Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  I once visited a house of my respondent, Fatima, who has been involved in the Salafi community for already one year. After having learned about the purist approach to religion among Salafi Muslims, I expected a new convert to follow, or, at least, to try to follow, all major rules typical of that group. At first glance, Fatima resembles a typical Salafi woman: she wears hijab in a non-traditional way, does not use make-up, and performs prayers with a great concern to all the details. Moreover, she has been attending Arabic lessons to be able to read the Koran in Arabic—a practice highly appreciated by Salafis. I found it surprising to see in Fatima’s living room an exhibition of Orthodox Christian icons. She told me stories of particular saints depicted on wooden panels and explained how she had been gathering the whole collection. When I touched the problem of controversy around saint people in Islam, she replied that she is not a “radical, but a moderate Muslim.” She said:

  I know that some of my sisters are against veneration of saints and criticize us for possessing icons. But I personally see no problem in praying to saint people and asking them for help. They do not replace God, but act as His “secretaries,” listening to our wishes and passing them to God, so that he could solve them as quickly as possible. Thanks to saint people, the time needed to handle our maters is shortened.

  It is also not uncommon for Muslims seeking religious experience or fulfillment of wishes to attend churches. Hafiza and her sister are taught by their mother (secular Shia Muslim) how to behave in an Orthodox church. Once, on Sunday, the girls were asked to visit the main church in the city to light candles in front of the icons of three saints and Jesus. They mother repeated saints’ names several times and explained the icons’ locations to her daughters. At each place, the girls had to say wishes; one for their mother’s health, who suffers from a migraine, the second for a little baby in the family, and two others for their own private dreams. Then, Hafiza and Nuray learned how to make a proper sign of the cross according to the Russian Orthodox Church. After some training, their father took us to the church, where the girls carefully performed the task.

  Other stories from Hafiza’s family illustrate the endeavours of Christian missionaries in Azerbaijan. Hafiza’s mother could not have a child for eight years after marriage, a serious problem in a society where a woman is still judged by her ability to give birth. She was told to visit the home of God, but it must belong to a different religion. Additionally, it would be the best to pray abroad. Following this advice, the mother went with her husband to Saint Petersburg (called Leningrad at that time), and the same year she became pregnant. Another woman, Hafiza’s relative, had only sons, but dreamed of a daughter. Someone gave her an advice to promise God that in case the next child was a girl the woman would give her a Christian name. Again, the wish has been fulfilled and the baby girl’s name is Ludmila.

  Similar observation about merging elements of Christianity into Muslim traditions has been made by Jerzy Rohoziński (2005). During his field work on the Absheron Peninsula in 2000, he noticed that some families not only had a Bible at home, but also consulted it in harsh life situations. Besides, his research confirms the tendency among Muslims to visit Christian churches from time to time.23

  Having reviewed examples of an inter-religious form of bricolage, i.e., combining Islamic and non-Islamic elements, I shall now mention the intra-religious form of eclecticism. The most obvious type refers to Shia-Sunni differences, which had been diminished for many decades. In contemporary pluralistic landscape, eclecticism is observed in the religious life of individuals who, usually unconsciously, follow elements of both or more Islamic traditions. For instance, some of my respondents were students or teachers of Baku Caucasus University known for its close connections to Fethullah Gülen’s community (the so-called fethullahci or neo-nurcu community). Nurcu Islam is characterized by scholars as modern, moderate, elitist, pragmatic, and respecting mystical forms of religiosity (Balci, 2008). In many conversations, I have been told that they “condemn Wahhabism,” so I expected those people to keep a distance from Salafi mosques. However, as I discovered during interviews, some of Gülen’s sympathizers see no problem in socializing with Salafis, and from time to time they pray in “Salafi” mosques. This phenomenon of interaction and overlapping of Islamic traditions will have inevitable implications for their development. Among other things, it can lead to more frequent “migrations” between religious groups, as well as to changes in organizational, doctrinal and ritualistic aspects of particular traditions.

  4.4Am I a Shia or a Sunni? The blurring of sectarian division

  When I asked Azeris about their ways to religion, they usually pointed to the tradition of their ancestors as one of the main sources. One middle-aged man explained: “The basis for us, for our interest in Islam, was the tradition of our fathers and grandfathers that we followed since childhood.” Generally, as I observed, an emphasis on family as a basic channel for transferring values, customs and norms is still very strong. My respondents used to underline that their ancestors were either Shia or Sunni, but in an “ethnic sense.” This phrase referred to being a Muslim just for the sole reason of being born in such a family. The upbringing and socialization into one of these traditions was thus taken for granted, and not challenged. Certain differences visible in ritual matters did not disturb anyone, despite of the fact that both groups often prayed in the same mosques. A girl at the focus group explained that the Shia-Sunni divisions did not matter in the past: “Azerbaijan is historically a place of mixture of Shiism and Sunnism. There were marriages between both groups, and no problems resulted from it.” Traditional Islam, with its usually limited ritualistic sphere, was transmitted from generation to generation. “Shiites have always lived alongside Sunnis. It was our tradition. At times, one group dominated, at times the second. During communism, there was an atheistic ideology, but people did not completely lose their faith and handed it down to their children,” another man stated in a group discussion. I also discussed an issue of religiously-mixed marriages with a German teacher. She assured me that in Azerbaijan people tolerate such relationships, and gave me an example from her own family: a Muslim-Jewish marriage. When I asked her how do they get along with religious differences, she said that they attend a synagogue as well as a mosque.

  In chapter 1, I discussed historical developments of the Islamic field. I pointed to some periods where discrimination or persecutions forced people to change or hide their religious preferences. It is curious that most Muslims nowadays are not aware, or do not want to be aware, of these facts, and paint a picture of Azerbaijan as a country where tolerance was always one of its main features. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that one cannot speak of free choice in the Azerbaijani past (as it is the case of most of the world). In Soviet times, still most of the people who regarded themselves as Muslims did not question their inherited tradition. Only a few of my respondents had given me examples from their close surrounding of change in the religious affiliation, which was usually associated with marriage (e. g., a grandmother was a Sunni, and parents were Shia).

  The Sunni-Shia division is relatively weak also due to another factor. A lot of Muslims, especially urban youngsters, are unaware of this problem. For them, the label of a “Muslim” is enough to determine their religious identity. That was, for instance, the answer I got from my flatmates, when I first enquired them about their religion. The girls were studying social sciences (International Relations and Law) and obviously had heard of Sunnis and Shias, but could not relate themselves to neither of these groups. The word “Muslim” summarizes everything about religion in the form and content their parents have taught them, even though it has evident Shia traditional elements. This was evident when I spoke to my friends about my forthcoming meeting with Ilgar Ibrahimoglu. The title “imam” is widely used in regard to this Islamic theologist and usually he is referred to as “an imam of the Juma Mosque in Baku’s Old City.” After my phone conversation, which the girls witnessed, I told t
hem that it was an imam who called me back and we arranged details for the meeting in the next day. Hafiza scrutinized me with a sense of unbelief as she was taught, in accordance with a Shia tradition, that there are Twelve Imams and the last one, Mahdi, is in occultation. I could not, in her opinion, meet an Imam.

  4.5Cultural Muslims in post-Soviet states

  The Muslim identity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan is complex and nuanced. For most people, religion is treated as an inseparable part of their culture—culture of the Caucasus, of post-Soviet area, of unique, local traditions passed from one generation to another. Islam is also, in the eyes of the people, an important pillar of Azerbaijan cultural heritage. Being a Muslim for many Azeris means diverse things, often contradictory. For some of them it is simply a synonym of ethnicity, for others, a term denouncing some socio-cultural norms which they regard as Islamic norms. Similar confusion and ambiguities have been observed by scholars studying culture of contemporary Chechens, Tatars, Uzbeks and other Muslims of the former Soviet empire.

  There are reports from all over the Muslim republics on the ongoing popularity of shrine visitations. In the Soviet reports this aspect of religiosity was reduced mostly to mythology (Basilov, 1970). Post-Soviet ethnography shows more appreciation for the role and meanings of shrines. The lists of the most renowned pirs are being made. For instance, field material from the Samarqand province in Uzbekistan points to the existing hierarchy of saints in the popular discourse. Saints and their “venues” are categorized and assessed by people. There are shrines which are located at the gravesites of Islamic theologians, teacher or leaders of Sufi brotherhoods and there are shrines built around a place where a miracle occurred or where a saint or sheikh simply stayed for some time. In Bukhara, such places are known as avliyo or pir, or, less frequently, mazar, ziyārat, ziyoratgoh, or a “place of visit.” Muslims going to those sacred places often consider it to be a “Little Pilgrimage” to Mecca. The tombs of female saints also attract followers (Louw, 2006; Malikov, 2010).

  To sum up, secularization is a social reality in Azerbaijan. Baku is commonly referred to as one of the most secularized Muslim cities in the world. For an average Azeri, the role of religion is very limited and does not act as a vital force shaping people’s conduct, worldview, political choices, etc. Islam is widely accepted as an element of the cultural identity, but it is Islam reinterpreted in the context of local traditions and history. It is against this background—the dominant cultural and secularized Muslim identity—that the religious revival is so clearly and sharply seen. All kinds of new Islamic traditions and movements had to deal with the status quo. New Islamic preachers faced strong opposition from various segments of Azeri society who charge them with revolting against the tradition—which has an almost sacred status.

  Chapter 5

  Religious Revival and the Plurality of Choices

  One of the most extraordinary things about contemporary Islam in the Caucasus is the relative weakness of sectarian divisions. All around the Muslim world it is widely assumed that the most divisive line in Islam goes between Sunnis and Shias. The hostile relations dating back to the very beginning of Islamic civilization are thought to determine the current situation in Muslim-majority countries. It is the first characteristic of Islamic pluralism that students usually learn while studying preliminary courses on Islam. This perspective is strengthened by media coverage from the Middle East, where religious divisions blend, often in a drastic way, with politics and family ties. Similar intra-religious tensions and conflicts I had expected to observe in Azerbaijan as well. This country, which has a significant Sunni population, is typically associated with noticeable Iranian influences and Shia beliefs, ideas and practices. Already during the restructuring of the Soviet empire (perestroika) in the 1980s there were voices among Western analytics that warned about possible dangers associated with the rising popularity of extremist and fundamentalist ideologies in the region. Iran was trying to export its Islamic revolution with a lot of fervour and spreading radical Shia ideas among Azerbaijani Muslims was a desired aim from the geopolitical perspective.

  Indeed, when one sets out on a trip to Nardaran, a village located around 25 km north from Baku, he may get some ambiance of the Iranian-style Shia Islam. In the eyes of many journalists and scholars Nardaran is a stronghold of Shia traditional religiosity and cultural conservatism. This settlement attracted wide international attention after the events in June 2002 when, in clashes with the police, one person was killed and many others wounded. This conflict was quickly interpreted as an obvious sign of the Islamic revolution. The image of Shia “fundamentalist” activities that aim at destroying the secular state and secular law and replace them with the Iranian model is also held by the Azerbaijani authorities. After the protests in Nardaran, political elites from Baku tended to put the blame on the Iranian propaganda. More recently, in March 2013, when the village hosted protests against the arrest of an Islamic theologian, Taleh Bagirzadeh, Yevda Abrmemberamov, a member of the governing New Azerbaijan Party commented (Abbasov, 2013): “Even in Soviet times, Nardaran was under Iranian influence. Everyone in Azerbaijan knows that the residents of this village owe allegiance to Iran.” In such popular claims, there is no doubt regarding pro-Iranian inclinations of religious, orthodox Shia followers. In the case of any protest involving Shia rhetoric and symbols, the first image that comes to mind is “Islamic fundamentalism.” When, in addition, the mass media show pictures focused on women in long, dark niqabs, the thesis of Iranian activities in Nardaran and similar places is widely accepted.

  In reality, not only the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a significant force in the political life of Azerbaijan is untrue. Shia-Sunni tensions among Azerbaijani Muslims are, for the moment, weak, nuanced, and far from causing any serious problems. For the majority of Azerbaijanis religion is more an element of their culture than a crucial factor that guides their social or political decisions. The Sunni and Shia labels and identities have little relevance in social life and this situation refers not only to contemporary, Azerbaijan, but also to many other post-Soviet states. These religious etiquettes do not carry the same content as in the Arab Middle East. Surprisingly for the outsiders who visit the region for the first time, for a lot of people the only religious identification is a general “Muslim” identification. What’s more, unlike in the “core” Islamic states the respect for secularism among Azeri Muslims and the separation between religion and the state is rarely questioned. In this respect, there are some similarities to Turkey and its tradition of Kemalism.

  The main religion-related division, which is spontaneously invoked by Azerbaijanis, is thus not between Sunni and Shia, but between “cultural” (or, in another words, “traditional”) and pious Muslims. Whenever I was talking about my research on pluralism in Islam with Azerbaijanis, they used to ask me: “Are you looking for ‘religious’ Muslims?” My interlocutors in Baku took it for granted that in order to do research on Islam I was searching not just for Muslims, since the majority of local Muslims are largely unaware of the Islamic teachings. The category of “religious” or “pious” Muslims forms a very vivid element in the public discourse. It is a relatively new category of people who publicly show their religious attachment and are known for religious observance. Those people are quite easily distinguishable by external symbols, such as the Islamic dress code. Many (but certainly not all) Azerbaijani religious women dress modestly —usually they wear hijab and cover most parts of their body. For men, the most distinctive sign of their religious observance is a small beard. Some of them, especially Salafis, also wear shorter trousers. Those “religious” Muslims are also widely known for regular praying (namaz) and frequent mosque attendance. But the distance between average “cultural” Muslims and the religious group is caused not by the way people dress. It is rather the salience of the new ideas and practices that arouses resistance. Religious Muslims are contesting the status quo, including the mainstream, traditional culture and esta
blished social relations. They bring the Islamic culture into the limelight and, as a result, religion with its various implications is increasingly present in everyday discourse, in media, at schools and universities.

  Religious revival is a phenomenon related to the minority of Muslims living in the vast areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus. This empirical fact regarding the influence of Islam in society was often raised in my conversations with Azerbaijani scholars and journalists. They were anxious about Islam-related stereotypes. For them Westerners too often demonize Islam and equal Islamic revivalism with the rise of fundamentalism that would inevitably turn secular states into sharia-ruled political organisms. In fact, much less than 20% of Muslims consider themselves to be “religious,” even though almost everybody in Azerbaijan underlines the Muslim identity. Nevertheless, in spite of its relatively small size, Islamic revivalism is important and fascinating due to many factors. First, it adds new colors to the ideological spectrum and makes Islam a debatable issue. There is a new dimension in the debates concerning public and private spheres. Second, religion is presented as a foundation for social norms and is claimed to justify various behaviors, such as new social norms governing men and women interactions. Thus, social change is taking place with a strong religious legitimacy. Thirdly, this phenomenon is dynamic and Islam in its diverse models is gradually spreading into various sectors of society. Islamic ideas find resonance among the poor and the unemployed, as the example of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees vividly illustrates. In the refugees’ camps, preachers and missionaries who bring both material and spiritual help are more than welcomed. Islam is also attractive to the growing urban middle class and especially to the young people who are aspiring to become members of the global middle class with good education and prospects for life. For them, Turkey—and its model of Sunni Islam—is the point of reference. The religious revival in the era of globalization brings a diversity of identifications to local groups and communities. People are offered various Islamic models with their ideologies, practices and international networks.