Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan
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To analyse religion, Bourdieu employs one of his favourite and central concepts: the “fields” (les champs):
[A] field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of a species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relations to other positions” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).
The term religious field suggests a similarity to religious market. Both concepts suggest that religion can constitutes a relatively independent object of research for sociologists. They direct researchers’ attention not only to a relationship between religious and other spheres of social life, but also to the inner dynamics and processes that are characteristic for that particular area. The main developments in the field and on the market are connected to competition between actors and institutions. Religious field is, however, a wider term, and for that reason I often choose to employ that notion rather than religious market. Thinking of Islam as a religious field with its internal dynamics can help us better understand the complicated religious change involving social movement, communities, groups which are not as institutionalised as in for instance Christianity.
Inspired by the classic Weber’s analysis of the relations linking bureaucratic priest, charismatic prophet and sorcerer, Bourdieu was concerned with competitive relations between various types of religious specialists. His model implicitly includes three elements of the economy of religion, as Scott Lash (1993) has noticed (Rey, 2004, p. 333): (1) the supply side, or the actors producing relevant goods; (2) the symbolic goods (products); (3) the demand side (consumers of those products). However, the concept of field is not limited to competition, but includes also other kinds of objective interactions in the field. The interactions link not only religious “firms,” as is postulated by the market model, but also different types of actors attached to their social positions. This opens more analytic possibilities in regard to Islam. Moreover, Bourdieu puts more emphasis on transactions between religious specialists, who produce and disseminate religious goods, and the laity.
Another problem Bourdieu (1991) deals with includes his explorations of two further elements observable in every kind of competition: “capital” and “strategies.” Including them into an analysis enables researchers to widen the scope of investigation proposed by advocates of religious economies. For Bourdieu, the model situation for his analysis was the process of monopolisation of power by the Catholic Church (Dianteill, 2003). Therefore, he often refers to a specific type of competition—between the orthodox hierarchy on the one side and adherents (l’herésiarche) on the other. An important aspect of this process was competition between different types of clerics. In Haiti, for example, competitive relations linked the Catholic Church with the Voodoo priests and their followers. Religious professionals compete for influence among various social strata for augmenting their own authority. To achieve this aim, they must also struggle for access to resources at stake and to employ special strategies.
Bourdieu’s investigation into the types of capital used in religious field is more advanced than in the market approach. Each social field is characterised by distinct capitals employed in the process of competition. For instance, in the educational field degrees constitute the specific form of capital, and in the cultural field it is prestige. In the religious field, Bourdieu refers to religious capital. Among its main types are the legitimation of the social order and the kind of sense of meaning a religious doctrine brings to people (Rey, 2004, p. 337). Religious competitors also effectively use different sources of knowledge and authority. For Bourdieu, the most significant type of capital in the struggle for influence and power is what he calls “the goods of salvation” (les biens de salut) (1991, p. 299), which encompass sacraments or other means considered to be necessary to achieve salvation.
Religious capital is interrelated with other forms of capital, such as material (including financial) and social. In other words, capital can be transferred between different social fields. The redistribution of financial resources in times of radical political changes, such as those observed after the break-up of the Soviet monopoly, is conducive to a dramatic fight for payments for religious services, control over religious institutions and places of worship.
The access to unequally distributed religious and related forms of resources influences strategies that particular players choose in competition. Religious specialists have to choose how to legitimize their cause, what kind of arguments can effectively persuade their audience in the light of attacks from other sides. In the context of Central Asia, the claims made by participants in the struggle are, e. g., based on genealogy and hereditary titles of a certain group of people. They can refer to rituals led by specialists or to claims to an exclusive right to the control of holy places. This discourse is frequently enriched by moralistic arguments presenting the other side in a negative light (see Abashin, 2006).
Another problem raised in Bourdieu’s writings that can hopefully add more inspiration to the subject of pluralism and its consequences is the transformation of religious doctrine. One of his main argument is that the structure of religious teaching is related to the interest and needs of two groups: producers and consumers (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 299). Religious doctrines and practices, that undergo transformations during competition, should thus be analysed from this perspective. Therefore, it can be argued that competition favours reinterpretation of religious traditions. The most intense sectarian activity, as Bourdieu noticed, coincides with the most dynamic production of Catholic canonical doctrine. To defend its ideology against heretical attacks, the Church responded with a new set of arguments and innovations in the ritualistic sphere. The well-known strategy used by the Catholic Church in the struggle for a monopolisation of capital and power in the religious field was the announcement of the formula extra ecclesiam nulla salus, which tied access to salvation to one institution. In that way, all new religious enterprises, independent communities, prophets, or individual search for future reward were discredited. On the basis of this doctrine, weapons of “symbolic violence,” such as excommunication or anathema, were developed (Bourdieu, 1991; Rey, 2004).
To sum up the above discussion, the theoretical model of an economic approach to religion is one of the most promising ways to advance social studies on religion. Its main thesis, which is still widely debated, posits that religious pluralism leads to an increase in the level of religious engagement. Two main factors influencing this relationship are competition between representatives of different religions or branches of religion and regulation of religious economy. This framework guides my analysis of contemporary religious situation in Azerbaijan, which basically will be conducted at three levels. I will be dealing with perspectives of the following actors: believers, representatives of Islamic traditions (religious leaders, theologians, Muslim intellectuals) and the state. In order to test the model in the context of Muslim Azerbaijan, some changes had to be applied. The most significant is the introduction of a concept “discursive traditions,” that enables us to interpret pluralism without reducing it to its institutional dimension. Among many traditions in Azerbaijan the book will focus on the most important and influential. Bourdieu’s propositions regarding competing processes in the religious field will be applied in my analysis to explore more aspects of pluralism. His concepts of “capital” and “strategies” are useful tools to guide the field research. The final section of this chapter will provide information about the methodological program that has guided this work.
1.5Fieldwork Research in Baku
This book analyses the contemporary transformations of religious traditions. It aims at understanding the process of competition between religious leaders and their c
ommunities as well as choices made by people regarding following particular forms of religion. Field research is one of the best ways to get closer to different socio-cultural worlds and to get first-hand experience in a particular society at a given moment. It enables a researcher to delve into agendas and motivations of religious movements and communities. Studying official documents and analysing statistics is helpful, but has limitations. The social world, especially the more private realm of religion and spirituality, is full of senses, emotions, symbols which are best approached in a direct encounter with people. Qualitative research can add a lot to uncovering human practices and ideologies.
The main sources and data for this study come from my research conducted in Azerbaijan in October–December 2009. It was part of my doctoral project entitled “Competing Islamic Traditions: An Anthropological Perspective.” After having studied socio-religious changes and dynamics among Tatars in Poland and then among Muslim Kists near Georgian-Chechen border, I have decided to do larger research in Baku. While both in Poland and in Georgia Muslims constitute tiny minorities, Azerbaijan is a Muslim-majority country. This Caucasus state is bordered by countries of different religions: Eastern Orthodox Christian Georgia and Russia (with largely Islamic North Caucasus and many religious minorities), Christian Armenia with its unique Armenian Apostolic Church, and Iran having Shia Islam as its official religion. Azerbaijan is thus often evoked as a bridge between the East and the West. The locus of the study in the capital city of Azerbaijan was chosen for the reason that it provides a unique opportunity to observe the current process of Islamic revival against the background of post-Soviet secularism. So far, sociological research on religious markets have been largely confined to the Western context. The main theorists in the field of religion are from U.S. and Europe. The most comprehensive and systematic data are also from the Western world, where scientific studies of religion and social surveys have long tradition. It is thus understandable that most theories on religious change and secularization relies upon the European and American experience, but extending their scope requires examining other contexts.
Three features of Azerbaijan make this country especially attractive to test and develop sociological theories. Firstly, the Islamic religion is the prevailing religion of society, not a religion of minorities. Western countries have different experience with religion and its public expression. Secondly, the issue of intra-religious diversity. Azerbaijan is very heterogeneous in regard to Islamic traditions. There are Sunni, Shia and Sufi Muslims with different religious worldviews and ideas. There is a further clash going on between conservative trends versus liberal. Modernist interpretations of Islam, which have a long history in Azerbaijan, are now regaining popularity. Thirdly, the post-Soviet particularities common to the whole vast part of the former Soviet empire. Baku, as a capital, has further advantages for the study of pluralism—it has attracted all kinds of religious groups. The city is in a boom and is growing rapidly at an unprecedented pace. It is the business, financial, cultural, educational centre of Azerbaijan. There are representatives of Iranian, Turkish and Arab Islamic movements, groups, missionaries in that city, each of them having followers and activists promoting their ideas. This fact makes it possible to observe competition between Islamic traditions on a daily basis. The public expression of religion makes it also a hot topic of discussions. Religious change is debated in newspapers, at schools and universities, at homes and in teahouses.
The group of my respondents and informants was not a probability sample of Azerbaijani Muslims, therefore it is not intended to be statistically representative. The selection of participants in the research was purposive, i.e., respondents were chosen because they had particular features important for the exploration of research problems (Qualitative Research, 2003). Members of the sample were chosen mainly to represent Shia and Sunni traditions, and, additionally, different groups inside each of these branches. It was important for me to conduct interviews with people who considered themselves to be “religious Muslims.” I have not defined by myself what does a “religious person” mean, because it was one of my aims to get to know people’s perceptions of religion and religiosity. At the very beginning of my research I noticed that it is the basic distinction people make themselves. The majority of Azeri Muslims, whom I call “cultural Muslims,” perceive themselves as distinct from “religious Muslims.” I was often advised that in order to understand Islam I should meet with the latter group. The symbolic boundary is huge, and at present even from the appearance one can categorise people in regard to their religious attachment. There are many exceptions, which I describe later, as the state regulations are against “untraditional” religious movements. But even so, people know who in their networks is “religious,” or considers himself/herself as such.
By first presenting my position as a researcher, I conducted in-depth interviews with forty two Muslims, mostly “average” believers, but also with some religious leaders (from mosques, educational institutions, religious NGOs, or faithbased organizations) and a few Azerbaijani experts from academia and media on the religious situation and the politics of religion in the country. This number includes people from two focus groups, one carried out with female representatives of the Shia “Juma mosque” community, the other with a group of Sunnis (including one Salafi and one Sufi Muslim). My first contacts were established either with the help of various people related in some way to religion (researchers from universities in Baku, NGOs’ representatives, journalists, etc.) or directly during my visits to mosques.
These interviews and discussions aimed at gathering information about choosing a religious affiliation, contents of Islamic traditions, the role of religious authority, attitudes towards other Islamic and non-Islamic religious movements, and about secular law. The questions were inspired by the theory of religious market and Bourdieu’s concept of competition in the religious field. The sets of questions differed depending on the type of interviewee, whether it was a believer (“religious Muslim”), religious leader or an expert on religious situation. I have chosen semi-structured interviews as the method which allows uncovering new ideas and questions. While survey data classify people according to predetermined categories, the interviews are much more flexible and leave a space for including respondents’ perspectives and understandings of social reality. The following kinds of questions served me as a general framework, which I adjusted to particular groups of people. First was the religious identity and the demand for religion. How are the particular religious identifications formed? I was enquiring “religious Muslims” about their personal experiences with Islam, their families background, how religion was expressed at home, and was it a Shia or Sunni branch. This included another set of questions: do they identify themselves with a particular Islamic branch or community? How do they define Islam? How did they make the choice and in what circumstances? What are the main sources of knowledge of religious issues? Which aspects of religion are important, and which have lesser significance? Do they participate in religious rituals? These questions helped me to identify the key divisions in contemporary Islamic market in Azerbaijan and provided me with a deeper understanding of each of them. A few times I was also given books about Islam, which my informants read and recommended to me. By reading them, I was learning the “religious language” of people and was able to nuance my questions. Exploring personal religious history, I also learned about Islam in the Soviet times, and the family stories made me realize how religiosity survived the state’s oppression and an official policy of atheism. The background of the family religiosity often was linked with the issue of religious switching. My interviewees were explaining how religion was practiced at their homes, often only during “rites of passage,” and how they made choices of their own Islamic tradition. The hypothesis here was that the religious change was taking place and an Islamic religious market emerged in the 1990s. Religious suppliers emerged with several distinct reinterpretations of Islamic theology, practice,
and relation to modernity and democracy.
Secondly, I was exploring strategies people employ in dealing with religious competition. I tried to understand which religious option is attractive for what kind of people? What are the determinants of religious affiliation? What makes certain religious practices and obligations appealing to people in the current context? What kind of factors influence religious choices? Framing this issue in the terms of market theory: What determines the success of religious suppliers? How they advertise themselves and attract people to their “brands”? Which products or services are especially looked for, and why? Next there were questions about religious leaders and competition between them. In this aspect I was looking into the dynamics of the religious field to better understand the interplay between religious actors (leaders, activists) in the same religious field. In Azerbaijan, the capital acquired by religious communities and leaders differ significantly and there is a large degree of inequality in this respect. The established “official” Islam (mainly Shiite) is close to the state, foreign missionaries often have support from their countries, mainly the Arab states, Iran or Turkey. This topic was addressed from two sides. I inquired “believers” about their views on religious authority. What do they expect from religious leaders and do they find proper leaders around? Which features make a leader or an imam especially charismatic? And, do people rely on what the leaders say? Talking to imams I was asking them about their perception of Islamic leadership and their attitudes to other Islamic groups. The answers show that many pious movements, which stand in opposition to the established Islam with the sheikh-ul-islam as the highest official religious authority in the country, seriously change the ideas on the essence of Islam. Also, the “official Islam” is responding to these challenges and also evolves its doctrine and expression. Islamic groups and their leaders rely on different kinds of capital and, using it, they develop and adapt their competitive strategies.