Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  A political aspect of Shiism is also visible, although, in the light of negative state campaigns and unfavourable social attitudes, it does not influence the religiosity of most Shiites. Founded in Nardaran, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan is probably the only well-known political organization promoting the Iranian model. Its relationships with the state are problematic. The leaders were accused of spying for the Iranian Republic; subsequently they got arrested and were sentenced to prison. Neither political (wilāyat al-faqīh, “rule of the Islamic Jurists”), nor spiritual (marǧaʿ at-taqlīd, “source of imitation”) leadership of Iran’s Supreme Leader seem to be considered as a serious option for an average Azerbaijani Shiite.

  In this short overview, the well-known Azerbaijani Shiite reformist movement has to be mentioned. The Juma mosque (“Friday mosque”) community in the old “Inner City” in Baku, the Icheri Sheher, and its leader imam haji Ilgar Ibrahimoglu have received a lot of public attention. What they propose is a synthesis of Islam and democratic values. Ibrahimoglu’s struggles with the authoritarian regime and with official Islamic structures made him a chief representative of oppositional or “independent” Islam in Azerbaijan. His opponents criticize him for “promoting radical Shia ideas.” The main argument used against the imam is his educational background, as he studied in Iran. It is true that Haji Ilgar received his scholarly degrees in that country, as he publicly admits, but it is also true that neither in his writings nor speeches does he summon believers to follow the Iranian model. On the contrary, his activities are aimed at promoting human rights and liberal democratic values. As Haji Ilgar has told me during our first meeting, he studied these topics in Poland at Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, which was led at that time by Marek Nowicki, a famous human rights defender who reported on communists’ abuses. Ibrahimoglu’s anti-state rhetoric, alongside an increasing popularity, posed too much threat to the ruling elite. Therefore, after the presidential elections in 2003, which were widely considered by external observers as fraudulent and ended with the post-election demonstration, the imam was arrested and charged with using his religious authority for political gains. Such actions are defined by the Azerbaijani law as illegal. As these tough measures did not prevent Ibrahimoglu from oppositional work, government officials evicted the community from the mosque’s building, claiming that the community leaders failed to pass registration at the State Committee on Work with Religious Organizations (SCWRO), and that the mosque as a part of national heritage must undergo urgent renovation.27 This issue has been constantly addressed by international human rights organizations, but for the moment nothing has changed. Following the decision of the head of the Caucasus Muslim Board, sheikh-ul-islam Pashazade, the mosque has been mandated to an akhund with “appropriate” official certificates. In 2009, during my stay in Baku, the mosque was managed by Haji Surhay Mamedov, who represents Shiite views and fully supports the official Islamic hierarchy. The group of Ilgar Ibrahimoglu continues to function, but in a private place. It has, nonetheless, retained the name “Juma mosque community.” Its religious activities are closely related to human rights issues and are conducted in the framework of an organization known as DEVAM. At present, as Ibrahimoglu’s followers do not have “their” mosque, it is hard to estimate how numerous the community is. In 2004, according to its imam, there were around 1000 members (Bedford, 2009, p. 102). Now, as I have witnessed, only a small group attends weekly lectures, but at the same time Internet social networks related to Haji Ilgar are much more numerous.

  Figure 5.1 Juma Mosque in Baku with its original minaret from 1442 In his preaches and public activities, Ibrahimoglu calls for democratic and liberal values, which in his opinion should characterize the Islamic world. Shiite symbols in his understanding have not only strictly religious, but also political and moral meanings. In fact, it is an idea common to a lot of Muslims that all spheres of life belong to religion and it does not make sense to speak of religion as a separate field.

  Ilgar Ibrahimoglu is actively engaged in the debate on the role of Islam in the public sphere, which constantly turns up as controversies around visible aspects of Islam continue. Protests against unofficial bans on wearing hijabs in schools and universities unite Islamic activists. One of such prominent Shia theologians is Elshan Mustafaoglu, a founder of an Azerbaijani organization called Menevi Saflig Devet Ictimai Birliyi (Social Union for the Appeal to Moral Purity). A recent study on this community, made by Bruno de Cordier (2013), shows some useful light on its genesis and modes of operation. Its founder, known also as Haji Elshan, had a typical biography of a “born-again” Muslim, who discovered true Islam in a young age, when the Soviet empire was beginning to collapse and the Nagorno-Karabakh war began. In 1989, he joined a Muslim youth organization, which was one of the local agents promoting the “religious revival.”

  5.2Sunnism

  In Baku, which is attracting population from all regions of Azerbaijan, one can find numerous variants of Sunni traditions. The main competitors to deep-rooted local Sunnism are: the Turkish branch of Sunni Islam, and inspired by Arabic countries Salafism. Historically, Sunnism of the Hanafi legal school developed in the north of Azerbaijan, which is understandable since the Northern Caucasus has predominantly Sunni character. Its adherents belong to both Azeri and non-Azeri ethnic groups. It is estimated that around 80% of the Azeris living in the north are also Sunni (Kotecha, 2006, p. 18). For religious education those people tend to choose nearby Dagestan—a strong centre of Sunnism, which has a reputation of being “more religious” than Azerbaijan. However, the existing state religious policy rather discourages people from seeking knowledge outside Azerbaijan. For instance, the state does not allow people educated abroad to take leadership positions in the religious sphere. This factor contributes to a general unfavourable feeling local population has towards the Azerbaijani political establishment. It is one of the factors contributing to more radical sentiments and activities in the north.

  As in the case of Shiites, Sunni Muslims also practice ziyārat to numerous shrines or other pilgrimage places in Azerbaijan and abroad. pirs in Dagestan are frequently visited. Most Azerbaijani villages have informal mosques, prayer houses, or rooms. In some of them believers lead the prayers themselves, in other they invite a person regarded as a religious specialist, usually someone who has some knowledge of the Koran or who is widely perceived as a spiritual man. A lot of pirs in that region are weakly related to Sufism, which used to be influential in Northern Azerbaijan for centuries. Today participation in a Sufi order is certainly not a popular practice, but still some forms of Sufi tradition exist. My respondents from Baku confirmed the activity of a Nakshbandiyya brotherhood in that region. One of them told me about his grandfather who had been a murīd of that ṭarīqa, and was considered to be a very religious man. However, such accounts suggest that embracing Sufism in its classic form is rather an exception than a rule. Bruce Grant (2011, p. 669) while researching the life of shrines related to Islam in rural Azerbaijan also noted the lack of traditional Sufi attributes, such as master-student model of education. Rural Azeri pirs constitute a very heterogeneous reality and cannot be reduced to the tradition of Sufism. This stands in sharp contrast to the lively Sufi tradition across North Caucasus and Central Asia (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2006).

  There are also places of worship on the Georgian territory which are popular among Azeris. One of them is the tomb of a famous Sufi preacher that had come from Dagestan—“Isa Efendi,” as the local population calls him (see Sanikidze, Walker, 2004).28 His tomb, located in Kabal—a village in the Lagodekhi region of Georgia bordering Azerbaijan, attracts not only Sunni, but also Shiite Azeris. The cemetery is guarded by the sheikh’s ancestors, most of whom are Azeris, as the grandson of the saint explained me when I visited the village in 2008.

  Figure 5.2 The tomb of a Sufi Sheikh Isa Efendi in Kabal My field research in Azeri communities in Georgia, which are in contact with Azerbaijan, confirms that Muslims attach significant importance to
religion during life cycle events, such as wedding or someone’s death. Weddings and funerals are usually accompanied by a mulla. Occasionally, after someone’s death, a group of people gather to perform a ḏikr. Religious figures preside also over weddings. As distinctions between Sunnism and Shiism significantly diminished during communism, it was not surprising to see a Sunni Muslim celebrating common Shiite rituals, such as the ʿĀšūrāʾ commemoration, or a Shiite making a pilgrimage to a Sunni pir, or performing the ḏikr (Sanikidze, Walker, 2004).

  Salafism: Between Piety and Fundamentalism

  The prevalence of “unorthodox” practices and a lack of scholarly knowledge about Islamic religion made the local traditional Sunnism an object of attack from all kinds of revivalist Sunni movements. The main opponents to ḏikr and ziyārat are representatives of Salafism, commonly referred to as Wahhabism. In the Caucasus, this term represents a radical-reformist Islamic tradition that first appeared in the region in the 1970 – 1980s. Etymologically and ideologically, this tradition dates back to the 18th century, when in present-day Saudi Arabia, Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab managed to mobilize his followers to take part in the struggle against traditional understandings and practices of Islam. Following the Hanbali maḏhab (widely regarded as the most strict and conservative), Salafis of the Caucasus continue the reformist program, but the objects of attacks vary depending on local contexts. In Dagestan, where Sufi orders have gained significant social support, Wahhabis directed their attacks at that tradition and all kinds of Sufi-like rituals. In Azerbaijan, the major object of the debate is the “unorthodox” attitude to Islam, related not directly to Sufism, but rather to ethnic or secular approaches to religion. Although it’s hard to speak nowadays of Sufi Islam in the form of traditional ṭarīqas in the South Caucasus, the cult of saint people is widespread among Azerbaijani Muslims. These practices are the main focus of controversies over what constitutes the “proper” understanding of Islam. In this competition, Sunni traditions inspired from outside of Azerbaijan managed to give new meanings to the term “Musulmanchilik” (being a Muslim). In this process of reinterpretation of Islam, Salafi leaders turn to an idealized past, when the Muslim community lived according to the norms and values Prophet Mahomet transmitted from Allah. The discursive focus on the past is one of the issues that differentiate Salafi tradition from another influential Sunni Islamic group—the Turkish Nurcu movement.

  In Azerbaijan, Salafism found its followers mainly in the historically Sunni northern region and in Baku. Sunni preachers have been coming from Arab countries, Chechnya, and Dagestan since the beginning of the 1990s to propagate their revivalist and reformist ideas. Meanwhile, young Azerbaijanis were offered scholarships to study theology in Arab countries. In that process, a new local Salafi elite developed.

  In the capital, the most well-known symbol of this tradition is the Abu Bakr mosque founded by the Azerbaijani branch of a Kuwaiti charity organization “The Revival of Islamic Heritage,” but the mosque’s activities were to be covered by the visitors themselves, as the imam assured in a press interview (Gamet, 2008). Since its opening in 1998, it has been led by a charismatic young imam, Haji Gamet Suleymanov, a graduate of the World Islamic University of Medina. After the mosque established its reputation as one of the most popular in the capital, political problems appeared. Mass media systematically featured stories of extremist and militant Islamist groups allegedly associated with the mosque. As the tension intensified, state authorities attempted to close Abu Bakr on the grounds that it had been functioning without official registration.29 But it was not until a terror act at the mosque was committed in August 2008 that the officials succeeded with their plan (President Azerbaydzhana, 2008). At present, the Salafi community is allowed to function, but their main mosque remains closed. During the Friday congregational prayer in the area of the Abu Bakr mosque, I have seen only a couple of Salafi-looking people just wandering around or visiting neighbouring shops with Islamic products. Some followers of Salafism gather at the Lezgi mosque in Icheri Sheher, but that historical place is too little to accommodate many people. Even before the terrorist act, many of the several hundred Muslims that gathered there on Friday had to pray outside, on carpets (International Crisis Group, 2008). For that reason women are discouraged from coming, since, for them, Friday prayer in a mosque is not obligatory. They either perform namaz at home or visit other, even Shia, mosques. Once, when I accompanied two Salafi people to a prayer in the Old City, the man went straight to the Lezgi mosque, while the woman went with me to the nearby Juma mosque, which is known for its Shia akhund and has Shia visual symbols. In the women’s part, Sunnis prayed alongside Shiites, which is an evidence of a certain level of tolerance, and a lack of open discrimination of people adhering to different branches of religion.

  The Salafi community is not homogeneous. While on the most general level Salafism makes a powerful appeal to the purities of Islamic religion, the actual implementation of “pure” Islam takes various forms. The overwhelming majority of orthodox Muslims are devout people developing a purist habitus to Islam without having any political aspirations. Conservatism, which is usually attributed to Salafi Islam, refers to strictly doctrinal and ethical issues, such as the belief that the Koran and Sunna contain all rules stating how a good Muslim should live. According to this view, nothing in Islam can be modified, because Islamic Scriptures are complete and infallible. Contemporary norms regulating social relations and institutions should therefore be modelled upon those that were biding in the first Muslim community. The term “conservatism” does not, however, refer to all Salafi attitudes. Ahl al-sunna, as Salafis call themselves, are not opposing all aspects of the modern world. On the contrary, many of them use modern information and communication technologies. In my opinion, instead of using the term conservatism, it is more appropriate to speak of Salafi reformism. It conveys the sense that this movement proposes innovations in the social sphere, although it uses the discourse of the Golden Age of the first Muslim generations.

  Apart from this vast majority of Azerbaijani Salafis focused on Islamic spirituality and morality, there is also a much smaller group representing radical and non-conformist attitudes, who may be called fundamentalists. In understanding the phenomenon of fundamentalism, I follow Bassam Tibi’s framework (1995), which postulates three complementary schemes of thinking. Fundamentalism, in his view, shall be seen as (1) a political ideology, (2) an anti-Western or anti-modern worldview, (3) an ideology of conflicts. In the post-Soviet context, Islamic fundamentalist groups are not only engaged in changing political structures of power, but they endeavour to do so using militant methods. Wars in North Caucasus, Afghanistan and Pakistan only increase fundamentalists’ radicalization. In Azerbaijan, the so-called ḫawāriǧ (“the expelled”),30or, less frequently, Qutbist,31 Muslims have rebelled against the leader of the Salafi community. In their view, Suleymanov is too conformist and apolitical and rejects violent actions against the state, which shall be permissible under some conditions. According to some observers, these radicals are behind the terror attack at the Abu Bakr mosque in 2008. Such a version is also upheld by the sheikh-ul-islam, who attributed the bombing to the internal struggles in the Salafi community (International Crisis Group, 2008; Valiyev, 2008).

  Despite the inner differences and tensions regarding particular aims and methods of activity, Salafi ideology formulates some general concepts. Salafis strongly oppose any practices and beliefs that cannot be justified on the basis of the Koran and the hadiths. Only their leaders’ interpretation is accepted. Unlike followers of the Hanafi school of law, Salafis do not accept local customs, such as ziyārat, and call for the replacement of non-Islamic habits with the “pure” Islamic order. Such strategy usually raises objections of the local population attached to their culture and traditional forms of worshiping. From them, the value of traditional Islam lies partially in the continuity of practice that is being passed from one generation to another (even if it is an “invented tra
dition.”) In Azerbaijan, a strong social opposition has emerged towards this Sunni branch, which, however, does not prevent many young people from embracing Salafism.

  Modern Orthodoxy in Turkish Islam

  Not all pious Sunni movements that recently appeared in the Caucasus and Central Asia are as radical as Salafi in their socio-cultural ideologies. In fact, the followers of Salafi tradition face tough competition from the Turks who successfully promote their interpretations of Islamic religion inspired by the Hanafi school of Islamic law. There are three features that distinguish Turkish Islam from other Sunni traditions: a Sufi orientation (there is more willingness in Turkish Islam to embrace Sufi tradition as a part of the Islamic identity than in Salafism), state-centrism, and openness to local cultures (Yavuz, 2008). Rooted in Turkey’s unique experiences with religion and the secular state, this tradition of Islam fits Azerbaijan’s secularism. Ethnic ties between the people of Turkey and Azerbaijan also play a crucial role: it is easier to accept novel interpretations from a “brother” nation, using the pan-Turkish term.

  The expansion of this Islamic tradition benefited from the pro-Turkish policy and liberal measures in religious policy of independent Azerbaijan. Those factors enabled the rapid expansion of official and legal religious groups functioning under Turkish state structures that cooperate with Baku. The Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey has engaged itself in the “re-Islamization” of Central Asia and the Caucasus, actively supporting religious institutions, offering scholarships for high school and university studies, educating imams, and supporting missionary activities. By 1996, Imam Training Centres established by Turkey had almost 900 students from Azerbaijan (Yavuz, 2008, p. 134). The directorate was also responsible for founding the Faculty of Theology at the largest public university—Baku State University. Today, some of its graduates form an academic elite and are actively engaged in studying and teaching Islam. So far, several mosques have been financed by Turkish authorities; the most popular is the “Shahidlar mosque” located near the Martyr’s Alley32in Baku.