The second consequence of the emergence of the theocratic state was a rapid development of religious ideology. The close relations between politics and religion bore fruit in the shape of a significant elaboration of a religious doctrine. The founder of the Safavid Empire wished to enhance his position with the help of religious legitimacy. Similarly, to other Shiite rulers, the Safavids supported the development of falsafa (philosophy; a mixture of positive sciences with logic and metaphysics), as well as a Shiite version of esotericism and cosmology. The patronage also resulted in the progress in the studies of Shiite sharia, specifically in the investigation of the Jafari maḏhab’s legal problems. In most Azerbaijani cities intensive religious, cultural and scientific life focused around Islamic schools, especially madrasas. Schools in Tabriz and Ardebil were considered the best in the Safavid empire. The theological and philosophical studies developed mainly from the Shiite perspective. There were attempts at introducing new or less orthodox ideas and concepts, but scholars pursuing such research risked persecution.
The third significant consequence of the alliance between state and religion, or rather of the appropriation of religion by the shah, was the long-lasting separation of Shia and Sunni countries. For Azerbaijan, it meant also a cut-off from the Turkic culture and language. Wars between countries belonging to different branches of one religion, Safavid Iran and Ottoman Turkey, resembled the situation in Europe, where at that time, plenty of people were killed in the long struggles between various Christian denominations.
Chapter 3
Islamic Modernism and Secularism
3.1The Emergence of a “Modern” Understanding of Islam
Since the initial period of Islamization, the main trend in the religious history was the persistent strengthening of Islamic position. Apart from a sheer military power, Muslim leaders used to incorporate or adapt some of Islamic rituals and elements of doctrines to the local cultures. Such strategy proved to be successful and Islamic groups and sects gradually managed to increase their numbers, membership and support. Other characteristic feature was the continuous pluralism of the Islamic religious scene. Since the very beginning the appearance of Islam on the lands of Azerbaijan was marked by the activities of various Islamic branches. Sunnites appeared naturally as the majority of Muslims, Shiites—as refugees escaping from persecutions immediately after the political discontent over the succession controversy, which followed the death of Muhammad in 632. Finally, Sufi brotherhoods were established and gained popularity with the influx of Turkic and Mongolian tribes, which had been Islamised mainly by the Sufi masters. This pattern of a pluralism, offering numerous possibilities to the local population, was drastically changed with the introduction of a monopoly in the religious sphere in the beginning of the 16th century. Shah Ismail’s decision to make a particular model of Islam, Twelver Islam, the dominant religious tradition had restricted people’s choices in religious affiliation.
Azerbaijani cultural and religious identity was vastly transformed during the era of Russian rule.13 The new approach to religion, formed in the course of the XIX and beginning of XX century, was revolutionary and had far-reaching consequences. It was a rupture with the past and an attempt to form a “modern” Muslim society, led by religious principles, but principles redefined to a large extent. It was also an endeavour to break up with Iran and its long-lasting influences on peoples’ religious and social worldviews.
The Russian “patronage” introduced new traditions and ideas which influenced the way Muslim elites thought of their societies and religion. The loss of sovereignty made Muslim intellectuals rethink their position in the world. It made them realize the urgent need to undertake radical reforms in education, economy, social organization, customs and religion. The impact, direct and indirect, of Russian colonialism, reinforced during the Soviet era, is noticeable even today in the reformist, modernist and secular forms of Azeri Muslims’ engagements with the state and Islam.
The modernization of Islam refers to particular concepts of the reformist movements in Islam that appeared in the 19th century as a consequence of the encounter with Europe and the Enlightenment ideas. Such movements emerged at the same time in many parts of the Muslim world. In many cases, they were part of liberation movements and protests against European colonialism. The calls for reformation reflected the need to reformulate Islamic ideals and to conduct social reforms among Muslim societies in the light of a vivid confrontation with Western civilization and its political ideas. The debates that swept the Muslim world led to numerous constructive propositions of social, educational and religious reforms. Muslim reformers searched for those elements of European models that might be useful in modernizing their societies, such as technology, educational system, press, the economy. Modernization, however, was to be achieved without losing the Islamic identity. Islam was to become a modernizing force, open to the world and its challenges. Islamic tradition was redefined and widened to encompass the ideas of socio-cultural revolution.
Jadidism—Modernist Reform Movement
In the Russian sphere of influence, this intellectual ferment expressed itself in the reform movement of Muslim intellectuals widely known as Jadidism, inspired by the publications and activities of Ismail Gasprinsky (1851–1914) from Crimea. His ideas spread among Tatars, Bashkirs and other Muslim communities of the Volga and Ural regions through Gasprinsky’s newspaper “Tarjiman” (“Translator”), his textbooks and programs. Education was chosen as one of the most powerful tools of social reforms. The model of a progressive “new-method” school quickly gained popularity throughout Russia and Central Asia. The graduates, acquainted with European culture and science, formed the new generation of Muslim intellectuals, eager to engage themselves in reforming society and the public sphere.
In the religious context, this movement led to a redefinition of Islamic identity. Islam became a legitimizing force in the struggle with the past. The Jadids were looking into the Koran and hadiths to prove their ideology of progress. In this process, Islam was engaged with the social reality and everyday life of people. Modernists tried to persuade people that Islam is not only about reciting the holy verses, but also about changing the world, according to the religious principles. They also showed Muslims under Russian rule that there is a global community of believers. Inhabitants of Khiva, Tashkent, and Bukhara came into contact with Iran, the Ottoman world and other Muslim regions. Such a dynamic milieu and a flow of ideas often lead to creativity and social change.
Research on the phenomenon of jadidism has only recently gained wider popularity. It was mostly due to Adeeb Khalid and his ground-breaking book “The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia (1998).” Using various sources, among others Uzbek and Tajik, and many archival materials, Khalid analyses the socio-cultural debates and search for modern identity among Central Asian Muslim elites in a very comprehensive way. Besides the new model of education, Khalid points to the progress in communication technologies to explain the extent of jadids’ impact. The press, the telegraph and the railway opened Central Asia, the periphery of Islam, to the worldwide Muslim umma. In this process, a new public sphere was created, which changed the criteria for entering the social stratum of elites (ibidem, chapter 4). However, even though Khalid perceives similarities in the Muslim project of modernization, he warns against imagining jadidism as a unified, coherent movement that spread from the Crimea to Central Asia and its regions (ibidem, p. 8–9). Local realities, with their distinct histories, political situation, cultural traits, shape the strategies of social actors, in this case, the Muslim progressive elites. The ideology of change and modernization was adapted to the particular needs and situation of the communities.
The first generations of Azerbaijani modern elites, inspired by Russian culture, networked with Muslim Tatars and Central Asian Muslims in the collaboration on reform projects. However, it was not until 1905 that jadidist ideas made an impact of the socio-cultural life of Azeri people (Lemercier
-Quelquejey, 1984, p. 54). In 1905 the first school for Muslim girls was opened. It was funded by an Azeri reformer, Haji Zeynolabedin Tagiyev, who made a fortune during the first oil boom. He was a representative of a new bourgeoisie, the social class that cooperated with the Azeri intelligentsia in the project of social modernization. The inspirations for egalitarian approach to education came from Europe as well as the Volga Tatars’ experience. The religious justification was found in the Koran, on the basis of chosen passages.
In spite of the engagement, according to some scholars (e. g., Goyushov, 2008), the impact of jadidism on Azerbaijani Muslims was not as strong as on Sunni Muslim societies of the Volga region and Central Asia. In Shiite legal systems, the use of iǧtihād (independent reasoning) was never so restricted as in Sunni interpretations, therefore new (ǧadid) methods of Koranic exegesis proposed by Jadidists had relatively little value for Azerbaijani Muslim scholars.
Modernization of Azerbaijani Islam took its own, distinctive way, grounded in the local context. Ideas of the Azeri intelligentsia were more radical than the proposals of Sunni leaders. The reformist agenda in Azerbaijan focused on the ideological struggle with elements of Shia “folk Islam.” The term folk was used as an antonym of “pure,” and denoted all kinds of cultural innovations in the sphere of Islamic religion that could not be justified on the basis of the Islamic scriptures, mainly the Koran and hadiths. Some elements of Shia ritual life came under attack, especially the Muḥarram commemorative tradition dedicated to the tragedy at Karbala. The practice of self-mortification and public street processions were regarded as unjustified in Islam. The well-known modernists, such as Mirza F. Akhundov, called for rejecting that elements of Shia tradition. This line of criticism is still alive at the beginning of the 21st century, and among its supporters is the current sheikh-ul-islam (“the leader of Islam”) Allahshukur Pashazade.
The criticism of Shiite pietistic rituals had also another root—the existing tensions between Shiites and Sunnites. Sunni intellectuals and reformers underlined the social and political aspects of Shia religious holidays. Especially the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn often ended in a confrontation between the two Islamic schools. For that reason, the ecumenical reformers protested against some forms of Shia expressions.
There were, nonetheless, certain features shared by both Jadidists and Azerbaijani Muslim modernists. One of the most important was the issue of education. Modern schools with adequate curriculum were supposed to replace traditional system of Islamic maktabas and madrasas, where education was in Arabic and Persian. The youth educated in European institutions, being under great impression of what they saw as European progress, propagated the spread of secular sciences in their societies. Representatives of Azerbaijani new stratum of intellectuals called for far-going reforms in education, including the separation of schools from the influence of religion. This modernization and secularization attempts were met with a strong opposition from the traditionalist Muslim elite, who identified itself with Iranian values and worldviews.
Apart from the Jadidist movement and Russian cultural influence, there is a third distinguishable point of reference for Azerbaijani modernists, namely pan-Islamism. It was adopted by the Sunni segment of the Azerbaijani elite that had connections with the Ottoman Empire, where this ideology was developed. Having completed their education in Sunni Ottoman centres, the Azerbaijani elite undertook actions for modernization of Islamic culture and institutions. Again, the main focus of the struggle was on the educational system. Additionally, Sunnis, who at that time had already lost their dominant position among groups in Islam in that region, advocated the end of divisions and conflicts inside Islam, which, according to some observers, such as Russian orientalist K.N. Smirnov, turned out to be relatively successful (Yunusov, 2004, p. 123). Similar strategy can be observed among Sunni Muslim communities in contemporary Azerbaijan.
Pan-Islamic ideology was at the beginning deeply related to Pan-Turkism, which also found fertile ground in Azerbaijan. Ali-bey Huseyn-zade (1864–1941), one of the first Azeri protagonist of Pan-Turkism, stressed three values that are worth fighting for: Turkization (understood mainly as an introduction of Turkic languages to schools), Islamization, and Europeization. These slogans underwent a small transformation and eventually they expressed the following issues: Turkish, Islam and modernism, symbolised subsequently by the three colors of the flag of Azerbaijan (Yunusov, 2004, p. 126). Pan-Turkism provided a strong impulse to the development of the secular tradition, which emphasises ethnicity and Turkic roots instead of religious aspects of identity.
Finally, modernism also had a political episode. In order to put the new ideas into life, modernists established an Islamist Ittihad (union) party. However, in the light of a decrease in social support, they were forced to concede their leadership in the parliament to the coalition of secular parties with nationalist and liberal agendas. The winners fought with the rule of the sharia and religious courts, proposing instead an establishment of secular institutions and a secular legal system. In other Muslim societies of Central Asia and Caucasus religious influence over judicial system lasted longer, until the late 1920s.
3.2Secularization
The roots of secular outlook among Azeri Muslims can be traced to the encounter with European culture, imported to Azerbaijan in a Russian form. Furthermore, the ideology of Turkish nationalism is vital in our understanding of that phenomenon. Both trends generally led to a decrease of the role of religion in public life. Pan-Turkism became the dominant trend of Azerbaijani political life during the first decade of the 20th century. For new Azeri elites that constructive ideology of the unity with Turkic people on the basis of ethnicity, culture, and language was very appealing. The most spectacular realization of secular values was the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic—the first independent republic in the Muslim world. For Azeris it is a source of national pride.
Early manifestations of secularism can be seen in the attempts at placing the religious sphere under strict control. Russian officials, who distrusted Muslims more than Christians, pursued the policy of co-opting representatives of Muslim religious figures to subsequently use them to control the Muslim society. After the conquest of the Caucasus by Russians, in 1823 in Tiflis (Tbilisi) the position of sheikh-ul-islam was established by Russian officials. This highest religious structure was headed by Muhammed Ali Husejnzade, who was an ethnic Azeri. His appointment was not recognized by the Shiites nor Sunnites. The duties of sheikh-ul-islam encompassed issuing certificates to akhunds (akhūnd, in Azerbaijan, a Muslim cleric that can be appointed the head of a mosque) and mullas. Shiite clerics were forbidden to send youth for religious education to Persia, and those with Persian certificates were not entitled to work in Azerbaijan (Yunusov, 2004, pp. 89–90, 95). In Azerbaijan, the Board, known as the Spiritual Board of the Transcaucasian Muslims, was created in 1872 by the decree of Alexander II; it exits still today but under a slightly different name—the Caucasus Muslim Board. Shiites were headed by a sheikh-ul-islam, whereas Sunnis by a muftī. The ideas of the state’s control over religion had already been in use towards the Russian Orthodox Church. The main role was the spread of control over local religious functionaries and over all aspects of religious life. The power of the Boards was gradually reduced and replaced by the power of the secular state and its leaders. Another function of the Council was the indirect regulation of the Islamic market. According to the law, a religious official could not have been a member of any “illegal associations” nor a “follower of the prohibited teachings,” the terms referring to Sufi brotherhoods, which at that time were famous for their anti-Russian sentiments and activities (Rohoziński, 2005).
The indirect consequence of secular control over the religious field was the systematic gathering of data concerning religion. Statistical information on religious affiliation, taking into account the division between Sunni and Shiite Islam, has remarkable value for researchers, although the data sh
ould be treated with caution. For instance, they referred only to the male section of the society. Sometimes, untrue numbers of family members were given to the officials in order to avoid high tax or military service, obligatory for young men. Later censuses, conducted during Soviet times and afterwards, do not contain religious data.14 Here, let us only briefly refer to the ratio of Sunnis and Shiites, as it relates to the topic. According to the first census, giving exact information on religion in particular regions of Azerbaijan, there were overall two times more Sunni Muslims than Shia. The religious distribution in Azerbaijan was as follows: the northern territories (Sheki, Kuba, Shirvan, Kazakh and Djaro-Belokan) were generally Sunni, while the central and southern religions were inhabited mostly by Shiites. In 1848, the Azerbaijani population was divided equally between those two branches. From the next census in 1886, interesting information comes about activities of the Shiite sect ʿalī ʾilāhi in Azerbaijan, with the centre in Dashkesan. Generally, religious trends in the 19th century, shaped by wars, migration, and Russian policies, were directed towards the change in the religious situation. The trend towards Shiitisation of the society was reinforced again by the influx of Iranian workers looking for work in the booming oil industry. As a result, in 1917 Shiites outnumbered Sunnis and became the dominant group (Yunusov, 2004, pp. 106–108). Most probably, although currently there are no exact data on this issue, the domination of Shiism has remained unchallenged till present and, according to cautious estimations Shiites continue to make 65 percent of the Muslim population, whereas the rest, around 35 percent is Sunni.
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