Book Read Free

Data Versus Democracy

Page 14

by Kris Shaffer


  goal of the public influence operations. As significant as a close business tie

  with a real estate mogul and reality TV star is, that business tie or personal

  relationship becomes exponentially more valuable if that asset becomes the

  president of the United States. Not only is that asset a “friend in high places,”

  but that asset also has a personal financial motivation to work in the interests

  21“Maria Butina’s Defiant Plea and Yet Another Russian Ploy,” Natasha Bertrand, The

  Atlantic, December 13, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/

  maria-butina-pleads-guilty-russian-agent/578146/.

  22Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).

  76

  Chapter 5 | Democracy Hacked, Part 1

  of his foreign business associates. Even more so should those associates, or

  others with whom they are coordinating, come to possess kompromat (the

  intelligence industry’s term for compromising material) about the would-be

  president or his inner circle. As tantalizing as the investigation into these

  alleged and attempted relationships can be, they are ultimately not what this

  book is about.

  This book is about how big data and information can influence people and

  alter history. And so, I will focus on the activity of the GRU and the IRA, two

  organizations that were successful at influencing public discourse, spreading

  falsehood, and setting the lion’s share of the agenda in the final weeks of the

  presidential election. We may never know how many votes—popular or in

  the Electoral College—were won or lost by their activities. But there is no

  doubt that their activity influenced the issues that Americans took with them

  into the voting booth, and even at the end of 2018, the content they published

  in 2016 is still circulating and driving political conversations. (And that’s to say

  nothing of the work they have done since then, both detected and undetected.)

  Let’s start with Fancy Bear.

  Fancy Bear Crashes the Democratic Party

  The GRU has likely been focused on the United States for some time. They

  have certainly had their eyes fixed on the West in recent years. For example,

  in April 2015, Fancy Bear hacked into TV5Monde in France and posted

  messages on the national television network like, “Soldiers of France, stay

  away from the Islamic State! You have the chance to save your families, take

  advantage of it. The CyberCaliphate continues its cyberjihad against the

  enemies of Islamic State.” While initial signs pointed to a possible ISIS attack,

  security experts ultimately determined the source of the attack to be an IP

  address associated with the GRU.23

  One of the earliest direct signs that they intended to conduct an operation to

  influence or discredit the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election was

  in October 2015, when the GRU began targeting the email account of

  Democratic National Committee (DNC) director of voter protection, Pratt

  Wiley. According to the Chicago Tribune, Fancy Bear hackers “tried to pry

  open his inbox as many as 15 times over six months. ”24 This, of course, raised

  23Sheera Frenkel, “Meet Fancy Bear, The Russian Group Hacking The U.S. Election,”

  BuzzFeed News, published October 15, 2016, www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sheer-

  afrenkel/meet-fancy-bear-the-russian-group-hacking-the-us-election.

  24Raphael Satter, “Inside story: How Russians hacked the Democrats’ emails,” Associated

  Press, published November 4, 2017, www.apnews.com/dea73efc01594839957c3c9

  a6c962b8a.

  Data versus Democracy

  77

  the specter of possible hacks into voting machines to change vote counts in

  precincts with fully electronic voting.

  While cybersecurity experts generally agree that Russia did not change any

  electronic vote tallies in the United States in 2016, they did manage to break

  in and steal personal information about U.S. citizens from voter registration

  records in states such as Illinois. 25 Election officials across the United States shored up election security and in some cases returned to paper ballots, at

  least as a backup. But even as the U.S. midterm election approached in

  November 2018, security experts and election officials across the United

  States were worried that many precincts around the country would not be

  able to withstand an attack on vote tallies if it did come. But even that isn’t

  the greatest fear of many election officials. As NPR reported in a story about

  the Illinois data breach:

  Illinois is investing a few million dollars in federal money to help

  some of the state's smaller voting jurisdictions secure their data and

  equipment. Some counties don’t even have their own IT staff. But

  officials here are less worried about hardware and software. They’re

  more concerned that even a modest breach could undermine voter

  confidence in the machinery of our elections. 26

  Where changing voter tallies or bringing down machines on election day could

  be a devastating attack on the U.S. democratic system, perhaps just as

  effective—and certainly more cost- effective—would be a discrediting of the

  election results. If voter confidence were brought down far enough, it could

  depress turnout. And you can’t recount votes that were never cast. If you

  targeted that voter confidence to a specific demographic or geographic region

  that leaned heavily one way, you could depress votes for a single party

  predictably and irreversibly. And if that took place in a large swing state with

  a large pool of electoral votes and a close final tally, you could theoretically

  swing an election.

  Swinging an election isn’t the only end game. Discrediting the process can call

  the results into question, and if enough citizens feel the election was

  illegitimate, it can make it difficult for the election winners to govern. This

  appears to be the underlying motivation of Fancy Bear’s wildly successful

  campaign to hack the Clinton campaign and the Democratic National

  Committee.

  25“What Illinois Has Learned About Election Security Since 2016,” All Things Considered,

  National Public Radio, broadcast September 17, 2018, www.npr.org/2018/09/17/

  648849074/what-illinois-has-learned-about-election-security-since-2016.

  26Ibid.

  78

  Chapter 5 | Democracy Hacked, Part 1

  How Fancy Bear Got In

  Have you ever seen the movie WarGames (1983)? It’s not exactly recent, but

  it illustrates perfectly the kind of hacker mindset that underlies the specific

  techniques used by Fancy Bear leading up to the 2016 election. In WarGames,

  the protagonist, David Lightman, wants to change his high school biology

  grade to avoid going to summer school. The school’s grade database is

  (somewhat shockingly for 1983) accessible “online”—that is, by modem

  access over the phone lines from a compatible computer. The database is

  protected by a password that changes on a regular basis, which David doesn’t

  have, and would only last for a short time anyway. David could try a brute-

  force method, like algorithmically generating random passwords until he

  guesses the correct one, which could work wi
th a simple enough password

  and a lot of time. But it would spike system login attempts over a prolonged

  period of time, raising the likelihood that his attack would be detected.

  Instead, he uses a human intelligence or HumInt (pronounced hyoo-mint)

  method. He (purposefully?) gets in trouble at school on a regular basis and

  sent to the main office for a talk with the principal. While there, he discovers

  where the database password is kept and regularly notes the new password

  as it is changed. He gets in trouble frequently enough that his presence near

  the location the password is written raises less red flags than multiple access

  attempts from the computer at his home phone number would. And so his

  password theft and grade change go undetected by the school.

  A little later in the movie, David is searching for the servers of a video game

  company so he can attempt to play a new game before it is released (and,

  presumably, without paying the price of new computer software in the early

  1980s!). As he probes phone numbers in the geographical vicinity of the video

  game company, he stumbles upon a few other interesting computer

  connections. After making a phony reservation for a trip to Paris with a female

  classmate he wants to impress, he discovers what turns out to be a military

  server containing games that teach the kinds of strategy that could be helpful

  to decision-makers and negotiators at the height of the Cold War. He consults

  two fellow computer geeks, who tell him he’ll never get through the primary

  system security. But he could look for a “back door”—a secret method of

  entry placed by the original programmer(s) unknown to the current system

  administrators. It turns out that one of the games on the server contains a

  name: Falken’s Maze. David does some digging at the library and discovers a

  developer and inventor, Steven Falken, who had a history of working with and

  for the government. Upon researching his life, David discovers Falken’s “back

  door” password and gains entry to the system. (And almost starts World

  War III…)

  Encryption and online computer security has increased exponentially since

  the early 1980s. Brute-force methods, without any knowledge of the system,

  are nearly doomed to failure, as it is far, far easier to encrypt data than it is to

  Data versus Democracy

  79

  computationally discover the encryption “key.” (And because the same kinds

  of computer processors are responsible for both processes, that will continue

  to be the case for some time.)

  But technology has also increased drastically since the 1980s, in both

  complexity and ubiquity. What hasn’t increased since then is the human brain’s

  capacity to manage that complexity. We make mistakes. Expert developers

  don’t just leave back doors in their code, they leave obsolete functions, unit

  tests, analytic trackers, dependencies on other people’s code that isn’t always

  updated when security vulnerabilities are discovered in that other code, overly

  permissible web app installation scripts that are triggered when a system is

  overloaded and forced to restart—or left open when a user fails to update

  permissions after installation. And that’s to say nothing of user error like bad

  passwords, reused passwords, unnecessarily running the wrong app with

  administrator settings, and unknowingly installing and using apps that require

  more system access than necessary … and leave those doors open through

  their own poor security settings.

  Just as fictional hackers like David Lightman used HumInt and traditional

  research to reduce the complexity of a computational problem, real-life

  hackers like those of Fancy Bear use human intelligence—and capitalize on

  human error—as their point of entry.

  Fancy Bear’s weapon of choice in 2016 was email. Specifically, a type of

  fraudulent email called spearphishing. You may be familiar with phishing—those

  usually poorly written emails saying “your email inbox is full” or “your bank

  account is frozen,” and that to fix the problem you have to click on a link in

  the email and provide your personal login details—including your username

  and password—to solve the problem. Spearphishing is like phishing, except

  instead of sending the email out into the wild in the hopes of catching some

  users’ data (like “fishing” with a line or a net just aims at catching some fish),

  spearphishing attacks are directed at a specific user or group of users (like a

  spear is aimed at a specific fish).

  These emails look less like “your bank account is frozen” and more like

  “Hey [your real name], it’s [your boss’s real name]. I’m stuck in a meeting

  and need you to do X for me by lunch time.” There’s almost always a

  fraudulent link to click on that will potentially give the sender of the email

  access to some part of your system, or request information from you that

  will do the same. Or it may look like a really good copy of a Google security

  notice sent to your Gmail account, with a button to click on to address the

  security concern they detected on your account. They might be after the

  contents of your email account, the company documents in your G Suite

  account, access to your camera and microphone, or they might be trying to

  install a keylogger on your computer that will collect every keystroke,

  including usernames, passwords, URLs, and the content of the messages you

  write. Any of these can give them access to intelligence—such as the email

  80

  Chapter 5 | Democracy Hacked, Part 1

  addresses of coworkers and clients, internal reports, financial documents,

  etc.—or kompromat—information that could compromise the integrity of

  you or your firm if it became public.

  On March 10, 2016, once it had become clear that Hillary Clinton would

  become the democratic nominee for president, her campaign team first

  started receiving spearphishing emails from Fancy Bear. On March 19, GRU

  hackers began targeting the personal Gmail account of her campaign chair,

  John Podesta. The attacks on the campaign continued through March and

  April, but also branched out to other groups linked with the campaign, such

  as the Clinton Foundation, the Center for American Progress, ShareBlue, and

  others.

  The campaign was successful. One of Podesta’s staffers had clicked on the link

  in a fraudulent Google security alert sent to Podesta’s personal Gmail account

  on March 19 and entered his username and password. Twice. In late April,

  word reached Trump advisor, George Papadopoulos, that Russia had obtained

  kompromat on Clinton from “thousands of emails. ”27

  Around the same time, Fancy Bear targeted the Democratic National

  Committee. But this spearphishing attempt didn’t just target emails. The

  fraudulent link in those emails contained the power to install malware on

  the computer when clicked, and malware downloaded onto DNC computers

  gave the GRU access to data on both those computers and the DNC

  servers. 28

  Russia didn’t just sit on the kompromat they gained from these attacks. In

  April 2016, two web sites, now beli
eved by U.S. intelligence agencies to be

  connected to Russia, were registered: electionleaks.com and dcleaks.com. In

  June, both dcleaks.com and the blog of “hacker” Guccifer 2.0 (also believed by

  the U.S. intelligence community to be a likely GRU operation) began to publish

  kompromat gained against the Democratic Party—including information

  about how the DNC leadership worked to protect Clinton from the challenge

  posed by Bernie Sanders. This led to, among other things, a suit against the

  DNC from Sanders supporters—and likely a number of protest votes from

  leftists (either no-votes or votes for a third-party candidate like Jill Stein),

  hurting Clinton in the election.29

  Also in June 2016, Julian Assange announced that WikiLeaks had obtained

  kompromat on Hillary Clinton. (Assange denied that Russia was the source

  of the data.) In July, WikiLeaks began to publish that kompromat,

  strategically scheduling the release of that information over the course of

  the remainder of the election, culminating in the release of the Podesta

  27Raphael Satter, “Inside story: How Russians hacked the Democrats’ emails.”

  28Sheera Frenkel, “Meet Fancy Bear.”

  29Raphael Satter, “Inside story: How Russians hacked the Democrats’ emails.”

  Data versus Democracy

  81

  emails on October 7, 2016—the same day (and soon after) the Trump-

  compromising Access Hollywood tape was released.30

  Though we’ll never know the full extent of the impact of the GRU’s operation,

  there were several fallouts that we can likely attribute to the release of the

  kompromat Fancy Bear obtained from the Clinton campaign and the DNC.

  First, the revelations about the way the DNC held back Sanders’ chances at

  winning the nomination alienated many left-leaning voters—likely depressing

  votes for Clinton both from those further left (who supported Sanders in the

  primaries and caucuses) and those toward the middle (who may have been

  demotivated to vote for Clinton, in spite of distaste for Trump). This was

  likely exacerbated by pro-Jill-Stein and “never Clinton” campaigns conducted

  by Russia’s Internet Research Agency (which we’ll unpack shortly).

  Other details contained in the Podesta emails likely depressed turnout—or at

 

‹ Prev