Tug of War

by Shelfold Bidwell

  The battle sequences cannot be explained unless the reader understands that the whole German position consisted of pairs of interlocking sections. This was obviously not understood by the commanders at the beginning of the battle. These were the open, watery southern outskirts of the town linked to the main built-up area under the heights; the town linked to the hillside above it crowned by the Monastery; the front and back of the Monastery were linked together, and the back of the Monastery was joined to M. Castellone, a long, exposed flank. These five zones had to be attacked simultaneously to prevent mutual reinforcement. Piecemeal attacks therefore, were fore-doomed to failure.

  That is the tactical dimension. Similarly, the operational dimension has also to be viewed as a whole, and as a (somewhat dislocated) continuation of the First Battle of Cassino.

  Finally, we emphasise our debt to Martin Blumenson. Although our account of AVENGER differs from his in important respects, were it not for his labour, and that of his colleagues, revisionary studies such as ours would be immeasurably more difficult.

  1. The National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington.

  1A:1 181/32/12, Author’s File, N. C. Phillips Part 1. This includes correspondence concerning Calculated Risk.

  181/55/1 Kippenberger correspondence with Jerry Scoullar (narrator of an earlier volume) on the Monastery, and Dickens.

  181/53/11 Reviews of Phillips’ volume. WA 2 Series 8/46 Freyberg Diaries. September 1943–October 1944.

  Freyberg’s “diary” in his papers; actually the log kept for him by his Military Assistant, now Justice Sir John White.

  8/50 Historical, February 1944. (Tuker’s Correspondence.)

  8/51 Conference Notes (contemporary).

  11/6 Kippenberger Papers.

  3/26 Phillips. Investigation into the bombing.

  21.1/1/50 G. Log, 2nd NZ Division.

  21.1/1/50 G (operations) Log, 2nd NZ Division.

  2. National Archives, Suitland, 105–3.2.

  3. Kippenberger’s diary, op. cit. n. 1 above.

  4. Freyberg — White’s log.

  5. US National Archives, Suitland. Md. Fifth Army Papers, 105–3.2; AAT Operation Instruction No. 42, 11 February 1944.

  6. Extract from the Diary of Jack Glennie in “British Troops Malta Command Study; The Battles of Cassino, January to May 1944”. (HQ British Troops, Malta, 1968.)

  2nd NZ Div/Corps G Log for 1400 Hours 12 February shows American locations: “1/141 reported 100 yards beyond crest of Point 593 towards Point 569.2/142 on ‘Hill 468’.” (Hill 468 was Massa Albaneta. It was not a hill but a spot height in the valley below Point 593. The 142nd had never held it, but were halted at the pass on Cavendish Road above it.)

  The US units were the 135th and 168th Infantry of the 34th Division and the 141st of the 36th Division.

  7. Gruenther was clearly mistaken about the date and time of the original request for bomber support. By the evening of the 12th Freyberg, at last in possession of the facts of the situation on the heights behind the Monastery, had realised that a postponement was necessary. He would not, therefore, have asked that same evening for air support on the 13th. Clark could not have been aware of the facts, or else he would not have asked for the mission to be delayed until 10 a.m. Disregarding the added misunderstanding about the bomb safety line, Gruenther did not cancel the mission until 10 a.m. on the 13th, and then only in response to the vehement objections of Keyes and Ryder. It should be noted that both Clark and Phillips give the date and time of the original request as p.m. 12th.

  8. One inexplicable feature of a dreadfully muddled affair was that although the NZ Corps and the US 2nd Corps were under command of HQ Fifth Army, and the NZ Corps was about to carry out a major, independent operation, albeit in a sector believed to be controlled by the 2nd Corps, the channel of communication carrying the vital information about the timing of the bombing mission was via HQ 2nd Corps and thence to HQ 34th Division, both failing to pass it either to HQ NZ Corps or to HQ 4th Indian Division. Viz., “150158 [i.e., 1.58 a.m., February 15] As far as we know the first bombing will not take place until 1300 [1p.m.]” “150730. Abbey will be bombed this morning between 0930 and 1015,” 2 US National Archives, Suitland, pp. 334–3, 2. (Even if the mistaken belief that Keyes, Ryder et al, were in full operational control on the heights and therefore entitled to overrule the NZ Corps over matters affecting the safety of US troops still obtained in the American camp, the failure to pass such vital information directly to HQ NZ Corps can only be attributed to a disastrous failure in “staff duties”.

  Chapter 13. Scarcely any Goal, pp. 203–24.

  1. Phillips, p. 239.

  2. Phillips and others date this meeting the 18th: the Freyberg diary the 19th, which is the more likely.

  3. Molony, pp. 833–7.

  4. Ibid., pp. 838–46.

  5. It was only after the war that Freyberg claimed to have laid down these conditions.

  6. Alexander to Freyberg. NZ National Archives, Series 8/50.

  7. NZ Archives, 447.28.5. Narrative of Private E. H. Groves, “D” Company, 25th Infantry Battalion, 2nd NZ Division.

  Chapter 14. Look Out, Fighter Bombers!, pp. 225–40.

  When this chapter was being researched Richard Kohn, the Chief of Air Force History, and his staff were undertaking a second-generation study on the component phases of FM 100–20 — “air superiority”, “interdiction” and “close support”. They allowed us to see proof sheets of their publication, Air Superiority in World War II and Korea — a volume in the USAF Warrior series, edited by Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan — in which interviews with senior airmen were recorded. Members of the staff were kind enough to read a couple of draft papers on the subject of army–air cooperation from which this chapter was distilled. Graham was also able to talk to Eduard Mark who was working on interdiction, and with Dan Mortensen on a number of subjects. The Air Force study provided a framework for the chapter.

  Sources on microfilm at Boiling are extensive and the drafts and printed versions of numerous formation histories are on the shelves of the library. Historical studies used by the original official historians are available. We list here the more useful to us:

  General

  The Ninth Air Force History chapter “The Genesis of an American Tactical Air Force in the United Kingdom”.

  Historical Study Number 88, April 1954: “Employment of strategic bombers in a tactical role, 1941–51”. Historical Study Number 35, 1948 (by Kent Roberts Greenfield of OCMH), “Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, including organic light aviation”.

  Narrative of close support by 12 TAC and its adaptation of FM 100–20 to conditions in Italy.

  On Cassino

  Reports on the bombing of the town on March 15 appeared in the two months that followed:

  H. R. Alexander, 4 May 1944, in 621.549 frame 662

  The New Zealand Corps, n.d., frame 664

  John K. Cannon (MATAC), frame 663

  Allied Forces Headquarters, 4 June, frame 672

  Ira Eaker, 12 April, frame 669

  HQ MAAF, April, frame 649

  On STRANGLE

  The subject merges with interdiction generally and has been viewed from the German side as well as the Allied.

  The Zuckerman Report, 28 December 1943. 519. 425–1 also 1211–16, 512,609c and 533.306–1.

  F. W. Sallagar, Operation Strangle: a case study of tactical air intelligence (Rand, Santa Monica, 1972).

  Henry D. Lytton, “Bombing policy in the Rome and pre-Normandy invasion campaigns of World War II …” Military Affairs, vol. xlvii, No. 2, April 1983.

  12th Air Force, “Op Strangle, 15 March–11 May”, 650.454.4. Documents concerning German impressions and experience of Allied Air Operations in Italy from interviews and documents. K113. 107–184.

  Also: “The Supply Situation”, by Colonel Ernst Faehndrich, “The Transport Situation”, by Colonel Klaus Stange. K 512.621 VII/100. “Rail Transportation Problems in Italy”, by Ge
neralmajor Karl Koerner, April 1947, and “Advantages and Defects of European Transport Networks” (German Historical Branch Study), 512.621 VII/4.

  AFHQ Assistant Chief of Staff (G2), “Appreciation of German intentions in Italy” from the point of view of their ability to control their communications. 512.621.

  Recorded interviews with Ira C. Eaker are in K 239.0512–626, 627, 868.

  With Carl Spaatz, 868 and Laurence Kuter, 810.

  Letter and conversation with James Parton at Carlisle Barracks, in June 1983. (Parton was Eaker’s military assistant and flew with him almost everywhere. He is Eaker’s biographer.)

  Printed sources in addition to those above:

  Field Manual FM 100–20 drafted by Brigadier-General Laurence Kuter.

  Staff Officer with Fifth Army, by Edmund F. Ball. K 146.01

  Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine for Close Air Support, by Riley Sunderland (Office of Air Force History, March 1973).

  1. The 12th Air Support Command became the 12th Tactical Air Force in 1944.

  2. Captain Edmund Ball, author of Staff Officer with Fifth Army.

  3. DeWitt S. Copp, Forged in Steel: strategy and decisions in the airwar over Europe 1940–45 (Doubleday, 1982), pp. 426–8 and 440–2.

  4. Boiling Air Force base. US Air Force Historical section. 168.7001–102; 20 April.

  Chapter 15. A Man of Ruthless Logic, pp. 241–52.

  1. Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 47–8.

  2. Carver, Harding of Petherton: Field-Marshal, Chapters 1, 6 and 8.

  3. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 374; Carver op. cit., p. 125.

  4. Carver, op. cit., p. 126.

  5. Diary and Papers of General Sir Sidney Kirkman, passim.

  6. Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 404–5 and n. 405.

  7. Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 105–6 and n.

  Chapter 16. The Battering Ram, pp. 253–64.

  1. Based on the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Historical Society, vol. xi, no. 3, “Cassino 1944” — papers read by Brigadier F. S. Siggers and General Sir Sidney Kirkman.

  Chapters 17–18. Tiger Drive, and The Battle in the Liri Valley.

  We have attempted to describe a great battle, in all respects except space on the same scale as El Alamein, October 1942, and our account is necessarily condensed. We have not concerned ourselves with the carping of Clark, who bequeathed to the US historians the notion that the Eighth Army was “drawn along” in the wake of the successes of the Fifth, nor with the fraught command relationships inside the Canadian Corps or between Leese and Burns, as neither affected the course of the battle. With regard to Leese, we are much indebted to Nigel Hamilton, who furnished us with much useful information, the fruit of his own research. Otherwise we have relied extensively on the accounts of Anders, Jackson, Nicholson’s admirable volume of the Canadian official history, Ray’s history of the 78th Division, the German sources as listed and Kirkman’s diary.

  Chapter 17. Tiger Drive, pp. 265–81.

  1. Directorate of History, Ottawa, Report No. 20, p. 39.

  2. The title is derived from that of the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, the ancient Prussian order of chivalry. It has been translated for us as: “The All-German Grenadier Division: The Grand Master of the Realm”.

  3. See note on Chapter 16 above.

  4. A Polish officer suggested that HONKER referred to the cry of migrating wild geese, to whom he compared his fellow countrymen: migrants, but flying home. Alas, only a flight of fancy. J. Ellis, Cassino: The Hollow Victory, p. 324 and n.28.

  5. Verbal communication to the author (Bidwell) and article by Maynard Pockson, “Crossing the Garigliano” (actually the Rapido), RUSI Journal, vol. 4, no. 72, December 1972.

  6. Jackson, The Battle for Rome, pp. 94–7. General Sir William Jackson speaks with the additional authority of a Royal Engineer and of one involved in the assault crossing.

  7. Ibid.

  Chapter 18. The Battle in the Liri Valley, pp. 282–96.

  1. Directorate of History, Ottawa, Report No. 20.

  Chapters 19–20. General Juin’s Plan, and Breaking the Mountain Line

  Based on the French official history, as given in Sources.

  Also the Revue Historique de l’Armée, 23rd Year, no. 2, May 1967, Hommage au Maréchal Juin, containing biographical sketches by Juin’s chief of staff, General M. Carpentier and others, and articles on the work of the Deuxième Bureau of the CEF and the services of the Moroccan Goums.

  Ernest Fisher in Chapters I and II of his Cassino to the Alps provides an excellent and, for an official history, unusually candid account of the opening stages of the US 2nd Corps’ drive along the Via Appia.

  Chapter 19. General Juin’s Plan, pp. 297–308.

  1. In his staff memorandum of April 14, 1944: source Hommage au Maréchal Juin.

  2. Op. cit., p. 29.

  Chapter 20. Breaking the Mountain Line, pp. 309–17.

  Nil.

  Chapter 21. Juin Triumphant, pp. 318–27.

  1. Fisher, p. 48.

  2. Michael Glover, communication to author.

  3. Fisher, p, 49.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Ibid., p. 68.

  6. For an account of these actions see “Les Goums Marocain et leur emploi par le général Juin 1943–1944”, Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Jouin, Revue Historique de l’Armée, May 1967, pp. 90–1.

  Chapter 22. The Glittering Prize, pp. 328–46.

  1. Major-General A. J. C. Block, late Royal Artillery, commanded the 24th Field Regiment, RA in support of the US 3rd Infantry Division in the Anzio bridgehead. He describes Truscott as “essentially a quiet, strong, and determined character. We all wished he’d been corps commander when we landed in January.” Communication to Bidwell.

  2. Mathews, in Command Decisions, p. 356 and n.

  3. Fisher, p. 119 and n.

  4. Blumenson, Mark Clark, pp. 208–15.

  5. Fisher, pp. 89–90 and n.

  6. Nicholson, p. 441.

  7. Boulle, Les Campagnes de printemps et d’été, Table D, pp. 118–19.

  8. Von Senger, diary, op. cit.

  Chapter 23. Operation Olive, pp. 347–66.

  Notes on Research

  This chapter was originally researched in 1970 by Dominick Graham and Nicholas Straker as part of their battlefield tour in the summer of that year. The documentary support on the British side was sparse since the relevant volume of the Official History had not been commissioned. However, Straker wrote a narrative using what had been prepared by historians in the Cabinet Office, Jackson’s Battle for Italy, Orgill’s The Gothic Line, and British regimental histories. By then Nicholson’s volume had been published and much of the documentation on which it was based, German as well as Allied, was available at the Directorate of History, Ottawa. Good regimental histories, such as those of Roy and How (BC Dragoons and New Brunswick Hussars), were also published. This ought to have served to balance the accounts of Jackson and Orgill which tend to concentrate unduly on the operations of the British 5 th Corps, whereas it was the Canadian Corps that broke the German main defensive line, captured Coriano and finally broke through.

  In 1983 Brereton Greenhous and William McAndrew of the Directorate of History conducted a battlefield tour to study the actions of the Canadian 5th Armoured Division. Many veterans, including the divisional commander, Major-General Hoffmeister, participated. We have used the papers written for the tour which reinforce our view that a great opportunity was lost. The inherent fault in Leese’s plan was the lack of a reserve he could dispose of flexibly. As a result when the 5th Corps failed to loosen the strong German defence lines near the coast by a series of left hooks, the Canadians, whose role and strength were incompatible, were unable rapidly to exploit their success and help the 5th Corps forward, instead of vice versa.

  Canadian Sources

  “The 5th Canadian Armoured Division in the Gothic Line — 1944”, by Brereton Greenhous.

  “The 5th Canadian Division: th
e background 1943–4”, by William McAndrew.

  “Eighth Army at the Gothic Line”, by William McAndrew.

  “Interview with General Hoffmeister”, Greenhous and McAndrew (1982).

  “Correspondence of G. W. L. Nicholson with participants concerning drafts of the Official History. (948.013 D 21.) Folders 7 and 8.

  (Mainly concerning General Burns and his relations with Leese and his own subordinates.) In Folder 7, 604–9, Burns comments:

  There did not exist any well-recognised authority with respect to the function of an armoured division when fighting in the Italian terrain. Conditions were completely different from those encountered by 7th Armoured Division in the Desert … General Leese, both at the Liri Valley battle and in the Gothic Line did not exercise the direction that might be expected of an Army Commander. In the former operation General Burns worked with the commander of 13th Corps [Kirkman], who appeared to have more concern with the running of the battle than General Leese. Similarly, in the Gothic Line matters seemed to be left in the hands of the 5th Corps commander.

  “CMH Report No. 187. Canadian Operations: Olive to the Marecchia”.

  “AHQ Report No. 27. Captain Steiger’s translations of German documents 11 August–31 October 1944. (981.011 D3)”. In particular: “Material for the presentation of the Battle of Rimini within the framework of the treatment of the Italian Campaign from the standpoint of military history, August 1944–February 1945”, written by Lieutenant-Colonel Pretzell, Operations Officer, 71st Division and later Colonel, Operations, Tenth Army. (His dates are twenty-four hours adrift and he denies that Tenth Army was surprised by Olive. The account was written during the period in which the American historians were collecting German recollections in 1947.)

  “MS B-268 (Historical Division, HQ US Army, Europe), Italian Theatre, 23 August–2 September”, by Adolf Haeckel and Dietrich Beelitz. (Another account written from memory and not documents.)

  The war diaries of the units of the Canadian Corps were examined. Their value varies but some contained excellent after-action reports. One of these extra papers is the radio log of the Strathcona’s in their attack on M. Pelosa with the Princess Louise’s Dragoon Guards. Also Brigadier I. S. Johnston’s appreciation for the attack of the 11th Brigade against the Green Line on August 30. There are also good accounts of the attacks of the Cape Breton Highlanders on Montecchio and Point 120 and the Perths and British Columbia Dragoons operations at Point 204.