military style, creating “uneasiness with the whites.”
Th
ey received information that Andrew Halliday, a white man who previously
disputed with the victim, was responsible for the hanging. Halliday fearfully
called on civil authorities for protection. Th
ey quickly raised a posse and
marched to his aid. In the meantime, the freedpeople, perhaps having second
thoughts, left Halliday’s residence and headed for town. Approaching town, as
fate would have it, the two posses met. Th
ey did not immediately fi re on one
another. As leaders of the two groups conversed, however, a shot rang out and
caused “a general fi ring . . . from the whites.” Th
e freedpeople scattered. Rand-
lett, at best, could only speculate which party fi red fi rst, evidenced by several
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