Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan
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Apart from sheer military power, ideology had an impact in ensuring successful Islamization. It was at the period of rapid expansion of the umma that the Islamic concept of jihad was developed by Muslim scholars.9 The power of an ideological justification that the war against unbelievers is desirable is sometimes used as an explanation of the fact that Arabs, who lacked sufficient forces, were so successful. It’s easier to risk one’s life when heavenly rewards are promised. Additionally, Muslim jurists worked out the concepts of dār al-īslām (land of Islam) and dār al-ḥarb (land of war). The former describes states under the Muslim authority, where sharia is in force, while the latter term denotes non-Muslim territories where strife for Islam should continue. Muslims have an obligation to sacrifice their lives for the sake of God and his rule.
Another factor explaining the Islamization of the Azerbaijani society is the relatively tolerant attitude of Muslim winners towards the local population. As elsewhere, the basic aim of jihad in the Caucasus was not to convert unbelievers to Islam, but to expand the dār al-īslām. Islamic law provides for the co-existence of people holding different religious beliefs. Jews and Christians, as “people of the Book” (ahl al-kitāb) enjoyed the status of “protected people” (ahl aḏ-ḏimma), whereby they were granted autonomy in religious matters. In exchange, non-Muslims generally were obliged to pay tax (ǧizya). The concept of ahl aḏ-ḏimma was subsequently widened to include Zoroastrians (Danecki, 2002a, p. 259). In such circumstances, Islamic religion was not imposed on people in any direct way. It constituted a religious option to choose or to reject, though it must have been quite an attractive option. Embracing Islam created a possibility of an upward mobility or simply enabled maintaining one’s privileges. It is not therefore surprising that the majority of the first converts to Islam recruited themselves from craftsmen, traders, and townspeople, eager to avoid paying ǧizya, and from local feudal families interested in maintaining their social status.
Early Islamization was not straightforward. There were some circumstances which retarded this process. The policy of Islamic caliphates played a crucial role. The Umayyad dynasty (661–750) was engaged in the territorial expansion of the caliphate and in political and bureaucratic issues. Pursuing expansion towards the Indian subcontinent, North Africa, southern Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula, the Umayyads were not so much interested in converting unbelievers (kuffār). The growing empire needed, first of all, to care for its budget. Massive conversions to Islam would entail massive exemptions from ǧizya, meaning a significant reduction of the potential caliphate’s wealth. Thus, the state adopted an idea of class society; the highest class included ruling Muslims headed by the caliph and his court, next were the new non-Arab Muslims (mawālī), mostly Persians, Turks and Kurds, followed by ahl aḏ-ḏimma, and slaves at the end of the social hierarchy. For non-Arabs, the decision to embrace Islam was on the one hand encouraged by offering a promotion to a higher social class, but on the other hand discouraged by restrictions of the mawlā status, meaning the lack of equal rights among Muslims (Bocheński, 1971). Such policy was in force till the Abbasid dynasty took up the reins in 750. The revolt against the Umayyads was strongly supported by Muslims of other than Arab origin, as well as by the Shiites. With the change of the ruling dynasty, the Arab supremacy basically came to an end. Islam was no longer perceived as a national property reserved for the Arabs. The caliphate was transformed into a cosmopolitan, multinational and theocratic state. Accepting Islamic faith with its new universal mission became easier and more rewarding.
Islam owes its tremendous success also to its flexibility. Much akin to Christianity, the Islamic religion became attractive and more acceptable to Azerbaijanis for the reason that it incorporated some deep-rooted traditions, to which people felt emotional attachment. Islam reinterpreted many elements of other religions to make them coherent with the spirit of the Koran. It turned out to be adaptable to local cultural contexts, instead of initiating a revolt. It happened, for instance, with religious holidays. The Shia ulama managed to convince people that the Persian celebration of the New Year, Novruz, is very Islamic in its nature, and represents the succession of Ali, one of the central figure in Shia history (Smirnov, 1934, as cited in Rohoziński (2005)). Other Zoroastrian symbols, in a similar way, entered and enriched the Islamic Shiite tradition. Such similarities made it easier for people to accept the new religion as their own.
The appearance and subsequent popularity of Shiism in Azerbaijan may have contributed to the success of the Muslim religion in that part of the world. It must be underlined that the Islamic landscape was always highly pluralistic, especially outside the Arab cultural area. Sects mushroomed and their mix of religious, social and economic ideas secured mass support. The vast territories of Persia, which since the times of Median and Achaemenid Empires included also Azerbaijan, attracted all kinds of dissidents and rebels. Shia ideology gave them opportunities to express their socio-economic or political resistance in religious terms. A significant opposition to Arab rule united around the Alids—descendants of Ali, regarded by them as the only true, legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammad. Alids defended the concept of the umma, which tended to be undermined in practice by Arabs, who preferred to employ ethnic, and not religious, rules in building the caliphate. Having attracted some support in Persia, Shiites led numerous rebellions against the authority of the Sunni caliphate (Składanek, 1995; Baranowski & Baranowski, 1987).
Among the movements, the Khurramites were exceptionally powerful. They drew upon various Zoroastrian and Shiite symbols. The famous leader of Khurramites, Babek, came from the province of Ardabil (where up to now the majority of inhabitants is ethnically Azeri, they are called also Iranian Azeris, as this province belongs to Iran at present), known for its religiosity. Babek, who changed his name from a Muslim one, Hasan, to a name exceptionally respected in the Zoroastrian tradition, is said to lead a fight against orthodox Sunni Islam. His movement’s activities in the ninth century are often referred to as the last struggles of Zoroastrianism and other non-Muslim beliefs in the Caucasus against Islamization. After the defeat of the Khurramites, Islamic victory was almost completed, although information about that movement appeared until the sixteenth century. What remained of it was partly adopted by radical Shiite sects, such as ahl-e ḥaqq (people of the truth), known also as ʿalī ʾilāhi (Ali is God); the latter term referring to a belief in the divinity of Ali (Yunusov, 2004, p. 51).
2.2Turks and Mongols
The next crucial phase for Azerbaijan that influenced its complex religious identities was the appearance of Turkic tribes. Seljuk Turks came from the steppes of Central Asia and invaded southwestern regions of Asia. They converted to Islam between the 9th and 11th centuries, and set out to propagate the Hanafi version of Sunnism, along with the Turkic language and culture. On the basis of the Turkic language, Azerbaijani was created, and came later to replace both Iranian and Caucasian dialects.10 Some groups of Turks came to settle down in the Caucasia— a process which altered the ethnic composition of the local population and reinforced the Islamization and Turkification of native populations, which results can be seen even today. Turkish culture is for many contemporary Azeris a vital point of reference in their daily lives, and the brotherhood between Turkey and Azerbaijan is stressed again and again.
Seljuk rules influenced the existing religious traditions and beliefs. Being zealous Sunni Muslims, Turks ruthlessly struggled with all manifestations of Shiism. Shia communities, however, managed to survive persecutions. Among their strongest weapons was the practice of taqiyya (religiously sanctioned practices of dissimulation). It was incorporated into the realm of Shia ideas quite early, when the followers of Ali found out that expressing their true convictions in the context of a combat was fruitless or dangerous. Taqiyya as a concept enables believers to hide or deny their beliefs under several conditions, such as threat, persecution, or compulsion. Hence, most people supporting Shiism in Azerbaijan seemingly switched to Su
nnism. Shiite rituals went underground (Baranowski & Baranowski, 1987; Steigerwald, 2009). Such strategy proved useful for the survival of the Shia tradition. If researchers surveyed the population at that time, they would find orthodox Sunni beliefs and practices to be prevalent. In case of a real danger, Shiites were obliged not only to hide their beliefs, but also to act convincingly as Sunnis. Sometimes they even cursed publicly Shiism and Shia practices, just to deceive their enemies.
A multitude of active sects with Shiite influences arouse threats among local feudal lords and invaders. The most dangerous factor was the massive and secret support for Shiism. For a long time Caucasian people respected a radical Shia group known as the Ismailis. The Ismaili doctrine shows signs of Manichaean and Neoplatonist influences. Even though this sect was persecuted by Sunnis during the Abbasid caliphate, they managed to attract new supporters in many regions of Persia, in Bahrain, Yemen, and even in India (Thorval, 2002). Their presence in Azerbaijan is known from the poem of a renowned twelfth-century artist Nizami Ganjavi “The Storehouse of Mysteries” (maḫzan al-asrār). Many vivid legends describe the activities of one of the best-known leaders of the Ismailis—Rashid ad-Din Sinan, known widely as the Old Man of the Mountain. His “pirate-state” encompassed lands of Southern Azerbaijan. Having attracted his faithful and obedient disciples, he made them murder unfavourable governors. His followers allegedly dreamed of dying as martyrs. The supply of those ready-to-die people reached such a degree that Hassan used to sell his professional killers to anybody who offered him money. The social support for the Old Man and his Assassins was strong in Azerbaijan and northern Iran. They killed feudal lords and they stood on the side of the poor. Even after the defeat of this “empire” by the Mongols, the local population remained attached to the Ismailis. That was another factor that added to future successes of Shiism (Thorval, 2002; Baranowski & Baranowski, 1987; Pashazade, 2005).
Table 2.1An outline chronology of Azerbaijan from the 7th till the early 20th century. Source: adapted from Lapidus (2002).
Islam introduced to Azerbaijan by Arab armies 7th century
Sunni Islam propagated by Turkic tribes 9–11 centuries
Mongol conquest 1219
Ilhkanid dynasty 1256–1336
Iran (and Azerbaijan) partitioned among local regimes 1336–
Conquest by Timur 1370–1405
Succession states
Qara Qoyunlu 1380–1468
Aq Qoyunlu 1378–1508
Safavids
Sufi masters
Safi al-Din Ishaq d. 1334
Sadr al-Din d. 1391
Khwaja ʿAli d. 1429
Ibrahim d. 1447
Junayd d. 1460
Haydar d. 1488
IsmaʿilI d. 1524
Safavid conquest of Iran 1501–1510
Safavid dynasty 1501–1722
Ismaʿil I 1501–1524
ʿAbbas I 1588–1629
Death of Nadir Shah and the end of Iranian supremacy over Azerbaijan 1747
Turkmenchay Treaty: the division of Azerbaijan between Russia and Iran 1828
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 1918–1920
In the times of Turkic westward invasions, some local rulers in Azerbaijan enjoyed a certain level of autonomy. Among the most powerful was the Shirvanshah dynasty that established a khanate with Baku as its capital (from 1191) and promoted Islamic religion and culture. The court attracted theologians, scholars, artists, and various religious specialists. Around the 11–12th centuries, the social stratum of clergymen was formed. Its characteristics varied depending on a state. The emergence of religious officials was made easier by the unclear role the caliph played for the Muslim community. Officially, he was the one responsible for governing and judging all Muslims. That was the theory. In reality, the territory of the caliphate was too vast and needed other administrative solutions and strategies. As a part of his duties, the caliph was obliged to counsel seminary students in religiously controversial or uncertain issues. In this process, a new religious function emerged: an “assistant” of a caliph, called muftī. His advisory role included issuing of fatwas (legal opinions on Islamic law). Gradually, the status of a muftī changed. In Azerbaijan, the function of sheikh-ul-islam (az. şeyx-ül-Islam) appeared for the first time in the second half of the tenth century (Yunusov, 2004, p. 57), and later became the most important in the local religious organization. At first the term was assigned to respected ulama or Sufis. Later, it served Ottoman caliphs as a position of the top of the hierarchy of muftīs. Another important function that developed in Azerbaijan was that of a chief judge (qāḍī), who supervised the observance of the sharia and fulfilling religious duties. Other main religious roles included: imams of Friday mosques, teachers of madrasas, sayyids (or, sādah)—descendants of Prophet Mohammed or other Imams’ families, and sheikhs who headed Sufi brotherhoods. The social classes most closely related to the clergy were, apart from rulers, craftsmen and traders. Muslim schools existed in bigger cities of Azerbaijan, and were usually related to mosques. Madrasas in Tabriz, Ganja, and Barda were among the schools that enjoyed especially high status (Baranowski & Baranowski, 1987; Rohoziński, 2005).
Sufism was another Islamic tradition that enriched the religious landscape. Not only did the Turks initiate various Sufi activities, but also promoted this branch of Islam among their subjects. Again, the policy of a sovereign had deep influence on choices made by people. Sufi brotherhoods, ṭarīqas (or, ṭuruq), contributed to the Islamization of Turkic and Mongolian tribes in Central Asia. Sufi practices enjoyed such popularity that Turkish leaders had no choice but to take it into consideration. In spite of attacks from some segments of the ulama, Sufi sheikhs were successfully undertaking missionary travels to attract followers. Governors often supported the erection of Sufi lodges (called ḫānaqāh in Persian, and tekke in Turkish), which served as shelters for dervishes and as focus of religious teachings and poetry. Quickly, they became centres of collective life and of worship for believers. There were shelters for the teachers and students with a kitchen. Often the lodges were built near mosques (or places adapted to mosques for the purpose of collective prayer) or madrasas. In some cases, a ḫānakā served as a tomb of a Sufi mystic or other venerated figure known for his miraculous abilities, in other it was built next to the shrines. Muslims used to make pilgrimages to those places to pray and ask for favours. The practice of a pilgrimage, ziyārat (lit. visit), to the tombs of venerated saints, scholars, or Imams became particularly widespread in the 13th and 14th centuries. In Turkey, the first tekkes were related to the great Sufi poet and master, Ǧālal ad-Dīn Rūmī. They were found all over the Turkish and Persian cultural area, including Iran, Central Asia and South Asia. Their counterpart in the Maghreb was called zāwiyā. A few of the Sufi ḫānakās exist still nowadays in Azerbaijan: Pir-Mardakan and Pir-Huseyn ḫānakā near Shamakhi, the Giz Galasi ḫānakā in Ismayilly region (Yunusov, 2004, p. 55). The most popular group in the Southern Caucasus was Yasaviyya, founded by a Turkic mystic, poet and Sufi sheikh, Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Yasavi (d.1166). Yasaviyya doctrine inspired other Sufi fraternities in the Azerbaijan region: the Halvatiyya and Bayramiyya, which originated in Tabriz (Trimingham, 1998, as quoted in Yunusov (2004)).
Were Sufi brotherhoods based on Sunni or Shia Islam? The answer to this question is not clear. Sufism undoubtedly appealed to various social groups, and managed to attract even pagan tribes. The above-mentioned brotherhoods in Azerbaijan were probably based on Sunni Muslims. There were also brotherhoods known for their Shia affiliations, e. g., Kubraviyya or Haydariyya (Yunusov, 2004, p. 54). However, due to the hegemony of Sunni Seljuks at that period, the practice of taqiyya enabled numerous Shiites to survive by keeping their true beliefs secret and pretending to be Sunnis or Sufis. The estimation of the proportions and popularity of particular branches in Islam is therefore to some extent flawed. Clearly, Sufism turned out to be remarkably attractive among the local population and managed to merge with both Sunni and S
hia doctrines, although controversy over the “purity” of Muslim religion appeared. However, it is also probable that the religious systems of beliefs were not as complete or homogeneous as they are nowadays.
After the Turks introduced new religious concepts and understandings of Islamic religion, next changes on the religious market were brought by the Mongol people who carried military campaigns to Azerbaijani lands in the first half of the 13th century. South Caucasus got incorporated into the Mongolian empire of the Ilkhans. The Mongol rules brought Azerbaijani people devastation, social unrest and a bloody conflict. Vast territories were depopulated by Mongol armies, and new settlers of Turkish and Mongol origins appeared. Although a relative autonomy of local dynasties was allowed, the Islamic domination of religious market in Azerbaijan was in danger. Competition from other religions got tough. Buddhists and Nestorian Christians came with the conquerors from Central Asian steppes. Under the patronage of new rulers, pagan temples were built, and Shamanism flourished.
The anti-Islamic sentiments of the Ilkhanate dynasty were not unambiguous. They were aware of a variety of Islamic expressions and actors and consciously differentiated between groups of Muslims. On one hand, the already established class of Islamic clergy was seen by the rulers with suspicion. Thus, affluent religious specialists suffered discrimination and repression. On the other hand, Sufi dervishes and Sufi ṭarīqas gained a lot of respect and managed to increase their status in society. According to some researchers, Sufism enabled the survival of Islamic religion and contributed to its future growth (Yunusov, 2004).