The initial destabilisation of the religious field under the rule of the Ilkhans was hampered by a couple of developments. The most influential was the conversion of some Mongol khans to Islam. Unlike Arabs, who had a profound impact on local languages and cultures, the Mongols were absorbed by the Persian civilisation and Islamic religion. Further, rivalries between Mongol regimes resulted in the invasion of the Golden Horde on the Mongolian Ilkhanid State. The Golden Horde had already been Islamised and thus treated by Azerbaijanis as a liberator rather than an invader. In 1295, a Buddhist Mongol, Mahmud Ghazan, became a khan and adopted Islam. The military elite followed his decision and changed religion. For the conversion ceremony Ghanzam called a Shiite Sufi from Khorasan, not a local Sunni scholar. Ghazan’s rule led to the re-emergence of Islam as the state religion. Following official decrees, mosques, madrasas, and other Islamic institutions were built, while temples of unbelievers were destroyed. As a zealous convert, Ghazan turned against all idolaters forcing them to make a choice: either they leave Azerbaijan or accept Islam (Yunusov, 2004).
Some data on the religious structure of the South Caucasus during the Mongol era can be obtained from geographic sources from the 13–14th centuries (Yunusov, 2004, pp. 62–64). Those writings reveal the diversity of religious manifestations, with the emphasis of Muslim pluralism. Accordingly, some Christian communities are mentioned in the city of Shahr Islam (in the past known as Udjan). The majority of Muslims adhered to Sunnism and followed the Shafii maḏhab (school of law, literally—path, conduct, opinion). Less influence had the Hanafi maḏhab, with followers concentrated in the Marga region. Sources confirm also the presence of the sheikh Safi ad-Din ṭarīqa in Ardabil. Finally, a small number of Shiites is acknowledged. The level of religious diversity varies; in some region only one religious trend dominates. Inhabitants of Ganja, according to the encyclopaedia of Zakariya al-Qazvini, are said to strictly follow Sunnism and discourage anyone professing a different faith from settling in their city. On the contrary, Tabriz accommodated various believers, although the Shafii maḏhab dominated. The institutional arrangements reflected the social diversity. In the Ilkhanid state, four chief qāḍīs were elected; each represented one of maḏhabs. It must be noted that the term maḏhab had slightly broader meaning than simply the canonical school (Amoretti, 1986).
Both the Turks and the Mongols aspired to spread control over religious life of their subjects, and their preferences in this subject had real consequences. One of the most clearly perceptible aspects was financial support. The imams, heads of Islamic schools, sheikhs, and other religious officials who were favoured by the state received not only support but also salary. Yet, despite of favouring certain traditions at the expense of others, some level of pluralism inside Islamic religion was maintained through centuries.
To sum up, the Middle Ages in the Caucasus were characterised by the reinforcement of Islam, which became a dominant religion. Both Sunnism and Shiism gained strength, and a lot of various expressions of Islamic religion appeared, in many cases formed from mixing with non-Islamic religions, local traditions and cultures. It’s probable that the diversity of Islamic traditions, adapted to the local life, was one of the main factors which enabled the survival and the flourishing of Islam in that part of the world. Different forms of religious practice and doctrines, as well as the engagement of Islamic leaders in social and political issues, have responded to the needs and preferences of particular social groups. The Islamic traditions were further reinforced by the process of institutionalization of Islam. It led to an emergence of a class of religious specialists, who, at least in part, collaborated with the state in exchange for support.
2.3State Shiism
Another turning point for Iranian and Azerbaijani religious situation, a breakthrough with far-reaching consequences for society, culture, politics, was in the early sixteenth century. It was in 1501 when Shah Ismail I (reigned 1501–1525) gained power over vast Iranian lands and proclaimed the Twelver Shia Islam (Ithnā ʿashariyya) the official religion of his new theocratic empire. This successful military commander, spiritual leader, and a legislative reformer initiated a long, lasting up to now, period of dominance of one Islamic tradition in Iran (and in Azerbaijan). The Safavid dynasty reigned in Iran till 1722.
Safavid Shiism developed or strengthened certain forms of piety. The most characteristic is the focus on pilgrimage to holy sites connected to the Twelve Shia Imams and their families. Safavids promoted Shia rituals, such as the annual re-enacting of the historical event seen as the greatest tragedy in the history of Shiism. On the tenth day of Muḥarram, the first month of the Islamic Lunar Calendar (this particular day is referred to as ʿĀšūrāʾ) in 680 CE, the Shia hero, Imam Husayn ibn ʿAli, was killed by the caliph Yazid at the place of Karbala. For Shiites, it was a killing of a legitimate heir to the Muslim state. This episode of history is crucial to Iranian national identity as a founding myth that for centuries retained its function. The anniversary of Husayn’s death is celebrated by all Shia communities in a very solemn way. It is central event in the Iranian’s religious calendar. There are “passion plays,” “religious dramas,” known as taʿziye, mourning rituals, in which the tragedy of Karbala is performed. Although the theatrical ceremonies were performed earlier in Iran and Iraq, Safavids promoted those forms of emotional religious gatherings and used them as a political tool. In the sixteenth century Muharram ceremonies became popular among the inhabitants of major urban centres, such as Isfahan, Tabriz or Shiraz (Rahimi, 2013, pp. 57–58).
The Career of the Safavid Order
To account for the success of Shiism in Iran and Azerbaijan, let us briefly examine the social roots of the Shah Ismail and his supporters. The direct beginnings of the Safavid career can be linked to a formerly mystical Sunni Sufi ṭarīqa, called Safaviyya, which subsequently transformed itself into a powerful radical Shiite organization hostile to any signs of Sufism. This unusual transformation was not coincidental—it reflects the complex relationships between sheikhs and their supporters in the changing milieu of unstable regimes, which emerged after the end of Mongol invasions.
The Safaviyya movement, which gave rise to the Safavid dynasty, made its first appearance in the 13th century in Ardabil, which today belongs to Iranian Azerbaijan. The founder—Safi ad-Din Ishaq (1254–1334) (known as the “Great Sufi”)—most probably descended from a Kurdish family. Later, to justify their religious and political aspirations, Safavids used to claim descent from the seventh imam Musa al-Kazim to enhance their religious legitimation. According to Ira Lapidus (2002, p. 286), by putting stress on the hereditary descent as a basis of succession, the Safavids ensured the stabilisation of Iran for a few centuries.
How did a single Sufi ṭarīqa manage to attract so many supporters to be able to successfully overthrow the existing order? First of all, Sufi fraternities had a long tradition of active engagement in socio-political affairs. Not only did they practice various mystical forms of religion, but also they used to take part in the public life of their societies. When there was a need for resistance against oppressors, Sufis used to organize and lead local social movements to unite the unprivileged. The period which followed the Mongol rule favoured rather the authority of Sufi masters, sorcerers and shamans than Islamic orthodox scholars. Religious leadership was based more upon esoteric knowledge or magical abilities (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 283–284). The principle of loyalty and obedience of the murīds (followers of a sheikh) facilitated such kinds of activities. One of the best well-known, although from other times, Sufi movement deeply involved in the worldly affairs was established by the charismatic Imam Shamil in the North Caucasus. Having trained his murīds, sheikh Shamil organized a strong resistance against Russian occupation and created his own state.
The Safavid order was transformed into a hierarchical, strong organization with a political agenda by the son of the Sheikh, Sadr al-Din (who headed the ṭarīqa from 1334 till 1391). Under his direction, the hierarchy of a m
uršid (teacher), who headed the organization, and khalifas who acted as his agents was established. All missionaries, assistants and students were under control (Lapidus, 2002, p. 258).
Secondly, Safaviyya sheikhs’ moves were relatively flexible. The sheikhs were able to recognise the needs and respond to the diversified and constantly changing demands of the population. Thus, the transformation of the group’s doctrine from Sufi Sunnism to Shiism shall be understood in relation to social preferences and balance of power. On the other hand, the religious doctrine itself was never rigid and complete. On the contrary, some of the ṭarīqa’s concepts had always more or less eclectic character; it employed elements from various religious and cultural traditions, e. g., from Christianity, Judaism, Shiism, Sunnism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism. Again, such heterodoxy and eclecticism seem to be typical of the religious landscape of the 14th century.
The initial appeal to Sufi ideas was understandable because in the post-Mongolian times it was Sufism, not scholarly orthodox Islam represented by the ulama, that attained the highest status among various Islamic trends.11 For average people not mosques but pirs, understood in Azerbaijan as sacred places, tombs of saint people or shrines, symbolised the Islamic religion (Yunusov, 2004, p. 65). In such an environment, sufi ṭarīqas flourished. During the 15th century many new brotherhoods emerged; their activities reflected the social realities and expectations. In Azerbaijan one of the most popular was the movement of the Hurufis, popularised by a famous Azeri poet Nasimi (1369–1417). Fadlallah Astarabadi (d. 1394), the founder of the Hurufiya, claimed to be the Hidden Imam. He preached a doctrine that the secret knowledge was within reach of those who mastered the understanding of the alphabet, for the particular letters represent elements of the microcosm of God’s reality (Lapidus, 2002, p. 284).
Although the Sufi ṭarīqas enjoyed favourable conditions, some of them received additional support from the governors. The ruling dynasty of Aq Qoyunlu in their sphere of influence offered privileges in particular to Halvatiyya, Nakshbandiyya and Kubraviyya brotherhoods (Amoretti, 1986; Yunusov, 2004). It is also noteworthy that the popular and dynamic Halvatiyya movement similarly to Safaviyya changed its religious doctrine, however in this case in another direction: from Shiite towards Sunni affiliation.
Safavids’ reference to Sufi ideas was not only convenient because of the popularity of this form of Islam. Another reason was the pragmatic implication of some Sufi values and norms. The high status of a Sufi sheikh and his unchallenged authority made it possible for leaders to shape the ethics and activities of murīds. Such relationships established between disciples and masters laid a foundation for social organization and, in some cases, turned Sufi concepts into considerable ideological force.
In the case of the Safavid movement, the most noticeable shift in religious ideology occurred during the process of expanding the movement’s social base. The adoption of Shiite doctrine seems to have been a successful strategy in increasing the membership of the ṭarīqa. The breakthrough came with the recruitment of 32 Turkish tribes with Shiite preferences. Under Sheikh Junayd (d. 1460), who married into the clan of local princes, the Turks joined and supported the order. The distinguishing symbols were their caps with twelve purple stripes worn in order to honour the Twelve Imams. Due to that headdress, the new murīds got their common name—Qizilbash (literally “men with red caps”) (Yunusov, 2004, p. 67; Lapidus, 2002, p. 285; Amoretti, 1986, pp. 629–634). With the help of new followers, the Safavid order got ready for military operations under the flag of religion. Serious support came from vast social strata of the peasantry and the city poor. Some local lords and aristocratic families also joined the movement to resist more powerful rulers. Among those groups the Shiite outlook had already been developed, although some religious or cultural elements may suggest a kind of Shiism grounded in the syncretic local influences, not accepted by mainstream Shiism.
Thus, the reason for the Safavid’s change in religious affiliation in the 15th century may be a serious demand for Shia ṭarīqas that got stronger in the turbulent times. Three elements seem to be crucial in the rising popularity of Shiism: (1) a tradition of resistance to injustice and unfair leadership, which constitutes a founding and basic element of the Shia doctrine, (2) radicalism, and (3) symbolism of the Hidden Imam, called Mahdi. The history of struggle of the Shia minority against usurpers, seizing and holding power without legal rights or authority, must have attracted positive feelings of masses oppressed by feudal lords or tribal chieftains. According to historical sources, all rebellions against Mongolian rule and their immediate successors used Shiite symbols (Yunusov, 2004, p. 66). Shiites had always been persecuted and suffered from clear injustice, but nevertheless retained faith. Their faith in future victory is epitomised in the figure of Mahdi, who was perceived as an anticipated just governor. Among the people of Iran in the 15th century there was a ‘return’ to the myth of the perfect sovereign, a ‘true Caliph,’ and consequently to a renewal of the hope in the advent of a leader (ibidem).
Politics and Religion under Safavid rule
Relations between religion and politics have various forms. We will focus on three of them that marked the Safavid era: the change in relations between the Shia “winners” and Sunni as well as Sufi “losers,” the complex development of Shiite religious system, and the geopolitical situation.
Shah Ismail concentrated so much power in his hands that he was able to significantly dictate the rules for religious communities and their leaders. To justify his rights, he proclaimed that he was the Hidden Imam, or the descendant or even reincarnation of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law, the fourth caliph. Both temporal and permanent mystical leadership belonged exclusively to him. His military successes acted as proof of his closeness to God and supernatural abilities. On the basis of such religious claims, the Safavids did not tolerate any single sign of disobedience or hesitation. Questioning the authority was equal to apostasy (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 285–286).
The Safavids religious career had to be supported by some segments of the society. Their new empire was inhabited mainly by Sunnis, who constituted around two-thirds of the whole society. Unlike Shiites, people affiliated with Sunnism more often dwelled in cities. In spite of such distribution of religious preferences, Shah Ismail in his new mission attempted to create a society consolidated by one universal doctrine of Ithnā ʿAsharī Shiism. This decision was officially announced in Tabriz, then the capital of Azerbaijan, declared by the Shah the new capital of his Safavid empire. Ismail recited the ḫuṭba (public preaching) in the names of the Twelve Imams and cursed the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman), rejecting the Sunni version of Islamic history. All mosques were obliged to add a phrase “Ali—the governor of Allah” to namaz (the Muslim prayer). Shiism became the official religion of the Safavid Empire. At the same time, Ismail’s idea of being the Imam’s reincarnation went beyond any Imamite concept of a leader.
Consolidation of the society began with a cruel elimination of non-Shia groups. Persecutions, murders, and mass executions were commonplace.12 A lot of Sunni officials left Iran and moved to neighbouring Sunni countries. Also, Sufism, in spite of its significance in the origin and development of the Safavids, did not evade persecution. Even some Shiite ṭarīqas were repressed (among others, Nimatallahiyya and Nurbashiyya), because they were regarded as potential competitors or rivals. Another decision of the Shah that changed the religious situation was the mass deportation of the enemies of the state. Suspected Sunnis were deported deep into Iran, while Shiites were encouraged to settle in their place. Such policy affected many communities. For instance, Sunni inhabitants of some villages of Nakhchivan, who supported the Ottoman state, were deported to central areas of Iran. The reports of a traveller who visited Azerbaijan in the middle of the 17th century, Evliya Chelebi, paint a picture of a vibrant Shiite religiosity in the form of many more or less orthodox sects, and of exceptional piety among the population.
Apart from
force and repression, the Safavids used also other strategies for Shiitization of the society. One of the most effective was the tax policy. Already in 1502, Shah Ismail granted tax privileges to some of the Shiite clergy. His eldest son and the successor of the Safavid dynasty, Shah Tahmasp (1524–1576), strengthened this trend by providing fiscal exemptions to the whole Shiite area. Charismatic reformer, Shah Abbas (1587–1629) went even further—paying taxes was obligatory for Sunnites, while Shiites were exempted from this duty. The trend of Shiitization was prevented only for some short periods when the Ottoman rivals were attacking Ismail’s kingdom (Yunusov, 2004, pp. 69–73).
As a result of the Shah’s policy, the division between various Islamic traditions, which had not been very sharp in the past centuries, became tangible. The diffusion of various religious practices and elements of doctrines was limited, and people were forced to adapt to the only acceptable creed and rituals of the Twelver Shiism. However, Sunnism did not disappear in Azerbaijan. According to some historical sources, Sunni communities managed to survive those hard times. The majority of Baku inhabitants were referred to as Sunnis. Moreover, in some traditional Sunni communities in Shirvan and northern regions, Sunnism was still dominant in the 17th century (Yunusov, 2004, pp. 74–75). The open preference of the state for the Shiite model lasted till the 18th century, when the Safavid state was seriously weakened, and some local feudal governors in Azerbaijan, mainly Sunnites, started to turn to the Ottomans for support. Generally, social tensions and conflicts between various denominations remained serious. To illustrate this point, it is enough to mention the activities of Nadir Shah (reigned 1736–1747), who endeavoured to reform religious policy. One of his first moves was putting an end to the existing Shia practice of cursing publicly the first three caliphs—the practice especially insulting to Sunnis. On the other hand, from Sunnis the Shah demanded that they recognise the Jafari maḏhab as equally valid as the four orthodox legal Sunni schools of law. His proposals were written down in the form of decrees, such as the “Decree about uniting two doctrines of Islam, Sunni and Shiite, the existence of which divides Persians and Turks” (Yunusov, 2004, pp. 81–82). Inspired by the geopolitical situation, his ecumenical attempts to unite Shiite and Sunni Islam were opposed by the orthodox Shia clergy as well as by the Sunnis. Both groups were suspicious of his intentions and responded negatively to religious reforms. In 1747 Nadir Shah was murdered in unknown circumstances.
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